Kovach v. Service Personnel & Employees of the Dairy Industry, Local Union No. 205
Docket: Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-00432
Court: District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania; September 30, 2014; Federal District Court
On April 4, 2012, Nick Kovach initiated a lawsuit against Turner Dairy Farms, Inc., Turner Dairy, Local Union No. 205, and two union members, William Lickert, Jr. and Greg Shafer, asserting various federal, civil, and state law tort claims. After multiple amendments to his Complaint, several claims against Local 205 and Turner Dairy were dismissed by the Court, with remaining claims against Turner Dairy dismissed per a stipulation under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). Kovach subsequently filed a Fourth Amended Complaint asserting federal claims under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) and state law tort claims including intentional interference with contractual relations, negligent supervision and retention, and assault. He alleged that Shafer, the Union Steward, engaged in threatening behavior, including harassment and physical intimidation, in retaliation for his activities as a union member, compelling him to resign. Kovach claimed that Lickert, as Secretary-Treasurer of Local 205, was aware of Shafer’s actions and failed to intervene. Currently, the remaining Defendants have filed Motions for Summary Judgment, which the Court is considering alongside the parties’ extensive filings and an oral argument heard on July 16, 2014. Mr. Kovach has been a member of Local 205 since 1983, working as a truck driver for Turner Dairy since 1989, and has sought to change his work schedule from five eight-hour days to four ten-hour days.
Turner Dairy was permitted to change driver routes from 5-8s to 4-10s but had to first put the change up for bid based on seniority. Greg Shafer, a truck driver since 1985 and appointed Local 205 Steward in 2006, had specific responsibilities including handling grievances and ensuring compliance with the collective bargaining agreement. During negotiations for a new agreement in 2011, Turner Dairy proposed changing routes without a bidding process, which Local 205 countered by requiring driver consent and limiting changes to once per agreement. Driver Mike Kovach objected, believing it violated his seniority rights, a sentiment acknowledged by Shafer and another driver, William Lickert.
On May 1, 2011, a meeting was held to discuss these proposals, during which Union members voted unanimously to reject Turner Dairy's proposals. Kovach, who could not attend due to his wife's eye injury, submitted a signed note expressing his disagreement, but it was not counted in the vote. The following day, Kovach inquired about the meeting outcomes and was met with hostility from Shafer, who yelled at him and suggested a physical confrontation, which Kovach and another driver interpreted as a threat.
Mr. Kovach asserted his right to express opinions on union matters, leading to a heated exchange with Mr. Shafer, who responded aggressively and suggested Mr. Kovach should have attended a union meeting. Following this confrontation, Mr. Kovach sought to have Mr. Shafer removed from his position as Steward and reported the incident to Turner Dairy. Prior to May 2, 2011, their interactions had been minimal and amicable, but post-incident, their relationship deteriorated into daily conflicts characterized by harassment and insults from Mr. Shafer. Witnesses described their interactions as frequent bickering, with Mr. Shafer mocking Mr. Kovach and their disputes becoming a common topic among colleagues.
On May 8, 2011, Mr. Kovach attended a union ratification meeting where he protested a contract provision and voted against it, which was ultimately ratified by a large majority. In response to Mr. Kovach's complaints, a meeting was organized on May 26, 2011, involving Mr. Kovach, Mr. Shafer, Mr. Lickert, and a union business agent. During this meeting, Mr. Kovach reiterated his demand for Mr. Shafer's removal, while Mr. Shafer acknowledged the conflict and expressed a willingness to resolve it if Mr. Kovach approached him differently. Mr. Lickert stated that Mr. Kovach needed to gather support from 51% of union members for Mr. Shafer's removal, then concluded the meeting.
Following this, Mr. Kovach sent a letter to Mr. Lickert summarizing the May 26 meeting and reiterating his concerns about Mr. Shafer’s conduct, including new derogatory greetings from Mr. Shafer. He warned that Mr. Lickert would be accountable if the situation escalated. Mr. Lickert replied on June 3, 2011, in a letter that included Mr. Shafer.
Mr. Lickert addressed an ongoing harassment issue involving a Union member and a Steward, emphasizing that he would not tolerate harassment. He noted that the behavior of the Union member had likely contributed to the situation and stated that replacing the Steward would not resolve the complaints. He warned that any escalation in conflict would be the responsibility of the involved parties and advised against further actions. Mr. Kovach later alleged that on August 16, 2011, Mr. Shafer threatened him by driving at him with his truck, causing him to dodge and be hit by rocks, with a similar incident occurring on September 27, 2011. On or around early October 2011, Turner Dairy President Chuck Turner contacted Mr. Winters regarding Mr. Shafer’s behavior, describing it as immature and disrespectful, and indicating that Mr. Winters acknowledged the need for change. Despite claims that Mr. Shafer had improved, Mr. Kovach reported an aggressive encounter with him on October 27, 2011, involving dangerous driving tactics that prompted Kovach to confront Shafer and subsequently resign from Turner Dairy due to safety concerns. The legal standard for summary judgment indicates it is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact, requiring parties to substantiate their positions with evidence from the record.
The non-moving party in a legal proceeding must present specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial; otherwise, the court will accept the factual record provided by the moving party and grant judgment as a matter of law. The burden of proof falls on the non-moving party to present affirmative evidence that counters a properly supported motion, rather than merely asserting unsupported allegations. If the evidence presented is merely colorable or lacks sufficient probative force, summary judgment will be granted. Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists that could allow a reasonable jury to rule in favor of the non-moving party. The court must consider all record evidence in favor of the non-moving party and is not responsible for weighing evidence or making credibility determinations. Only factual disputes affecting the suit's outcome under the law will prevent summary judgment. When the defendant is the moving party, the initial burden is on them to demonstrate that the plaintiff has not established essential elements of their case.
The plaintiff, Mr. Kovach, asserts five causes of action against Local 205 and its officers: (1) violation of his rights to free speech and assembly under the LMRDA; (2) breach of fiduciary duties by Mr. Lickert and Mr. Shafer; (3) intentional interference with his employment contract by Local 205 through Mr. Shafer; (4) negligent supervision and retention of Mr. Shafer by Local 205; and (5) assault by Mr. Shafer for which Local 205 is liable under an agency theory. Each cause of action will be examined in the court's discussion.
Count 1 asserts a claim under 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(2) against Local 205, which guarantees union members the right to free speech and assembly, provided they adhere to the union's reasonable rules. This section allows members to express views on union matters and candidates during meetings, emphasizing that unions can impose reasonable rules to maintain order. The Legislative intent of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) supports the notion that democratic practices within unions require members to voice opinions and criticize leadership without fear of retaliation.
The Supreme Court has clarified that this protection primarily extends to rank-and-file members rather than union officers or employees. Speech must relate directly to the union-member relationship, yet the Third Circuit has interpreted this right broadly, providing extensive protections against intimidation and harassment for members expressing dissenting views.
For instance, in Maier v. Patterson, union members faced potential retaliation during a meeting where one member was assaulted by a union official after raising concerns about his performance. The court recognized that retaliation could manifest not only through physical harm but also through actions that inhibit dissenting speech, affirming that a claim under Section 411(a)(2) does not require demonstration of actual physical harm. The law protects against any union conduct that threatens or suppresses dissent.
In Wiglesworth v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Helpers Local Union 771, the court denied summary judgment for the defendant concerning a Section 411(a)(2) claim, noting a pattern of intimidation and harassment directed at plaintiff Mr. Kovach following his grievance about vacation procedures. The local union’s business agent, Mr. Shafer, reportedly encouraged physical violence against Kovach, leading to threats against his safety. The case highlights Mr. Kovach's long-standing advocacy on union matters, particularly regarding seniority rights, which was perceived by some local members as disruptive. Testimonies indicated that Kovach frequently expressed his views to union leaders, which earned him a reputation as a "sh-tstirrer." Despite Local 205's defense that Mr. Shafer was not a union officer and acted outside his official capacity, the court referenced precedents establishing that union stewards can be considered agents of the union, particularly when they facilitate member grievances. Consequently, if Shafer's actions fall within his duties as steward, Local 205 could be held liable for his conduct, especially if they had knowledge of and condoned his behavior. The union's by-laws defined shop stewards as lacking officer status, but case law suggests that their role can still implicate union accountability for their actions.
Stewards, under 29 U.S.C. 501(a), hold positions of trust regarding labor organizations and their members, indicating that a jury could view Mr. Shafer as an agent of Local 205. Local 205 contends that Mr. Shafer's actions towards Mr. Kovach were not official but rather personal conflicts. The Third Circuit emphasizes that private misconduct resulting in ordinary tort claims does not constitute a violation under Section 411. Testimony suggests that both Mr. Kovach and Mr. Shafer contributed to their disputes, framing them as a personal feud rather than harassment. However, evidence indicates that Mr. Shafer retaliated against Mr. Kovach for expressing his views on union matters, which could suggest he acted within his official capacity during the alleged harassment. Additionally, there appears to be evidence of Local 205's tacit approval of Mr. Shafer's conduct, particularly through Mr. Lickert's communications, which did not prompt further reports of harassment from Mr. Kovach. Local 205 claims ignorance of ongoing issues, but Mr. Kovach asserts that the union was aware of Mr. Shafer's behavior and chose not to intervene. The conflicting narratives present a genuine issue of material fact, leading the Court to deny Local 205's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Mr. Kovach's Section 411(a)(2) claim.
Count 11 addresses claims under 29 U.S.C. 501 against Mr. Shafer and Mr. Lickert, focusing on the fiduciary responsibilities of union officers. Under 29 U.S.C. 501(a), union representatives hold positions of trust, and 29 U.S.C. 501(b) allows union members to sue these representatives if the union fails to act on a request for legal action regarding breaches of fiduciary duty. To initiate such a lawsuit, a member must first request the union to act and demonstrate that the union has refused or failed to do so. This process mirrors a shareholder derivative suit, where a member acts on behalf of the union to recover damages.
Local 205 argues that Mr. Kovach lacks standing to file a Section 501 claim since he is no longer a union member, referencing Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 764 v. Greenawalt, which determined that a former president lost standing upon resigning. However, Mr. Kovach claims his departure was involuntary due to threats and harassment from Mr. Shafer, creating a factual dispute regarding his membership status.
Additionally, Messrs. Lickert and Shafer seek summary judgment, asserting that Mr. Kovach's claim for personal monetary damages does not align with the derivative nature of relief intended by Section 501(b), which is meant for the union's benefit. The court acknowledges the existence of genuine issues of fact concerning Mr. Kovach's membership status and the appropriateness of the requested relief.
The Third Circuit has established that union officers have broad fiduciary duties under Section 501, which include safeguarding the political rights of all union members as outlined in Section 411. This principle encompasses all actions of union officers. In O’Rourke v. Crosley, a plaintiff claimed harassment and intimidation from union members after accepting employment at a picketed site, with union officers allegedly aware of the situation but failing to act. The case centered on whether the plaintiff had met the procedural requirement under Section 501(b) to request union action before filing suit, without any claims of unauthorized relief. Similarly, in Wiglesworth, the plaintiff alleged that union officials encouraged violence against him for filing a grievance, and sought an injunction against interference with his Section 411 rights, which the court did not dismiss.
In Mr. Kovach's case, the First Amended Complaint (FAC) asserts a Section 501 claim solely in his name and details various damages he has incurred, such as loss of employment and emotional distress, while seeking remedies permitted under 29 U.S.C. 501. Notably, the FAC does not request relief for the benefit of the Union, unlike the cases of O’Rourke and Wiglesworth. Instead, all claims and requested relief are clearly for Mr. Kovach’s personal benefit. The comparison with Fraser v. James illustrates this point, where plaintiffs sought recovery of strike funds denied by their union, and the court concluded their claim was for their own benefit rather than the union’s.
In July 2014, during oral arguments, Plaintiffs' counsel proposed that the "other appropriate relief" under Section 501(b) included a declaration of Union leadership's condonation of Mr. Shafer's actions, an injunction to remove Mr. Shafer as Steward, and attorney’s fees for Mr. Kovach. However, the First Amended Complaint (FAC) did not request these remedies, and the court found no legal precedent supporting such relief aside from the fee shifting claim. The court noted that Section 501's language implies that "other appropriate relief" pertains to actions the Union could pursue in its own lawsuit, which had not occurred. Mr. Kovach’s oral argument suggested a new theory that he was effectively seeking a court order to remove Mr. Shafer, despite this not being included in any of his five complaints. The court determined that the FAC did not seek Section 501 relief for the Union's benefit and declined to allow Mr. Kovach to amend his complaint for a fifth time to include this Union-centric relief. While the court acknowledged that leave to amend should generally be granted freely, it emphasized that such decisions are at the district court's discretion and can be denied due to undue delay, bad faith, or potential prejudice to the opposing party. Mr. Kovach’s late introduction of these new claims was seen as an example of undue delay and bad faith, especially given his multiple prior opportunities to amend his complaint over two years. The court concluded that his claims were primarily focused on personal monetary damages rather than any benefit to the Union, and allowing the amendment would impose undue prejudice on the Defendants by necessitating significant additional discovery related to Union governance issues.
Mr. Kovach's Section 501 Count does not involve a lawsuit against the Union, yet it is implied that the Union should assert its right to select Stewards, particularly concerning Ms. Shafer's status, which has not been contested in any of the five prior complaints. The introduction of new injunctive relief would raise additional issues and discovery avenues. A significant delay in seeking to amend the complaint may justify denial of such a motion, as indicated in case law, especially when a party waits until after a summary judgment is granted. Mr. Kovach did not attempt to amend his Fourth Amended Complaint to seek injunctive relief regarding Mr. Shafer until after the summary judgment motion was filed and argued. His new request does not align with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c), which aims to protect against technical oversights in pleadings, as Mr. Kovach's extensive pleading has been deliberate and focused on compensatory damages. The court noted that after Mr. Kovach's Third Amended Complaint, it dismissed six other claims, indicating he has previously articulated his legal theories with precision. The court found no evidence of inadvertent oversight regarding concerns for the removal of Mr. Shafer, concluding that Mr. Kovach's recent assertions appear to be an attempt to avoid dismissal of his Section 501 claim.
Raising new theories through a motion to amend to avoid dismissal constitutes undue delay, as established by the Court of Appeals in CMR D.N. Corp. 703 F.3d at 630-31. Bad faith in this context is characterized by "gamesmanship" and "wait-and-see" tactics, which compromise the integrity of the truth-seeking process, as noted in Reginella, 971 F.Supp.2d at 479. The Court has consistently rejected a wait-and-see approach to pleading, recognizing that introducing new theories long after litigation has begun is prejudicial to opposing parties (Trunzo v. Citi Mortg. and Jang v. Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc.). The Plaintiff's introduction of a new remedy under Section 501, unrelated to previous complaints and aimed solely at circumventing summary judgment, reflects such delay. Consequently, the Court, adhering to Third Circuit directives, will not grant leave to amend, leading to the dismissal of Mr. Kovach’s Section 501 claim.
For the Count III claim regarding intentional interference with contractual relations under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) a contractual relationship with a third party, (2) purposeful action by the defendant intended to harm that relationship, (3) lack of privilege or justification for the defendant’s actions, and (4) actual legal damage caused by the conduct. Factors to assess the impropriety of interference include the nature of the conduct, the actor’s motive, the interests of the affected parties, and the proximity of the interference. Mr. Kovach asserts that Mr. Shafer's actions towards him were intended to harm his employment with Turner Dairy, relying on the common law theory of agency to hold the Union accountable. A jury could determine that intimidation and harassment were employed to deter Mr. Kovach from voicing his concerns, suggesting that Local 205 was aware of and permitted such conduct.
Insufficient evidence exists to demonstrate that Mr. Shafer intended to harm Mr. Kovach's employment at Turner Dairy, or that Local 205 was aware, or should have been aware, of such intent and condoned it. Mr. Kovach's claims of a conspiracy involving Local 205 management lack substantiation, with testimony indicating that Local 205 intervened on two occasions to prevent Mr. Kovach's termination. Consequently, the Court grants Local 205’s Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Mr. Kovach’s claim of intentional interference with contractual relations.
For the claim of negligent supervision and retention under Pennsylvania law, the plaintiff must prove that a loss resulted from the employer’s failure to control an employee acting outside the scope of employment on the employer's premises, with the employer being aware of the situation. Since the alleged incidents involving Mr. Shafer occurred predominantly on Turner Dairy property and not on Local 205’s premises, the Court grants summary judgment for Local 205 on this claim.
Regarding the assault claims, Pennsylvania law defines assault as an act intended to create reasonable apprehension of immediate battery. Evidence exists that could support a jury finding Mr. Shafer liable for assault based on his threatening conduct and actions toward Mr. Kovach. Therefore, the Court denies Mr. Shafer's motion to dismiss the assault claim against him. However, the assault claim against Local 205 fails under the agency theory, as the conduct in question is deemed outside the scope of employment, thus the Court finds that a jury could not reasonably conclude that Local 205 is liable for Mr. Shafer's actions.
The record does not support a finding that Mr. Shafer assaulted Mr. Kovach in a manner related to his employment or intended to further Local 205's interests, nor was there evidence that Mr. Lickert or Mr. Winters were aware of the incident until after Mr. Kovach left Turner Dairy. Consequently, the Court will dismiss the assault claim against Local 205. The Court’s rulings on the Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment are as follows:
1. Local 205’s Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Mr. Kovach’s claim under 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(2) is denied.
2. The Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants Shafer and Lickert concerning Mr. Kovach’s 29 U.S.C. 501 claim is granted.
3. Local 205’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Mr. Kovach’s claim for intentional interference with contractual relations is granted.
4. Local 205’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Mr. Kovach’s claim for negligent supervision and retention is granted.
5. Mr. Shafer’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Mr. Kovach’s assault claim is denied.
6. Local 205’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Mr. Kovach’s assault claim is granted.
Additionally, Local 205 is affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The document outlines that 29 U.S.C. 412 allows union members to litigate in federal court for violations of their rights under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). There is a dispute regarding Mr. Kovach's ability to vote by proxy; he claims he was permitted, while Mr. Lickert, Jr. asserts that proxy voting is not allowed. Mr. Kovach argues that Mr. Lickert's failure to act on his suggestions regarding a Shop Steward constitutes valid claims against Local 205 and Mr. Lickert. Testimonies reveal differing accounts about an incident involving Mr. Shafer and Mr. Kovach, with Mr. Turner acknowledging awareness of the event but noting discrepancies in accounts. There is no evidence that Mr. Winters or Mr. Lickert were aware of the incidents in question.
At the beginning of the May 2, 2011 confrontation between Mr. Kovach and Mr. Shafer, a jury could reasonably determine that Mr. Shafer was inquiring about Union matters, and his subsequent actions aimed to persuade Mr. Kovach to cease discussing the seniority issue. Local 205 references the Third Circuit case Brenner v. Local 514 to support its position that the Union leadership's inaction regarding the Kovach-Shafer incident did not signify approval or endorsement of Mr. Shafer's behavior. In Brenner, a claim was made against an international union under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) for not intervening in a local union's discriminatory practices. The court ruled in favor of the international union, emphasizing that their investigations into the local's actions were adequate and did not necessitate further intervention.
However, the current case differs from Brenner as it deals with the local union's liability for its officials' actions rather than the international union's responsibility for local chapters. The investigation conducted by Local 205 was limited to a single meeting where Mr. Kovach was admonished, and Mr. Shafer’s behavior was downplayed as merely a "bad day." While the court does not assert that the Union was required to issue an explicit directive to stop Mr. Shafer from bothering Mr. Kovach, it notes that Mr. Winters, the Business Agent, was aware of Mr. Shafer's ongoing harassment, which could imply tacit approval of such actions. Mr. Turner testified to Mr. Winters’ knowledge of the harassment extending into October 2011. The court previously determined that Mr. Kovach's Third Amended Complaint satisfied the "request" and "good cause" requirements of Section 501(b), and the same reasoning applies to the First Amended Complaint (FAC). Each version of Mr. Kovach’s complaints consistently articulated the harm suffered and sought relief solely for himself, not on behalf of the Union or others.
Section 501(b) permits fee shifting in lawsuits by union members against officials for violations of duties. The First Amended Complaint (FAC) at paragraph 152 requests various legal remedies under 29 U.S.C. 501, including compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and interest, but fails to mention an injunction to remove Mr. Shafer as Steward. The Court notes that the FAC does not indicate any request for relief benefiting the Union, as Mr. Kovach's arguments at oral argument were an afterthought and did not reflect any prior intention to seek broader remedies. Furthermore, Mr. Kovach's claim against Mr. Shafer would be illogical, as it would involve suing Mr. Shafer for not initiating a suit against himself. The precedent set in Sabolsky, which allows Section 501 actions without fiscal loss to the Union as long as the relief benefits the Union, contrasts with Kovach's case, where no relief for the Union was sought. Additionally, Mr. Kovach was informed of an alternative method to remove Mr. Shafer, which he did not pursue. The Court emphasizes that the plaintiffs in Sabolsky acted on behalf of numerous union members, while Kovach's actions appear self-serving. The discretion exercised by the Court denies further amendments due to the pleading history and potential implications for defendants, despite acknowledging the reprehensible nature of Mr. Shafer's alleged conduct.
The Court's ruling on the Section 501 claim does not endorse misconduct but rather confirms the procedural standards governing federal civil litigation. Mr. Kovach will have the opportunity to seek damages from Local 205 and Mr. Shafer for any provable harm. During oral arguments, Plaintiffs counsel referred to Mr. Shafer as “The Hammer,” suggesting a violent disposition that Local 205 management allegedly tolerated, which could implicate the union in liability for assault. However, this assertion lacks corroboration in the record. The only relevant evidence from depositions included a 1994 incident involving Mr. Shafer stealing a magazine, and a 2013 threat against another truck driver, both insufficient to substantiate claims of violent behavior condoned by Local 205. The remaining claims are Mr. Kovach’s Section 411(a)(2) claim against Local 205 and a state law assault claim against Mr. Shafer. The Court maintains supplemental jurisdiction over the assault claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as it shares a "common nucleus of operative fact" with the federal LMRDA claim, does not pose novel or complex state law issues, and no extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant declining jurisdiction.
