Court: District Court, D. Connecticut; September 30, 2014; Federal District Court
Ray Victor Boyd, a pro se incarcerated plaintiff, filed claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and state law provisions against thirty-nine defendants. The court previously dismissed several claims, including those under the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments, specific Connecticut statutes, and provisions of the Connecticut Constitution, as well as claims against certain defendants. However, the First and Fourteenth Amendment claims under § 1983, RLUIPA deprivation of religion claims, and some state law claims were allowed to proceed against specific defendants.
The remaining defendants sought to dismiss the § 1983 claims for monetary relief against them in their individual capacities under Rule 12(b)(6). The court outlined its legal standard for evaluating such motions, emphasizing that it accepts factual allegations as true and draws inferences in favor of the plaintiff. The court's review is limited to the allegations in the complaint and relevant documents, focusing on whether the plaintiff has provided sufficient facts to support his claims rather than the likelihood of success. It applies a plausibility standard, requiring that the complaint state a plausible claim for relief, while also liberally construing pro se complaints.
Pro se filings are to be interpreted liberally, allowing complaints to meet less stringent standards compared to those drafted by attorneys, as established in Burgos v. Hopkins. The plaintiff identifies as a member of the Nation of Gods and Earths (NGE) and alleges that from October 2008 to July 2009, he was denied participation in religious services while incarcerated at Garner Correctional Institution. After being transferred to MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution from July 2009 to December 2012, he claims continued denial of congregate religious services, refusal to allow him to purchase religious headwear, and restricted access to a religious newspaper. He seeks monetary damages from various defendants in their individual capacities.
The defendants have moved to dismiss the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that: (1) Assistant Attorney General Steve Strom is protected by absolute immunity; (2) the allegations regarding retaliatory transfer do not warrant relief; (3) claims of lost property do not constitute violations under the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) there is insufficient evidence of the defendants' personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations; and (5) they are entitled to qualified immunity.
Regarding absolute immunity, defendants assert that Strom is shielded because his actions were performed as an Assistant Attorney General. The plaintiff counters that Strom's advice to the Director of Religious Services was unrelated to his official role. Absolute immunity is recognized as rare and applies to actions intimately associated with the judicial process, extending to assistant attorneys general in civil actions defending the state. The burden lies with the official claiming immunity to demonstrate its applicability for the specific function performed. The plaintiff has indicated that Bruno referred his religious requests to Strom for evaluation.
The plaintiff claims that the review and advice on his religious requests fell outside the normal duties of an Assistant Attorney General. The defendants argue that Assistant Attorneys General, appointed by the Attorney General under Conn. Gen. Stat. 3-125, operate under the Attorney General's supervision regarding legal matters involving the state. Defendant Strom has represented correctional officers, including defendant Bruno, in cases involving inmate religious claims and has consulted with Bruno on the plaintiff’s requests for collective worship by NGE members. The defendants assert that communications between Strom and Bruno regarding these requests were reasonable, as they pertained to a similar issue being litigated in the Brewer case, which was filed after the communications occurred.
The court notes that the Second Circuit does not grant absolute immunity to state officials for providing advice prior to litigation, reaffirming that such advice only qualifies for qualified immunity. Consequently, the court concludes that Strom is not entitled to absolute immunity for his advisory role concerning the plaintiff’s requests from December 2008 to April 7, 2011. However, after April 8, 2011, when Strom officially represented Bruno in Brewer, his actions are deemed part of his advocacy role, qualifying for absolute immunity. Thus, the motion to dismiss is granted for Strom’s actions post-April 8, 2011 but denied for the period before that.
Regarding the retaliation claims, the defendants contend that the plaintiff's assertion that his transfer from Garner to MacDougall in July 2009 was retaliatory is overly broad and should be dismissed. To establish a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his conduct was constitutionally protected and that it was a significant factor in the alleged retaliatory action by prison officials.
Claims of retaliation require specific factual support rather than mere conclusory statements, as established in Flaherty v. Coughlin. The plaintiff alleges that defendants transferred him to MacDougall in July 2009 in retaliation for his religious practices but fails to provide facts to substantiate this claim. Consequently, the motion to dismiss this retaliatory transfer claim is granted, while other retaliation claims remain.
Regarding property claims, defendants argue that the plaintiff's allegations about property loss or destruction do not warrant relief, and the plaintiff did not counter this argument. He claims that rejected volumes of The Five Percenter newspaper were lost and that he incurred costs due to these losses. The Supreme Court's precedents indicate that the Due Process Clause is not violated if a state provides an adequate remedy for lost property. Connecticut has such remedies, allowing inmates to seek compensation for lost or damaged property through the Department of Correction's Lost Property Board and the Claims Commissioner. The plaintiff has not contested the adequacy of these procedures, leading to the dismissal of his property claims.
In terms of personal involvement, several defendants seek dismissal on the grounds that the plaintiff has not demonstrated their personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional actions. The plaintiff contends that he has adequately alleged their involvement. To succeed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish personal involvement in the constitutional violations, as supervisory liability cannot be based solely on subordinate actions.
To establish personal involvement of a defendant in unconstitutional acts, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) direct participation in the acts; (2) failure to address a known wrong; (3) creation or approval of a policy that led to the violation; (4) gross negligence in supervising involved officers; or (5) failure to act on information regarding the conduct. An affirmative causal link between the supervisory inaction and the plaintiff's injury must also be shown. The Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal limits liability to the supervisor's own actions, raising questions about some previous supervisory liability criteria set forth in Colon, which the Second Circuit has not re-evaluated post-Iqbal. The defendants argue that certain individuals (Murphy, Dzurenda, Frey, Farrell, LaJoie, Weir, Hynes, Rinaldi, Marcial, and Aldi) cannot be held liable for their subordinates' actions. The plaintiff's correspondence with Dzurenda and Marcial indicates these defendants acted on his requests concerning collective worship, thus lacking personal involvement. Additionally, Rinaldi's involvement is insufficiently alleged, as he was only noted in correspondence without evidence of direct involvement or knowledge regarding the plaintiff's request for an NGE crown.
The motion to dismiss is granted for defendants Dzurenda, Marcial, and Rinaldi due to insufficient allegations of personal involvement. Defendant Aldi responded to the plaintiff's inquiry about purchasing an NGE crown but did not ultimately resolve the request, which the plaintiff claims was unanswered. Defendant Frey is alleged to have unlawfully rejected copies of The Five Percenter newspaper and responded to related grievances, indicating sufficient involvement in violations of the plaintiff's First Amendment rights. Defendant Farrell allegedly denied the plaintiff's requests for televised NGE programming and collective worship, constituting a violation of his First Amendment rights.
Defendant Peter Murphy is implicated for being aware of the plaintiff's requests and grievances regarding collective worship and access to the newspaper, supported by documentation. Defendant LaJoie is also sufficiently involved as he responded to a grievance about collective worship. Defendant Weir is alleged to have played a role in placing the NGE on the Disruptive Group List and banning certain newspaper issues. Defendant Hynes reportedly ignored multiple requests for collective worship, despite being informed through letters from defendant Bruno, indicating awareness of potential constitutional violations.
Consequently, the motion to dismiss is denied regarding 1983 claims against Aldi, Frey, Farrell, Peter Murphy, LaJoie, Weir, and Hynes. The defendants argue that the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege personal involvement of defendants Beaudry, Kelly, Manley, DeGennaro, Corl, Paine, Boland, and Walker, arguing that failing to respond to a letter or grievance does not demonstrate involvement in First Amendment violations. However, precedent from the Second Circuit suggests that a reasonable inference can be drawn that the officials received and read the plaintiff's complaints, warranting denial of the motion to dismiss for these defendants.
The plaintiff claims that defendants Beaudry, Kelly, Manley, and Paine participated in the designation of the Nation of Gods and Earths (NGE) as a disruptive group. Defendants Kelly, DeGennaro, Manley, Corl, and Walker were involved in forming the Media Review Board, which rejected or banned multiple issues of *The Five Percenter Newspaper*. Additionally, defendant Boland allegedly denied grievances related to the plaintiff's requests for collective worship, access to the newspaper, and an NGE crown. The court finds that the plaintiff has adequately alleged violations of his First Amendment rights by these defendants, thus denying their motion to dismiss based on lack of personal involvement.
Regarding qualified immunity, the defendants assert that even if their actions violated the plaintiff's rights to practice his NGE beliefs, they are protected from liability. The plaintiff contends that the defendants recognized the NGE as a religion, making qualified immunity inappropriate. Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability unless their actions violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would know. The court evaluates if the plaintiff's allegations demonstrate a constitutional violation and if that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. A negative finding on either point grants immunity.
The Supreme Court allows district courts to choose which prong of the qualified immunity analysis to address first based on the case's specifics. For a right to be "clearly established," it must be evident to a reasonable official that their actions violate that right, with existing precedent placing the issue beyond debate. The defendants argue that their decisions regarding the NGE were not objectively unreasonable based on the law at the time. The rights of inmates to attend religious services and receive religious materials were already established as of 2008.
Defendants argue that there is no established constitutional protection for Five Percenter literature, headwear, or collective worship, and the status of the Nation of Gods and Earths (NGE) as a dangerous group remains unresolved. They cite evidence of violence associated with NGE members in New York prisons, including specific incidents over the past twenty years, suggesting that Five Percenters engage in organized criminal activities and intimidate rival groups. Although some evidence indicated that Five Percenters were involved in violent disruptions, the court denied summary judgment on First Amendment grounds due to unresolved factual issues regarding the link between the banned religious materials and violence.
Defendants claim that their denial of the plaintiff’s right to collective worship was consistent with judicially approved protocols related to the NGE. They maintain that, as neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has recognized the NGE as a religion, their actions regarding monitoring NGE materials and denying the plaintiff's religious exercise did not constitute a legal violation.
The court partially granted the motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity regarding the plaintiff's First Amendment claims for monetary damages. It concluded that absolute immunity applies to defendant Strom for actions taken after April 8, 2011, while denying it for actions taken before that date. The motion was granted concerning the retaliatory transfer claim against several defendants and for the plaintiff's property loss claims related to The Five Percenter newspaper. Additionally, the court granted the motion regarding First Amendment claims against some defendants due to lack of personal involvement but denied it for others.
The motion is granted regarding qualified immunity for all defendants concerning the First Amendment religion claims in their individual capacities. Claims of retaliation against specific defendants, including Arnone, Bruno, Peter Murphy, Frey, DeGennaro, and others, remain viable in individual capacities. Additionally, claims for injunctive relief under the First Amendment and RLUIPA against the same defendants in their official capacities are also preserved. Furthermore, claims under Conn. Gen.Stat. 52-571b and Article First, Sections 3, 14, and 20 of the Connecticut Constitution remain against the same individuals in their individual capacities. The document lists the names and titles of these defendants, including various commissioners, wardens, and other officials. The plaintiff asserts that the defendants' decisions to label the NGE as a disruptive group, deny congregate worship, and restrict access to The Five Percenter newspaper were retaliatory actions taken against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. The factual allegations are derived from the Amended Complaint and its exhibits.
