United States v. Hung Shun Lin, A/K/A Chang Wu

Citations: 101 F.3d 760; 322 U.S. App. D.C. 87Docket: 95-3164, 95-3172

Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; January 28, 1997; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Hung Shun Lin and Qiu Gao were convicted of hostage-taking under 18 U.S.C. § 1203, with Lin also convicted of two counts of using/carrying a firearm during a crime of violence and possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. On appeal, both challenged the application of the Hostage Taking Act and argued insufficient evidence for the jury's conviction. They also claimed violations of their Sixth Amendment rights due to limitations on cross-examination and improper testimony supporting government witnesses. Lin specifically contended that an erroneous jury instruction regarding firearm use under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) warranted a reversal.

The court affirmed the convictions, finding the facts aligned with the Hostage Taking Act and sufficient evidence supported the jury's decision that Lin and Gao seized and threatened to harm hostages to extort money. The limitation on cross-examination was deemed not an abuse of discretion, as defense counsel failed to justify prejudicial questions. Despite concerns over a law enforcement officer's statement, it was ruled non-prejudicial. However, the court found the jury instruction on "use" under § 924(c) to be erroneous and prejudicial to Lin, leading to a reversal of that specific conviction. Lin's case was remanded for resentencing based on this reversal. 

The background established that on January 21, 1994, Lin, Gao, and two other men entered a Chinatown building, interrogating Sheng Chen about connections in China, with at least two armed individuals present during their assault on Chen and Zhao Qui Li.

Appellant Lin assaulted Chen during questioning, while four intruders subsequently abducted Chen and Li at gunpoint from their apartment. The group briefly stopped at a nearby house before taking the hostages to appellants' residence, where they were handcuffed, beaten, and interrogated about wiretapping phone calls to China. Chen admitted to tapping a line and the captors demanded $10,000 in reimbursement. Unable to provide the sum, they suggested borrowing from relatives. Chen identified Guan Huan Chen as a potential source. Li was allowed to call Liu Hai from a pay phone, asking her to reach Guan Huan Chen, who was informed of the situation and sought assistance from "Stupid Brother," the head of the intruders. After learning that Hung T'ien Gao was responsible, Guan Huan Chen was instructed to wait for contact at a specific location. He later met the hostage-takers and negotiated for Chen and Li's release, ultimately settling on $5,800. Guan Huan Chen communicated with the hostages via walkie-talkie, and they contributed $800 towards their release, with the remainder paid over the following days. Over two months later, Guan Huan Chen reported the incident to the FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service. The FBI executed search warrants at the appellants' residences, discovering wooden poles, a gun, ammunition, handcuffs, and walkie-talkies. None of the involved parties were U.S. nationals.

On May 31, 1994, a grand jury indicted Lin, Gao, and Hung T'ien Gao on multiple charges, including two counts of hostage taking under 18 U.S.C. § 1203, two counts of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), and one count of possession of a firearm by an illegal alien under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) and § 924(a)(2). Hung T'ien Gao pled guilty to some charges, while Lin and Gao went to trial on March 22, 1995, resulting in their convictions for hostage taking. Lin was additionally convicted of firearm-related charges.

The discussion centers on whether the Hostage Taking Act applies to Lin and Gao's actions, which occurred entirely within the District of Columbia without involvement of the U.S. government. Appellants argue their conduct does not constitute international hostage-taking as all involved were non-nationals. However, the application of the Hostage Taking Act is contingent on the nationality of both offenders and victims. The Act does not apply if all parties are U.S. nationals, but the presence of even one non-national invokes its provisions. 

The appellants' claim that the Act was not intended for domestic kidnappings is countered by the statute's clear language, which does not indicate ambiguity. The essential elements of hostage taking—seizure or detention, along with a threat to compel action from a third party—are present in this case, fulfilling the criteria for charges under the Hostage Taking Act.

The Hostage Taking Act was enacted by Congress to align with the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, which exempts purely domestic hostage incidents under specific conditions. Congress intended to allow prosecution for hostage takings involving non-nationals within a single state. Appellants Lin and Gao contended that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate intent to compel a third party, arguing their actions were aimed at collecting a debt from the victims rather than extorting a third party. However, the legal standard for evaluating evidence requires a review in favor of the prosecution, determining if any rational juror could find the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Under 18 U.S.C. 1203, to convict for hostage taking, it must be established that the defendant seized or detained a person and threatened continued detention to compel a third party to act. The Act's language does not differentiate between motivations for taking hostages, allowing for broad application. While the appellants initially sought money from their captives, they later engaged a third party in negotiations for the victims' release, establishing the requisite connection to the third party under the statute. The failure to release the hostages before negotiations reinforced the prosecution's case.

A sum was agreed upon before hostages Chen and Li were released from captivity, where Guan Huan Chen promised to pay the ransom later in exchange for their freedom. At their release, the hostages contributed $800 of their own funds, while Guan Huan Chen later paid an additional $5,000 to Lin. The evidence suggests that the appellants unlawfully detained Chen and Li, threatening continued detention unless payment was made. 

Appellant Lin contended that he was unfairly targeted by Guan Huan Chen due to competition in the gambling business. During cross-examination, Lin's attorney attempted to question Guan Huan Chen about his involvement in gambling, claiming it was relevant to bias and motive. The government objected, prompting the court to seek a basis for the inquiry. Lin's attorney could only reference his client as a witness, leading the court to restrict the line of questioning, citing a lack of sufficient grounds. Lin later moved for a mistrial, which the court denied, allowing for the possibility of recalling the witness if a proper basis was provided.

Lin argued that the court's ruling violated his Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment, but the court maintained that it had the discretion to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination. Legal precedents indicate that while bias is a pertinent topic, defense counsel must establish a reasonable basis for potentially damaging inquiries. The court concluded that limiting the cross-examination did not constitute an abuse of discretion, affirming that effective cross-examination does not equate to unrestricted questioning.

The general principle requires that a questioner must possess factual support for a genuine belief that a witness engaged in the alleged misconduct. In this case, the district court properly limited cross-examination regarding a witness's potential illegal activities, as the defense's proffer lacked specificity and was based solely on vague references to "shady businesses" and the witness's supposed motive to lie. The defense failed to provide sufficient evidence to justify the line of questioning about gambling parlors, and the court provided multiple opportunities for the defense to substantiate its claims, which were declined. The court's actions fell within its discretion to restrict cross-examination to prevent highly prejudicial questioning without a factual basis.

Additionally, appellant Lin aimed to impeach government witnesses by calling FBI Agent Gary Shepard, who testified that omissions in witness interviews might stem from the use of interpreters. Shepard noted that initial interviews often do not capture all relevant facts, particularly with Chinese witnesses, who tend to respond narrowly to direct questions. This exchange suggests that cultural and linguistic factors may influence the completeness of witness testimony.

Objections were raised by Gao's attorney, Ms. Lobo, during court proceedings regarding the judge's questions, which were perceived as seeking to validate the truthfulness of government witnesses. The judge clarified that his inquiries were aimed at understanding the experience of Agent Shepard with non-English speaking witnesses, having served 17 years at the FBI, primarily in counter-terrorism and organized crime investigations since 1980. Agent Shepard indicated that the challenges included both the lack of additional information from witnesses and the order in which information was provided. He confirmed that the core facts provided by witnesses were consistent with investigative findings. 

The appellants contended that the judge's questions improperly bolstered the credibility of the witnesses, which is the jury's responsibility to assess. Previous case law supports that a judge should not induce testimony regarding another witness's truthfulness. However, it is recognized that judges play a crucial role in helping juries comprehend complex evidence. The district judge's questions were reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Although the first questioned phrasing was poorly worded and might suggest an endorsement of the witnesses, any potential error was deemed harmless. The judge promptly clarified the intent of his inquiry, and Agent Shepard did not answer the contentious question directly. Furthermore, jurors were instructed to disregard any perceived biases from the judge's questioning. The second question was reformulated and unobjectionable, focusing on Agent Shepard's experience rather than bolstering witness credibility. Overall, the judge's queries were determined not to have substantially influenced the jury's verdict.

Agent Shepard made a voluntary remark after the court's inquiry about his experience with non-English speaking witnesses, which was neither invited nor anticipated by the court. Although neither attorney objected at trial, the appellants now claim that this comment constitutes a reversible error. The court applies a plain error standard, requiring a finding of (1) error under established law and (2) that it unfairly prejudiced the jury's deliberations. The remark appeared to enhance the credibility of the government's witnesses, which raises concerns about law enforcement's role in bolstering the case, but the court found no plain error in allowing the comment. The defense may have strategically opted not to object to avoid drawing attention to it. The overall evidence against the appellants was substantial, with multiple witnesses identifying them as participants in the hostage-taking, and no credible evidence supported the appellants' defense that the incident was fabricated by business rivals.

Additionally, the jury found appellant Lin guilty of two counts of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. The district judge instructed the jury that having the firearm available for the crime was sufficient for a conviction. However, the Supreme Court's ruling in Bailey v. United States clarified that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) requires proof that the defendant actively employed the firearm during the crime, indicating that mere possession does not meet the legal standard for "use."

Under the supervening-decision doctrine, changes in law occurring after a trial court's judgment can be considered if the law was well-settled at trial. The application of this doctrine led to the conclusion that appellant Lin was prejudiced by erroneous jury instructions regarding the use of a firearm, as established in the Supreme Court case Bailey. The government acknowledged this error, resulting in the reversal of Lin's convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and a remand for resentencing. The government requested a two-level upward adjustment for Lin's remaining convictions based on the Sentencing Guidelines, contingent on a pending decision in United States v. Rhodes, which examines the authority to modify sentences under 28 U.S.C. 3582.

The court affirmed the convictions of other appellants under the Hostage Taking Act, finding sufficient evidence for their charges. It upheld the trial court's discretion in limiting cross-examination of a witness due to a lack of reasonable basis for the questioning. Additionally, a comment made by Agent Shepard did not significantly impact the jury's verdict. The court clarified that despite the absence of an explicit objection from Lin's counsel, the review standard applied would not hinder the preservation of objections raised by co-defendants, concluding that any potential error was harmless. Thus, Lin's convictions under 924(c) were reversed, and the case was remanded for resentencing, pending the Rhodes decision.