Safa v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktienge-Sellschaft, Inc.

Citations: 42 F. Supp. 3d 436; 2014 WL 4274071Docket: No. 12-cv-2950 (ADS)(SIL)

Court: District Court, E.D. New York; August 28, 2014; Federal District Court

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On February 14, 2012, Jamal M. Safa initiated a damages lawsuit against Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, Inc. under the Montreal Convention and related laws including the Warsaw Convention and relevant U.S. statutes. Lufthansa filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint, which was granted. The factual background indicates that Lufthansa has established policies and procedures for responding to medical emergencies on flights, detailed in a Flight Safety Manual. Flight crews are contractually required to be familiar with these protocols, which include notifying relevant crew members, attending to the passenger, retrieving medical equipment, and seeking onboard medical assistance. The purser, responsible for managing the situation, communicates with the cockpit crew and documents the incident in an Emergency Report, which records symptoms and treatments provided. The report does not need to be shared with the pilot, as the purser manages the information flow during the flight.

The Lufthansa Flight Safety Manual emphasizes that, when feasible, an emergency report should be completed by the treating doctor. If a doctor is unavailable, the flight crew must document key health indicators, such as the passenger's pulse, blood pressure, general appearance, and chest pain symptoms. International SOS (ISOS) provides support to some Lufthansa flights, enabling communication between medical personnel and the crew to assist in decision-making regarding potential diversions. However, during the November 2011 incident, Lufthansa's policies did not mandate contacting ISOS if a doctor was on board.

Section 5.8 of the Flight Safety Manual outlines symptoms of a heart attack, including chest tightness, anxiety, shortness of breath, and irregular pulse, and recommends administering nitroglycerin if a heart attack is suspected. It further states that if the patient's condition does not improve, an intermediate landing should be planned. Lufthansa's training emphasizes that the suggestion of a heart attack is a life-threatening situation, necessitating a diversion. Ultimately, the flight captain has the authority to decide on diversions, not the onboard doctors.

On November 12, 2011, the Plaintiff was on Lufthansa Flight LH427 from Philadelphia to Beirut, seated in 35D. About three hours before landing, the purser, Katja Poggenpohl, was informed of a medical emergency involving the Plaintiff, who was found lying in the aisle and complaining of chest pain. Following protocol, Poggenpohl relocated the Plaintiff to a safer area and requested assistance from any on-board doctors. Two to three physicians responded, providing care that included checking vital signs, starting an IV, administering nitroglycerin and other medications, and using a defibrillator. Although one physician was experienced in emergency medicine, none were board-certified cardiologists. The Plaintiff displayed signs of distress, including sweating and anxiety.

Dr. Graf, not present on the flight, indicated that the Plaintiff's symptoms—chest pain, pallor, and cold sweats—could suggest several medical issues, such as high blood pressure, vasovagal episode, or anxiety. Emergency reports recorded by Poggenpohl noted the Plaintiff's pulse was 87, deemed normal by the attending physicians, although Lufthansa's Flight Safety Manual defines a normal pulse as 60-80 beats per minute. The physicians also confirmed normal blood pressure and heart rhythm but contemplated the possibility of a heart attack. Poggenpohl informed Captain Gerhard Fischer about the medical situation, describing symptoms of chest pressure, pallor, sweating, and fear. Fischer received documentation indicating chest pain and circulatory collapse, with an "excited pulse." Despite this, he was unaware of the Plaintiff's distressing symptoms, which would have prompted him to seek further confirmation from the physicians.

At the time of the report, the aircraft was about one hour from Ireland and three to three and a half hours from Frankfurt. Fischer considered rerouting to Dublin or London and communicated with Frankfurt airport about a potential heart attack situation. Attempts to contact an independent doctor via a satellite phone were unsuccessful due to technical issues. Initially, Poggenpohl updated Fischer that the situation appeared stable, leading Fischer to decide against diverting the flight, opting instead to arrange for an ambulance and emergency doctor upon landing in Frankfurt.

Upon landing, the Plaintiff was transported by ambulance but suffered a cardiac arrest that required six defibrillator shocks. He subsequently underwent surgery to replace a stent and was placed on a ventilator under hypothermic treatment.

On February 14, 2012, the Plaintiff initiated a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, which was subsequently transferred to the Eastern District of New York. The Plaintiff seeks damages under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention, claiming that the Defendant's actions exacerbated his injuries during an incident on Lufthansa Flight LH427. The Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on June 30, 2014, arguing that the Plaintiff's medical episode did not qualify as an "accident" under the Montreal Convention and that the Defendant did not act negligently, limiting any potential recovery to "Special Drawing Rights" as per Article 21(2)(a).

In response, the Plaintiff clarified that he is not arguing the episode itself constituted an "accident" or that the Defendant's training was deficient, but rather that the Defendant's failure to follow its own procedures worsened his condition. The standard for summary judgment requires the court to determine if there is no genuine issue of material fact, viewing evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must provide specific facts to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial, rather than relying on speculative claims. If the evidence is insufficient for a reasonable jury to rule in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment is appropriate.

The Montreal Convention, which supersedes the Warsaw Convention, aims to balance limited liability for air carriers with the need to protect consumer interests and ensure equitable compensation in international air travel.

The Montreal Convention and the Warsaw Convention share many similar provisions, allowing courts to reference Warsaw Convention case law when interpreting the Montreal Convention. Notably, Article 17 of the Montreal Convention parallels Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, stipulating that an air carrier may be liable for passenger bodily injuries if the accident occurred on board the aircraft or during boarding or disembarking. The Supreme Court defines "accident" as an unexpected or unusual event external to the passenger, which should be assessed flexibly considering surrounding circumstances. Medical complications arising from a passenger's own conditions do not qualify as "accidents" under the Montreal Convention, as established in cases where heart attacks were deemed non-external events. Additionally, failures by airlines to provide adequate medical assistance do not constitute "accidents" unless accompanied by unexpected circumstances. However, an airline's unexpected response to a medical emergency can qualify as an "accident," as seen in a case where the failure to move an asthmatic passenger from smoke resulted in death. The Supreme Court's analysis in Olympic Airways illustrates that a decision to ignore imminent danger to a passenger could be deemed an unusual event, highlighting the distinction between routine responses and those that deviate from expected care standards.

Courts have established that a "medical emergency" aboard an aircraft can be considered an "accident" under the Montreal Convention if the flight crew deviates from established procedures in their response. In the case of Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, a passenger experienced a heart attack shortly after takeoff, but the crew did not divert the flight after consulting an onboard doctor, contrary to standard protocol. The court denied the airline's summary judgment motion, suggesting that failure to follow internal policies during a medical emergency could qualify as an "accident."

In a subsequent trial, Fulop II, the court found no deviation from policy by the crew, who had acted in accordance with Lufthansa's procedures during a medical emergency on Flight LH427. The purser, Poggenpohl, gathered medical equipment, summoned physicians, and communicated their assessment, which indicated that the situation was not life-threatening. Although the plaintiff argued that a heart attack is inherently life-threatening and necessitates a diversion, the court concluded that the decision not to divert rested with the pilot, Fischer. The plaintiff acknowledged that diversion is not mandatory in every medical emergency, emphasizing the need to assess the overall situation and consider the safety of all passengers and crew. Ultimately, the court determined that the crew's actions aligned with Lufthansa's policies and did not constitute an "accident" as defined by the Montreal Convention.

Section 5.8 of the Flight Safety manual outlines procedures for handling symptoms of "Angina Pectoris/Heart Attack," indicating that an intermediate landing must be "planned" if initial measures fail, but not necessarily executed. The Plaintiff’s assertion that his condition warranted an immediate diversion misinterprets Lufthansa’s policies. Testimony from Fischer supports the policy that an intermediate landing only needs planning if the situation does not significantly improve. The Plaintiff also criticizes Poggenpohl for misreporting medical details to Fischer, claiming this, alongside Graf’s testimony regarding information transfer to the pilot, qualifies the incident as an "accident" under the Montreal Convention. However, the complaint fundamentally questions the adequacy of the crew's medical response, not their adherence to policy, which cannot substantiate a claim under the Convention. The Court concludes that the inability to connect with the ISOS hotline did not represent a significant policy deviation, as contacting the hotline was not mandated at the time. Citing precedents such as Sook Jung Lee v. Korean Air Lines, the Court finds no material factual dispute regarding the Flight LH427 crew’s compliance with procedures, leading to the conclusion that the Plaintiff cannot demonstrate the injuries resulted from an "accident" as defined under the Montreal Convention. Consequently, the Court grants summary judgment to the Defendant, dismissing the complaint and directing the case to be closed.