United States v. Castillo

Citations: 28 F. Supp. 3d 673; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88809; 2014 WL 2931955Docket: Criminal Action No. 6:13-CR-108

Court: District Court, S.D. Texas; June 30, 2014; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

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In Texas, it is illegal to drive in the left lane unless passing another vehicle, as indicated by a "Left Lane for Passing Only" sign. In this case, Trooper Jeremiah Collins observed a white Ford Explorer traveling in the left lane without passing, but the nearest sign was 5.3 miles behind him. After following the vehicle for approximately 2.7 miles and unable to drive directly behind it due to traffic conditions, Collins eventually stopped the Explorer about 6 miles from his initial observation and 11 miles from the sign. He suspected a possible human trafficking situation upon noticing a young female passenger who avoided eye contact. After the stop, he found multiple individuals hidden in the vehicle. The driver, Joe Angel Castillo, and the passenger, Giselle Lys-ette Gonzalez, were charged with harboring aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1324. They contended that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment due to a lack of reasonable suspicion regarding a traffic violation. The court discussed that while Texas law does not explicitly prohibit left lane driving without passing, compliance with traffic signs is mandated by the Texas Transportation Code. A previous ruling established that without a relevant sign within a reasonable distance, no offense can be charged.

Disobeying a traffic control device, such as a "left lane for passing only" sign, constitutes an offense only if the driver had notice of it and failed to obey. The court adheres to the precedent set in Abney, which stipulates that section 544.004 requires such notice for a violation to be valid. The primary issue in the suppression motions is whether Officer Collins had reasonable suspicion that the Explorer passed the sign indicating this requirement. 

For a traffic stop to be justified, an officer must possess an objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, including a traffic violation, prior to stopping a vehicle. The determination of reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of circumstances, requiring a particularized and objective basis for suspecting wrongdoing. The threshold for reasonable suspicion is significantly lower than that for probable cause or a preponderance of the evidence.

Evidence suggests a high likelihood that the Explorer had seen the "Passing Only" sign, as Collins first observed it 5.3 miles away from the nearest sign. This stretch of U.S. 59 is largely undeveloped, with limited access points, making it reasonable to infer that vehicles traveling on this highway had likely passed the sign. Given the sparse traffic from entrance ramps and minor roads, it is reasonable to conclude that over 50% of vehicles, if not more, had passed the sign before Collins observed the Explorer, supporting the assertion that he had reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.

Castillo and Gonzalez reference the case Abney, where the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that an officer could not reasonably suspect a driver had passed a sign located 15 to 27 miles away from the traffic stop. The court warned that allowing such distant stops would permit law enforcement to stop vehicles near any sign along the highway. The distinction between Abney and Mouton v. State is highlighted, with Mouton being deemed acceptable due to specific, articulable facts concerning the proximity of the stop to the sign.

A recent federal district court case, Garcia, provides additional context. In Garcia, the distance from the sign to the observed vehicle was about 5 miles, but the presence of three nearby on-ramps led the court to conclude that the officer could not reasonably suspect the defendant had entered the highway from a previous entry. Despite the officer's testimony about the low traffic on connecting roads, the court emphasized the presence of homes and businesses in the area.

Although the factual records in Garcia and the current case are not fully known, they share similarities regarding the distances involved. The court noted that the reasonable suspicion threshold was likely met in the current case, despite potential difficulties in achieving a conviction under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. The Supreme Court has established that reasonable suspicion does not require ruling out innocent behavior, and concerns about selective enforcement of signs do not factor into Fourth Amendment analysis. The Constitution, while prohibiting discriminatory enforcement, addresses such issues under the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Fourth Amendment.

In conclusion, the traffic stop was deemed consistent with Fourth Amendment standards, leading to the denial of the defendants' motions to suppress evidence. The defendants did not contest the reasonableness of the stop or the questioning following the initial pull-over.

The Fifth Circuit determined that the defendant did not demonstrate that the Texas Transportation Code mandates a traffic control device's proximity to the violation site, as established in United States v. Castro. The Court deemed Castro no longer relevant and affirmed that Abney governs the interpretation of the statute. Castillo and Gonzalez did not contest the reasonableness of the warning sign's distance from Collins’s stop. The focus is on Collins's knowledge at the time of the traffic stop, which was not challenged by Castillo and Gonzalez, who did not dispute his familiarity with the "Passing Only" sign. His year-long stationing in Victoria supports his testimony. Vehicles exiting Highway 59 to visit the gas station would have seen the sign, and only new entrants to the highway should be excluded from the probability assessment. Furthermore, Abney serves as persuasive authority regarding Fourth Amendment issues, while Navarette reaffirms existing principles of reasonable suspicion rather than introducing new legal standards.