St. George v. BNSF Railway Co.

Citations: 60 F. Supp. 3d 1016; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142226; 2014 WL 4988155Docket: Case No. 12-cv-2592 (SRN/FLN)

Court: District Court, D. Minnesota; October 7, 2014; Federal District Court

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Defendant BNSF Railway Company filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment regarding Plaintiff Robert A. St. George's Counts Two and Three in a case initiated under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA) and the Federal Safety Appliance Act (FSAA). The Court received multiple documents, including affidavits and exhibits, from both parties between March and April 2014, culminating in a hearing on April 16, 2014. The Court ultimately denied Defendant's motion.

St. George, employed by BNSF from May 1973 until November 2009, claims damages for injuries sustained during his employment. His lawsuit includes three counts: Count One pertains to injuries from an incident on October 13, 2009; Count Two addresses musculoskeletal dysfunction due to cumulative trauma; and Count Three involves cumulative injuries from FSAA violations linked to inadequate safety appliance inspections. The Court's analysis specifically focuses on the challenges to Counts Two and Three.

At 64 years old, St. George has a history of exposure to Agent Orange during his military service, which contributed to his diabetes and subsequent partial disability status from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. His employment at BNSF as a switchman/brakeman ended with his retirement on February 2, 2010, which was influenced by ongoing shoulder pain and his intention to retire at age 60.

Plaintiff St. George experienced shoulder pain beginning in 2006, which he attributes to cumulative injuries from his work as a switchman/brakeman over 36 years. He managed his discomfort with daily ibuprofen and maintained consistent earnings from 2005 to 2009, suggesting his symptoms did not initially impact his work performance. However, his shoulder pain intensified in the months leading up to his retirement in late 2009, with symptoms evolving from stiffness and soreness to severe pain that hindered his ability to lift his arms. St. George first consulted Dr. Janus D. Butcher for his shoulder issues on December 8, 2009, who diagnosed him with rotator cuff impingement and noted that this was the first instance where the pain affected his work capabilities. In response to his injury, St. George filed an Employee Personal Injury/Occupational Illness Report on December 3, 2009, attributing his condition to unsafe working conditions related to his job. He was informed during an interview with BNSF's claim representative that he had three years to file a legal claim following his injury report. Under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), St. George alleges that BNSF failed to provide a safe workplace and equipment, leading to his cumulative shoulder injury, which he claims resulted from operating and moving on defective equipment.

Count Three alleges a violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act (FSAA), which mandates that railroads equip their railcars with functional appliances, including effective braking systems and couplers. The FSAA includes pinlifters in its definition of couplers, particularly when they malfunction and hinder uncoupling. It also encompasses air hoses used in braking systems. The plaintiff claims that the defendant utilized railcars with defective and unsafe hand brakes, pinlifters, and couplers, leading to his injuries. Although the FSAA itself does not allow private lawsuits, injured employees may seek damages under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) for FSAA violations. The plaintiff admits difficulty recalling specific defective equipment but asserts he reported issues with railcars to trainmasters and yardmasters. He identified defective air hoses and pinlifters on certain types of railcars and indicated that the defendant’s records may contain details about defective equipment. The document also outlines the standard for summary judgment, emphasizing that it is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The burden of proof lies with the party seeking summary judgment to demonstrate that material facts are undisputed.

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must provide specific facts to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial, rather than relying on mere allegations or denials. Only factual disputes that could affect the suit's outcome under governing law will prevent summary judgment; irrelevant disputes will not be considered. Summary judgment can be granted if a party does not sufficiently show the existence of an essential element of their case, which they must prove at trial.

In Count Two of the Plaintiff's Complaint, claims are made under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), which holds railroad carriers liable for employee injuries resulting from negligence. The Defendant, as a common carrier, can be held accountable if it fails to provide safe equipment or a safe workplace. Legal precedents indicate that proving negligence does not require showing a specific negligent act but can arise from cumulative incidents or an employee's weakened condition.

The Defendant seeks summary judgment for these FELA claims, arguing that they are barred by FELA's three-year statute of limitations. Under FELA, an action must be initiated within three years from when the cause of action accrued. However, a railroad may be equitably estopped from invoking this defense if its misrepresentations led the employee to delay filing. 

The Plaintiff counters with two arguments: first, that the determination of when he should have recognized his cumulative injury as work-related is a question for a jury; second, that he relied on misinformation from the Defendant’s representative, who indicated he had three years to file after submitting a personal injury report. The Plaintiff filed the lawsuit on October 11, 2012, and for the Defendant to succeed in its motion, it must prove that the Plaintiff was aware or should have been aware of the causation of his injuries before October 11, 2009.

The parties dispute when the Plaintiff's shoulder injury, stemming from years of employment at BNSF, "accrued." The Supreme Court's “discovery rule,” established in Urie v. Thompson, dictates that a cumulative injury claim accrues when a reasonable person is aware or should be aware of both the injury's symptoms and its potential cause. In Urie, the plaintiff developed a pulmonary disease from prolonged silica dust exposure, which did not accrue until he was too ill to work and received a diagnosis. The Eighth Circuit, in Fletcher v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., applied this rule, stating that for industrial diseases, the cause of action accrues only when the employee becomes aware of their condition or receives a diagnosis. In Fletcher, the plaintiff's cause of action was barred by FELA’s three-year statute of limitations, as he had already been diagnosed prior to filing his lawsuit. Additionally, United States v. Kubrick further refined the discovery rule, with various courts interpreting it as an elaboration on Urie’s accrual standards.

In Kubrick, the Supreme Court determined that under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), an injury accrues when a plaintiff is aware of both the injury and its cause, and that the plaintiff must diligently investigate the injury's cause. The Eighth Circuit has yet to clarify whether the standards from Urie and Kubrick are distinct or should be interpreted together. However, both parties in the current case agree that a Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) claim for an occupational disease begins when a plaintiff knows or should reasonably know about the injury and its cause, and that reasonable diligence is required in investigating the injury.

The district court noted that even if Kubrick were limited to medical malpractice under the FTCA, it still suggests a requirement for a plaintiff to be aware of the injury and its cause. For the Defendant to succeed in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, it must prove that the Plaintiff was aware of his injury and its cause before October 11, 2009. The parties dispute when the Plaintiff became aware of his work-related injury, with the Defendant asserting that the Plaintiff knew about his shoulder conditions and their connection to his railroad employment more than three years prior to the lawsuit. The Defendant contends that a medical diagnosis is not necessary for the limitations period to commence and that the Plaintiff has a duty to investigate the injury.

In contrast, the Plaintiff argues that summary judgment is inappropriate because the timing of his awareness regarding the work-related injury is a factual issue for a jury to decide. The Plaintiff cites the opinion of the Defendant's medical expert, who attributed the Plaintiff’s cumulative trauma to aging rather than work-related factors. The Plaintiff further claims that his symptoms were transient and intermittent, leading to his lack of awareness of an injury until he could no longer work in October 2009.

The "discovery rule" necessitates an objective assessment of whether the plaintiff was aware or should have reasonably been aware of the essential facts surrounding their injury and its cause. In this case, evidence suggests a genuine dispute regarding when St. George recognized his cumulative shoulder injury and its work-related cause. Although St. George experienced shoulder pain as early as 1999, it did not impede his work until shortly before his retirement in December 2009. He managed the pain with ibuprofen and felt “fine” for years. The symptoms only became significant when they prevented him from working, aligning with the precedent that pain must be cognizable for the statute of limitations to be triggered. St. George received a diagnosis for his shoulder pain only on December 8, 2009, which was identified as rotator cuff impingement with spur. Despite the absence of a medical diagnosis being a barrier to initiating the limitations period, there is an indication that St. George may not have realized his shoulder issues were part of a diagnosable injury rather than typical soreness due to work or aging. Additionally, a medical expert noted that shoulder inflammation is often age-related and not necessarily work-related. Unlike another plaintiff cited in the ruling, St. George did not undergo extensive medical treatment before December 2009. The Court emphasizes that the purpose of outlining these facts is not to assess the merits of the case but to highlight that a significant question remains regarding when St. George's symptoms became a recognizable injury. Courts have ruled that minor aches do not qualify as injuries under the FELA statute of limitations. Given the context, St. George’s pre-December 2009 pain may not reasonably have alerted him to a cognizable injury. Consequently, the Court concludes that there remains a disputed issue regarding St. George's awareness of the severity and causation of his shoulder injury prior to October 11, 2009, leading to the denial of summary judgment on Count Two.

Plaintiff contends that there are unresolved factual issues regarding the timing of his awareness of a job-related injury and whether discussions with BNSF’s claim representative tolled the statute of limitations under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). The doctrine of equitable estoppel may prevent BNSF from using the statute of limitations as a defense if the misrepresentations by BNSF or its agents led the Plaintiff to delay filing his claim. The Supreme Court's ruling in Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal establishes that a party cannot benefit from its own wrongdoing, allowing a case to proceed if the Plaintiff can prove he was misled about the filing period. The Eighth Circuit similarly holds that a railroad can be equitably estopped even for unintentional misrepresentations, provided the employee genuinely and justifiably relied on them. 

In this case, Plaintiff asserts that Jeff Johnson, a BNSF representative, informed him he had three years from the injury report date, December 3, 2009, to file a claim, which he relied upon in deciding when to file this lawsuit. BNSF counters that the Plaintiff's limitations period had already expired by the time of the alleged misrepresentations. The Court identifies that factual questions remain regarding whether Johnson made the alleged statement and whether Plaintiff justifiably relied on it, both of which are jury issues. Additionally, the timing of when Plaintiff discovered his injury is also a factual question. If the jury finds the injury occurred between December 14, 2006, and December 3, 2009, BNSF may be estopped from raising the statute of limitations defense; if the injury occurred prior to December 14, 2006, BNSF's argument holds. The Court concludes it is premature to rule on the relevance of Johnson’s alleged statements.

Count III of the Complaint presents a claim under the Federal Safety Appliance Act (FSAA). The FSAA does not grant a direct right of action to injured parties; rather, it establishes the basis for claims, with the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) providing the remedy. Under the FSAA, railroads are required to use vehicles equipped with automatic couplers and efficient hand brakes. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant's railcars had defective handbrakes and coupling mechanisms. The Defendant counters that the Plaintiff has not specified the defective items or their specific defects.

In analyzing FSAA claims, courts are instructed to interpret the Act liberally to fulfill its purpose of protecting employees through the use of safe equipment. To establish a violation of the FSAA, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the statute was violated, and (2) that violation contributed to the accident causing injuries. Importantly, the injured employee need not prove negligence but only the statutory violation itself. Evidence of inefficiency can be shown through specific defects or by demonstrating that equipment did not function properly under normal conditions. The Supreme Court has indicated that the existence of a visible defect is not necessary for a violation to be established; rather, the performance of the equipment is the critical factor. Proof of inefficient or improper functioning of the mechanism suffices to indicate a violation of the FSAA.

The Federal Safety Appliance Act (FSAA) requires plaintiffs to identify the specific piece of equipment they claim is defective. The Eighth Circuit, in Coleman v. Burlington Northern, established that liability arises if an appliance fails and causes injury, but the plaintiff must still pinpoint the inefficient equipment. Evidence of a defect or failure to function correctly is necessary, as clarified in Grogg and Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Farmers Union Oil Co. of Rolla. Although plaintiffs do not need to specify a defect, they must identify the equipment in question. Causation under FSAA allows recovery if the defective equipment was a proximate cause of the injury, without the need for traditional common-law proximate causation. Defendants cannot use contributory negligence or assumption of risk as defenses in FSAA claims. In cases of cumulative trauma, such as Tezak v. BNSF Railway Co., courts have reiterated that plaintiffs must detail specific defects in specific equipment to overcome summary judgment. Similarly, in O’Neill v. BNSF Railway Co., the court ruled against a plaintiff who failed to identify the particular devices involved in their claim.

The plaintiff could not specify any defective railroad equipment or instances of failure, leading the Minnesota Court of Appeals to affirm a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. The court found that the plaintiff's failure to identify a specific defective device hindered the defendant's ability to prove the device functioned properly, thus depriving the jury of a critical fact issue regarding a potential violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act (FSAA). Consequently, a plaintiff claiming cumulative injuries must identify specific equipment linked to the injury. 

In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in Strickland v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. allowed a FSAA claim to proceed despite the plaintiff's inability to precisely identify the rail car involved in his shoulder injury from a faulty handbrake. The plaintiff noted it was a "tank car" and argued that Norfolk Southern could narrow down the possibilities using a Switch List. The court distinguished Strickland's case from O’Neill, explaining that Strickland's claim survived summary judgment due to differences in procedural posture and substantive allegations. While O’Neill's claims were deemed insufficient due to a lack of documentation linking equipment to his injuries, Strickland provided specific details about the incident, allowing his claim to proceed. Thus, a plaintiff must make specific allegations regarding defective equipment to overcome summary judgment.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on St. George’s Federal Safety Appliance Act (FSAA) claim is denied. Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. To withstand summary judgment, the Plaintiff must show he was injured by inefficient equipment covered by the FSAA. While the Plaintiff argues that he is not required to identify a specific defective rail car, the Court agrees, referencing Supreme Court precedent that allows for liability if a jury can reasonably infer that the equipment was defective. The Plaintiff is not obligated to pinpoint the exact rail car but must present evidence of specific defective equipment. Despite his inability to identify specific rail cars, St. George provides adequate evidence of defective equipment, including couplers, pinlifters, air hoses, and hand brakes. He has narrowed his claims to certain types of cars and reported defective equipment to relevant personnel, thus supporting his FSAA claim.

Plaintiff St. George's efforts to identify the specific rail cars involved in his case align with the precedent set in Strickland, where the plaintiff was able to identify the type of defective rail car. St. George claims he can further narrow down the relevant rail cars using the Defendant's records. At this stage, he sufficiently identifies a subset of rail cars with allegedly defective equipment, contrasting with cases like O’Neill, where the plaintiff failed to specify the defective device linked to his injuries. St. George distinguishes his case by identifying specific equipment and series of locomotives involved, asserting that his injuries resulted from operating various pieces of equipment and consistently reporting defects. 

The court notes significant differences with prior cases such as Tezak and Boyd, where plaintiffs could not establish a causal link between their injuries and the defective rail cars. Unlike the plaintiffs in those cases, St. George's claims are supported by specific allegations of defective equipment that he directly associates with his injuries, which were reported during his employment. The defendant does not contest the causation element of St. George’s claim, further supporting his position that a cumulative-trauma claim can meet the legal standards under the Federal Safety Appliance Act (FSAA).

In the case of Munns, the plaintiff claimed cumulative injuries under the Locomotive Inspection Act, presenting evidence through personal time-books and worksheets that documented his experiences with defective locomotive seats. While he identified a series of locomotives believed to have these defects, he could not specify individual locomotives. St. George, similarly, provided evidence to support his claim, identifying a series of locomotives with alleged defective coupling equipment and notifying BNSF Railway of the issues. Although St. George did not maintain written records of his complaints, the Court deemed his oral reports sufficient to notify the defendant of the defective equipment. The Court asserted that it is the jury's responsibility to assess the credibility of St. George's testimony regarding his reports. Ultimately, the Court found that sufficient evidence existed to create a genuine issue of fact regarding the link between the defective appliances and St. George's injuries. Consequently, BNSF Railway's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied, and a trial was scheduled for January 12, 2015. Additionally, the plaintiff had a separate, unrelated neck injury from 1989, which was not part of this case, although he continues to experience pain from that injury. Medical records document the treatment of this prior injury.

Dr. Butcher is the treating physician for Plaintiff St. George's Achilles tendon injury, which occurred on October 13, 2009, and serves as the basis for Count One of Plaintiff’s Complaint. The Court is not addressing this injury as Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss focuses on Counts Two and Three. Eighth Circuit case law has not evolved on the specific issue regarding the interplay of Urie and Kubrick as highlighted in Courtney v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., with no binding cases found within the Circuit. Both parties reference additional authorities from state and other federal courts; Defendant cites Fries v. Chicago Northwestern Transportation Co., while Plaintiff relies on Nichols v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co., Green v. CSX Transportation, Inc., and Kennedy v. BNSF Ry. Corp. The Court emphasizes reliance on controlling Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedents, noting that railroads have broader duties under the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA) compared to the Federal Safety Appliance Act (FSAA), but finds LIA cases relevant to Plaintiff's claims. The Court acknowledges that while the analysis for FSAA and LIA claims is similar, St. George must specify a defect in equipment for a valid FSAA claim. The relevance of LIA case law is thus limited to its analogy to FSAA analysis.