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Issaenko v. University of Minnesota
Citations: 57 F. Supp. 3d 985; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138300; 2014 WL 4954646Docket: Civil No. 13-3605 (JRT/SER)
Court: District Court, D. Minnesota; September 30, 2014; Federal District Court
Olga Issaenko, a former research scientist at the University of Minnesota’s Masonic Cancer Center, alleges that Dr. Martina Bazzaro claimed ownership of written materials and figures that Issaenko developed independently during her employment. Issaenko has filed eleven claims against Bazzaro, the University, and various University employees, asserting statutory, constitutional, and common law violations. The defendants have moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. Issaenko subsequently sought to file a second amended complaint and requested preliminary injunctive relief for copyright infringement. The Court determined it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over many of Issaenko’s claims and found that the First Amended Complaint does not adequately state claims, except for promissory estoppel and tortious interference claims against Bazzaro in her individual capacity. Consequently, the Court granted the motion to dismiss most claims but allowed the tortious interference claim against individual defendants Frances Lawrenz and Tucker LeBien to proceed with the amendment. Issaenko’s motion for a preliminary injunction was denied due to her failure to show a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm. Issaenko, who holds a Ph.D. in biology and has experience in cancer research, accepted a position in Bazzaro's laboratory in September 2009. Her responsibilities included conducting research, analyzing data, writing reports, co-authoring manuscripts, presenting research findings, and managing laboratory operations. Issaenko claims that during her initial three months of employment, she managed the lab’s operations, including ordering supplies. While Bazzaro provided general instructions, Issaenko took the initiative to expand experiments, address protocol deficiencies, and enhance research projects independently. She alleges that Bazzaro was largely unhelpful, refusing necessary software, dismissing her work, and lacking knowledge of the experiments. Issaenko worked on two significant projects under Bazzaro's supervision. The first involved cancer cell survival studies, for which she obtained data from her former supervisor, Dr. Polunovsky. Without Bazzaro's guidance, Issaenko analyzed this data at home, creating tables and graphs, and suggested additional experiments that Bazzaro declined. Despite this, she conducted the experiments with Dr. Polunovsky's assistance and shared her findings with Bazzaro. The second project involved compiling data and preparing a manuscript intended for submission to the Journal of Medicinal Chemistry. Issaenko performed multiple experiments and sought Bazzaro's assistance, which was often unavailable. She conducted statistical analyses at home without compensation and designed additional experiments independently. Despite submitting her findings to Bazzaro for inclusion in the manuscript, her requests were denied. In May and June 2010, while Bazzaro was on vacation, Issaenko completed requested experiments and developed new ideas for additional studies. Lacking resources to conduct these in Bazzaro's lab, she utilized Dr. Polunovsky's lab instead, compiling her results using her own software. In June, upon returning from vacation, Issaenko presented her independent research from Dr. Polunovsky’s lab to Bazzaro, who requested copies and raw data to draft a joint manuscript, promising to list Issaenko as the first author. After Issaenko provided the information, she alleges that upon returning from another vacation on July 1, 2010, she was terminated from her position and escorted out of the building. She claims that several of her personal research materials, including a research binder, x-ray films, a USB drive with digital files, and software for her Canon digital camera, were not returned. While Issaenko suggests that her termination might have occurred in early 2011, this timing does not affect her claims. In August 2010, Issaenko contends that Bazzaro used her research findings in a joint manuscript submitted to the Journal of Medicinal Chemistry (JMC) but failed to credit her as an author, despite claiming otherwise. Bazzaro signed a publishing license agreement transferring copyright to the JMC, although Issaenko asserts that she retained non-exclusive copyrights and all proprietary rights related to her research in the article. Concerned about the authorship issue, Issaenko reached out to university professors and submitted a complaint on August 26, 2010, to Linda Carson, head of the Department of Obstetrics, Gynecology and Women’s Health, alleging a violation of University policy. In her complaint, she requested an investigation into her authorship rights for the joint manuscript and future publications. In response, university officials indicated that Issaenko would be included as a co-author if the manuscript was accepted, contingent on her review and agreement to its publication. Authorship on future publications is governed by established guidelines at the University of Minnesota and relevant scientific journals, with final decisions resting with Dr. Bazzaro as the senior author. Employment in Dr. Bazzaro’s laboratory does not guarantee authorship or obligate her to include any employee as a co-author on future publications. The letter also prohibited Issaenko from sharing preliminary data, emphasizing that such data are owned by Dr. Bazzaro and the University. Issaenko accused Dr. Bazzaro of making damaging statements to the University regarding her alleged improper sharing of data and noted her concerns about authorship rights over work done independently. In early 2011, Issaenko obtained copyrights for three compilations related to her projects and communicated her concerns about authorship to the University. She denied sharing data inappropriately and considered any insinuations of unethical behavior as defamatory. Following her notification to the University about her copyright intentions, Issaenko was terminated. After her termination, another professor allowed her to perform experiments and publish results. Despite intimidation from the Defendants regarding her intent to publish her work, Issaenko received approval from her co-researchers and submitted an article to a journal, which was later refused publication due to false allegations made by Dr. Bazzaro regarding a misconduct investigation against her. Issaenko published an article in the May 1, 2012 issue of the Cell Cycle journal without permission from Dr. Bazzaro or the University of Minnesota. The University informed Cell Cycle that Issaenko was unauthorized to use data from Bazzaro's laboratory for publication. Defendant LeBien stated that a significant portion of the data in Issaenko's article originated from Bazzaro's lab, prompting the University to request a review of the article's authorship and publication compliance. Consequently, Cell Cycle retracted Issaenko's manuscript on May 1, 2013, citing the unauthorized use of data generated while Issaenko was employed in Bazzaro's lab. Issaenko claimed the retraction was temporary and alleged that the Defendants pressured the journal to publish defamatory statements regarding her work. Following a copyright infringement claim by Issaenko against Bazzaro, the University asserted ownership of certain data in the article, which Issaenko disputed. The journal expressed a desire to remain neutral in the conflict and advised the parties to resolve their issues independently. Issaenko filed her initial complaint on December 23, 2013, and later amended it to include claims against the University, its Regents, various officials, and Bazzaro in multiple capacities. The First Amended Complaint alleges that all Defendants are liable for multiple claims, including copyright infringement, violations of Minnesota's Uniform Deceptive Trade Practice Act, unfair competition, unjust enrichment, defamation, tortious interference, promissory estoppel, and constitutional violations under the Privileges and Immunities and Due Process Clauses. Issaenko seeks both injunctive relief and damages, asserting that Defendants' actions have hindered her ability to secure employment in academic science, negatively impacted her research and funding opportunities, and irreparably harmed her professional reputation and career development, undermining her educational investments in cancer research. In response, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Subsequently, Issaenko sought to amend her complaint to drop certain Individual Defendants and to add details regarding the remaining Individual Defendants and her defamation claims. Defendants opposed this motion, arguing that any amendment would be futile. The Court plans to first address the motion to dismiss, applying the same standard of review as for the amendment motion since both motions involve similar substantive issues. Additionally, before evaluating the merits of these motions, the Court will consider Issaenko's procedural motion to strike Defendants' untimely memorandum opposing her motion to amend, which she argues should be struck due to a failure to comply with the seven-day filing requirement for nondispositive motions under local rules. Issaenko requests a general award for her “expenses” and “fees” without specifying amounts or their relation. The Defendants acknowledge that their memorandum was filed late but attribute the mistake to good faith confusion regarding deadlines, exacerbated by Issaenko’s recent motion for a preliminary injunction and the Court's new briefing schedule. They contend that striking their memorandum would not cause Issaenko any prejudice and would unnecessarily delay proceedings, as their arguments against her proposed Second Amended Complaint mirror those made in response to her First Amended Complaint. The Court finds that the untimeliness of the memorandum is harmless, noting no unfair surprise or inability on Issaenko's part to prepare for the hearing. Consequently, the request to strike the memorandum is denied, and Issaenko's request for fees and costs is also denied. The Court reviews amendments under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which encourages granting leave to amend unless there are compelling reasons against it, such as undue delay, bad faith, or futility. If futility is claimed, the Court evaluates whether the proposed claims could withstand a motion to dismiss. Denial of leave based on futility implies that the amended complaint would not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which assesses if the complaint presents a plausible claim for relief based on the Twombly standard. The Court applies this standard by accepting all allegations in the complaint as true when determining plausibility. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must present more than mere "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." A claim achieves facial plausibility when it includes factual content that enables the court to reasonably infer the defendant's liability for the alleged misconduct. If the facts merely suggest consistency with the defendant’s liability, the claim falls short and may be dismissed. Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court can dismiss a claim based on a decisive legal issue. Additionally, defendants can move to dismiss claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity under Rule 12(b)(1), as sovereign immunity presents a jurisdictional question. A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) can challenge the complaint either facially or based on the truthfulness of its claims. In this instance, the defendants’ sovereign immunity argument is a facial challenge, assessing whether the jurisdictional basis is meritless by examining the complaint's face and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. The document then addresses Issaenko's copyright infringement claim, stating that she alleges the defendants used her copyrighted works without authorization for various activities, including grant applications and public displays. Specifically, she accuses the defendant Bazzaro of infringing her copyrights by using images that are identical or substantially similar to her copyrighted works and lists specific instances of this infringement. Issaenko claims that the Defendants had the authority to oversee the alleged copyright infringement and held a significant financial interest in Dr. Olga Issaenko’s copyrighted works, leading to substantial harm, including damage to her reputation, lost trade opportunities, and profits. Issaenko seeks both statutory and actual damages, along with injunctive relief to seize and destroy the infringing copies of her works. The Defendants argue for dismissal of the copyright infringement claim based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, asserting that the University and individual state officials cannot be sued in federal court unless the state has waived its immunity or Congress has explicitly revoked it for that cause of action. The University of Minnesota is deemed an arm of the state, and the Eleventh Amendment protects it from monetary damages claims. The court must assess whether Congress has clearly expressed intent to abrogate this immunity and if such actions were a valid exercise of its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Issaenko does not contest the lack of waiver of immunity but disputes whether Congress has abrogated it specifically regarding the Copyright Act. The determination involves a two-pronged analysis to evaluate Congressional intent and the validity of its actions under the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress has not validly abrogated states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from private lawsuits in federal court when it fails to act under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, resulting in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction for claims based on such abrogation. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit in Alsbrook determined that extending Title II of the ADA to states did not constitute a proper exercise of Congressional power under Section 5, thereby affirming Arkansas' immunity from ADA claims in federal court. In contrast, the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA) explicitly expresses Congress's intent to abrogate state immunity. Section 511 of the CRCA states that states and their instrumentalities, officers, or employees are not immune from federal copyright infringement suits. The critical issue for the defendants' motion is whether this abrogation is a valid exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 grants Congress remedial power to enforce the Amendment's provisions but not the authority to define constitutional violations. The Supreme Court requires a congruence and proportionality between the injury being addressed and the means adopted to remedy it. Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Eighth Circuit has yet ruled on whether Congress's actions under Section 511 of the CRCA were a valid exercise of its Section 5 authority. The Fifth Circuit and various district courts have determined that Congress did not validly exercise its Section 5 power, resulting in state sovereign immunity not being waived under the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA). This analysis references the Supreme Court's ruling in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, which invalidated Congress's attempt to abrogate state immunity from patent infringement claims, stating it exceeded Congress's Section 5 authority. The Court noted that the Patent Remedy Act explicitly aimed to remove state immunity but ultimately found that Congress lacked the power to compel states to relinquish this immunity under its Article I powers. The Court evaluated the Act's legislative history and concluded it could not be considered remedial legislation for the Fourteenth Amendment, as there was no substantiated pattern of patent infringement by states, unlike in cases addressing racial discrimination. The Court highlighted the absence of significant evidence of state patent infringement, citing minimal historical instances, and asserted that Congress had not adequately shown a connection between the Act's remedies and any unconstitutional conduct by states. Congress did not demonstrate widespread unconstitutional conduct necessitating remedy under the Patent Remedy Act, leading the Court to determine that the Act’s provisions were excessively disproportionate to any alleged remedial goals. The Court criticized Congress for failing to restrict the Act to cases involving clear constitutional violations, such as instances where states do not provide remedies for patent infringement, and for not limiting the scope of the Act to specific types of infringement. Consequently, the Court found that the Patent Remedy Act could not be justified under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The historical evidence showed that states rarely avoided patent infringement liability by invoking sovereign immunity, and there was insufficient argument that such actions deprived patentees of property without state law remedies. The Act appeared aimed at creating a uniform remedy for patent infringement, aligning states with private parties, a concern proper under Article I, but not justifying the Act post Seminole Tribe decision. In Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, the Fifth Circuit echoed this reasoning regarding the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA), ruling that Congress's abrogation of state sovereign immunity was invalid since it explicitly invoked the Copyright Clause of Article I without referencing the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted the absence of any legislative indication that Congress intended the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment to support the CRCA. Although the Chavez court explored whether the CRCA could be justified under the Due Process Clause, it ultimately sought evidence of a pattern of copyright infringement by states to justify Congress's remedial action, similar to the approach in Florida Prepaid. The legislative history of the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA) reveals fewer documented cases of copyright infringement compared to the Patent Act, yet both exhibit similar shortcomings. Testimonies indicated that states were not broadly violating copyright laws, with the Copyright Office reporting only seven instances of state infringement linked to the Eleventh Amendment. The court noted that the primary concern raised during congressional testimony was the potential for future abuses rather than current widespread violations. Additionally, the court highlighted that Congress did not adequately consider the availability of state remedies for copyright infringement, paralleling findings related to the Patent Act. The CRCA’s remedies were deemed overly broad and disproportionate to legitimate legislative goals. Consequently, the court concluded that Congress was not addressing significant constitutional violations or evaluating state remedies adequately, rendering the CRCA an improper exercise of congressional power. Courts have broadly supported this conclusion, stating that Congress lacked constitutional authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the CRCA. Some courts specifically pointed out that Congress referenced only Article I as the basis for its action without invoking Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, further undermining the argument for valid abrogation of sovereign immunity. Most courts have determined that Congress did not validly exercise its Section 5 power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA). Notable cases including Whipple v. Utah and others have reached similar conclusions. The reasoning from various district courts supports this view, indicating that Congress's actions concerning the CRCA were not a legitimate enforcement of its powers under Section 5. Issaenko presents two main arguments against this conclusion. First, she references a dissent in Florida Prepaid, suggesting that the CRCA could be seen as appropriate legislation due to documented instances of copyright infringement by states, particularly state universities. Second, she claims that the legislative history reflects Congress's recognition of constitutional violations by states regarding copyright ownership, citing testimonies from a Senate hearing that highlighted vulnerabilities in educational publishing. However, other courts have scrutinized the legislative record and concluded that it does not sufficiently demonstrate a pattern of unconstitutional conduct by states. Although there were some instances of infringement noted, they were limited and did not indicate widespread violations. The majority of harms addressed by Congress appeared to be prospective rather than indicative of existing constitutional abuses. Overall, while some evidence of sporadic infringement exists, it does not substantiate a compelling case for Congress's authority to abrogate state immunity under the CRCA. Copyright owners are primarily concerned that states might engage in rampant unauthorized copying of their works without compensation. However, evidence from legislative history fails to demonstrate the widespread violations necessary to justify Congressional remedial action. Previous court rulings, such as Garrett and Kimel, illustrate that isolated incidents of discrimination do not establish a pattern sufficient to warrant legislative intervention. In contrast, Tennessee v. Lane showed that Congress had adequate evidence of systemic violations, as a significant percentage of state services were inaccessible to disabled individuals. The court concludes that evidence cited by Issaenko does not change the determination that Congress lacked sufficient proof of persistent constitutional violations by states to support the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA). Furthermore, Issaenko's arguments overlook additional findings by courts that invalidated Congress’s attempt to abrogate state immunity. The legislative history does not indicate that Congress considered the scope of state remedies or tailored the expansive remedies in the CRCA to proportionally address state violations. Moreover, even if Congress identified a pattern of unconstitutional conduct, the remedies provided in the CRCA lack the required congruence and proportionality to be valid under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court asserts that Congress did not possess the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity through the CRCA. Lastly, Issaenko contends that the abrogation could be valid as enforcement of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, referencing Saenz v. Roe, which addressed residency requirements for state benefits and affirmed the right of newly arrived citizens to enjoy the same privileges as existing citizens of the state. The Court determined that California's residency requirement for benefits discriminates against citizens' right to interstate travel, referencing constitutional provisions and the dissent in Saenz. Issaenko argues that the Privileges and Immunities Clause includes the right to property, including copyrights. However, her claim that Congress validly abrogated state immunity under the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA) as remedial legislation fails because Congress did not identify a consistent pattern of unconstitutional state infringement on copyrights or tailor the CRCA remedies to such violations. Therefore, the Court concluded that the CRCA does not validly waive state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, leading to the dismissal of claims against the University and individual defendants in their official capacities for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Issaenko contends that she can still pursue injunctive relief against the defendants despite the dismissal of damage claims under the Eleventh Amendment. Citing Ex parte Young, the Court recognizes that state officials can be sued for prospective injunctive relief without violating the Eleventh Amendment, but this does not extend to states or state agencies. The Court granted the motion to dismiss claims for monetary damages against state officials in their official capacities but denied the motion concerning injunctive relief claims. Issaenko's First Amended Complaint seeks injunctive relief from all defendants related to her copyright infringement claim. Injunctive relief against the Individual Defendants and Bazzaro in their official capacities is not constrained by the Eleventh Amendment, leading the Court to deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss Issaenko’s copyright claim based on sovereign immunity under Rule 12(b)(1). Although the claim for injunctive relief is permissible, Defendants challenge its adequacy, arguing that it fails to establish a viable claim. Official-capacity suits are treated as actions against the governmental entity rather than the individuals named, necessitating proof that the governmental entity’s policy or custom contributed to the federal law violation. To hold an individual liable in such suits, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the official acted under an unconstitutional or unlawful policy or had final authority over relevant policies and misused that authority. Issaenko alleges that the Defendants facilitated copyright infringement by engaging in various actions regarding her copyrighted images and works. However, the First Amended Complaint lacks allegations of any University policy or custom that unlawfully infringes employees’ copyright, nor does it assert that the Individual Defendants or Bazzaro had the authority to establish such policies unlawfully. The only mention of a University policy is a reference to its copyright policy, which states that faculty and students own the copyrights to their academic works unless otherwise agreed, but this does not indicate any unlawful or unconstitutional practice contributing to the alleged copyright violation. Is-saenko's claims for relief against the Individual Defendants and Bazzaro in their official capacities have been deemed implausible, leading the Court to grant the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the copyright claim seeking prospective injunctive relief. The Court referenced a precedent where a similar claim was dismissed due to a lack of plausible allegations regarding the official's authority to set governmental policy. Regarding the copyright claim against Bazzaro in her individual capacity, the Court considered qualified immunity, which protects government officials from liability unless their conduct violates clearly established rights that a reasonable person would recognize. To assess Bazzaro's entitlement to qualified immunity, the Court will evaluate whether the facts, viewed favorably for Is-saenko, indicate a constitutional violation and whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. The Court noted that qualified immunity, although typically associated with civil rights cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has also been applied in copyright violation cases involving state officials. Is-saenko did not contest the applicability of qualified immunity to her CRCA claims. The Court will analyze Bazzaro's potential liability for copyright infringement under this doctrine, focusing on whether Is-saenko's claimed rights under the CRCA were clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, emphasizing that the determination must consider the specific legal context rather than general principles of copyright law. The Supreme Court clarified that a reasonable person's awareness of potential violations of copyright law does not require materially or fundamentally similar facts from prior cases. The core inquiry for the Defendants in their individual capacity focuses on whether a reasonable person would recognize that the alleged actions contravened clearly established copyright law. The Defendants assert that Issaenko's copyright claim hinges on her employment at the University, her role in Dr. Bazzaro's lab, her unauthorized work at home, and Dr. Bazzaro's subsequent use of that work. They argue that Bazzaro could reasonably believe that this conduct fell under the work-for-hire exception outlined in the Copyright Act, which typically vests initial copyright ownership with the creator of the work unless it is a work made for hire. Under the Act, works made for hire are defined as those created by employees within the scope of employment, with relevant interpretations drawn from common law agency principles. Courts often apply a three-part test to determine if a work is within the scope of employment, considering whether the work is of a type the employee is hired to perform, occurs within authorized time and space limits, and is driven by a purpose to serve the employer. If the first criterion is satisfied, courts have generally not granted authorship rights to employees solely based on work performed at home during off-hours. A work may be classified as a "work for hire" even if created by an employee during personal time using their own resources, provided it is directly connected to their employment duties. Issaenko's assertion that Bazzaro would unreasonably believe the Copyrighted Works were works for hire is undermined by her own claims in the First Amended Complaint, which indicate she conducted research at the lab and consulted with Bazzaro. Case law supports that working outside of designated hours with personal resources does not alter the work's classification. The assessment of whether the work falls within the scope of the employee's job description is crucial; Issaenko's job description included conducting research and analyzing data, suggesting her independent work aligns with her employment responsibilities. Specifically, in relation to a project on cancer cell survival, Issaenko's actions to perform experiments after Bazzaro indicated they were unnecessary still relate to her job's evaluative and developmental duties, indicating that her work could reasonably be viewed as within her employment scope, regardless of explicit authorization from Bazzaro. Thus, the employer does not need to initiate every work created by a salaried employee for it to be considered a work for hire. Talented employees are generally expected to independently produce work relevant to their roles without explicit direction from employers. In the case of Issaenko, it is alleged that she contributed raw data, conducted experiments, and collaborated with Defendant Bazzaro on a manuscript intended for submission to the JMC in May 2010. Issaenko sought Bazzaro’s assistance and guidance regarding the experiments, which aligns with her job description that included analyzing research data and authoring manuscripts. The decision to conduct experiments independently does not exclude the work from being within her employment scope. The court referenced previous case law affirming that a project can be incidental to job responsibilities, noting that a reasonable supervisor could view Issaenko’s research as partially serving Bazzaro’s interests since it was supervised by him, and Issaenko frequently consulted him about her work. Consequently, the court concluded that the legal precedent regarding the work-for-hire doctrine was not clearly established, allowing Bazzaro to reasonably determine that Issaenko was not the copyright owner. Therefore, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the copyright claim based on Bazzaro’s qualified immunity. Additionally, in the Second Amended Complaint, Issaenko removed all individually named Regents as defendants and added claims against remaining individual defendants in both their individual and official capacities, clarifying their roles in the litigation. The Second Amended Complaint introduces changes primarily focused on Issaenko’s defamation claim but also seeks to strengthen his copyright claim against the Individual Defendants in both their official and individual capacities. It alleges that the Regents of the University of Minnesota are responsible for enforcing copyright policies, with Karen Hanson overseeing copyright ownership policies and Frances Lawrenz overseeing research openness policies. Furthermore, it asserts that the University and its Regents supervise copyright policies, delegating authority to departmental heads, including Yee, LeBien, and Carson. Allegations are made that these Individual Defendants authorized infringing activities related to Issaenko’s copyrighted works. However, the Court finds that these amendments do not rectify the deficiencies identified in the First Amended Complaint regarding the copyright claim. The Second Amended Complaint fails to demonstrate that there exists a University policy or custom that unlawfully infringes on copyrighted works, nor does it allege that the Individual Defendants or Bazzaro had final authority to set such policies or exercised that authority unlawfully. Consequently, the Court concludes that the Second Amended Complaint does not sufficiently plead a claim against Bazzaro and the Individual Defendants in their official capacities, rendering further amendment futile. Additionally, while the allegations provide some context about the Individual Defendants’ roles in copyright enforcement, they lack the necessary connection between the defendants' actions and the infringement of federal copyright law, failing to establish liability. The Court dismissed copyright infringement allegations against Individual Defendants, concluding that the qualified immunity analysis applicable to a previous defendant also applies here, rendering any amendment to assert copyright claims against these individuals futile. Issaenko's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Privileges and Immunities and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment allege that the Defendants infringed her rights by violating her Copyrighted Works. She argues these works constitute property protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, asserting that the Defendants' actions caused her damage through willful copyright infringement. Issaenko maintains that her rights in the Copyrighted Works are secured by federal law and cites 17 U.S.C. § 511 as the basis for Defendants' liability. Similar arguments are made regarding her Due Process claim, where she contends the works are property protected from infringement by state actors. The Court determined that these § 1983 claims rely on the same allegations as her copyright infringement claim, and thus are subject to the same legal analysis concerning immunity and pleading viability, which led to the dismissal of her copyright claim. Additionally, the University is not considered a "person" under § 1983, exempting it from liability. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits 1983 damage suits against Individual Defendants and Bazzaro in their official capacities. Claims for injunctive relief against them are insufficient, as they do not demonstrate that any constitutional violations resulted from an unconstitutional policy or custom of the University. Issaenko’s 1983 claims, which are based on alleged violations of the Copyright Act, are subject to the same qualified immunity analysis applicable to Bazzaro. Issaenko contends that her 1983 claims are separate from her Copyright Act claims and are based on the right to enforce deprivation of property interests, asserting that the Copyright Clause provides enforceable rights against the government. However, her claims do not allege a violation of the Copyright Clause; they reference the Copyright Act and the Fourteenth Amendment instead. The Copyright Clause does not grant individual rights but rather empowers Congress to legislate. Additionally, Issaenko’s claims under the Privileges and Immunities and Due Process Clauses lack a foundation in demonstrating an unconstitutional University policy. She failed to present any authority indicating that her constitutional rights regarding the copyrighted works were clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, which would have made a reasonable University employee aware of potential constitutional infringements. Consequently, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss Issaenko’s 1983 claims. The Court denies Issaenko’s motion to amend her 1983 claims, concluding that the Second Amended Complaint fails to rectify existing deficiencies. Regarding state law claims, Issaenko’s First Amended Complaint against all Defendants is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits such claims against unconsenting states or their officials in federal court. This includes claims for damages or injunctive relief against the University and individual Defendants in their official capacities, as established in *Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman*. The Court notes that federal court intervention in state law matters constitutes a significant intrusion on state sovereignty. The Court recognizes that state law claims may be viable solely against non-University Defendants in their individual capacities and proceeds to evaluate each claim against Bazzaro, the only Defendant sued individually. Specifically, regarding Issaenko's claim under the Minnesota Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (MUDTPA), she alleges that Defendants engaged in deceptive practices by misleading consumers about the origin of her copyrighted images. Issaenko seeks both damages and injunctive relief. However, Defendants argue that this claim is preempted by the Copyright Act, which protects rights exclusively under federal law and negates equivalent rights under state law as outlined in 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). A state cause of action is preempted by the Copyright Act if two conditions are met: (1) the work in question falls under the copyright subject matter as outlined in sections 102 and 103, and (2) the state law right is equivalent to the exclusive rights defined in section 106. Section 106 grants copyright owners exclusive rights, including reproduction, derivative works, distribution, and public display. For a state law right to be considered equivalent and thus preempted, it must not require additional elements beyond those acts covered by federal copyright law. If a state-created cause of action includes extra elements, it is not preempted. The initial prong of the preemption test is met, as the subject matter of the MUDTPA claim involves copyrighted works. Courts have found that claims like those under MUDTPA often mirror copyright claims, particularly when they allege misrepresentation of copyrighted materials. Examples include a Ninth Circuit case where California’s unfair competition law was deemed preempted because it was based on rights granted by the Copyright Act. Similarly, other cases have determined that various state law claims were preempted when they did not assert rights significantly different from those under the Copyright Act. Ultimately, the court concludes that Issaenko's MUDTPA claim is preempted by the Copyright Act. A court analysis regarding preemption focuses on the nature of a plaintiff's claim and the rights being enforced under state law, as exemplified in *Kodadek*. For Issaenko’s MUDTPA claim to withstand scrutiny, it must present an additional element beyond mere reproduction or distribution actions that would violate the Copyright Act. However, Issaenko's allegations indicate that her claim is grounded solely in conduct equivalent to the Copyright Act's exclusive rights, specifically the unauthorized use and distribution of her copyrighted works. This includes claims of confusion about ownership stemming from the defendants' actions. The court references previous cases, such as *Gary Friedrich Enters.* and *Randolph v. Dimension Films*, where claims similar to Issaenko's were deemed preempted due to their fundamental basis in unauthorized copying and misrepresentation of ownership. Although Issaenko argues that her claim requires proof of misrepresentation and confusion, this argument is flawed. The MUDTPA does not necessitate proof of actual confusion, only the likelihood of it, as stated in Minnesota statutes. The essence of Issaenko’s claim is her assertion that the defendants’ use of her copyrighted material caused confusion, without any additional misleading statements or deceptive representations. As observed in *Integrative Nutrition, Inc.*, claims that do not qualitatively differ from copyright protections, such as mere allegations of confusion based on similarity, are also preempted. Consequently, the court concludes that Issaenko's MUDTPA claim is preempted by the Copyright Act, leading to the dismissal of her claim. Issaenko's unfair competition claim asserts that Defendants' actions have caused confusion regarding the source and sponsorship of their images and activities in relation to her copyrighted works, leading to potential consumer deception. Defendants contend that this claim is redundant with her Minnesota Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (MUDTPA) claim and preempted by the Copyright Act. Unfair competition is classified as a general category of torts that protects commercial interests, such as product disparagement and tortious interference. To be valid, a common law unfair competition claim must specify an underlying tort, and if it is duplicative of another claim, it should be dismissed. The court agrees with Defendants, concluding that Issaenko’s claim is indeed duplicative of her MUDTPA claim and preempted by copyright law. Although Issaenko argues that her claim is distinct due to referencing tortious interference, the court finds that it overlaps with her existing tortious interference claim, leading to its dismissal. Furthermore, her assertion that the claim is based on a likelihood of confusion does not differentiate it from her MUDTPA claim. Thus, the court concludes that her unfair competition claim must be dismissed. Is-saenko's unfair competition claim is deemed duplicative of her MUDTPA claim because both are based on identical allegations. Furthermore, this claim is preempted by the Copyright Act, similar to the MUDTPA claim, as established in Rottlund Co. v. Scott Larson Constr. Inc. The court will therefore grant the defendants' motion to dismiss the unfair competition claim. Regarding the unjust enrichment claim, Minnesota law requires the claimant to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly received value that they should compensate for in equity and good conscience. Is-saenko claims that defendants unlawfully benefited from misappropriating her proprietary and copyrighted images. However, the defendants contend that this claim is also preempted by the Copyright Act. Many courts have ruled that state unjust enrichment claims are preempted when they are based on rights protected by copyright, as these claims essentially constitute copyright infringement. The court's prior rulings support the conclusion that Is-saenko's unjust enrichment claim, based on the alleged unauthorized use of her works, is likewise preempted. An unjust enrichment claim was found to be preempted by the Copyright Act because it centered on allegations that defendants were enriched through the unauthorized use of copyrighted designs. The court noted that while actual enrichment is a component of unjust enrichment, it does not significantly differentiate the claim from copyright infringement, as both relate to the wrongful exercise of rights protected under the Copyright Act. Specifically, the plaintiff, Is-saenko, claimed that the defendants benefited from misappropriating her copyrighted works in various applications and presentations. The court rejected Is-saenko's argument that her use of "misappropriation" created a substantial difference from the unjust enrichment claims in precedent cases. It maintained that the essence of her claim—claiming benefits derived from the unauthorized use of her copyrighted works—remained unchanged. The court found that the allegations made in the complaint, including intentional copying and the creation of derivative works, were encompassed within her unjust enrichment claim, leading to the conclusion that this claim was preempted by the Copyright Act. Consequently, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim. To establish a claim for promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a clear and definite promise, (2) the promisor's intention to induce reliance, which occurred, and (3) the necessity of enforcing the promise to prevent injustice. Dr. Olga Issaenko claims that Defendant Bazzaro made a specific promise to jointly publish an article, crediting Issaenko as the first author if she disclosed her research. Issaenko alleges reliance on this promise, leading her to produce her research, but claims Bazzaro published an article without crediting her. Defendants contend that this claim is preempted by the Copyright Act, arguing that it essentially concerns contingent authorization for Bazzaro to use Issaenko’s copyrighted works. However, legal precedents indicate that a breach of contract claim is not preempted if it is based on a right created by the contract rather than copyright law. The court concludes that Issaenko’s claim falls into the category of non-preempted contract claims, as it is based on Bazzaro's promise regarding authorship, a right not guaranteed by copyright. Thus, the court denies the motion to dismiss this claim against Bazzaro individually. Regarding the defamation claim, under Minnesota law, a plaintiff must show that a statement was false, communicated to someone other than the plaintiff, and harmful to the plaintiff's reputation. Issaenko alleges that the Defendants made false statements to Cell Cycle, claiming ownership of data and copyrighted information from her scientific article. Dr. Olga Issaenko alleges that the Defendants made defamatory statements implying she improperly used data belonging to them, particularly in publications and communications with the journal Cell Cycle. Specific claims include failure to disclose her role in providing data, false assertions of ownership of data, and misleading allegations regarding her being under investigation for misconduct. Issaenko asserts these statements damaged her reputation. The Defendants seek dismissal of the defamation claims, arguing they are barred by the two-year statute of limitations under Minnesota law, which begins when the defamatory material is published. Issaenko filed her complaint on December 23, 2013, making any statements prior to December 23, 2011 non-actionable. The only Defendant potentially liable is Bazzaro, but Issaenko's complaint lacks allegations of defamatory statements made by Bazzaro after the statute of limitations period. While Issaenko mentions statements from 2010 and 2011, these are outside the allowable timeframe. She contends some statements were republished in January 2012 during her job applications; however, Minnesota law does not recognize each repetition of a statement as a new cause of action in cases of mass-produced libel. Thus, the court concludes that Issaenko's defamation claims must be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. The Eighth Circuit has determined, following the precedent set in Church of Scientology, that the Minnesota Supreme Court would similarly apply the single publication rule in various scenarios, including compelled self-publication. In this case, the court concluded that Minnesota law would not allow the statute of limitations to reset each time Issaenko’s personnel file was viewed. Issaenko's claims included communications from December 2012 involving the University and several Individual Defendants, yet none of these communications identified Bazzaro as the speaker of any defamatory statements. The exhibits from the First Amended Complaint attributed the statements to Defendant Le-Bien, not Bazzaro, leading to the dismissal of the claims against Bazzaro due to failure to allege actionable defamatory statements within the two-year statute of limitations. The Second Amended Complaint introduces new allegations against Individual Defendants Hanson, Carson, Yee, LeBien, and Lawrenz. However, the court found the claims against Hanson futile, as there were no allegations implicating her in the publication of defamatory statements. For Carson, the statements in question were made in 2010 and 2011, which are outside the statute of limitations. Issaenko's argument that republication through her complaint restarts the statute of limitations was rejected, as it would effectively eliminate the statute of limitations for defamation claims. Consequently, the court deemed amending the complaint regarding Carson futile. Further analysis on the allegations against Yee is pending. Defendant Yee is implicated in a defamation claim within the Second Amended Complaint, which alleges that Defendant Bazzaro disseminated false statements regarding Issaenko's purported misconduct investigation at the University of Minnesota to Yee, LeBien, and Lawrenz, spanning from September 2011 to January 2012. The complaint cites Exhibit 29, a collection of emails, as evidence of this dissemination; however, it reveals no emails from Yee or any communication involving Yee after December 23, 2011. Consequently, since no defamatory statements made by Yee fall within the statute of limitations, further amendment regarding Yee is deemed futile. Additionally, Issaenko's claim against Yee fails as it lacks allegations that Yee knew or should have known the statements were false, aligning with precedents that shield those merely transmitting defamatory material unless they are aware of its defamatory nature. Similar claims are made against Defendants LeBien and Lawrenz, which are also found to be futile for the same reasons: the emails cited do not include communications from them, and the allegations do not establish their knowledge of the statements’ potentially defamatory nature. The complaint references letters and a report from April 2013 related to a publication in *Cell Cycle*, but it does not substantiate the defamation claims against LeBien and Lawrenz based on this material. Each Table and Figure in the manuscript was analyzed in relation to data from Dr. Bazzaro’s laboratory notebooks and files. The report by LeBien and Lawrenz concludes that data in Table 1 and parts of Figures 1 through 6 were produced by Dr. Issaenko during her employment in Dr. Bazzaro’s lab from September 2009 to July 2010, and that she used this data in the manuscript without authorization. Additionally, the small molecule inhibitors used were obtained by Dr. Bazzaro from a prior collaboration, and Dr. Issaenko lacked permission to use them outside his laboratory. The Court determined that even if the report contained defamatory statements, they would not support a defamation claim due to qualified privilege. This privilege protects statements made in good faith, without malice, and in appropriate contexts. The burden of proof for establishing qualified privilege lies with the defendant, requiring them to demonstrate the communication was made on the right occasion, for a proper purpose, and based on reasonable grounds. The determination of whether these conditions are met is generally a legal question for the court, except when evidence allows for multiple conclusions, in which case it becomes a factual question for the jury. Qualified privilege can shield a defendant at the motion to dismiss stage, as the allegations in the complaint, if taken as true, may reveal the privilege's applicability. In Elkharwily v. Mayo Holding Co., the court granted a motion to dismiss due to the plaintiff's failure to allege facts indicating that the defendants acted with actual malice, thus losing the privilege. Statements made during investigations or disciplinary actions regarding employee misconduct are generally privileged, aimed at protecting the employer from harmful employees. The court assesses whether an employer had reasonable grounds for their statements by examining the investigative steps taken and the investigation's nature and extent. In this case, the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint establish that LeBien and Lawrenz possess a qualified privilege concerning statements made to Cell Cycle about the Copyrighted Works. Although the communications with Cell Cycle were not typical internal discussions among University employees about potential misconduct, they were made to safeguard against dishonesty by Issaenko, aligning with qualified privilege's purpose. The Minnesota Supreme Court has affirmed that qualified privilege applies broadly to any statements made during an employer's investigation into employee misconduct, as long as they are made on a proper occasion and for a legitimate purpose. A court determined that a report by an employer regarding an employee's criminal background was protected by qualified privilege, even though it was not part of an investigation into the employee's workplace misconduct. The court reasoned that the primary aim of the investigation was to safeguard the company and the public from potential dishonesty. It found that statements made during an investigation related to an employee's misconduct, intended for communication with an academic journal and to uphold the integrity of academic research, are appropriate and deserving of protection. The court also noted that the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint indicated that individuals LeBien and Lawrenz conducted a sufficient investigation, providing them with reasonable cause for their statements. Specifically, the complaint stated that LeBien, Lawrenz, and Bazzaro evaluated a manuscript submitted by Issaenko and compared it with materials from Bazzaro's lab before reaching conclusions about the manuscript's propriety. Citing Walker v. Wanner Engineering, the court emphasized that a thorough investigation can establish reasonable cause for statements made. Consequently, LeBien and Lawrenz were found entitled to qualified privilege regarding their communications with Cell Cycle. To overcome this privilege, Issaenko would need to demonstrate malice, which the Second Amended Complaint failed to do. The complaint did not allege any malice or ill will from LeBien and Lawrenz toward Issaenko, leading the court to conclude that the defamation claims against them would be futile if amended. Additionally, Issaenko's claims against Bazzaro pertained to statements made in September and October 2011. Claims against Bazzaro are barred by the two-year statute of limitations, as the alleged defamatory emails were sent before December 23, 2011. Issaenko's assertion that Bazzaro recirculated these emails in January 2012 does not revive the claims. Additionally, Issaenko's claims based on Bazzaro's statements in an investigation submitted to Cell Cycle are insufficient; only two statements attributed to Bazzaro are present, one of which is a non-false statement about a figure, and the other is an opinion regarding Issaenko's research practices, which does not constitute a false statement of fact necessary for defamation. Issaenko argues that Bazzaro's statements from September and October 2011 were republished when she filed her lawsuit and reported by the Star Tribune, suggesting a new statute of limitations. However, plaintiffs cannot reset the statute of limitations by filing a lawsuit on the same defamatory statements. The court concludes that amending the defamation claim would be futile due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Regarding the tortious interference claim, Issaenko alleges that the defendants' actions, including accusations of data misappropriation and attempts to restrict her work, have caused her financial harm by jeopardizing her employment and publication opportunities. Specifically, she claims that two job offers from professors were withdrawn after they consulted Bazzaro. Issaenko claims a reasonable expectation of economic benefit from her employment, publishing prospects, and grant opportunities, asserting that the defendants were aware of these expectations. Minnesota law recognizes two torts for interference with economic relations: 1) interference with an existing contract, and 2) interference with a prospective business relation. To establish a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations, the plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) a reasonable expectation of economic benefit; 2) the defendants' knowledge of that expectation; 3) wrongful interference by the defendants; 4) a reasonable probability of realizing the expected benefit absent the wrongful act; and 5) resulting damages. The defendants argue that Issaenko's claim, which challenges the University professors’ hiring decisions, should be dismissed as it should have been filed as a petition for writ of certiorari to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, as required for reviewing local public employers’ discretionary employment decisions. Minnesota law mandates that tort claims requiring review of such decisions must also be pursued through certiorari. However, the court finds that part of Issaenko's claim is viable, as it primarily concerns Bazzaro's alleged actions that obstructed her economic opportunities, including blocking publication of her article and deterring others from engaging with her professionally, rather than solely contesting the professors' hiring decisions. The Court finds that certain allegations made by Issaenko are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss concerning her tortious interference claim, as they do not require examination of professors' discretionary hiring decisions. The Court emphasizes that it is not necessary to analyze each allegation in detail, acknowledging that some aspects state a plausible claim for relief. Defendants argue for dismissal based on the idea that tortious interference claims against employees require proof of bad faith. However, Issaenko's claim extends beyond mere interference with her contracts, involving lost job and research opportunities as well. Consequently, the Court denies the motion to dismiss the claim against Bazzaro individually. Regarding the Second Amended Complaint, while it does not introduce new factual allegations, it includes claims against Individual Defendants LeBien and Lawrenz for their communications with Cell Cycle that allegedly caused Issaenko to lose economic opportunities. The Court finds these allegations sufficient and grants permission to amend the claims against them. Issaenko also seeks a preliminary injunction to protect her proprietary content during the lawsuit. The Court outlines the criteria for granting such an injunction, including the likelihood of success on the merits, the threat of irreparable harm, the balance of harms, and the public interest. Issaenko must demonstrate a fair chance of prevailing on her claims to justify the injunction. A moving party does not need to prove a greater than fifty percent likelihood of success on the merits to satisfy the likelihood of success requirement for a preliminary injunction. The court assesses whether the movant is likely to prevail on the merits without determining the ultimate outcome of the case. In this instance, Issaenko's request for a preliminary injunction, which is tied to her copyright claims, is undermined by the dismissal of those claims. The court finds that Issaenko cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success due to this dismissal. Furthermore, even if a likelihood of success were established, Issaenko fails to show irreparable harm, which requires evidence of certain, imminent, and significant harm necessitating equitable relief. She asserts that the defendants' continued use of her copyrighted works prevents her from controlling their access and distribution, and diverts attention from her own academic work. However, her claims are weakened by a considerable delay in filing the suit and motion for injunctive relief, having waited from 2010 and 2011 until December 2013 to initiate legal action, and not demonstrating any changes in the defendants' conduct. The court cites precedents indicating that such delays can negate claims of irreparable harm, concluding that Issaenko has not met the necessary criteria for injunctive relief. Irreparable harm must be demonstrated for injunctive relief; thus, Issaenko's request for a preliminary injunction is denied. The court orders the following: 1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part: - Claims against the University of Minnesota and Regents are dismissed without prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction. - Claims in Counts I, VIII, IX, X, and XI seeking damages against Individual Defendants and Defendant Bazzaro in their official capacities are dismissed without prejudice. - Claims in Counts I, VIII, IX, X, and XI seeking injunctive relief against Individual Defendants and Defendant Bazzaro in their official capacities are dismissed with prejudice. - Claims against Defendant Bazzaro in her individual capacity within Counts I, VIII, IX, X, and XI are dismissed with prejudice. - Counts II, III, IV, V, VI, and VII against the University of Minnesota, Regents, and the Individual Defendants in their official capacities are dismissed without prejudice. - Claims against Defendant Bazzaro in her individual capacity within Counts II, III, IV, and V are dismissed with prejudice. - The motion is denied regarding Count VII for promissory estoppel and Count VI for tortious interference against Defendant Bazzaro in her individual capacity. 2. Issaenko's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is denied. 3. Issaenko's Motion for Leave to Amend the First Amended Complaint is granted in part to add allegations against Defendants LeBien and Lawrenz for Count VI but denied in other respects. 4. Issaenko's Motion to Strike Defendants’ Opposition to the Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint is denied. The Order cites the First Amended Complaint for factual allegations, noting that many allegations relate to Bazzaro's demeanor and claims about her credentials. Allegations against Issaenko are deemed irrelevant to their legal claims and are viewed as part of a contentious history with Bazzaro, as referenced in the case Bazzaro v. Issaenko regarding a harassment restraining order. The court does not elaborate on these allegations as they do not pertain to Issaenko’s First Amended Complaint. An exhibit cited by Issaenko, a letter from Defendant LeBien, fails to support the claim regarding Bazzaro's communication with the Journal of Molecular Cancer Therapeutics, as the letter is addressed to an unrelated entity. The Regent Defendants in the case include multiple individuals, with Bazzaro being sued in both official and individual capacities, which will be discussed separately. Issaenko contends that the State of Minnesota does not provide remedies for copyright infringement, arguing that without evidence of adequate state remedies, the Court should not assume the constitutionality of the CRCA. The court’s analysis focuses on whether Congress acted properly based on legislative history when the CRCA was enacted, rather than on individual cases. Furthermore, while the Plaintiff highlights the lack of alternative remedies under Tennessee law, there is no evidence indicating that Congress considered state law remedies when deciding to abrogate states' sovereign immunity. The Court will dismiss claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment without prejudice, as clarified in Roth v. United States, viewing such dismissals as jurisdictional. Additionally, it notes that the existence of a statutory right may not be clear-cut, granting the court discretion in the order of addressing qualified immunity prongs. Bazzaro is entitled to qualified immunity because it was reasonable for him to believe that the Copyrighted Works were made for hire, negating the need to address other defenses regarding copyright ownership under the University policy and fair use. The copyright claim against the University is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and the claims for damages against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities are also barred, rendering proposed amendments futile. Counts VIII and X assert identical Privileges and Immunities violations, with Count VIII seeking damages and Count X seeking injunctive relief. Similarly, Counts IX and XI allege identical Due Process Clause violations, with differing claims for damages and injunctive relief. Issaenko's argument that she is enforcing the Copyright Act through a § 1983 suit is deemed unviable, as the court focuses on her claim of constitutional property rights instead. Issaenko’s § 1983 claims fail to plead entitlement to relief, so the court does not consider the argument that § 1983 cannot enforce Copyright Act violations. Under Minnesota law, injunctive relief is the sole remedy for deceptive trade practices, and since damages are not recoverable under the Minnesota Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (MUDTPA), any claim seeking damages is subject to dismissal. A referenced case allowed a MUDTPA claim alongside copyright infringement but did not address the potential preemption of the MUDTPA claim. Coyne's case is deemed irrelevant to the Court's preemption analysis of Issaenko's MUDTPA claim due to its lack of discussion on preemption. Issaenko argues that her MUDTPA claim is distinct from copyright infringement, citing ethical breaches and harm to her professional reputation. However, these issues are not part of her MUDTPA claim but pertain to other claims in her First Amended Complaint. The Court asserts that the relevance of her tortious interference and defamation claims to copyright law does not impact the preemption of her MUDTPA claim. Issaenko also references CSM Investors, which indicated that some unfair competition claims may not be preempted by the Copyright Act. Nonetheless, she fails to differentiate her unfair competition allegations from her copyright claims. While the CSM Investors case noted that unjust enrichment claims are not equivalent to copyright infringement, the Court emphasizes that it is not bound by other district court decisions. It finds the reasoning from other courts on preemption more compelling and declines to follow CSM Investors, stating that no new allegations in Issaenko's Second Amended Complaint affect the preemption status of her claims. Therefore, amending the claims against additional defendants would be futile regarding preemption under the Copyright Act. The Second Amended Complaint does not introduce new factual allegations for the promissory estoppel claim but attempts to assert this claim against Individual Defendants in their personal capacities. However, the claims only reference conduct by Bazzaro, failing to implicate other Defendants, rendering the amendment futile as it does not provide grounds for relief against the Individual Defendants. The Amended Complaint generally asserts fourteen claims related to different mortgage loans against nine Bank Defendants without clearly delineating which claims apply to specific Defendants, leading to inadequate pleading under Rule 8. The Court finds that no new factual allegations are presented regarding the promissory estoppel claim, making further amendment unnecessary. Additionally, since the University is immune from Issaenko’s state law defamation claim, the Court has not examined those allegations in detail, as any amendment would also be futile. Furthermore, under Minnesota law, a plaintiff cannot circumvent defenses to a defamation claim by categorizing statements under a different doctrine. Although the Defendants have not claimed this as a basis for dismissal of Issaenko’s tortious interference claim, the Court has not addressed whether they might have a qualified privilege concerning it.