Court: District Court, S.D. New York; September 29, 2014; Federal District Court
Plaintiff Gene Lewis filed a Complaint against Defendants Blackman Plumbing Supply L.L.C., Orange County Plumbing Group, L.L.C., Ridgewood Corp., and Jules M. Weinstein, alleging various federal and state law violations related to his employment. The Court reviewed Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and granted it in part while denying it in part.
Lewis, diagnosed with hip bone deterioration in May 2006 while working as an assistant manager at Ridgewood Corp., informed his branch manager, Richard Robinson, about his condition and need for a future hip replacement. Following this disclosure, Robinson's behavior towards Lewis deteriorated significantly. He began closely monitoring Lewis, frequently assigning him heavy lifting tasks without regard for his physical limitations, and prohibited the use of equipment that could ease his burden. Robinson also subjected Lewis to derogatory comments, referred to him as "slow" and a "gimp," and threatened termination if Lewis was not "100%" physically capable.
Despite experiencing increasing pain due to Robinson’s mistreatment, Lewis attempted to fulfill his job duties. In March 2008, after consulting an orthopedic surgeon, Lewis received a disability certificate restricting him from lifting over 25 pounds and engaging in prolonged standing or walking. This certificate was sent to Robinson, who reacted with evident irritation and reiterated that Ridgewood did not accommodate workers who were not fully able. Robinson continued to mistreat Lewis, disregarding his disability, yelling at him, and insisting he perform heavy lifting tasks, further exacerbating his condition.
In the fall of 2009, the Plaintiff was transferred from the Middletown branch to the Newburgh branch, which alleviated his distress from being subjected to ridicule by Robinson, who remained at Middletown. At Newburgh, while still occasionally required to lift over 25 pounds, the Plaintiff experienced a reduction in such tasks and noted that management made efforts to accommodate his medical needs, consistently providing assistance with lifting when requested, and showing compassion when he could not perform a task. In 2010, Ridgewood filed for bankruptcy, leading to the sale of its assets to Sovereign Bank. Subsequently, Blackman Plumbing Supply, through its subsidiaries, purchased many of Ridgewood’s assets, including the Newburgh branch, and continued operations without interruption. The Plaintiff remained employed during this transition, experiencing no break in service. After the takeover, the Newburgh branch manager was replaced by Scott Brown, who gave the Plaintiff positive performance evaluations. However, in April 2011, Blackman informed the Plaintiff of the Newburgh branch's closure and the impending transfer back to Middletown, where Robinson was still the manager. Anxious about returning under Robinson's supervision and recognizing the worsening of his disability, the Plaintiff reached out to Blackman’s Regional Sales Manager, expressing his concerns about his disability and previous experiences with Robinson.
Harpster indicated that the transfer of the Plaintiff would proceed and instructed him to address concerns directly with Robinson, refusing to intervene until then. Concerned about job security, the Plaintiff chose not to pursue the matter further and endured Robinson's supervision, during which Robinson's abusive behavior resumed. Although the Plaintiff could not recall specific derogatory terms used by Robinson after his transfer, he detailed continued mistreatment, including excessive physical task assignments, public mockery regarding his disability, and disparaging comments implying he was near death. Following Harpster's guidance, the Plaintiff attempted to complain to Robinson, who dismissed his concerns and ordered him back to work. Approximately eight weeks post-transfer, the Plaintiff was terminated. Harpster met privately with Robinson before informing the Plaintiff that his employment was ending. The Plaintiff alleges Robinson influenced the termination decision due to his disability. While Defendants claim the Plaintiff was laid off due to poor sales performance and financial losses at the branch, the Plaintiff contends his sales figures were comparable to those of retained employees. He argues that Robinson's discriminatory actions directly impacted his job performance and sales outcomes, contradicting the Defendants' claims of his inadequate skill set as a reason for dismissal.
Harpster requested a draft help-wanted advertisement for a position identical to that held by the Plaintiff no later than 90 days after the Plaintiff's termination. Defendants subsequently hired Fred Krampath for the role, despite him being less qualified than the Plaintiff and not having a disability. The Plaintiff initiated a lawsuit in September 2011 against several parties, alleging violations of federal and state labor laws regarding minimum and overtime wages. In October 2011, the Plaintiff filed a charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC, which led to a right-to-sue letter. The Plaintiff later amended the complaint to include claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and New York’s Human Rights Law, alleging discrimination based on disability. Discovery concluded in late 2012, and a settlement was reached between the Plaintiff and one defendant in October 2013. Following this, the remaining defendants filed for summary judgment in October 2013, with subsequent legal filings from both parties leading to a court hearing on July 24, 2014. The legal standard for summary judgment requires a showing of no genuine dispute regarding material facts, favoring the non-moving party in interpretations of evidence.
A party seeking summary judgment must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists. If the burden of proof at trial lies with the non-moving party, the movant can succeed by highlighting the lack of evidence for an essential element of the non-movant’s claim. The non-moving party must then provide admissible evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact to avoid summary judgment. Merely showing metaphysical doubt regarding material facts is insufficient; the non-moving party must present specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial. A fact is considered material if it could affect the suit's outcome under applicable law. The court's role at summary judgment is to determine whether any factual issues remain to be tried, focusing on eliminating unsupported claims or defenses.
Defendants seek summary judgment on specific claims from the Plaintiff, including allegations related to the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) and New York Executive Law regarding disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and hostile work environment. The Defendants argue they did not terminate the Plaintiff due to his disability, did not deny reasonable accommodation, and did not create a hostile work environment. Additionally, they seek judgment against claims of successor liability related to labor law violations while the Plaintiff worked for a non-moving defendant, Ridgewood.
The Plaintiff's claims include assertions of wrongful termination due to disability, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, and a hostile work environment linked to his disability. To establish a prima facie case for ADA discrimination, the Plaintiff must prove that the employer is subject to the ADA, he is disabled as defined by the ADA, he is qualified for the job with or without accommodation, and he experienced adverse employment action due to his disability.
Establishing a prima facie case of discrimination is relatively straightforward, creating a presumption of unlawful discrimination once the plaintiff meets this initial burden. The defendant must then provide a clear, specific explanation for the termination that suggests a nondiscriminatory reason. If the defendant successfully does so, the presumption of discrimination is nullified, and the plaintiff must produce evidence supporting a finding of discrimination. The plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer's legitimate reasons for termination are false and that the disability was the likely reason for the dismissal.
In this case, the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, particularly regarding whether the termination was due to his disability. The plaintiff claims that both Robinson and Harpster were aware of his disability, providing specific instances where Robinson allegedly made negative comments about it and where Robinson's abusive behavior continued after the plaintiff's transfer. Additionally, the plaintiff claims that Robinson was involved in the decision-making process that led to his termination.
The defendants counter that the termination was due to legitimate reasons unrelated to the plaintiff's disability, citing staff reductions and the plaintiff's low sales performance. They assert that Harpster was not aware of the plaintiff's disability and that Robinson's involvement was negligible. This argument presents a plausible nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.
In rebuttal, the plaintiff contends that Harpster was indeed aware of his disability, that Robinson played a role in the decision to terminate him, and that his sales performance was comparable to others who were not terminated. The plaintiff also notes positive performance reviews and inconsistencies in the defendants' explanations, as well as the replacement of the plaintiff with a less experienced, non-disabled employee. These factors collectively support the argument that the defendants' stated reasons for termination are pretextual, indicating potential discrimination.
The plaintiff further alleges a violation of the ADA due to the denial of reasonable accommodation. This claim also follows the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that he is a person with a disability, that the employer was aware of this disability, that he could perform essential job functions with reasonable accommodation, and that the employer refused such accommodations.
Defendants acknowledge the first, third, and fourth elements of the case but contest that Plaintiff has not demonstrated the second element regarding notice of his disability. They argue that without knowledge of the disability, an employer cannot be found liable for discrimination under the ADA. For a plaintiff to meet the notice requirement, they must show that the employer was aware of the plaintiff’s disability as defined by the ADA, which is distinct from merely knowing about an injury. The case of Watson v. Arts. Entertainment Television Network illustrates this point, indicating that the absence of evidence regarding the employer’s awareness of a serious disability precludes liability.
However, Plaintiff asserts there is a genuine dispute regarding whether Defendants were notified of his disability and his request for accommodation. In an affidavit, Plaintiff claims he informed Fenton Harpster, shortly before his transfer to the Middletown branch, about his hip-related disability and past issues with Robinson, including mockery and a refusal to provide medical accommodations. Harpster allegedly dismissed these concerns, instructing Plaintiff to address them directly with Robinson and declined to intervene. Plaintiff expressed disappointment with Harpster’s response and felt compelled to endure the situation under Robinson’s supervision. Defendants' motion for summary judgment fails to adequately address Plaintiff's claims of having informed Harpster about his disability and accommodation needs.
Plaintiff's claim is framed by Defendants as relying solely on the assertion that he informed Robinson of his disability before his employment at Blackman, but not during it. Defendants acknowledge a potential factual dispute regarding whether Robinson was aware of a medical restriction limiting Plaintiff to lifting no more than twenty-five pounds while employed at Ridgewood Plumbing. They argue that any notice Robinson had did not carry over to Blackman, which treated former Ridgewood employees as new hires and did not review their prior personnel files, including any doctor’s notes regarding disabilities.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to request reasonable accommodations while at Blackman, as he did not object to lifting more than twenty-five pounds or ask to use a mechanized picker for retrieving orders. Specifically, Plaintiff admits he did not raise concerns about lifting heavy items at either the Newburgh or Middletown locations of Blackman Plumbing. Defendants contend that Plaintiff did not inform anyone at Blackman, including Robinson, of his physical limitations during his employment there.
However, Plaintiff maintains that he directly informed Harpster of his disability and his need for accommodations. Citing Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the text emphasizes that once an employer is aware of an employee's disability, it has a duty to provide reasonable accommodations, even if not explicitly requested. This duty entails engaging in an interactive process to assess potential accommodations, which remains essential regardless of whether Plaintiff directly asked for such accommodations. Furthermore, the excerpt notes Plaintiff's claim regarding his difficult relationship with Robinson, which may be relevant to his case.
Robinson's actions allegedly rendered it impossible for the Plaintiff to work due to his disability. There is a genuine dispute regarding whether Harpster’s dismissal of the Plaintiff’s concerns and his directive to address issues directly with Robinson constituted a breakdown in the required interactive process, potentially making the Defendants liable under the ADA. Case law indicates that employers can be liable for failing to provide reasonable accommodations when they are responsible for such a breakdown. The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's lack of objection to requests for lifting heavy objects undermines his claim; however, the Plaintiff contends that Harpster’s response—refusing to intervene until the Plaintiff approached Robinson—was an unreasonable accommodation or a rejection of his request. The Plaintiff expressed concern about retaining his job, leading him to end the conversation with Harpster without further discussion. Although Defendants assert that the Plaintiff did not inform Harpster of any current medical restrictions, the Plaintiff’s affidavit suggests he did notify Harpster about his disability and the need for accommodation, particularly in light of his worsening condition and prior requests. The Plaintiff alleges that Harpster was aware of his disability since 2011 and failed to engage in a meaningful interactive process regarding accommodations, indicating a genuine dispute over whether the Defendants had proper notice of the Plaintiff’s disability and accommodation requests.
Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case for a failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA, which the Court acknowledges as valid because Defendants did not present a legitimate reason for their lack of accommodation. Consequently, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is denied. Regarding the hostile work environment claim, the Court notes that the Second Circuit has not definitively ruled on whether the ADA includes such claims, though other circuits have. District courts within the Second Circuit have generally assumed that a hostile work environment claim is cognizable under the ADA, although this remains undecided.
For a successful hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: 1) the conduct is objectively severe or pervasive, creating a hostile environment; 2) the plaintiff personally perceives the environment as hostile; and 3) the hostility is due to the plaintiff’s disability. The determination of a hostile work environment under the ADA involves assessing the totality of circumstances, including the frequency and severity of the conduct, its threatening or humiliating nature, and its interference with the plaintiff's work performance. The Court acknowledges that such claims often involve factual questions that complicate the granting of summary judgment.
The determination of whether a work environment violates Title VII due to hostility is a factual issue, best resolved by a jury, particularly in cases of ambiguous conduct. Courts have established that hostile work environment claims involve mixed questions of law and fact, and summary judgment is only appropriate when the law leads to one reasonable conclusion based on undisputed facts. Disagreements among reasonable jurors regarding the impact of alleged harassment on a reasonable employee’s working conditions indicate that legal resolution is inappropriate.
In this case, Defendants argue that the Plaintiff has not sufficiently demonstrated conduct that a jury could deem "objectively severe or pervasive." They cite specific instances of alleged name-calling and mockery by an individual named Robinson, arguing these do not constitute actionable insults, particularly in relation to the Plaintiff's disability. Defendants acknowledge only a single instance of criticism regarding the Plaintiff's perceived slowness and claim that such comments do not connect to the Plaintiff's disability. Additionally, they assert that the Plaintiff's conflicts with Robinson do not indicate hostile treatment linked to his disability, as the negative behavior described was reportedly consistent among all employees.
The Plaintiff contests the Defendants' assertions and presents additional allegations of discriminatory treatment that the Defendants do not adequately address. He recounts multiple instances where Robinson mocked him in front of customers, noted his physical limitations, and made derogatory comments regarding his condition. The Plaintiff argues that these behaviors were not isolated incidents but part of a broader pattern of discriminatory conduct during his employment.
Lewis alleges that Robinson's treatment of him at Blackman was consistently hostile and related to his disability, countering Defendants' claim that such behavior was unrelated to his condition. Lewis claims Robinson mocked and ridiculed him because of his disability, asserting that the abusive treatment continued from previous employment. Defendants argue that Lewis's affidavit detailing multiple incidents of misconduct contradicts his deposition, where he reportedly identified only one additional incident of abuse. However, upon review, it becomes clear that Lewis was not asked to provide a comprehensive list of incidents, thus his affidavit does not contradict his deposition. Additionally, Defendants dismiss Lewis's allegation of Robinson's taunts involving a "shovel" and "bag of fertilizer" as irrelevant and non-actionable. Nevertheless, the Court emphasizes that the determination of whether conduct constitutes actionable harassment is typically a factual question for a jury, referencing that judges are not ideally positioned to assess the nuances of workplace behavior. Overall, the ambiguity surrounding the conduct in question suggests that summary judgment may be inappropriate.
A hostile-work-environment claim under the ADA has been recognized, with the Court denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim due to a genuine dispute regarding the alleged hostile environment faced by the Plaintiff. Defendants also sought summary judgment on Plaintiff's federal and state labor-law claims, which assert violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York Labor Law concerning unpaid minimum wage and overtime. The claims arise from Plaintiff's employment at both Ridgewood and Blackman, but Defendants challenge the allegations of Blackman's indirect liability for labor-law violations tied to Ridgewood.
To prevail, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Blackman is a successor-in-interest to Ridgewood, with both parties agreeing on this requirement. The Court notes that, under New York law and common law, a corporation acquiring another's assets generally does not inherit its liabilities. The Second Circuit has not established a definitive test for successor liability in FLSA cases, but courts typically apply either a common-law or a substantial-continuity test. The Court finds that, regardless of which test is applied, disputed factual issues exist that could support a finding of successor liability.
Under the common-law test, liability can exist if the buyer assumed the predecessor's liabilities, if there was a merger, if the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the seller, or if the transaction was designed to evade obligations. The Court does not need to choose between the tests due to the presence of these disputed factual issues.
Resolution of Defendants' Motion pertains to the second and third exceptions to successor liability, specifically the "de facto merger" and "mere continuation" theories, which require proof of "continuity of ownership" between predecessor and successor corporations. In this case, continuity of ownership is absent because Blackman purchased certain assets of Ridgewood through Sovereign Bank during a bankruptcy proceeding, rather than directly from Ridgewood. The documentation confirms that Blackman acquired assets through cash transactions, resulting in no shareholders of Ridgewood becoming shareholders in Blackman. Courts have consistently ruled that continuity of ownership is not satisfied in asset purchases made solely with cash. Consequently, Plaintiff cannot establish successor liability under the common law, leading the Court to grant Defendants' Motion. Additionally, the substantial-continuity test involves analyzing nine factors, but this aspect is not elaborated in the excerpt.
Successor liability is contingent upon several factors, with critical emphasis on two primary conditions: 1) the successor must have had notice of the claim prior to acquisition; and 2) there must be substantial continuity in business operations before and after the sale. Key considerations include whether the successor company was aware of any charges or lawsuits affecting the predecessor, the predecessor's ability to provide relief, and the degree of continuity in business operations, including use of the same workforce, supervisory personnel, working conditions, machinery, and product offerings.
Notably, courts emphasize that the notice of claims is a "critical" factor for establishing successor liability, as outlined in *Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc.* and supported by *Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc.* The burden lies with the plaintiff to demonstrate that the successor had notice of potential claims before the acquisition. In the case at hand, the plaintiff failed to prove that Blackman had notice of his Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claim prior to purchasing Ridgewood’s assets in 2010, as the claim was not raised until October 2011, and no formal complaints were filed before the acquisition. Consequently, the plaintiff did not establish any material facts to support a claim that Blackman had notice of potential liability.
Plaintiff contends that Blackman was aware of potential wage violation claims against Ridgewood due to changes made in the pay structure upon Blackman's employment, shifting from a salary model with no overtime to an hourly wage system that recognized overtime. Plaintiff argues that Blackman's decision was influenced by recent investigations and findings of liability from the federal and New York State Departments of Labor regarding unpaid overtime for Assistant Managers. Plaintiff claims these wage orders indicated to Defendants that their Assistant Managers were entitled to overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
However, the argument is undermined by a lack of evidence showing that Blackman had actual or constructive knowledge of any violations by Ridgewood. The submitted documents from federal and state investigations specifically targeted Blackman and did not mention Ridgewood, failing to establish that Ridgewood was under investigation or had violated labor laws. While Blackman may have been generally aware of labor law obligations, there is no evidence suggesting it was aware of any non-compliance by Ridgewood. Furthermore, payroll records submitted by Plaintiff, which indicate potential unpaid overtime, do not pertain to Ridgewood and date from after Blackman's acquisition of the company. Although Plaintiff claims that Blackman altered Ridgewood's wage scheme due to knowledge of prior violations, there is insufficient evidence to support this assertion, as changes were likely part of integrating Ridgewood's operations into Blackman's existing practices rather than a response to alleged violations.
Blackman implemented a wage scheme after acquiring Ridgewood, which undermines the Plaintiffs' argument that Blackman had prior knowledge of labor-law violations. The Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Blackman was aware of any potential claims against Ridgewood at the time of purchase, relying on unsupported, conclusory statements rather than concrete evidence. Additionally, there is no indication that Ridgewood was aware of any claims, as none of the submitted wage or investigation records pertained to Ridgewood. The assertion that former Ridgewood owners' positions at Blackman implied knowledge of potential claims is insufficient without evidence that these owners were aware of any violations prior to the sale. Even if they had such knowledge, their employment at Blackman after the sale does not imply that Blackman was informed of any potential claims beforehand. The context of the asset purchase occurring within a bankruptcy proceeding further weakens the argument for notice, as such transactions typically lack successor liability unless specific notice of liabilities exists.
In Steinbach v. Hubbard, the Ninth Circuit declined to impose successor liability due to time constraints related to an ongoing bankruptcy that undermined the notice requirement's primary purpose, which is to allow successors to negotiate terms that mitigate liability. The court emphasized that imposing such liability would negatively affect the interests of the parties involved and conflict with the policies of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the principles supporting capital transfer. Similarly, in Douglas v. Stamco, the Second Circuit noted that public policy concerns opposed successor liability in bankruptcy transactions, as it could disrupt the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code and hinder the goal of maximizing asset value for creditor recovery. Consequently, the court determined that the plaintiff failed to present a genuine dispute regarding material facts concerning labor-law claims against Defendants Blackman and OCPG, leading to a grant of summary judgment on those claims. However, the court denied the motion for summary judgment concerning the plaintiff's federal and state disability-discrimination claims. The court requested the Clerk to terminate the pending motion, confirming that the plaintiff's prior settlement with Weinstein did not affect claims against Ridgewood, which remains a defendant in the case. The court also noted that Ridgewood did not join Blackman’s and OCPG’s motion and clarified that the standard for liability under New York state law aligns with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) standards.
New York state disability discrimination claims follow the same legal standards as federal ADA claims, as established in Rodal v. Anesthesia Grp. of Onondaga and Gill v. Maul. The Court will not separately address the state-law claim. The Plaintiff advocates for a mixed-motive analysis instead of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, arguing that direct evidence of discrimination supports this approach. Under mixed-motive analysis, if a discriminatory factor is shown to be a motivating part of an employment decision, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the decision would have been made regardless. The Second Circuit has occasionally acknowledged the applicability of mixed-motive analysis in ADA claims, aligning it with precedents from other circuits. However, post-Gross v. FBL Financial Services, there is uncertainty about the viability of mixed-motive claims under ADA Title II, with some district courts questioning the precedent set by Parker v. Columbia Pictures. Despite this, the Court finds it unnecessary to resolve the mixed-motive issue, as the Plaintiff has met the more rigorous requirements of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
In Berkowitz v. Cnty. of Orange, the court emphasizes that a plaintiff's burden under the mixed-motives approach to establish a prima facie case is heightened relative to the McDonnell Douglas framework. The defendants assert that the plaintiff did not meet the fourth requirement of demonstrating notice of his disability and a request for reasonable accommodation. The court clarifies that Harpster’s awareness of the plaintiff's disability suffices for establishing notice under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Case law supports this notion, with precedents indicating that an employer’s awareness of an employee’s perceived disability meets the notice requirement for ADA claims.
Moreover, under New York law, once an employer is aware of an employee's disability, failure to engage in the interactive process is a violation, independent of the existence of a reasonable accommodation. The court references a nine-factor test for assessing successorship in labor contexts, noting factors such as the successor company’s notice of the charge, operational continuity, and workforce similarities. The plaintiff provided evidence of prior investigations into labor-law violations against Blackman, distinguishing it from Ridgewood, thereby supporting claims of relevant operational continuity.
The Supreme Court upheld a lower court's determination that a successor company was aware of ongoing unfair labor practice litigation when it acquired a business, primarily because a manager from the predecessor company retained his position and may have informed the successor about the litigation prior to the sale. The case cited involved evidence that the manager was aware of and had actively engaged with the litigation, including authorizing significant legal fees. In contrast, the current case lacks evidence showing that Ridgewood executives were aware of any actual or potential claims. The plaintiff's counsel argued against summary judgment based on precedents where courts found unresolved factual questions regarding knowledge of wrongdoing; however, the court found no genuine disputes regarding the successor’s notice in this instance. Additionally, when a successor acquires assets from a bankrupt entity, courts focus on the purchase documents and the policies of bankruptcy law, allowing for asset purchase agreements that explicitly negate successor liability claims. Bankruptcy court orders can prevent existing claimants from pursuing successor liability against the purchaser, as outlined in relevant statutes and case law.
Purchasers can acquire assets without accompanying liabilities, as established under 11 U.S.C. § 363(f), which allows for sales free and clear of claims that could otherwise impose successor liability. In this case, the bankruptcy court's order for the sale of Ridgewood's assets to Sovereign Bank explicitly stated that the sale was "free and clear of all liens, claims, and encumbrances." Furthermore, the agreement between Sovereign Bank and Blackman stated that Blackman would not assume any liabilities from Ridgewood, including any pending litigation. The court did not determine whether these documents alone would absolve Blackman from successor liability but noted they suggest Blackman lacked notice of the Plaintiff's potential claim. The Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that either Blackman or Ridgewood was aware of the claim prior to the asset purchase. Defendants clarified that their motion does not address direct claims against them for unpaid wages but only concerns indirect claims related to alleged successor liability from Ridgewood. The scope of the order is thus limited.
