Court: District Court, N.D. Georgia; September 19, 2014; Federal District Court
Defendant Jasen Minter's objections to Magistrate Judge Vineyard’s Report and Recommendation (R. R.) are addressed by District Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. The R. R. recommends denying Minter’s motion to dismiss the indictment and finds him competent to stand trial. The district judge is required to conduct a thorough review of the R. R., especially where objections are raised, which necessitates a de novo evaluation of specific contested findings. Objections must be specific; vague or general objections are disregarded to focus on genuinely contested matters. The judge can also choose not to consider arguments not presented to the magistrate judge.
After reviewing the R. R. and the objections, the court concludes that the tolling order regarding the statute of limitations applies to both of the government's foreign assistance requests under 18 U.S.C. 3292, confirming that the indictment is timely. Additionally, despite Minter's claims of amnesia, he is deemed competent to stand trial.
The background reveals that Minter and Sergeant First Class Louis Nock, both U.S. Army finance officers stationed in Saudi Arabia, are accused of embezzling over $2.7 million from U.S. government accounts at the Saudi American Bank (SAMBA). They allegedly misappropriated large cash withdrawals intended for the USMTM finance vault for personal use. Audits conducted by the Department of Defense uncovered the missing funds, linking discrepancies to their tenure as finance officers.
Significant unexplained income and cash purchases of real property and tangible assets by the Defendants and their families were identified following their return to the U.S. Minter and Nock are indicted on multiple counts: conspiracy to commit theft of government property (count one), embezzlement of government property (counts two and three), and concealment of stolen government property (counts four and five). Each count is subject to a five-year statute of limitations, which was set to expire on various dates between 2011 and 2012. The investigation, led by Special Agent David Outlaw from the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, required assistance from Saudi Arabian authorities, including requests for interviews with specific bank employees. Despite the lack of response from Saudi Arabia, the Government applied to toll the statute of limitations on October 19, 2011, which was granted by the Court under 18 U.S.C. 3292, allowing the limitations period to be suspended during the foreign request process. Minter and Nock were ultimately indicted on May 1, 2012. The Government argues that it met the conditions for tolling the statute, while the Defendants claim otherwise. The Court ruled in favor of the Government, affirming that the indictment was timely. Section 3292 allows for the suspension of the statute of limitations when evidence is sought from a foreign jurisdiction, provided the Government demonstrates that an official request has been made and that the evidence was believed to be in that jurisdiction at the time of the request.
A suspension period under this section commences on the date of the official request and concludes when the foreign court or authority acts on that request. The overall suspension for an offense cannot exceed three years and may not extend the initiation period of a criminal case by more than six months if foreign authorities finalize their actions before the original expiration. The Government filed for a suspension of the statute of limitations, supported by sworn declarations from Agent Outlaw and attorney Dan Stigall, detailing an investigation and official requests for interviews with six SAMBA employees in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). The Court, finding sufficient evidence of an official request and potential evidence in the KSA, tolled the statute of limitations starting February 28, 2011, the date of the first request. While the defendants do not contest the tolling's appropriateness, they question whether the October 2011 request falls within the tolling order's scope and when the tolling ultimately concluded. The Court confirmed the October 2011 request was included in its tolling order, as the application must be supported by credible evidence rather than unsworn statements. Both requests, from February and October 2011, were documented and considered, leading the Court to determine that the statute of limitations would remain tolled until a complete response was received from the KSA or for a maximum of three years. The defendants assert that the KSA's response on September 25, 2011, which included summaries for five employees, constituted 'final action.'
The statute of limitations for the case expired around March 25, 2012, making the May 1, 2012 indictment untimely. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) provided incomplete interview summaries for only five of the six requested bank employees in September 2011. The Government should have sought a court extension for the suspension period instead of assuming the KSA's response was final. In a referenced case, Torres, the Government received an incomplete response from the Isle of Man but did not request an extension, leading the Eleventh Circuit to note that the Government should not unilaterally determine the completeness of foreign responses. The court established that 'final action' occurs when a foreign authority fully responds to all items in the Government's request. The KSA's response did not address the interview request for Mohammed Al-qassim, leaving it open and unfulfilled. Courts have cautioned against allowing prosecutors to decide when 'final action' has occurred, emphasizing that the inability to locate a witness does not grant the Government the right to indefinitely toll the statute of limitations.
Section 3292(c)(1) establishes a three-year limit on the suspension period of the statute of limitations to prevent excessive prosecutorial discretion. The Court found that the Government's application to suspend the statute included both requests from Agent Outlaw; therefore, the KSA has not provided a definitive response regarding Mohammed Alqassim. As such, the statute remained tolled until February 2014, making the May 1, 2012 indictment of the Defendants timely.
Regarding Minter's competency to stand trial, he challenges the magistrate judge's finding due to retrograde amnesia resulting from a 2009 car accident, which covers the years of the alleged crimes. After a thorough review of medical records, evaluations, and testimony from a competency hearing, the Court concluded that Minter's amnesia, while unusual, does not definitively indicate malingering. The Court evaluated whether Minter could consult with his lawyer and understand the proceedings, affirming that he meets the competency standard. Amnesia does not automatically render a defendant incompetent; the Court must consider individual circumstances, including Minter's ability to testify, the permanence of his amnesia, and the overall strength of the Government's case. Minter demonstrated an understanding of the charges and effectively communicated during the hearing, indicating his capability to participate in his defense.
Minter claims he cannot testify regarding the events related to the indictment due to memory loss. However, a defendant is not mandated to testify, and Minter's situation is comparable to other defendants facing memory impairments. The court recognizes that although retrograde amnesia often resolves, Minter's memory has not improved over the past twenty years, raising questions about whether his amnesia is permanent or temporary. A continuance could potentially aid a defendant with temporary amnesia; however, it would be detrimental for a competent defendant with permanent amnesia, as it could hinder witness recall and complicate the defense.
The court notes that the alleged crime and Minter's actions can be reconstructed without his direct testimony. The Government is willing to provide access to discovery materials that would assist Minter's counsel in preparing for trial, including financial records, bank reports, and witness testimonies. Minter's defense can conduct an independent investigation and has received the Government's evidence, which should enable him to reconstruct the events in question. The court emphasizes that while the defendant's recollection is valuable, there are multiple sources of evidence available. Minter's arguments regarding the admissibility of certain documents and the potential difficulty in securing witness testimonies do not undermine the available evidence that could allow for a reconstruction of the alleged crimes. Finally, Minter's request for a detailed account of the Government's evidence is noted, emphasizing that a strong case against him may lessen the need for his own testimony.
The Court does not require overwhelming evidence for its findings, emphasizing that strong circumstantial evidence links the defendant, Minter, to the crime. Key evidence includes emails and eyewitness accounts confirming Minter and co-defendant Nock's withdrawals, with Minter's signature on the corresponding slips. A financial investigation revealed a shortfall in USMTM accounts that aligns with Minter's 2006 withdrawals. Additionally, Sonya Nock reported receiving DHL packages of cash in 2007 shortly after the withdrawals. Investigations also uncovered significant, unexplained cash deposits and purchases by the defendants and their families during that timeframe.
The Court determines that Minter is competent to stand trial, having consulted with counsel and understanding the proceedings. It adopts the Report and Recommendation, denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment. The Eleventh Circuit follows Fifth Circuit precedents, maintaining a clear-error standard for reviewing magistrate legal conclusions. An official request for legal assistance was made by the U.S. Department of Justice to Saudi Arabia, with delays noted in correspondence and responses. While the KSA provided interview summaries in response to the U.S. request, it did not include any information about Mohammed Al-qassim, a relevant figure in the investigation.
The Court recognizes that the Government referred to its requests to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) as a singular request in its application, specifically citing a February 2011 request, while Agent Outlaw's declaration indicated a second request made in October 2011. The Court finds no evidence suggesting the Government misrepresented the submission of this second formal request through the U.S. Embassy's legal attaché. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3292, a district court's authority to suspend the statute of limitations hinges on two factors: (1) whether an official request was made, and (2) whether that request pertains to evidence believed to be in the requested country. The investigator's sworn declaration provided sufficient detail regarding the investigation and holds evidentiary weight. A singular tolling order from the district court paused the statute of limitations until all pending requests were adequately responded to, despite some requests being completed and others still outstanding. In Torres, the Government's application did not mention follow-up requests, and the court ultimately ruled that supplemental requests fell within the scope of the original request since they sought items covered by it. The court emphasized that the statute's purpose is to streamline the admissibility of foreign-kept business records and facilitate the evidence-gathering process. The defendants contended that the KSA's response indicated final action; however, the Court stated that final action should be evaluated objectively based on the completeness of the responding country's submissions, not on its subjective opinion. The dissenting opinion in Jones criticized the subjective standard previously employed, stating it undermines Congressional intent by complicating the process of obtaining evidence from foreign governments.
