Court: District Court, E.D. Arkansas; June 19, 2014; Federal District Court
Jack L. Givens has filed a lawsuit against Union Pacific Railroad Company under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA) following injuries sustained on October 3, 2010, when the train he was operating collided with a motor vehicle at a railroad crossing near Mount Pleasant, Texas. Union Pacific has filed a motion to dismiss, which Givens has not opposed. The court has granted in part and denied in part this motion.
Givens alleges several negligent acts by Union Pacific, including: failing to provide a safe working environment; requiring him to occupy the most dangerous position in the locomotive; not supplying adequate safety equipment such as cushioning devices, restraints, and a safe locomotive; neglecting to install safety gates and warning lights at crossings; and failing to illuminate and post adequate warning signs on its property to alert vehicular traffic of train presence.
Additionally, Givens states that throughout his 30-year career, he was involved in seven previous collisions at various railroad crossings, each resulting in injuries and fatalities, and claims these incidents were similarly due to Union Pacific's negligence. He describes experiencing fear for his safety during these events and reports being diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and depression following the October 5, 2010, incident.
Mr. Givens claims he has experienced fear of physical harm, psychological and emotional injuries, mental anguish, and anxiety due to alleged negligence, with ongoing effects anticipated in the future. He describes specific injuries including stress, anxiety, depression, panic disorder, and PTSD. He contends that any pre-existing physical conditions were aggravated by the emotional trauma from his work.
Union Pacific seeks to dismiss Mr. Givens’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that a complaint must present a short and plain statement of the claim for relief. The complaint must provide fair notice to the defendant of the claims and their grounds, without needing extensive specificity. To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face, allowing for reasonable inferences of the defendant's liability. The plausibility standard does not necessitate certainty of success but does require more than mere possibility. The court evaluates the complaint in its entirety, using judicial experience and common sense.
Mr. Givens's action is brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), which provides a federal cause of action for railroad employees injured due to employer negligence. FELA mandates that employers maintain a reasonably safe working environment, reflecting Congress's intent to mitigate the inherent dangers faced by railroad workers by shifting some liability from employees to employers.
Congress has aimed to advance the humanitarian objectives of the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) by eliminating common-law barriers to employee recovery and encouraging courts to interpret FELA broadly to support its remedial intent. Union Pacific seeks dismissal of Mr. Givens’s claim linked to an October 2010 incident by contesting the negligence allegations detailed in paragraph 6 of his complaint. Union Pacific argues that these allegations do not meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8 or fail to establish a valid claim under FELA. Additionally, Union Pacific claims that Mr. Givens’s allegations related to seven prior accidents are time-barred.
Regarding the claim of providing a safe workplace (paragraph 6(a)), Union Pacific contends that Mr. Givens's assertion lacks sufficient specificity. However, the court determines that the adequacy of this claim should be assessed in the context of the entire complaint, leading to the denial of Union Pacific’s motion to dismiss this allegation.
In claims concerning locomotive safety features (paragraphs 6(b) through 6(e)), Union Pacific argues these are preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), which aims to enhance railroad safety and prevent accidents. The FRSA empowers the Secretary of Transportation to create regulations for railroad safety, with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) overseeing this authority. The act emphasizes national uniformity in safety laws and includes a preemption clause that allows states to maintain safety regulations until federal regulations are established on the same topic.
In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, the Supreme Court established that state-law negligence claims are preempted by federal rail safety regulations when the federal regulations substantially cover the same subject matter. Following this precedent, several courts have determined that uniform application of federal rail safety regulations is essential, ensuring consistency in negligence claims from both railroad employees and non-employees. The Eighth Circuit has expressed skepticism regarding this preclusion analysis but has not rejected it outright, emphasizing that the FRSA aims to eliminate inconsistent state regulations. Although the Eighth Circuit acknowledged its uncertainty about the implications of federal common law negligence claims on FRSA uniformity, it chose not to create a circuit split and reversed a lower court's decision, indicating that the issue could be revisited on remand.
Union Pacific contends that specific allegations made by Mr. Givens regarding safety equipment and the crashworthiness of locomotives are precluded by the FRSA regulation concerning cab equipment. This argument references a prior case, Dickerson, where similar negligence claims against Union Pacific were found to be precluded due to compliance with federal regulations on locomotive safety. The court in Dickerson collectively assessed the claims related to the locomotive's crashworthiness and determined they were preempted by the relevant federal standards.
The Dickerson court clarified that there are no requirements for the installation of safety restraints or locomotive floor padding under 49 U.S.C. 20701, indicating that such devices are not considered integral components of a locomotive. The court concurred that the applicable regulations at 49 C.F.R. 229.119 do not mandate cushioning devices or safety restraints like air bags or seat belts, although cab seats must be securely mounted. Consequently, Mr. Givens’s FELA claim regarding Union Pacific's alleged negligence related to these devices is precluded. However, Union Pacific’s preclusion argument does not address Givens’s claims in paragraphs 6(b) and 6(c), specifically regarding the requirement to ride in the front of the locomotive and the assertion that a safe locomotive was not provided for collision protection. Union Pacific failed to demonstrate that these claims are precluded under the relevant regulations, and the court found that paragraph 6(b) provided adequate notice of the claim. Conversely, paragraph 6(c) was deemed insufficient as it lacked enough factual detail to state a plausible claim. As a result, the court denied Union Pacific’s motion to dismiss paragraph 6(b) while granting the motion concerning paragraphs 6(c), 6(d), and 6(e).
Union Pacific's motion to dismiss Mr. Givens's claims regarding the lack of safety measures at a railroad crossing is denied without prejudice, as the company failed to provide evidence or legal authority supporting its assertion that the crossing was equipped with necessary safety features and its claim of no duty to provide additional warnings. Regarding Mr. Givens's allegations related to PTSD and depression stemming from seven prior accidents (1980-2006), Union Pacific argues these claims are time-barred under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), which requires actions to be initiated within three years of the cause of action's accrual. The accrual date, typically when an injury manifests, may be affected by the discovery rule, which allows claims to proceed if the plaintiff was not aware of the injury until a later date. Mr. Givens asserts he was diagnosed with PTSD and depression after October 5, 2010, suggesting he was unaware of these injuries prior to that date. Union Pacific's motion does not address the potential applicability of the discovery rule, leading to the denial of its motion regarding the seven prior accidents without prejudice. Overall, the court partially grants and denies Union Pacific's motion; it dismisses allegations of negligence concerning locomotive cab safety features and certain pleading insufficiencies but allows other claims to proceed.
