Patrick v. Garlick

Citations: 66 F. Supp. 3d 325; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168149; 2014 WL 6883634Docket: No. 13-CV-6365L

Court: District Court, W.D. New York; December 3, 2014; Federal District Court

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Plaintiffs, employees of Seneca Lake State Park, assert claims against former Branch Manager Steve Garlick for sexual harassment, a hostile work environment, and retaliation, citing violations of Title VII and the New York Human Rights Law. Garlick seeks dismissal of the claims, arguing he is not the plaintiffs' employer under these laws. In response, plaintiffs request to amend their complaint to add the New York State Department of Parks and Historic Development as a defendant, which the State of New York opposes.

On April 18, 2012, the plaintiffs filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regarding sexual harassment and discrimination, which were dismissed a year later due to "no cause," resulting in a 90-day "right to sue" letter. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed the current suit against Garlick alone. 

The court evaluates the plaintiffs' motion to amend, determining that adding the Department of Parks may be untimely unless the new claims relate back to the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C). Plaintiffs must demonstrate compliance with the "relation back" requirements, including that the new claims arise from the same conduct as the original complaint and that the Department of Parks had sufficient notice to avoid prejudice in its defense. The court ultimately grants Garlick's motion to dismiss in part and allows the plaintiffs' cross-motion to amend.

The plaintiffs' claims against the Department of Parks are found to be identical to those in their original complaint against Garlick, stemming from the same underlying conduct. The delay in notifying the Department of Parks is deemed insignificant, ensuring no prejudice to its defense. The relation back doctrine, as shaped by the Supreme Court's ruling in Krupski v. Costa Crociere, indicates that relation back should not be denied solely because the plaintiff knew the correct defendant's identity. Previously, the Second Circuit held that failing to name a known defendant suggested a deliberate choice; however, Krupski clarified that a misunderstanding about a defendant's role can constitute a mistake under Rule 15(c)(1)(C). The plaintiffs intended to assert Title VII claims against their employer but mistakenly identified Garlick as such, revealing a misunderstanding of his status. The failure to name the Department of Parks in the original complaint is characterized as a mistake rather than a strategic choice, despite the plaintiffs being represented by experienced counsel. The reasonableness of counsel's mistake regarding Garlick's potential liability is not pertinent to the analysis of relation back.

The Department of Parks, having been involved early in the administrative proceedings, "knew or should have known" that the plaintiffs' failure to name it as a defendant was due to a mistake regarding the identity of the plaintiffs' employer. The state argued that the plaintiffs' prior omission of the Department as a respondent suggested an intentional exclusion. However, legal precedents indicate that an intended defendant's participation in agency proceedings typically signals that it should have been aware it was the intended party in subsequent litigation. 

For example, prior cases demonstrate that defendants involved in EEOC investigations are presumed to have knowledge that they would have been named in a federal complaint but for an error. Therefore, the Department of Parks, which recognized itself as the plaintiffs' actual employer and knew of the mistake regarding Garlick's designation, should have understood its role in the case.

The ruling emphasizes that the Department would not face prejudice in defending the case despite being initially unnamed, as the omission stemmed from a clear mistake. The critical issue remaining under Rule 15 is whether the Department acquired the necessary knowledge within the 120-day service period defined by Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4(m), which, for a complaint filed on July 15, 2013, would expire on November 12, 2013. During a hearing on August 25, 2014, neither party could confirm when the Department became aware of the lawsuit, prompting the court to request additional evidence on this matter.

The Department of Parks provided a sworn declaration from Elaine H. Bartley, Senior Counsel, indicating her responsibility for overseeing litigation and accepting service on behalf of the Department. Bartley stated she first learned of the lawsuit through an email from Garlick's attorney, William R. Shaw, on December 6, 2013, which she read on December 9, 2013. This email was the Department's first notice of the lawsuit, as indicated by its content, which suggested that the information was new to Bartley and the Department.

Shaw later confirmed this timeline in a communication to the Court, asserting he had no prior communications with Bartley or the Department regarding the complaint before December 6, 2013. Consequently, evidence suggests the Department first became aware of the action around December 6 or 9, 2013, and the plaintiffs have not provided evidence to contradict this account or show that the Department received notice before the expiration of the 120-day period for service outlined in Rule 4(m).

The Court notes that while Rule 15(c)(1)(C) allows for relation back of claims, the Advisory Committee Notes suggest that an extension of the Rule 4(m) period also extends the time for relation back. Case law indicates that courts may retroactively extend the Rule 4(m) period when justified, though there is a split in authority on how strictly to enforce the 120-day period in relation to Rule 15(c). Despite this division, the Court favors allowing an extension to promote the preference for resolving cases on their merits, as established in Second Circuit precedents emphasizing substance over form.

A modest extension of the 120-day period under Rule 4(m) is granted due to plaintiffs demonstrating good cause. They diligently pursued the action and promptly moved to amend the complaint to include the Department of Parks, which had prior notice of the plaintiffs' claims from EEOC proceedings and learned of this action shortly after the 120-day period expired. An extension of less than one month will not significantly prejudice the Department's defense. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prioritize resolving genuine disputes on their merits, and procedural reforms support this goal. The granting of an amendment that relates back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) satisfies the requirements for extending the Rule 4(m) service period. Consequently, the plaintiffs are granted a brief retroactive extension through December 9, 2013, allowing for the relation back of their claims against the Department of Parks, which would have been named as a defendant but for a mistake. The court emphasizes the principle of allowing amendments freely and notes that plaintiffs' counsel's oversight in naming the Department will not penalize the plaintiffs, as no prejudice to the defendant has been shown. Thus, plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint is granted, and the Second Amended Complaint is deemed timely.

Regarding Garlick's motion to dismiss, he asserts he is not the plaintiffs' employer and thus cannot be liable under Title VII or the NYHRL. The court acknowledges that individuals are not subject to suit under Title VII, agreeing with Garlick's position and indicating that his arguments apply equally to the Second Amended Complaint. Consequently, the court agrees to dismiss the Title VII claims against Garlick.

Plaintiffs' state law claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) allow for a supervisor to be considered an "employer" if they directly participate in discriminatory conduct. Unlike Title VII, which does not permit individual liability for supervisors, the NYSHRL holds individuals accountable under the aiding and abetting provision if they actively engage in the discrimination. This principle is supported by case law, including Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester and Pellegrini v. Sovereign Hotels, Inc. Despite some controversy surrounding the interpretation of NYSHRL, the current precedent allows for liability of supervisors for aiding and abetting discrimination.

The plaintiffs have alleged that their employer, the Department of Parks, engaged in discrimination and retaliation, and that Garlick, their supervisor, was significantly involved as their sole harasser. Accepting these allegations as true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court finds valid claims of discrimination and retaliation against Garlick under the NYSHRL, maintaining these claims at this stage.

The court grants the plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint to include the New York State Department of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation, allowing it to relate back to the original complaint under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15(c)(1)(C). Garlick's motion to dismiss is partially granted, dismissing plaintiffs' Title VII claims with prejudice, while denying the request to dismiss the NYHRL claims without prejudice. Both defendants are instructed to respond to the Second Amended Complaint within thirty days. The court notes that the amended complaint did not specify the EEOC charge respondents, but parties agree it includes the Department of Parks and Garlick. The court will assume the Department of Parks received notice of the case on December 9, 2013, for the purpose of the motions.