Court: District Court, D. Maine; August 11, 2014; Federal District Court
The order affirms the Recommended Decision of Magistrate Judge Jon D. Levy regarding various motions in the case involving Hartt Transportation Systems, Inc. and former employee John Stark. The Magistrate Judge's Recommended Decision was filed on April 1, 2014, and objections were made by the defendant on April 18, 2015. A hearing took place on July 31, 2014, with legal representation for both parties present. After a thorough review, the District Judge accepted the Magistrate Judge's recommendations.
The case involves Stark's three claims against Hartt: (i) disability-based discrimination and breach of confidentiality under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), (ii) retaliation under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA), and (iii) retaliation under the Maine Whistleblower’s Protection Act (MWPA). Hartt sought summary judgment on these claims and also moved to prohibit Stark from relying on certain additional facts in opposing the summary judgment.
The Magistrate Judge's recommendations include granting Stark's motion for partial summary judgment concerning violations of ADA confidentiality provisions related to disclosures made on December 13 and 15, 2010, but denying it otherwise. The recommendations also partially grant Hartt's motions, denying claims related to ADA confidentiality provisions for a disclosure made on October 7, 2010, and other ADA examination provisions, while granting summary judgment on Stark's MWPA retaliation claim and part of the ADA discrimination claim.
Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when the moving party demonstrates no genuine dispute regarding any material fact, entitling them to judgment as a matter of law. A dispute is deemed genuine if reasonable evidence could allow a jury to favor the nonmoving party, while a fact is material if it could influence the litigation's outcome. The moving party must show an absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s claims, with the court viewing the record favorably towards the nonmoving party.
If the moving party establishes that no genuine issues exist, the nonmoving party must present specific facts in appropriate evidentiary form to demonstrate trial-worthy issues. This process remains unchanged by cross-motions for summary judgment, which are assessed separately, maintaining the standard under Rule 56 and requiring the resolution of factual disputes in favor of the nonmovant.
Local Rule 56 outlines procedures for presenting evidence in summary judgment motions. The moving party must submit a numbered statement of undisputed facts, each backed by record citations. The nonmoving party must respond with a concise statement admitting, denying, or qualifying each fact, also supported by citations. They may present additional facts, which the movant must address. Noncompliance with these rules can lead to serious consequences, including the automatic admission of uncontroverted facts and potential disregard of unsupported statements. The court is not obligated to consider any part of the record not specifically referenced in the parties’ statements.
Stark was employed by Hartt as an over-the-road (OTR) driver from October 8 to December 17, 2010. Prior to his employment, he underwent two physical examinations: a DOT examination by Dr. Kevin Flanigan on October 6, 2010, which deemed him fit for work, issuing a two-year DOT medical certificate; and a post-offer job placement assessment (JPA) at Central Maine Conditioning Clinic (CMCC) on October 7, 2010, where he was classified as 'green,' indicating he met the job's physical demands. Notably, the JPA was distinct from the DOT examination, and Stark did not complete a DOT exam at CMCC. Hartt's employment offers were contingent upon meeting both the DOT and JPA requirements, which were separate processes.
CMCC faxed the JPA results to Hartt, showing no need for accommodations or restrictions. On December 9, 2010, Stark expressed to Hartt employees his intention to consult his VA doctor due to pain he experienced. Subsequently, on December 13, 2010, at Hartt's request, Stark underwent another medical examination at CMCC, which cleared him to return to work the same day, with the results also faxed to Hartt's HR.
Hartt typically requires a fit-for-duty evaluation report from the evaluating company, as evidenced by the report received on December 13, 2010, concerning Stark. Roberta Murphy, Hartt's safety manager, indicated that it was normal for Rogers to receive such reports. Rogers arranged Stark's fitness-for-duty examination after being informed of his readiness to return to work. Hartt sought this examination on December 18, 2010, to confirm Stark's capability to perform job functions. The CMCC report stated Stark could safely return to work and did not indicate any need for accommodations or restrictions. The report also referenced Stark's October 7, 2010, pre-employment physical, where he did not disclose cervical injuries. Following the report, Rogers and Murphy discussed Stark's lack of disclosure during his pre-employment assessment. Murphy contacted Bob Brainerd of CMCC to inquire why this information was not disclosed. In a phone conversation on December 15, 2010, Brainerd confirmed that Stark had not mentioned his back condition. Rogers documented concerns that Stark's non-disclosure could have affected his hiring. Murphy noted that Stark's medical history could justify termination, as he was symptomatic despite being able to perform job functions. The decision to terminate Stark was made on December 16, 2010. Stark's October 7, 2010, assessment results were recorded in his driver qualification file, which is accessible only to Hartt's Human Resources Department.
Defendant’s motions for partial summary judgment are supported by statements of material facts, which are accepted as true when admitted or backed by record citations. Hartt is a family-owned dry goods motor carrier service established in 1948, with its main office in Bangor, Maine, and terminals in Auburn, Maine; Sumter, South Carolina; and Fulton, Kentucky. It has received recognition for its exemplary safety record annually since 1991.
Stark worked as an owner-operator of a tractor-trailer for four years before becoming a Hartt employee in October 2010. He maintained a commercial driver’s license (CDL) and a DOT card, and had no mental or physical issues affecting his driving prior to his employment with Hartt. Stark briefly drove for Hartt as an owner-operator before choosing to leave for more time at home. Upon his hiring as an OTR truck driver, he was dispatched from the Auburn terminal, typically driving for two weeks before returning.
Hartt implements a detailed employee handbook known as the 'Human Resource Directive: Company Drivers,' which includes an eight-hour driver orientation. During this orientation on October 8, 2010, Stark received the handbook and reviewed company policies regarding compliance with disability laws and whistleblower protections. Drivers are encouraged to report any work-related issues without fear of repercussions. The handbook outlines various infractions that could lead to disciplinary action, including dishonesty, falsification of records, policy violations, excessive absenteeism, and tardiness, although these examples are not exhaustive.
Hartt Transportation Systems, Inc. requires employees to be reliable and punctual, expecting attendance on scheduled workdays. Absence for three consecutive days without notification results in the automatic assumption of job abandonment, leading to termination. Employees are informed that decisions regarding employment benefits must not be based on disability or other legally protected characteristics. Stark acknowledged the potential for termination due to policy violations, including dishonesty and excessive absenteeism.
The company's Vehicle and Equipment Use Policy mandates that employees report damaged or defective vehicles promptly to prevent safety risks. The Position Objective and Responsibilities Policy emphasizes the importance of safety and maintenance, requiring daily pre-trip vehicle inspections and reporting of unsafe conditions. Stark confirmed his understanding of these policies and the Safety Manual on October 8, 2010, which outlines comprehensive safety operating procedures, including pre-trip and post-trip inspections, and mandates immediate reporting of any equipment defects. Additionally, the Maintenance Manual provides guidelines for vehicle operation and repair procedures, highlighting that drivers cannot perform their own repairs. Stark, experienced in commercial vehicle operation prior to his employment, was familiar with the inspection processes and requirements.
The Maintenance Manual mandates that all company drivers complete a Vehicle Inspection Report for each tractor and trailer combination, requiring daily reports if the same trailer is used consecutively. Stark received orientation on October 8, 2010, where he learned he must operate vehicles safely and comply with relevant laws, as well as inspect vehicles before use to ensure safety. He was informed about the appropriate contacts at Hartt for repair needs and understood that failing to maintain a vehicle could lead to disciplinary action. Stark studied for his CDL at Northeast Technical Institute and was familiar with the pre-trip and post-trip inspection requirements outlined in both Hartt's Handbook and the Maine CDL Manual.
As a Hartt driver, Stark had to conduct inspections and report safety concerns, completing a Daily Inspection Report (DIR) for any maintenance issues encountered during trips. He had prior experience as a commercial truck driver, including a brief period as an owner-operator for Hartt, and knew he must report any unsafe conditions. Stark drove Unit 9478 and would not operate the truck if he identified a serious defect; instead, he would report it to the Maintenance Department. He acknowledged that a CDL holder cannot drive a vehicle known to have a mechanical defect unless directed to do so for repairs.
Stark claimed that Hartt did not address two mechanical issues—a broken bunk heater and an exhaust leak—promptly. An expert testified that the bunk heater's condition did not violate regulations. Stark reported the exhaust leak multiple times but could not recall specific dates or the timeline for repairs. Although exhaust leaks were frequently reported by Hartt drivers without repercussions, Stark's driver logs and DIR forms did not document any reports of an exhaust leak.
On December 8, 2010, Hartt’s Maintenance Department examined Stark’s truck for an exhaust leak at Stark's request but found none, although they replaced the cab filter. Stetson Reynolds, a witness, did not evaluate whether Hartt properly repaired the vehicle's defects and stated that a defect must be present while operating the vehicle to constitute a violation of regulations. Stark did not express concerns about the safety or compliance of his vehicle during his reports of mechanical issues.
As a commercial truck driver, Stark was required to maintain a Commercial Driver's License (CDL) and a current Department of Transportation (DOT) medical certificate. Before starting orientation, Hartt ensured drivers completed a DOT physical examination, a drug test, and a Job Performance Assessment (JPA). Stark filled out his DOT Physical Examination Report, disclosing a history of hernia repair from 2009, but was not disqualified by the examining physician, Dr. Flanigan, who deemed him fit under DOT standards and issued him a DOT card, which expired in October 2012.
Stark provided Hartt with his DOT Physical Examination Report, as required for company audits. Additionally, for his October 7, 2010, examination through CMCC, Stark was required to complete a Health History Questionnaire, which was used to evaluate his ability to safely perform the job's physical demands.
Stark was mandated to disclose various medical conditions on the Health History Questionnaire, including any work-related injuries, chronic pain, and specific health issues such as back trouble and depression. He only reported a 2009 inguinal hernia repair. The questionnaire included a statement affirming the accuracy of the information provided and the consequences of dishonesty.
On December 6, 2010, Stark expressed interest in transferring from an OTR driver to a regional driver position, which typically allowed for weekends at home. His supervisor, Aaron Wiles, approved the transfer, noting Stark would need to adapt to truck-swapping and occasional trips to New York City. On December 9, Stark informed Hartt’s Safety Coordinator, Cote, about a neck injury and planned to visit his VA doctor. Cote communicated this injury to HR, prompting a requirement for Stark to be medically cleared to return to work.
Stark categorized his neck issue as a "medical instant." On December 10, he submitted a doctor's note indicating a short absence from December 9-11. Consequently, HR scheduled a fitness-for-duty examination for December 13 to assess his ability to safely perform job functions. This evaluation was not standard for all absences; it was specifically required when an employee's condition could disqualify them from holding a DOT card or pose a risk of injury. Rogers mandated this evaluation due to concerns about a potential herniated disc Stark allegedly disclosed, questioning whether his condition could impact his job performance.
On December 13, 2010, CMCC faxed a letter to Hartt indicating that Stark was cleared to return to work following a fitness-for-duty examination, which noted his strength and range of motion were adequate for safe work performance. The letter mentioned Stark's belief that he had aggravated a previous neck injury while driving in snow, despite him not disclosing any cervical injuries during his pre-employment assessment. On December 15, 2010, during a conversation with Brainerd, it was reiterated that Stark was cleared for work and had not reported any prior injury during his job application process.
Stark's employment with Hartt was terminated on December 17, 2010, with no mention of any reported mechanical issues during the termination meeting. Hartt regularly terminates employees for job abandonment, and Stark's phone records indicated he was contacting the Maine Department of Labor during the days leading up to his termination. Throughout his employment, Stark was able to fulfill the physical and mental requirements of the job, with no reported issues from his orientation until December 6, 2010. After his termination, Stark continued working as a commercial driver for various companies, maintaining the necessary licenses and certifications.
Dr. Curtis Hartt, a medical expert, concluded that Stark failed to disclose significant medical conditions during his DOT physical examination that would impact his certification to drive. Dr. Curtis identified inaccuracies in Stark's DOT Physical Examination Report, noting that his medical records indicated undisclosed conditions, including a hernia and degenerative cervical issues with associated symptoms. Dr. Curtis asserted that Stark's misrepresentation of his medical history warranted disqualification from obtaining a DOT medical certificate on October 6, 2010. He emphasized that Stark’s undisclosed medical conditions could impair his ability to safely operate a commercial vehicle.
Dr. Curtis also stated that due to the heavy redaction of Stark's medical records, he could not ascertain the implications of Stark's mental health or medications on his driving qualifications. He suggested that Stark's DOT medical certificate should have been revoked and that a new examination was necessary following Stark's injury in December 2010. Furthermore, he clarified that Stark’s clearance to return to work by CMCC after a fitness-for-duty evaluation did not guarantee qualification to drive a commercial vehicle as assessed by a DOT examiner.
While Dr. Curtis acknowledged that Stark performed essential job functions during a specific evaluation, he was unaware of any radiculopathy symptoms Stark may have experienced while working. He also agreed with the CMCC’s assessment from December 2010 that Stark was fit for duty and expressed no disagreement with their conclusion.
Dr. Curtis concurs with the CMCC's assessment that Stark was physically capable of performing his job duties. He is uncertain if Stark's neck condition has worsened since December 13, 2010, in a way that would prevent him from driving. Dr. Curtis recommends a reassessment by a DOT examiner for Stark to obtain another DOT card. He acknowledges he has not encountered a case where a driver experienced a sudden onset of severe symptoms affecting their ability to drive while on the job. An EMG test conducted on Stark in March 2011 showed only mild nerve impingement at the C7 vertebrae. Dr. Curtis is not aware of any medical issues that would render Stark unsafe to drive and states he has never disqualified a driver solely due to a chronic neck condition. He also asserts that the evaluations conducted by CMCC do not qualify as DOT examinations.
In the context of Stark's complaint, he alleges that Hartt unlawfully discriminated against him based on a perceived disability and violated ADA confidentiality provisions. The ADA allows for medical examinations after a job offer if the medical information is kept confidential and separate from personnel files, with specific exceptions for supervisors, safety personnel, and government compliance officials. Following employment, inquiries about an employee's ability to perform job-related functions are also subject to confidentiality rules. Stark seeks summary judgment on all elements of his ADA breach of confidentiality claim, except for causation, asserting he underwent a pre-employment examination on October 7, 2010, and a fitness-for-duty evaluation on December 13, 2010.
Hartt breached the confidentiality requirements of section 12112(d)(3)(B) by disclosing protected information to its managers through faxes on October 7 and December 13, 2010, and during a conversation on December 15, 2010. While Stark acknowledges a triable issue regarding whether these breaches caused his termination and resulting damages, Hartt does not dispute the applicability of section 12112(d) to the October and December examinations. However, it argues that the disclosures complied with ADA confidentiality standards and claims that any alleged violation did not cause Stark damages.
Stark asserts that section 12112(d) clearly limits the disclosure of medical examination information to three specific scenarios, with only the first potentially applicable here. He contends that Hartt cannot demonstrate that the disclosures fit this scenario, as no examination results indicated he required accommodations. Specifically, the October 7 fax classified Stark as "green" and fit for duty, while the December 13 fax confirmed his fitness to return without mentioning any restrictions. Stark further notes that even if restrictions were present, CMCC provided excessive detail beyond what was necessary. The December 15 conversation was prompted by concerns regarding Stark's failure to disclose a neck condition during his pre-employment physical, which was discussed in detail. Stark references the case of Blanco v. Bath Iron Works Corp., where similar disclosures were deemed potentially violative of section 12112(d)(3)(B) because they did not pertain to necessary work restrictions or accommodations.
The court dismissed the defendant employer's claim that revealing an employee’s dishonesty on a medical questionnaire did not breach the ADA confidentiality provisions. The court emphasized that the ADA safeguards the confidentiality of an employee’s responses, regardless of their truthfulness, asserting that no exception exists for falsehoods in the context of employment entrance exams. Stark contends that a similar violation occurred when CMCC disclosed confidential information about his alleged omissions during a pre-employment exam to Hartt’s human resources on December 13 and 15, 2010. He compares his case to Downs v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., where an employer improperly shared a medical file, ruling that the disclosure did not align with ADA’s permissible uses. Hartt argues Stark overlooks exceptions to ADA confidentiality for disclosures related to work injuries and claims its actions were mandated by federal DOT regulations regarding driver fitness. It asserts that CMCC’s sharing of the results of an October 7, 2010, medical assessment with Rogers was compliant, as it was not disclosed beyond necessary personnel and did not cause Stark any harm since he was hired as a driver. Hartt also claims that the December disclosures were limited to key HR personnel to assess necessary accommodations and compliance with safety regulations, while noting that the fitness evaluation indicated Stark might have aggravated a prior injury, which raised concerns about his qualifications under DOT standards.
Hartt distinguishes its case from Blanco, asserting that it involves an employer's supervening duties under DOT regulations, and from Downs, where a workers' compensation claims representative accessed an employee's full medical file beyond the signed release, particularly regarding an impermissible question about previous claims. Hartt argues that finding a violation of ADA confidentiality would allow DOT drivers to misrepresent their health on pre-employment exams without repercussions, threatening public safety. Stark counters that Hartt has not demonstrated that its actions fall within any acknowledged exceptions to the ADA confidentiality provisions.
The court concludes that Stark is entitled to summary judgment for the disclosures on December 13 and 15, 2010, but Hartt is entitled to summary judgment for the October 7, 2010, disclosure. The October 7 disclosure aligns with EEOC guidance, permitting the sharing of post-offer, pre-employment medical exam results with hiring decision-makers, with the information stored confidentially in a segregated file. In contrast, the December disclosures involved revealing Stark's undisclosed prior neck injury without a valid purpose, as there were no indicated restrictions or accommodations needed, thus failing to meet the ADA's confidentiality exceptions. Hartt's argument regarding the necessity of informing specific personnel is unpersuasive given the lack of documented need for accommodations.
Hartt argues that a December 13, 2010, fax indicating Stark's exacerbation of a neck injury while driving in snow qualifies as a potential work-related injury under workers' compensation regulations. The company asserts that three employees needed knowledge of Stark's injury to decide whether to file an Employer’s First Report of Injury or Disease. Hartt supports its position with references to the EEOC Enforcement Guidance, which permits employers to ask disability-related questions or require medical examinations to ascertain workers' compensation liability, provided they are job-related and consistent with business necessity. Key sections of the guidance emphasize that inquiries should be confined to the specific occupational injury and its implications for performing job functions. However, Hartt does not clarify how CMCC's disclosure regarding Stark's failure to report his neck injury during a pre-employment examination was essential for assessing its workers' compensation liability or Stark's job capabilities, especially since CMCC determined that he could safely perform essential job functions. Additionally, Hartt's argument for summary judgment, based on a Department of Transportation (DOT) defense, is unconvincing, as the ADA allows for such a defense only when compliance is necessitated by federal laws or regulations, which Hartt has not adequately demonstrated.
Congress acknowledged that federal safety regulations would restrict the application of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). According to the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee Report, individuals with disabilities must meet specific physical qualifications under Department of Transportation (DOT) standards to be deemed qualified under Title I of the ADA. Relevant case law, including *Albertson's* and *Campbell*, supports this interpretation. In *Albertson's*, the Supreme Court ruled that an employer could enforce DOT vision standards without needing to justify deviations on a case-by-case basis. Similarly, *Campbell* determined that an applicant's inability to meet DOT standards for grasping the steering wheel disqualified him from a courier position under the ADA.
The *Big Ridge* case dealt with the intersection of ADA confidentiality and federal safety regulations. The court found no conflict when the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) required access to employee medical records for compliance with the Mine Safety Act, asserting that privacy protections were in place and that operators could use the Mine Safety Act as a defense against confidentiality breaches.
Hartt contends that disclosures made in December 2010 were necessary due to DOT regulations, which prohibit employers from allowing unqualified drivers to operate commercial vehicles. It also highlights that providing false information during a DOT physical can lead to the revocation of a medical certificate. Additionally, it is noted that Stark voluntarily disclosed his preexisting neck injury, which was crucial for his supervisors to assess his ability to perform job duties safely and in accordance with DOT requirements.
An employer does not violate the ADA’s confidentiality provisions if an employee voluntarily discloses medical information. In contrast to the Pouliot case, where the plaintiff voluntarily shared the medical data he later claimed was improperly disseminated, Stark did not voluntarily disclose the information at issue, which arose from mandated pre-employment and fitness-for-duty examinations. The December 2010 disclosures were not necessary to determine Stark's qualifications as a commercial motor vehicle driver, as Stark had undergone a separate DOT physical examination. CMCC had conducted a fitness-for-duty examination to assess Stark's ability to safely return to work, despite noting he failed to disclose a preexisting neck injury during his pre-employment exam.
Hartt failed to demonstrate that the December 2010 disclosures were made to evaluate Stark's capability to perform his job under DOT requirements. There is no material issue regarding whether CMCC's disclosures fell under any statutory exceptions or were appropriate for workers’ compensation or DOT purposes. Regarding causation, Hartt seeks summary judgment, arguing that any alleged ADA violation did not result in damages for Stark, who has not shown negative consequences from the October 2010 disclosure. Stark's counsel acknowledged that no damages stemmed from that disclosure, and any adverse action taken by Hartt in December 2010 related to Stark's failure to disclose medical conditions would not incur liability under the ADA, as it was consistent with DOT regulations.
Hartt's arguments for summary judgment cite several cases, including Talbot, McCroskey, and Barnes, which address disability discrimination but do not specifically discuss the interaction between ADA confidentiality provisions and DOT regulations. Hartt has not established a basis for summary judgment regarding disclosures made in December 2010 from a non-DOT pre-employment physical examination as necessary for DOT compliance. The recommendation is to grant the plaintiff's motion concerning disclosures made on December 13 and 15, 2010, deny it otherwise, and grant the defendant's motion regarding the October 7, 2010 disclosure and any ADA examination claims, while denying other aspects.
Regarding Stark's reliance on certain facts in his opposition to summary judgment, Hartt's motion to prohibit reliance on facts solely in Stark's opposing statement is partially granted. Stark's references to those facts are considered only to counter Hartt's claims, not as affirmative support for his opposition.
In Counts II and III of Stark's complaint, he claims retaliation by Hartt under the STAA and MWPA, respectively. Hartt seeks summary judgment, arguing that Stark did not engage in protected activity under either statute and fails to prove causation linking any protected activity to his termination. Stark asserts his actions were indeed protected and that there is a triable issue regarding causation. The conclusion reached is that Hartt is entitled to summary judgment on the MWPA claim, but not on the STAA claim.
Employers are prohibited from discharging, threatening, or discriminating against employees regarding their employment conditions if the employee, in good faith, reports either a suspected legal violation or a health and safety risk. Employees must first report issues to a supervisor and allow the employer a reasonable opportunity to address them, unless they have specific reason to believe that reporting will not lead to prompt correction.
The Maine Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA) protects employees from adverse actions related to reporting suspected violations. While the MWPA does not provide a private right of action, employees can pursue civil action under the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that they engaged in protected activity, suffered an adverse employment action, and that there is a causal link between the two. The burden of proof for this case is not heavy, and if a protected activity is closely followed by an adverse action, an inference of causation arises. The employer then must provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action, while the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of proof regarding causality.
Additionally, under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA), similar protections exist for employees who report violations related to vehicle safety regulations. Discrimination or adverse actions against employees for filing complaints or refusing unsafe work conditions are also prohibited.
Operation of a commercial motor vehicle is deemed to violate regulations if it contravenes U.S. safety, health, or security standards, or if an employee reasonably fears serious injury due to hazardous conditions. An employee's apprehension is deemed reasonable only if a typical individual in similar circumstances would perceive a genuine risk of harm. To receive legal protection, the employee must first request the employer to remedy the hazardous condition and be denied. The Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA) was enacted to promote reporting of safety violations in the commercial vehicle sector, recognizing that employees are often aware of safety breaches but may face retaliation for reporting them. A prima facie case for unlawful termination under the STAA includes demonstrating engagement in protected activity, facing adverse employment action, and establishing a causal relationship between the two. If the complainant establishes this case, the employer can present a legitimate reason for the adverse action, shifting the burden back to the complainant to prove that this reason is a pretext for retaliation.
In reviewing whether Stark engaged in protected activity under the Michigan Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA), it was determined that he did not meet the criteria. Stark's actions were characterized as routine reporting required by Hartt’s policies and Department of Transportation regulations. He did not inform Hartt that he believed it had violated any laws or express safety concerns. Moreover, Hartt addressed the mechanical issues Stark reported, indicating compliance with internal protocols. Stark acknowledged his understanding of Hartt’s policies, which mandated daily inspections and reporting of safety concerns, further solidifying that his actions did not constitute protected activity under the MWPA.
Stark reported mechanical defects in his truck as part of his job, believing they were safety issues. Hartt argues that previous case law (Capalbo v. Kris-Way Truck Leasing and Winslow v. County of Aroostook) established that reports made at an employer's direction are not protected under the Maine Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA). Stark attempts to differentiate his case by asserting that he independently identified deficiencies, unlike the employees in Capalbo and Winslow, who merely reported information at their employer's request. He references Parks v. City of Brewer, arguing that it supports his position by rejecting the notion that job-related reports are unprotected. Stark claims that Hartt's interpretation of the MWPA creates an unwarranted exception for required job reports, which he believes contradicts the statute's plain meaning and leads to unreasonable distinctions among employees. However, the court finds Stark's distinctions unpersuasive, noting that he, like the employees in Capalbo and Winslow, was following Hartt's directive to report mechanical issues. The court emphasizes that Stark's case does not align with Parks as it pertains to the nature of protected activity and the fulfillment of job duties. Hartt also counters Stark's arguments in its reply.
The First Circuit affirmed the decision in Winslow on November 15, 2013, highlighting that in Maine, reports made as part of job responsibilities, especially when instructed by a superior, typically do not qualify as whistleblowing. The court referenced the Fair Labor Standards Act, stating that employees reporting violations as part of their duties are not engaging in protected activity under anti-retaliation provisions. Hartt cited Hall v. Mid-State Mach. Prods., where the Maine Superior Court applied a "manager rule," ruling that a supervisor could not recover under the Maine Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA) for reports made as part of their job. Although Stark is not a manager, this case, along with Capalbo, supports the position that reporting wrongdoing within job duties does not constitute whistleblowing. The argument against this interpretation was deemed unfounded. In Kidwell v. Sybaritic, the Minnesota Supreme Court similarly indicated that a report must be aimed at exposing illegality to qualify as whistleblowing, although it noted that understanding job duties could help clarify intent. The court concluded that an employee tasked with reporting misconduct must demonstrate intent beyond merely fulfilling job responsibilities, especially when reports are made outside normal channels due to unresponsiveness from superiors.
An employee making a report of wrongdoing outside their normal job duties may still engage in protected conduct under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). A reasonable fact-finder could infer that such reports, made from an employment-related obligation, aim to expose illegality. In this case, Stark's reports were part of his assigned job duties and communicated through standard channels. Although Stark argued that Hartt failed to promptly address safety concerns, he did not demonstrate engagement in protected conduct under the Michigan Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA), leading to Hartt being entitled to summary judgment on Count III.
Contrastingly, Stark's activity under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA) was evaluated differently. Hartt contended Stark did not engage in protected activity because he reported only routine mechanical issues and stated he never drove a truck with known defects, thus not reporting a violation. However, Stark countered that Hartt misinterpreted the STAA by suggesting that explicit reporting of a specific violation is necessary for protection against retaliation. The First Circuit in Clean Harbors Environmental Services, Inc. v. Herman established that internal complaints indicating reasonable belief of a violation of motor vehicle safety regulations can constitute protected activity. The court acknowledged the need for adequate notice to employers regarding complaints to fulfill the act's purpose, emphasizing that while overly vague concerns may not qualify, Stark's complaints were sufficiently clear to alert Hartt about the protected activity.
Superiors were aware of the employee’s strict adherence to safety regulations and his refusals to compromise these standards for customer satisfaction. In previous cases, such as Clean Harbors, the First Circuit did not require complaints to be formally structured to qualify as protected activity under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA). The court in BSP Trans did not define the specific conditions under which internal complaints qualify as protected activity. In Manske v. UPS Cartage Services, the court ruled that driver reports about vehicle conditions, mandated by DOT regulations, constituted protected activity, recognizing that drivers are often best positioned to detect safety violations. Hartt argued that Manske was distinguishable because the driver there reported multiple safety issues and explicitly expressed concerns for safety. However, Stark’s counsel contended that the STAA does not require employees to report issues through non-standard channels to qualify as whistleblowers. The Manske court emphasized that the STAA is distinct from the federal Whistleblower Protection Act and highlighted that the employee's assessment of safety impacts is crucial. The court acknowledged that actions deemed protected under the STAA could include completing a Daily Vehicle Inspection Report (DVIR). Furthermore, Hartt's claim that Stark did not engage in protected activity due to the absence of a specific DOT regulation violation was found to be without merit.
Stark contests Hartt's assertion that he never operated his truck knowing it had a mechanical defect. Hartt's motion for summary judgment regarding Stark’s STAA claim fails because it does not prove Stark did not engage in protected conduct. Additionally, Hartt argues that Stark cannot show retaliation for his vehicle maintenance reports was a “but for” cause of his termination or that he was treated less favorably than similarly situated individuals, citing case law that pertains to discrimination claims rather than retaliation. Stark counters that there is a triable issue concerning causation, supported by evidence that he reported unresolved mechanical issues, including an exhaust leak and a broken bunk heater. Despite some evidence being presented only in Stark’s opposing statement of material facts, sufficient grounds exist to raise a triable issue regarding the causation of his termination. Evidence includes Stark’s multiple reports of the exhaust leak and Hartt’s subsequent inability to find the issue after an investigation. Stark also disputes Hartt’s claims about its policies on driving trucks with mechanical defects and its response to reported issues.
Stark contests Hartt's claim that he never operated his vehicle with known mechanical defects, stating that when he reported such issues, Hartt instructed him to continue driving until his route was completed, rather than authorize repairs. Hartt terminated Stark on December 17, 2010, citing abandonment of his job for failing to return to work or respond to his supervisor’s calls from December 14-16, which Stark denies. This situation allows for the inference that Stark's termination may have been linked to his reporting of mechanical defects, potentially indicating retaliatory discrimination.
Hartt seeks summary judgment regarding Stark’s disability discrimination claim under the ADA, asserting Stark cannot demonstrate any of the three necessary criteria: (1) having a disability as defined by the ADA, (2) being qualified for the job with or without accommodations, and (3) experiencing adverse employment action due to his disability. Hartt argues that Stark's neck injury was minor, he does not meet the physical qualifications to drive commercially, and his termination was not due to his alleged disability. Stark disputes these assertions. The legal definition of a disability under the ADA includes actual or perceived impairments that substantially limit major life activities. Notably, an employer may defend against claims under the “regarded as” prong by demonstrating that the impairment is transitory and minor. Ultimately, the court finds that Hartt has not established its entitlement to summary judgment on this claim.
To establish a defense based on an impairment being “transitory” and “minor,” a covered entity must provide objective evidence demonstrating that the impairment meets both criteria. Subjective beliefs about the impairment do not suffice. The definition of “transitory” includes impairments lasting six months or less. In this context, Hartt claims Stark’s neck injury qualifies as transitory and minor since he was only out of work for five days and had been cleared to return. However, Stark counters that Hartt’s own expert labeled his condition as degenerative, which implies a lack of objective evidence supporting the claim of it being transitory.
Additionally, to be considered a qualified individual with a disability, a plaintiff must prove they possess the necessary skills and can perform essential job functions, with or without accommodation. Hartt cites DOT regulations, which mandate medical certification for individuals driving commercial vehicles, outlining specific physical and mental health criteria necessary for safe operation. Hartt argues that Stark has not provided expert testimony to demonstrate his qualification as a commercial driver under these regulations, nor is he qualified to testify on the matter himself.
Dr. Curtis, Hartt's medical expert, testified that Stark's medical conditions would have disqualified him from obtaining his DOT certificate on October 6, 2010, and that Stark's failure to disclose his complete medical history invalidated the certificate. Hartt cited case law indicating that failure to disclose known medical conditions during a DOT physical disqualifies a plaintiff from their position and that individuals unable to meet DOT certification requirements are not considered "qualified" under the ADA. Stark contended that the cited cases were distinguishable and provided evidence, including his own testimony, evaluations by CMCC confirming his fitness for duty, and admissions by Dr. Curtis, to argue that he was indeed qualified. The court found that a triable issue existed regarding Stark's status as a "qualified" individual under the ADA, as he had received a DOT certificate after his examination, which differed from the situations in the cited cases. Additionally, the court referenced the Seegert case, noting that evidence of misconduct does not bar a discrimination claim but may limit damages, and that Stark's testimony raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding his qualifications under the ADA. The court overruled Hartt's objection to Stark's competency to testify about his ability to perform the necessary functions of his job, as Stark claimed he was able to do so except for a three-day leave in December 2010.
Stark, after being terminated from Hartt, has continued to work as a commercial truck driver, holding a CDL and a DOT card. Dr. Curtis confirmed that Stark met essential job requirements during a Job Performance Assessment (JPA) in October 2010 and agreed with CMCC's December 2010 determination that Stark was fit for duty. However, Dr. Curtis noted that a JPA differs from a DOT physical and that Stark failed to disclose certain medical conditions during his DOT examination, which could have affected his certification. Despite admitting uncertainty about whether Stark's medical conditions would render him unsafe to drive, Dr. Curtis indicated that Stark's failure to disclose his medical history might lead to disqualification.
Hartt argues for summary judgment on the grounds that Stark has not established causation for his claim of unlawful discrimination under the ADA, asserting that Stark failed to provide evidence suggesting discrimination based on disability. Hartt contends that even if Stark's termination was related to perceived disabilities, it was lawful since those conditions disqualified him under DOT regulations. Stark counters that he has presented sufficient evidence indicating his termination was based on a perceived disability, creating a triable issue regarding his qualification as a commercial driver under DOT regulations. Thus, the evidence suggests a potential dispute over whether Stark was “qualified” as of December 6, 2010, undermining Hartt's summary judgment motion.
Stark argues he is a qualified individual with a disability and that causation supports his claim. His lengthy argument references facts primarily from his opposing statement of material facts. Despite this, sufficient evidence exists to suggest Hartt terminated Stark due to a perceived disability. Key points include:
1. Hartt had no issues with Stark as of December 6, 2010, when his position change request was approved.
2. On December 9, 2010, Stark informed Cote of a doctor's visit and subsequently provided a note stating he would be out from December 9-11, 2010. A fitness-for-duty evaluation was scheduled for December 13, 2010.
3. Hartt only refers drivers for such evaluations if a condition may disqualify them for their DOT card or pose a self-harm risk. Rogers required this evaluation after Stark allegedly disclosed a herniated disk.
4. The evaluation on December 13, 2010, cleared Stark to return but noted he had aggravated a neck injury while driving in snow and had not disclosed any cervical injuries during his pre-employment assessment.
5. On December 17, 2010, Wiles terminated Stark's employment, claiming job abandonment due to Stark's failure to return calls from December 14-16, 2010, which Stark disputes.
A reasonable fact-finder, considering Stark’s evidence, could conclude that Hartt's termination decision was influenced by a perceived disability, given the lack of prior issues, Stark's medical leave, and the discussions regarding his undisclosed neck injury before his termination.
Stark was terminated two days after an unspecified incident and disputes the rationale provided by Hartt for his dismissal. He has chosen not to pursue his claim of disability discrimination based on having a record of disability, which leads to a recommendation for summary judgment on that claim. However, Hartt has not sufficiently demonstrated entitlement to summary judgment concerning Stark's other disability discrimination claims under the ADA and MHRA.
Regarding punitive damages, Hartt argues that Stark fails to meet the necessary standards to prove that Hartt acted with malice or reckless indifference in its discriminatory practices. Under federal and state law, punitive damages can be awarded if an employer's actions show a perceived risk of violating discrimination laws, or if the employer acted with malice. Hartt asserts a good-faith affirmative defense, citing its anti-discrimination policies and employee training. However, Stark contends that Hartt does not qualify for this defense, arguing that a mere written policy is inadequate without demonstrated implementation and enforcement. The First Circuit has established that effective execution of anti-discrimination policies is essential to avoid liability for punitive damages.
Hartt did not provide evidence of an effective mechanism to keep employees aware of anti-discrimination policies, such as educational programs or updates to written materials. It also failed to show that supervisors were trained to prevent discrimination or that its policies had been successfully implemented. Consequently, Hartt is not entitled to summary judgment regarding Stark’s request for punitive damages.
The court's conclusion grants in part and denies in part the defendant’s motions and recommends specific rulings: (i) the plaintiffs' motion is granted regarding Stark's allegations that disclosures on December 13 and 15, 2010, breached ADA confidentiality, but denied in other respects; (ii) the defendant’s motion is granted concerning the October 7, 2010, disclosure and ADA examination provisions but denied otherwise; (iii) the defendant’s motion is granted against Stark's retaliation claim under the MWPA and the discrimination claim based on a record of disability under the ADA, but denied in other aspects.
The remaining trial issues include whether Hartt's violations of ADA confidentiality caused Stark's termination and damages, perceived disability discrimination under the ADA, and retaliation against Stark for protected activity under the STAA. A notice specifies that objections to the magistrate judge’s report must be filed within fourteen days for de novo review, and failure to do so waives the right to appeal. The document also mentions the handling of qualifications in the evidence and the resolution of Hartt's objections regarding the admissibility of Dr. Flanigan’s conclusions.
Hartt's motions for summary judgment involve specific qualifications regarding the factual background. Hartt claims that if Stark had disclosed his prior injuries, it could have altered his evaluation process at CMCC and potentially prevented him from passing the JPA; however, this assertion lacks supporting citations. Hartt's qualifications detail that on December 9, 2010, Stark informed Safety Coordinator Monique Cote of his intention to see a VA doctor due to a herniated disk and that he had suffered a disk issue for three years, which he stated was not work-related. Further, Rose Rogers contacted Stark that same day to discuss his leave and anticipated return to work, during which Stark agreed to provide a doctor’s note clearing him for work. Hartt denies several statements made by the Plaintiff but qualifies them instead, which have been included in the recitation. Additionally, Hartt notes that CMCC indicated Stark had aggravated a preexisting injury during work, prompting concerns from Rogers and Murphy regarding the implications of this claim. Portions of Hartt’s qualifications are omitted due to lack of supporting citations.
Hartt acknowledges that Brainerd indicated Stark was cleared to return to work and capable of performing his job's essential functions, but Stark failed to disclose a prior injury during his Job Performance Appraisal (JPA). The CMCC questionnaire notes that non-disclosure could lead to termination. Hartt also refers to various depositions asserting that Rogers documented statements made by Brainerd and that Murphy's notes included Brainerd's statements. Hartt claims Stark's failure to respond to calls from Auburn terminal manager Aaron Wiles from December 14 to 16, 2010, constituted job abandonment, treated as voluntary resignation per company policy. Furthermore, Hartt states that neither Rogers nor Murphy contributed to the decision to terminate Stark’s employment. Qualified statements are considered admitted unless otherwise indicated, with qualifications supported by citations included, and unsupported or redundant qualifications omitted. Stark counters by citing DOT records showing significant violations by Hartt in the two years prior to the complaint. Hartt responds with expert opinions regarding these assertions. The terms "DOT card," "DOT certificate," and "DOT medical certificate" are used interchangeably, and Hartt's objection regarding this usage is overruled.
Stark is deemed not qualified to testify about any mental or physical issues related to his commercial driving job. However, he asserts that an employee can competently testify regarding difficulties experienced in job performance. Citing case law, such as *Rooney v. Sprague Energy Corp.*, the text emphasizes that an employee's satisfactory job performance before being put on leave can create a material fact issue regarding their qualifications. Further references include *Doane v. City of Omaha*, where the court upheld an employee's demonstration of ability despite a disability, and *EEOC v. J.H. Hein Corp.*, which supported an employee's competence to testify about job performance capabilities.
The text distinguishes Stark's situation from cases cited by the defendant, such as *Ríos-Jiménez v. Principi*, where the employee's supporting evidence was insufficient, and *Hrichak v. Pion*, which limited a lay witness's ability to self-diagnose. Stark does not aim to self-diagnose but rather asserts facts about his job performance.
The defendant's claims regarding Stark's understanding of company policies are contested, with Stark stating that he received an incomplete employee handbook. Stark challenges the assertion that he comprehended the company's anti-discrimination policy, clarifying that he only assumed its existence. Additionally, he disputes the claim regarding the scope of retaliation covered by the company’s policy, which he argues is more extensive than what the defendant suggests. The evidence is viewed favorably to Stark, as the nonmovant, throughout the analysis.
Defendant's Statement of Material Facts (SMF) numbers 9, 11, 28, 33, 34, 37, 42, 46, 49, and 72 are omitted as Stark denies them, with the evidence viewed favorably towards Stark as the nonmovant. Hartt's claims that it does not allow drivers to operate unsafe vehicles, takes reported unsafe vehicles out of rotation for inspection, and that Stark reported mechanical issues which were promptly addressed, are denied by Stark. Stark contends he reported safety concerns while on the road but was required to complete his route before repairs were made. Additionally, Stark disputes the involvement of Todd Cotier in his termination, asserting Cotier had no knowledge of him. Stark asserts he did not inform Hartt that he believed any reported issues were safety violations. Objections by Stark are upheld regarding SMF 49 and 72, which are deemed non-compliant with Local Rule 56(b) due to the inclusion of excessive allegations supported by inadequate citations to a large sealed exhibit of medical records. Hartt responded to these objections by providing specific citations.
The court lacks Stark's response to the revised exhibits, and Hartt uses a sequential page numbering format for Exhibit 13 that is inconsistent with the ECF filing, requiring manual page numbering. Stark failed to paginate the document, which is filed under seal, resulting in no Page ID numbers being generated by the ECF system. However, the ECF did assign numbers to each of the six sections within the exhibit. The omission of Defendants' statements of material fact (SMF) 49 and 72 is determined not to affect the case outcome. Stark's objection to Hartt’s citation inadequacies is overruled, as the cited testimony lacks comments on Stark's experience but is supported by the form completed by Stark. Stark's denial of a statement is insufficient to controvert it, and parts of SMF 52 are omitted due to lack of citation support. Hartt claims that the DOT Physical Examination Report indicates Stark had a right inguinal hernia repair. Statements regarding Dr. Flanigan’s opinions are deemed hearsay and are sustained as inadmissible. Stark's explanation of a statement's effect on Hartt is noted to be non-hearsay. Certain sentences and paragraphs from the statements are omitted for lack of support or admission, while the court views the record favorably towards Stark as the non-movant. Stark's denial of an assertion regarding back pain is based on a questionnaire not relevant to the statement in question, not adequately contesting the underlying facts. Portions of SMF 60 and others that Stark denies are also omitted.
Stark asserts that in December 2010, he experienced a significant shoulder issue impacting his mobility. He denies various statements from Hartt, particularly those regarding claims of job abandonment and communications related to his employment status. Specifically, Stark refutes that Wiles attempted to contact him about returning to work, left messages, or that he failed to respond, arguing that Hartt’s conclusion of job abandonment is unfounded. He also challenges the assertion that Hartt terminated his employment due to his lack of communication over three days, maintaining that this characterization misrepresents the circumstances. Furthermore, Stark's testimony includes a dispute over the characterization of his herniated disk as "alleged." The evidence is viewed in Stark's favor, as the nonmovant, throughout these claims. Hartt's cited statements regarding fitness-for-duty evaluations and the necessity of filing an Employer’s First Report of Injury are noted but criticized for lacking support. Overall, the document reflects a series of contested assertions between Stark and Hartt, with Stark consistently denying the claims made against him and maintaining a perspective that favors his position.
Stark contacted the Department of Labor due to concerns about his employment status with Hartt, primarily because Hartt was unresponsive and had not provided a formal determination regarding his termination. The court omits a portion of Stark's affidavit stating he had no issues performing job functions, siding with Hartt's objection that this was a legal conclusion. Hartt also contested Stark's competence to testify about his job performance, but the court ruled in favor of Stark, viewing the evidence in his favor. Additionally, Stark's claim of being "medically limited" in his ability to drive for three days was excluded, as he was deemed unqualified to testify on his medical limitations. The court overruled objections regarding Stark's testimony on his symptoms affecting his driving capability, again favoring Stark.
Hartt's reliance on Dr. Curtis’s unsworn report was contested by Stark, who argued it constituted inadmissible hearsay. However, the court found the report admissible since it was supported by Dr. Curtis's deposition testimony, which affirmed the report's contents. The court referenced case law that allowed for the use of unsworn expert reports when followed by sworn testimony that confirms their validity. Stark also denied Hartt's assertions based on the claim that Hartt did not provide factual support for Dr. Curtis's conclusions.
Hartt's assertion that Dr. Curtis concluded Stark falsified his medical history is challenged by Stark, who argues that the citations do not prove intentional falsification and that Dr. Curtis lacked certainty about whether Stark's alleged conditions would disqualify him from a DOT card. Despite Stark's denials regarding the falsification of the DOT form, Hartt maintains that Dr. Curtis believes Stark's medical conditions "may have" disqualified him from driving a commercial vehicle. Stark contends that any inadequate information would not result in disqualification but rather would require a repeat of the DOT examination process, as supported by Dr. Curtis's testimony. Stark's additional claims regarding a July 10, 2013, DOT examination and his medical information are limited due to Hartt's objections, particularly concerning the invocation of psychotherapist-patient privilege. Hartt further emphasizes that Dr. Curtis distinguished between a JPA and a DOT physical examination, noting that Stark did not disclose relevant medical conditions that could impact his certification to drive. Additionally, Dr. Curtis stated that being cleared for work by CMCC does not equate to being deemed qualified to drive by a DOT examiner. Hartt's objections to certain statements are contested, but the record is viewed favorably toward Stark as the nonmovant.
Dr. Curtis testified that the CMCC assessment indicated Stark was fit to perform essential duties, with no significant distinction between “duties” and “functions.” Hartt partially denies this assertion, claiming it lacks citation support, though it is, in fact, supported. Hartt also contests Stark's fitness-for-duty evaluation, noting that Dr. Curtis recommended a subsequent DOT examination late in 2010 or early 2011, and highlighted Stark's chronic neck conditions which could trigger pain. Furthermore, Hartt asserts Stark failed to disclose certain medical conditions during his DOT examination that could affect his certification to drive. Dr. Curtis did not testify about the disqualifying nature of chronic neck conditions. Stark’s complaint alleges that Hartt violated ADA examination and confidentiality provisions, yet he did not argue this in his summary judgment motions, effectively granting Hartt summary judgment on that claim. During oral arguments, Stark's counsel conceded that Hartt did not contest the applicability of the ADA provisions to Stark’s examinations. Hartt references statutory authorities supporting a workers’ compensation exception, emphasizing that the ADA does not diminish state laws providing greater protection for individuals with disabilities.
The regulation referenced reiterates confidentiality exceptions outlined in 29 C.F.R. 1630.14(b)(1)(c)(1) and Maine statute 39-A M.R.S.A. 208(1), which allows healthcare providers to release medical information to employers without employee consent if it pertains to a compensable injury under the Workers' Compensation Act. However, there is no evidence that CMCC treated Stark or that his neck injury was claimed under workers’ compensation provisions. The assertion that DOT drivers can falsely report on pre-employment physicals without consequence is rejected; the disclosures in question were not part of such examinations. Hartt’s counsel argued that the company had an "absolute right" to obtain information from CMCC, citing the ADA's provisions allowing employers to seek job-related information post-employment. This information was deemed relevant to Stark’s ability to perform his job and Hartt's compliance with DOT regulations.
Hartt’s obligation to keep this information confidential arose only after it was legitimately obtained and used. The court clarified that while the statute allows for certain post-employment information to be collected, it does not extend to CMCC's disclosures concerning Stark’s pre-employment examination. Once such information is acquired for legitimate pre-employment purposes, it must be treated confidentially and used only per ADA guidelines. The court emphasized that there is no exception to the ADA’s confidentiality requirement for perceived inaccuracies in employment entrance examinations.
The discussion referenced federal case law guiding the Maine Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA) analysis. Stark’s counsel claimed he reported a safety concern outside normal channels, but this argument was unsupported and therefore not recognized. Additionally, Hartt’s new arguments in its reply memorandum regarding Stark’s reasonable belief about truck safety and the necessity of seeking employer correction of unsafe conditions were deemed inadmissible, as they were introduced for the first time in a reply.
Stark disputes Hartt's assertion that it repaired an exhaust leak, and Hartt seeks summary judgment regarding Stark's claim of having a "record" of disability. Stark fails to oppose this claim and, during oral arguments, his counsel confirmed that Stark no longer pursues it. Therefore, Hartt's motion should be granted concerning the "record" of disability claim. Hartt references Neumann v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc. and Dugay v. Complete Skycap Services, Inc. to argue that Stark's injuries were transitory and minor. In Neumann, an employee's back and leg pain was deemed transitory despite a three-year duration, since only six to eight weeks off work was needed for recovery. Similarly, in Dugay, neck and back injuries were considered transitory after the employee returned to work slightly over three months post-accident. However, these cases are criticized for conflating the definitions of "transitory" and "minor." Legislative history and EEOC regulations clarify that impairments must meet both criteria distinctly, with examples of transitory and minor impairments being colds and flus. Mischaracterizing significant injuries as transitory and minor contradicts congressional intent.
