Court: District Court, S.D. California; September 29, 2014; Federal District Court
Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs totaling $1,671,197.27, as well as additional fees incurred for this motion, has been partially granted and partially denied. The case originated from a lawsuit filed by Maurizio Antoninetti against Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. in 2005, alleging violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and California disability access laws due to the layout of restaurant serving areas. A second related class action was filed in 2006, and a third class action was initiated in 2008 by plaintiffs represented by the same counsel.
After a bench trial, Antoninetti won part of his case but was denied injunctive relief due to Chipotle's updated compliance measures. Following an appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of Antoninetti, prompting the lifting of stays on the class actions. Antoninetti passed away in 2011, and his widow continued the case. Although class certification was denied, a global settlement was negotiated, which consolidated multiple related cases. Chipotle agreed to pay reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as part of this settlement.
The named plaintiffs received $225,000 in damages, and previous awards for attorneys' fees and costs related to the individual case totaled $898,549 before the current motion. The background indicates ongoing litigation related to ADA compliance and settlements involving various plaintiffs and cases against Chipotle.
The pending motion seeks compensation for fees and costs related to putative class actions under the settlement agreement. Under 42 U.S.C. 12205, the "prevailing party" in an ADA action may recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs at the court's discretion. California's disability access laws also entitle the prevailing plaintiff to fees. The lodestar method is used to determine reasonable attorney’s fees, calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. Excessive, redundant, or unnecessary hours should be excluded from this calculation. Hourly rates are based on prevailing market rates in the relevant community, irrespective of whether the representation is by private or nonprofit counsel. The plaintiff must provide evidence that requested rates align with those in the community for similar services, which can be substantiated through attorney affidavits or rate determinations from other cases. The relevant community is typically where the district court is located, and the defendant may present evidence to dispute the hourly rates claimed. Fee applicants must exclude excessive hours and present detailed time records to justify their claims. There is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee, which can only be challenged by competent rebuttal evidence.
In Stonebrae L.P. v. Toll Bros., the court emphasized that when a party achieves an excellent result, it should not reduce the lodestar amount for attorney fees. However, adjustments to the lodestar may be made based on factors from Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., including time and labor, novelty of legal issues, required skill, potential preclusion of other employment, customary fees, fee structure, time constraints, case outcomes, attorney expertise, case desirability, client relationship length, and comparable case awards. The most critical factor is the degree of success obtained. The court also noted that it can implement percentage cuts to the claimed hours to eliminate excess hours from fee applications.
The evidentiary section of the document highlights the complexity of the motion, which includes numerous declarations and objections from both parties. Plaintiffs requested judicial notice of documents from a related case, but the court clarified that it cannot take notice of the contents of filings from other proceedings without formal evidence introduction. It acknowledged the existence of the related case but stated that the expert declarations from that case could only be admitted as evidence under Rule 702, not through judicial notice.
Defendant's objections to the relevance of data used by Mr. Pearl are overruled by the Court, which finds that Mr. Pearl's declarations meet necessary criteria for admissibility, referencing precedent that methodological flaws affect weight rather than admissibility. The Court also affirms that William M. Hensley's Declaration complies with Rule 702, dismissing Plaintiffs’ general objections.
Defendant challenges specific exhibits related to billing records from Amy B. Vandeveld's declaration, asserting they lack proper authentication. Vandeveld claims Exhibit 13 details costs from both individual and class actions, while Exhibits 14, 15, and 16 represent billing statements from specific actions, which she affirms are accurate. The Court determines these statements, supported by affidavits under penalty of perjury, meet personal knowledge and authentication requirements, overruling hearsay objections as well since the records qualify under the business records exception.
Further objections under various Federal Rules of Evidence are noted, but the Court finds no significant prejudice affecting admissibility. It acknowledges that experts can rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence for their opinions, negating the need to address all remaining objections as they do not influence the Court’s decisions.
Regarding the reasonable hourly rates, Plaintiffs seek $525 and $620 for Mr. and Ms. Vandeveld, respectively. The Court previously set Ms. Vandeveld's rate at $400 in an earlier ruling, considering her expertise, success, and the nature of the fee, and maintains this analysis due to the similarity of the cases and attorneys involved.
The Court determined that Mr. Vandeveld's hourly rate is reasonable, finding no significant change in the local prevailing rates for disability litigation services, aside from inflation. An adjustment for inflation will be made, increasing the awarded rate by five percent, resulting in an hourly rate of $420 for Plaintiffs’ counsel. The Court deemed the requested rate of $125 per hour for paralegal work reasonable. During the relevant period, negotiations and motion practice occurred, with Plaintiffs' counsel documenting 2,033.2 hours worked—494.4 by Thomas Vandeveld and 1,538.8 by Amy Vandeveld. The Defendants opposed the fee request, alleging that Plaintiffs’ counsel treated the case as a "cash cow" and engaged in excessive litigation, suggesting a significant reduction in hours claimed, citing issues like duplicative billing and inefficiency. The Court noted the potential for a discretionary reduction ("haircut") of up to 10 percent based on the excessive nature of the requested award. The parties also contested whether the time spent litigating terms of injunctive relief was reasonable, with skepticism expressed regarding the necessity of securing an admission of liability and declaratory relief.
On July 3, 2012, a hearing on fees was held concerning the individual Antoninetti case, during which Plaintiffs had previously moved for class certification on April 18, 2011. The Court denied the certification motion on August 28, 2012, determining that the claim for injunctive relief was moot based on a Ninth Circuit ruling, the absence of high counter walls in California Chipotle restaurants since 2009, and evidence from the Defendant that no Chipotle had counter walls exceeding 36 inches. The Court also dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief as moot, citing the Ninth Circuit's prior ruling against Chipotle on ADA violations, which barred relitigation of that issue.
Defendant argued that Plaintiffs’ counsel were aware that the problematic conditions at specific locations had been remedied by July 2010, and that representative plaintiffs had confirmed these changes by January 2011. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs maintained that the scope of remedial actions was uncertain until early 2011, necessitating further work on the class actions, including confirming remedy status before finalizing settlements.
The Court decided to exclude hours spent on unnecessary litigation efforts beyond January 18, 2011, when it should have been evident that pursuing injunctive relief and class certification was no longer productive. Although the Defendant had not confirmed all remedial actions statewide, the Court found the continued litigation excessive.
Billing statements revealed significant hours spent on class certification, with Ms. Vandeveld dedicating over 242 hours and Mr. Vandeveld at least 91.4 hours specifically to these issues. Mr. Hensley recommended excluding a substantial amount of both attorneys' billed hours for excessive or unnecessary work. The Court concurred with Mr. Hensley to some extent, agreeing to exclude certain hours based on these findings.
The Court determined that the time spent on class certification after January 18, 2011, was excessive, excluding 194.8 hours from Ms. Vandeveld and 62.4 hours from Mr. Vandeveld from the lodestar calculation. Approximately 77 hours of reasonable time spent on class certification remains included. Regarding fees on fees, recoverable costs associated with pursuing attorneys’ fees are recognized, with plaintiffs requesting compensation for over 265 hours on the pending motion. Mr. Vandeveld billed 59.6 hours for the motion, plus an additional 75.5 hours in response to opposition filings. Ms. Vandeveld billed 132 hours at a paralegal rate for preparing related documents. Chipotle contends this amount is unreasonable, citing previous motions as templates, and the Court agrees, finding much of the work duplicative and inefficient. Consequently, the Court deducts 35.1 hours from Mr. Vandeveld and 72 hours from Ms. Vandeveld, capping recovery to 100 attorney hours and 60 paralegal hours for the motion. The Court emphasizes the need for billing judgment to exclude unnecessary time, noting that some duplicative billing has already been addressed. Specific examples of duplicative work were identified, including 24.9 hours billed by Ms. Vandeveld in 2010 concerning jurisdiction over Perkins, which overlapped with the Antoninetti class action.
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ billing records exhibit excessive conferencing between counsel and potential witnesses. The Court identifies specific billing entries by Mr. Vandeveld as excessive or poorly documented, including: 7 hours on August 20, 2010; 4 hours on August 26, 2010, for an uncorroborated call; 2.2 hours on October 1, 2010, for travel and a meeting not supported by Ms. Vandeveld’s billing; and 1.2 hours on February 1, 2013. Consequently, the Court strikes 1.8 hours from Mr. Vandeveld’s bill for the October meeting.
Regarding administrative tasks, the Defendant claims overbilling for notifying class members. The Court concurs, finding that 98.9 hours spent by Amy Vandeveld on these tasks should be billed at a paralegal rate of $125 per hour. An additional 17.3 hours of similar work in July 2013 will also be adjusted to this paralegal rate.
Both parties accuse each other of prolonging settlement negotiations. Despite Mr. Hensley’s assertion that much of Ms. Vandeveld’s time from September 6, 2012, to November 1, 2013, was unnecessary, the Court does not exclude settlement-related activities from the lodestar calculation, except for those adjusted for drafting and notice tasks. The adjusted lodestar totals 1,461.5 attorney hours and 176.2 paralegal hours.
The Court declines the Defendant's request for a further reduction based on vague billing entries, suggesting that a discretionary reduction could address such issues. The final lodestar amounts are: Amy Vandeveld—1,070.9 hours at $420/hour, totaling $449,778; Thomas Vandeveld—390.6 hours at $420/hour, totaling $164,052; and paralegal work—176.2 hours at $125/hour, totaling $22,025, resulting in a combined lodestar of $635,855.
The Court has considered the Kerr factors for potential adjustments to the lodestar, including the skill required, the contingent nature of the fee, customary regional fees, and the experience of Plaintiffs’ counsel, but will not re-evaluate these factors for further adjustments.
The parties did not indicate any relevant time constraints from clients or case circumstances, leading the Court to evaluate the factors of amounts involved and results achieved. Under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, a lodestar multiplier may be applied when litigation involves contingent risk or extraordinary legal skill. While the Plaintiffs sought a 1.5 multiplier, citing the time, risk, and success achieved, the Court found no justification for enhancement, noting the modest settlement relative to the time spent and the straightforward nature of the claims, especially in light of existing Ninth Circuit rulings.
The Court also examined the Plaintiffs' claim that their lawsuits served as a catalyst for Chipotle's policy changes, determining that the Plaintiffs did not prove their lawsuits motivated the defendant nor achieved relief through legitimate threat of victory. Although Plaintiffs successfully obtained $10,000 in damages for each individual, they failed to show that class litigation yielded synergistic benefits or additional nonmonetary relief. The Court noted that the Plaintiffs had already been compensated for their successes, thereby ruling out any enhancement as it would result in double-dipping.
On the Defendant's side, Chipotle requested a 60% reduction in the lodestar due to limited success, arguing that the relief achieved was minimal compared to the overall scope of the litigation. The Court's consideration of the relief obtained compared to sought damages aligns with this request.
The Court evaluates the degree of success of the plaintiffs by comparing the overall relief obtained to the reasonable hours expended. Factors considered include the nature of claims won versus dismissed, the awarded damages relative to the sought amount, and whether the suit benefited the public. The determination of fee reductions is based on practical experience rather than a strict formula. In this case, the plaintiffs' initial complaint included six counts but only two counts (ADA and Unruh Act claims) were relevant due to dismissals. Class certification was denied, and while plaintiffs secured monetary awards for individuals, there was no additional non-monetary benefit. The benefits to the public stemmed from previous rulings, not this case. Thus, the Court finds the plaintiffs' success limited and their fee request excessive, noting that the outcomes were mixed, with substantial time spent on claims that did not yield additional relief for the class. A prior case resulted in a 25% reduction for similar reasons, and here the Court concludes that much of the work undertaken was not essential given the limited relief achieved.
The Court determined that the plaintiffs’ lodestar for attorneys' fees was excessive given the limited success achieved, warranting a fifty percent reduction. Consequently, the total fee award was set at $317,927.50. This adjustment reflects that while the plaintiffs had favorable outcomes for individual claims, considerable time spent on the case was disproportionate and not necessary for the results attained. Additionally, the plaintiffs sought $19,824.77 for litigation expenses, which was unopposed by the defendant and deemed reasonable by the Court. In conclusion, the Court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs, awarding a total of $337,752.27, which includes both the fees and costs. The Clerk of Court was instructed to enter judgment for the plaintiffs in this amount and to close the case docket as no outstanding issues remained.
An order dated July 17, 2012, awarded $545,079.05 in attorneys' fees and costs in case No. 05-1666. In a separate ruling on August 28, 2012, the court denied class certification in case No. 06-2671. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, expert testimony qualifies as scientific knowledge if it is based on sufficient facts, employs reliable principles and methods, and applies these methods to the case facts. The court conducts a preliminary assessment to ensure the expert's analysis adheres to scientific standards, referencing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc.
In the related Antoninetti case, the Ninth Circuit upheld hourly rates between $475-$500 for the same attorneys, but the defendant did not provide rebuttal evidence on these rates. In the current motion, however, Mr. Hensley's opinion is properly submitted. The court noted that communications regarding remedial measures took place in January 2011, with no argument from the defendant that class certification or other forms of relief were unrelated claims, thus treating them as part of the same case.
When calculating fee reductions, the court ensured no double-counting occurred, as per Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles. The court adjusted the lodestar figure to reflect a lack of success by striking unreasonable hours related to class certification (257.2 out of over 333 hours), while other unsuccessful claims were not similarly adjusted.
