Ghrist v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc.

Citations: 40 F. Supp. 3d 623; 42 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2438; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116393; 2014 WL 4187177Docket: Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-1544

Court: District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania; August 21, 2014; Federal District Court

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Christopher William Ghrist is the plaintiff in a legal action against a defendant that allegedly misidentified him in news broadcasts regarding criminal activities associated with another individual, Christopher Wayne Ghrist. The defendant is accused of using the plaintiff's photograph instead of the other Ghrist's, leading to significant personal distress, defamation, and a false public image. The plaintiff claims this misidentification has subjected him to ridicule, emotional distress, and has harmed his reputation, prompting him to seek various forms of monetary and non-monetary relief. 

The plaintiff's amended complaint includes four counts: 'False Light/Invasion of Privacy' (Count I), 'Defamation' (Count II), 'Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress' (Count III), and 'Abuse of Official Process' (Count IV). The first three counts arise from the wrongful publication of his likeness alongside reports of the other Ghrist’s criminal actions, while the fourth count alleges that the defendant's motion to dismiss the case constitutes an abuse of the legal process due to the defendant's prior misidentification practices.

The court is currently considering the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, having reviewed the relevant documents. In assessing the motion, the court must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in his favor. The plaintiff asserts that between October 15, 2011, and at least October 31, 2013, the defendant made false statements that harmed him, stemming from a case of mistaken identity. The plaintiff details the significant impact this misidentification had on his life, including over 110 communications from various individuals reacting to the news broadcasts, which caused personal upheaval, including the loss of custody of his child.

The Plaintiff notified the Defendant of a mistake regarding the unauthorized use of his photograph, but the Defendant continued to use it until shortly after the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit for False Light/Invasion of Privacy in state court on October 4, 2013. The Defendant removed the case to federal court on October 24, 2013, citing diversity of citizenship and subsequently moved to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. The Plaintiff sought to amend his Complaint, which was granted, leading to the filing of an Amended Complaint on November 26, 2013, introducing additional claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and abuse of official process.

In addressing the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint’s Counts I and II, which pertain to false light/invasion of privacy and defamation, the Defendant argued that these claims are barred by Pennsylvania’s one-year statute of limitations. Pennsylvania law does not recognize a continuing tort theory and follows the single publication rule, which stipulates that any publication is treated as a single event for limitations purposes. The Plaintiff contended that the Defendant's ongoing use of defamatory statements and lack of corrective action justified his claims. Pennsylvania law mandates that claims for defamation or invasion of privacy must be filed within one year of publication, and the single publication rule prevents endless statute of limitations triggers due to updates or links on websites.

A link and reference to an article do not constitute its republication. The lawsuit was filed in state court on October 4, 2013, making any claims based on publications before October 4, 2012, time-barred. The Plaintiff alleges that his photograph was first published in October 2011 and continued to be available until October 31, 2013, due to its presence on the Defendant’s website. The Defendant argues that all claims are barred by Pennsylvania’s 'single publication' rule (42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 8341(b)), which the Court of Appeals has confirmed applies to internet publications, emphasizing the importance of a clear statute of limitations timeline. Minor updates to online content do not constitute a new story unless they involve substantive changes. The Plaintiff contends that the article’s accessibility through search engines increased the audience for the defamatory material; however, case law indicates that only the original publication triggers a cause of action in Pennsylvania, and ongoing availability does not equate to republication. This principle was reinforced in Graboff v. Am. Ass’n of Orthopaedic Surgeons, where it was stated that continuous online presence does not lead to multiple liabilities for a single act of publication. The Plaintiff references Pendergrass v. ChoicePoint, arguing that the single publication rule does not apply when defamatory material circulates through a database, but the Pendergrass court noted that this situation mitigates the risks of endless limitations periods and multiple lawsuits due to the restricted audience.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant published a defamatory news article about Christopher Wayne Ghrist, which remained accessible online, contradicting any notion that it was limited to a small audience. The Plaintiff's complaint indicates that there has only been one story about Ghrist since October 15, 2011, which was both broadcast on television and made available on the Defendant's website. Consequently, the statute of limitations for any claims related to this publication, which is set at one year under Pennsylvania law, began on the publication date and was not reset by the article's ongoing online availability.

In regards to Count III, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff has not adequately claimed intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), asserting that the alleged conduct does not meet the threshold of being "outrageous" or "intolerable," and that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate resultant physical harm. The Plaintiff counters that the Defendant's actions were sufficiently egregious under Pennsylvania law and claims to have suffered severe depression and anxiety as a result. However, even if Count III were not barred by the statute of limitations, the Plaintiff has not met the necessary legal standards for IIED, which requires demonstrating that the Defendant’s conduct was extreme, caused severe emotional distress, and was intended to cause such distress or was known to likely cause it. Thus, the one-year statute of limitations applies, leading to the dismissal of Count III.

Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) requires conduct that is extreme and outrageous, surpassing all bounds of decency, as established in Reedy v. Evanson. A plaintiff must demonstrate suffering resulting physical harm due to the defendant's actions, supported by competent medical evidence. The excerpt outlines that the Plaintiff alleged the Defendant published an inaccurate photograph linked to a news story about another individual, disregarding the Plaintiff's complaints for over two years, which allegedly harmed his reputation and caused severe emotional distress. However, the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint lacks any claims of physical injury or competent medical evidence to substantiate such claims. While the Defendant's conduct could potentially be egregious, it ultimately fails to meet the legal standards for IIED due to the absence of necessary physical harm.

Additionally, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's claim of abuse of official process lacks legal foundation. The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant is misusing the legal process by seeking dismissal while ignoring wrongful acts. To establish an abuse of process claim, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that the Defendant (1) used legal process against the Plaintiff, (2) for an improper purpose, and (3) caused harm. The criteria for abuse of process, as defined in McGee v. Feege, require a clear demonstration of these elements, which the Plaintiff must argue effectively to proceed.

In Count IV, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant's continued publication of defamatory statements and refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing, despite the Plaintiff's notifications and a lawsuit, warrant Rule 11 sanctions and indicate a perversion of legal procedure. However, the Amended Complaint fails to establish a valid abuse of process claim, lacking allegations that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was used for an unlawful purpose or caused the Plaintiff harm. Consequently, Counts I through IV of the Amended Complaint are dismissed with prejudice, as they cannot be amended to cure identified deficiencies. The statute of limitations, which is one year for tort claims related to harmful publications, applies to Counts I, II, and III. The Plaintiff's reference to the Defendant's alleged "unclean hands" does not affect the legal analysis of the Defendant's motion, as this doctrine requires the party seeking relief to have acted inequitably in relation to the claim. Additionally, a complaint cannot be amended through arguments presented in a brief. The Defendant has neither admitted nor denied wrongdoing, as it has only filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the inadequacy of the Plaintiff's allegations under Pennsylvania law. Finally, while a dismissal without prejudice is possible if deficiencies can be cured, the Plaintiff has already amended the Complaint once, limiting the opportunity for further amendment.