Brustein & Manasevit, PLLC v. United States Department of Education

Docket: Civil Action No. 13-cv-0714 (KBJ)

Court: District Court, District of Columbia; March 31, 2013; Federal District Court

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil
Brustein, Manasevit, PLLC filed a complaint against the United States Department of Education (DOE) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) on May 15, 2013, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to compel the release of records related to the "State and Local Educational Agencies Risk Model," used by DOE to identify agencies at risk of misusing federal funds. Initially, DOE withheld all responsive records but subsequently released the documents after the complaint was filed. DOE then moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the document production rendered the case moot, or alternatively, sought summary judgment, asserting the adequacy of its document search.

In opposition, Brustein argued that the search was inadequate and that the case was not moot, citing the potential existence of additional unreleased records. The Court reviewed the submissions and determined that while DOE's argument for dismissal as moot was rejected, the agency was entitled to summary judgment based on the reasonableness and adequacy of its search. The motion was granted in favor of DOE, and summary judgment was entered regarding the sole count of the complaint. The Court referenced a November 2012 report by DOE’s Office of the Inspector General, which highlighted the Risk Model as a tool for identifying agencies at higher risk of misusing federal funds, underscoring the agency's commitment to oversight and accountability.

On December 7, 2012, the Plaintiff submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Department of Energy (DOE) for a complete copy or a full description of the State and Local Educational Agencies Risk Model, referencing a specific OIG Report. DOE acknowledged receipt of the request on December 11, 2012, and identified three documents totaling 16 pages that it believed fully described the Risk Model. However, DOE withheld these documents, citing FOIA Exemptions 5 and 7(E). Following an administrative appeal that was denied on February 13, 2013, the Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging wrongful withholding of documents and sought to compel disclosure. On July 8, 2013, DOE released the previously withheld documents in full, prompting the Defendant to file a motion to dismiss the complaint as moot, arguing that all responsive records had been produced. Alternatively, the Defendant sought summary judgment, claiming an adequate search had been conducted. In response, the Plaintiff contended that indications within the released documents suggested additional responsive records might exist, asserting that the case was not moot and the search was inadequate. The Defendant's motions were fully briefed by August 26, 2013, and remained pending. Legal standards for mootness under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) were also outlined, emphasizing that mootness arises when there is no longer a live controversy, as was noted in relevant case law.

A plaintiff retains a legitimate interest in having a court assess whether an agency's search for records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was adequate, even if the agency has already provided some documents. Courts maintain jurisdiction to evaluate the adequacy of such searches. The burden of proving mootness rests with the party claiming the case is moot. Summary judgment is warranted when there are no genuine disputes over material facts, and the movant must clearly outline the basis for their motion and highlight evidence demonstrating the absence of such disputes. The opposing party must then present specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial. In FOIA cases, an agency must demonstrate it conducted a thorough search for relevant documents and provide detailed affidavits to support the adequacy of its search methods and scope. While agency affidavits are presumed to be made in good faith, they must still show that the search was reasonably designed to uncover all pertinent documents. The evaluation focuses on the adequacy of the search rather than the possibility of additional documents existing.

Defendant argues for dismissal of the complaint as moot under Rule 12(b)(1), claiming that the Department of Energy (DOE) conducted an adequate search for records related to the Risk Model in response to Plaintiff's FOIA request and released all documents found. It is acknowledged that DOE produced all originally withheld documents. However, the production of documents does not automatically render the case moot, as the plaintiff retains a “cognizable interest” in the court's review of the agency's search adequacy. Jurisdiction persists when the plaintiff challenges the search's adequacy despite document production. Plaintiff asserts that DOE’s search was inadequate, arguing that additional relevant documents exist that were not located or released, specifically referencing inconsistencies in the released documents regarding a scoring system tied to risk factors. This claim reinforces the belief that the dispute is ongoing. The court concludes that the plaintiff’s challenge to the adequacy of the search necessitates denial of the motion to dismiss on mootness grounds.

In addition, Defendant seeks summary judgment, asserting its search was reasonable and adequate, claiming no genuine material facts remain in dispute. The key legal question in a FOIA case focuses on the adequacy of the search for documents, not on the potential existence of other documents.

An adequate search was conducted by the Department of Energy (DOE) in response to the Plaintiff's FOIA request, as confirmed by affidavits from DOE officials. OIG Counsel Marta Erceg stated that upon receiving the request, her office searched both electronic and hard copy records, resulting in the identification of three documents that fully describe the Risk Model. Although these documents were initially withheld, they were later released in full without redaction after the Plaintiff filed a complaint. Edward Slevin, the Director of the Computer Assisted Assessment Techniques team, confirmed that all records related to the Risk Model are stored on his work computer, which he personally searched for the requested documents. The Court finds the declarations from Erceg and Slevin credible and sufficient to demonstrate that the search was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents. The Plaintiff's arguments, which rely on speculative claims about potentially undiscovered documents, do not undermine the finding of a reasonable search. Consequently, the Court grants the Defendant's motion and enters summary judgment in favor of the DOE.

The Court determines that Plaintiff's complaint remains active and declines to dismiss it on mootness grounds. However, the Court grants Defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the agency’s search for records in response to Plaintiff's request was reasonable and sufficient. Plaintiff, Brustein, Manasevit, PLLC, is a law firm focused on federal education law in Washington D.C., working with various educational entities on federal programs and grant management. The excerpt references the Inspector General Act of 1978, which mandates semiannual reporting by Inspectors General. It describes the Risk Model, a system that evaluates local education agencies based on their risk of misusing federal funds, using inputs from various sources to rank these agencies and provide information to state education agencies. The Court rejects the Department of Education’s (DOE) argument that releasing all responsive documents necessitates dismissal, clarifying that a plaintiff can challenge the adequacy of an agency's search regardless of document release. Additionally, a supplemental declaration from Marta Erceg counters Plaintiff's claims that the provided documents do not clarify the weighting of risk factors in the Risk Model, explaining that users can select risk indicators and assign weights, a standard practice in statistical modeling as detailed in the Federal Judicial Center’s reference manual.