Gallimore ex rel. W.S.G. v. Henrico County School Board
Docket: Civil Case No. 3:14cv009
Court: District Court, E.D. Virginia; August 5, 2014; Federal District Court
Defendants Robert A. Turpin III, Assistant Principal, and Diane R. Saunders, Associate Principal, faced motions to dismiss brought by W.S.G., a Hermitage High School student, following a search for drugs on February 11, 2013. W.S.G. raised two counts: a Fourth Amendment violation against the Henrico County School Board and the school administrators, and assault and battery claims under Virginia law against Turpin and the School Board.
The Court granted the motions to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claims against Turpin and the School Board but denied them against Saunders. Additionally, the Court dismissed the assault and battery claims against Turpin and the School Board.
The facts indicate that Turpin and Saunders acted on reports from parents about a student allegedly smoking marijuana. Turpin summoned W.S.G. to Saunders' office without informing him of the reason. During the search, Turpin conducted a pat down and searched W.S.G.'s belongings, while Saunders searched a Vaseline jar, breaking its lid, but finding no drugs.
In analyzing the Fourth Amendment claim, the Court referenced relevant case law establishing that searches by school officials are subject to a reasonableness standard rather than probable cause. The Court found that the search was justified based on credible reports about potential drug use, meeting the requirement for a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing. The scope of the search, including the pat down and examination of W.S.G.'s belongings, was deemed reasonable given the circumstances, as it occurred in a private setting and was not excessively intrusive.
Saunders' search of W.S.G.'s cell phone was deemed unreasonable and exceeded the scope of a permissible search for drugs, as a cell phone could not contain drugs, unlike other items searched. This constituted a violation of W.S.G.'s Fourth Amendment rights. Although the search by another official, Turpin, did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the court noted that qualified immunity could protect Saunders if evidence showed that the search did not violate clearly established law. For qualified immunity to apply, a reasonable officer must have believed their actions were lawful based on the information available at the time. In this case, common sense indicated that a search of a cell phone would not yield evidence of marijuana, thus no reasonable administrator could justify such a search. Consequently, Saunders did not have a sufficient basis for searching W.S.G.’s phone, negating her qualified immunity.
Additionally, W.S.G. alleged a failure to train claim against the Henrico County School Board, requiring proof of three elements: (1) a violation of constitutional rights by subordinates, (2) the supervisor's deliberate indifference due to inadequate training, and (3) a direct causal link between the failure to train and the violation of rights, as established in relevant case law.
A plaintiff can establish the deliberate indifference element of a failure to train claim in two ways: first, by demonstrating that policymakers were aware of and accepted a pattern of constitutional violations; second, by showing a supervisory authority's failure to train employees on an obvious constitutional duty that they are likely to encounter. This alternate theory of liability applies only when the constitutional right is clear and regularly faced by subordinates. The plaintiff, W.S.G., failed to provide sufficient facts regarding deliberate indifference, lacking evidence of a pattern of violations or a failure to train in an obvious area of need. Consequently, the School Board is dismissed as a defendant in the Fourth Amendment claim, with the option for W.S.G. to amend the complaint if he has supporting facts.
Regarding the assault and battery claim against Turpin and the School Board, a legal justification for the act negates the claim. Turpin's search of W.S.G. was based on a reasonable suspicion of illegal drugs and was not excessively intrusive, rendering it legally justified. Thus, the Court dismisses the assault and battery count against Turpin, which also absolves the School Board from liability.
The Court partially grants and denies the defendants' motions to dismiss: it denies the motion regarding the Fourth Amendment violation against Saunders but grants the motion to dismiss against Turpin and the School Board and the assault and battery charge. W.S.G. has ten days to file a motion to amend the failure to train claim. The Court emphasizes that it views the allegations in the light most favorable to W.S.G., who only needs to show a plausible claim for relief at this stage. The complaint acknowledges that W.S.G. had long hair, but does not provide grounds for justifying the search of his phone, although Saunders may later assert additional facts that could support her actions.
