Court: District Court, District of Columbia; December 22, 2014; Federal District Court
The plaintiff, the elected Sheriff of Maricopa County, is suing the President of the United States and other federal officials, claiming that immigration policies announced on November 20, 2014, are unconstitutional and should be halted. The case raises significant questions about immigration policy's legality and its impact on millions of individuals. The Supreme Court has emphasized that sound immigration policy relies on informed civic discourse, but the central issue is whether the court is the appropriate forum for this discussion.
The concept of standing is crucial, as it defines the judiciary's limited role in a democratic society, ensuring courts do not engage in policymaking meant for elected representatives. Courts should only adjudicate claims when a party has suffered a recognizable injury. Additionally, it is not the judiciary's role to determine the constitutionality of actions by the legislative or executive branches unless a legitimate claim is presented by an affected party.
The excerpt highlights that courts must provide relief only to those who have experienced actual harm, while policy decisions, especially concerning immigration, should be handled by the political branches of government. This is particularly pertinent given the sensitive nature of immigration enforcement, which involves significant human and international relations considerations. The Constitution assigns such matters to the political branches, underlining the judiciary's cautious approach to interfering in these areas.
The regulation of immigration is a fundamental aspect of national sovereignty, delegated by the Constitution to the political branches of the federal government. The judiciary's role is limited to resolving specific cases brought by parties who demonstrate concrete injuries, rather than engaging in policymaking. The plaintiffs in this case present significant concerns about illegal immigration; however, these concerns are deemed generalized grievances inappropriate for judicial intervention. Consequently, the plaintiff is found to lack standing to challenge the immigration policies, leading to the denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction and the granting of the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) establishes a comprehensive framework for immigration and naturalization, outlining categories of inadmissible immigrants and grounds for removal. The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for enforcing the INA, but agency discretion limits the ability to act on every violation. The INA empowers the Secretary to set regulations and prioritize enforcement, particularly in light of the limited resources available, as DHS estimates that it can only remove fewer than 400,000 of the approximately 11.3 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S.
DHS is confronted with several challenges, including demographic shifts increasing costs related to unauthorized border crossings, complexities in alien removals, congressional mandates prioritizing recent border crossers and serious criminals, and the humanitarian impacts of family separations. To address these issues, the executive branch employs "deferred action" as an enforcement tool, allowing DHS to refrain from pursuing removal of certain aliens for a limited time. This policy acknowledges eligible individuals as low priority for enforcement and permits them to apply for work authorization under existing regulations, established by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Deferred action does not grant immigration or citizenship status and may be revoked at any time. Historically, the executive branch has used deferred action for various categories of aliens, including victims of domestic abuse and human trafficking, and children brought to the U.S. Congress has supported and expanded deferred action programs, highlighting its legislative endorsement of this enforcement approach. Notably, the REAL ID Act of 2005 recognized approved deferred action status for state-issued driver’s licenses used for federal purposes.
Three immigration programs are challenged by the plaintiff as unconstitutional or in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, based on a historical context of deferred action used for national immigration enforcement. The first program, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), established on June 15, 2012, allows for a two-year deferment of removal for undocumented immigrants under specific conditions: they must be under 31 years old as of that date, arrived in the U.S. before age 16, resided continuously in the U.S. for at least five years, were present in the U.S. on June 15, 2012, and meet educational or military service criteria, while not posing a threat to national security or public safety.
The second and third programs are outlined in a memorandum by the current DHS Secretary, which revises DACA (2014 DACA Revisions) and introduces Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA). The 2014 revisions remove the age cap, extending DACA eligibility to individuals of any age who entered the U.S. before 16, increase the deferment period from two to three years, and adjust the residency requirement date from June 15, 2007, to January 1, 2010. DAPA allows a three-year deferment for illegal aliens who are parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, requiring them to have a qualifying child and continuous U.S. residency since before January 1, 2010.
Eligibility for deferred action under U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services requires individuals to have been physically present in the U.S. as of November 20, 2014, to possess no lawful status on that date, not to fall within specified enforcement priority categories, and to present no factors that would render the granting of deferred action inappropriate. On the same day, President Obama announced updates to deferred action programs, including 2014 DACA revisions and DAPA. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking to invalidate these programs and referenced a preliminary injunction, though the formal motion for such relief was not filed until December 4, 2014. The defendants argued that the plaintiff lacked standing and requested dismissal, which led to the Court allowing the plaintiff to respond and submit additional evidence regarding standing. A hearing took place on December 22, 2014, focusing on the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The legal standard for a preliminary injunction requires the plaintiff to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, potential irreparable harm without relief, a favorable balance of equities, and that an injunction serves the public interest. A preliminary injunction is considered an extraordinary remedy that necessitates a clear burden of persuasion from the movant.
Injunctions are considered extraordinary remedies, requiring a clear demonstration that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. The Circuit recognizes a "sliding scale" method for evaluating the four factors necessary for a preliminary injunction, allowing a strong showing on one factor to compensate for a weaker showing on another. If a plaintiff raises a serious legal question rather than demonstrating a likelihood of success, a strong showing on the other three factors may still justify injunctive relief. A significant demonstration of irreparable harm can reduce the standard for likelihood of success, particularly if it does not cause substantial harm to the non-movant. However, there is a tension between this approach and the Supreme Court's ruling in *Winter*, which suggested a stricter standard that requires a likelihood of irreparable harm rather than merely a possibility. Additionally, the D.C. Circuit has refrained from definitively stating whether the likelihood of success is a standalone requirement, indicating it remains an open question. Regardless, a preliminary injunction cannot be granted solely based on the possibility of irreparable harm, as all four factors must be satisfied. The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff to convincingly meet these criteria for injunctive relief. Furthermore, federal courts possess limited jurisdiction, authorized only by the Constitution and statutes, as articulated in *Gunn v. Minton*.
Federal courts are required to operate within their constitutional and statutory authority, with an obligation to ascertain jurisdiction before hearing disputes. If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the case. When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the court accepts as true all uncontroverted material factual allegations in the complaint and must interpret the complaint liberally. However, it may disregard inferences that are unsupported by factual allegations or that merely represent legal conclusions. The court may conduct an independent investigation to confirm its subject matter jurisdiction and may consider facts beyond the complaint. The burden to establish jurisdictional facts lies with the plaintiff.
In this context, the plaintiff acknowledges that he and similar officials lack authority to enforce U.S. immigration laws. He seeks to challenge federal immigration policies aimed at prioritizing enforcement, despite the discretion granted to federal officials in the removal process. The plaintiff's inability to enforce federal immigration law relates directly to the critical issue of his standing to demand changes to federal enforcement discretion. Ultimately, the plaintiff fails to satisfy the standing requirements under Article III of the Constitution, which limits federal court jurisdiction to actual "Cases" and "Controversies."
The doctrine of standing delineates the constitutional boundaries for judicial disputes, emphasizing that federal courts can only address actual cases or controversies. The Supreme Court establishes that standing requires three essential elements: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact," which is a concrete, particularized invasion of a legally protected interest that is actual or imminent, not hypothetical; (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the defendant's conduct, indicating that the injury is traceable to the defendant's actions; and (3) it must be likely that a favorable court decision will redress the injury.
Additionally, for claims seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, the plaintiff must demonstrate an ongoing injury or a substantial threat of future injury. In this case, the plaintiff, Joe Arpaio, fails to establish any of these elements of standing. The complaint does not clarify whether he is suing in his individual or official capacity, although it is noted that he is pursuing both. Regardless, he cannot show a legally cognizable injury from the challenged deferred action programs. Typically, private individuals lack a judicially cognizable interest in enforcing immigration laws. Claims based solely on general grievances about government actions do not constitute a valid Article III case or controversy, as they do not benefit the plaintiff in a manner distinct from the public at large.
A plaintiff seeking to challenge the application of the Constitution and laws lacks the requisite standing if the alleged harm is a general interest and not a direct, concrete injury. The plaintiff, Sheriff Joe Arpaio, asserts that he is pursuing this lawsuit to compel the President and other defendants to adhere to U.S. immigration laws. He claims to have suffered threats against his life from undocumented immigrants due to his public stance on illegal immigration. However, these threats do not establish ongoing injury necessary for standing, as past threats alone do not constitute a present case or controversy. Additionally, such threats are not caused by the deferred action programs being challenged, but rather by third-party criminal actions unrelated to the litigation. The plaintiff's claims of injury are insufficiently connected to the deferred action programs, and an injunction would not change the underlying motivations of those issuing threats. Even if the plaintiff attempts to assert standing in his official capacity as Sheriff, he still fails to demonstrate that the deferred action programs impede his ability to perform his official duties effectively.
The plaintiff claims to be adversely affected in his office's finances, workload, and duties due to an influx of illegal aliens resulting from federal policies that offer amnesty. He argues that empirical evidence shows these policies will attract millions more illegal aliens to border states. The plaintiff cites specific financial impacts, alleging costs of over $9 million for holding illegal aliens in jails from February to December 2014. While he acknowledges that regulation affecting a state officer's official functions can confer standing, he fails to establish a direct regulation of his duties by the challenged deferred action programs, which only govern federal immigration officials. As such, the plaintiff struggles to identify a concrete injury, since he lacks legal authority to enforce immigration laws. His argument amounts to a generalized grievance about federal policies causing resource expenditures he views as inefficient. The standing doctrine does not support claims based solely on such grievances, as established by Supreme Court precedents emphasizing that only specific injuries that directly benefit the plaintiff can constitute an Article III case or controversy.
The plaintiff seeks to enforce compliance with the U.S. Constitution and immigration laws by the President and other defendants. The argument asserts that a state official has not experienced a legally cognizable injury merely because a federal program may increase the state's population and resource demands. The plaintiff's claim of injury is deemed speculative, centered around the belief that deferred action programs will attract undocumented immigrants to Maricopa County, potentially increasing crime. However, individual migration decisions are influenced by various factors beyond U.S. control, and the deferred action programs apply only to those already in the U.S. before January 1, 2010, making the plaintiff's theory unsupported. The plaintiff has not demonstrated a concrete and particularized injury related to his duties as Sheriff.
Moreover, to establish standing, the plaintiff must show that the injury is traceable to the defendants' actions and that the requested relief would address the injury. The plaintiff's alleged injury arises from the independent actions of third parties—undocumented immigrants committing crimes—which complicates the standing claim. Courts typically find standing only in limited circumstances involving third-party conduct in challenges to government actions.
In *Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ.*, the D.C. Circuit addressed the issue of standing in the context of government action affecting third parties. The court emphasized that for a plaintiff to establish standing when their injury arises from the government's regulation (or lack thereof) of another party, they must demonstrate a direct causal link between the government action and their injury. The plaintiff failed to show causation, as the challenged government action—discretionary enforcement relating to certain undocumented immigrants—did not authorize the conduct that allegedly caused the plaintiff's injuries. Specifically, the deferred action programs do not permit new immigration, authorize unlawful behavior, or grant permanent status to undocumented individuals. Instead, these programs aim to prioritize the removal of undocumented immigrants involved in serious criminal activities, potentially mitigating the plaintiff's concerns rather than exacerbating them. The court noted that establishing standing is "substantially more difficult" when the plaintiff is not the direct target of the government’s actions, requiring concrete facts to demonstrate causation and redressability.
Standing requires substantial evidence of a causal link between government policy and third-party actions, which is currently lacking in this case. The plaintiff provided press releases and letters indicating Maricopa County's issues with illegal immigration but failed to demonstrate that the deferred action programs directly cause crime or increased immigration. The plaintiff's assertion that millions of illegal aliens will be drawn to border states regardless of current immigration policies undermines their claim, suggesting injuries are not traceable to these programs.
Additionally, establishing redressability is challenging when injuries stem from government regulation of third parties not involved in the case. The plaintiff must show a significant likelihood that, if granted relief, there would be no increase in undocumented immigrants or related crimes in Maricopa County, which is a difficult task. The precedent set in National Wrestling Coaches illustrates that causation and redressability hinge on the independent actions of third parties, similar to the claims made here.
The D.C. Circuit determined that redressability was absent in the National Wrestling Coaches case because there was only speculation regarding whether schools would alter their actions in response to the challenged interpretive rule. Schools could still choose to eliminate or limit men’s wrestling teams due to compliance with existing statutes and regulations, as well as other motivations like budget constraints and moral considerations. The court concluded that a favorable ruling for the appellants would not likely change how schools decide on fielding sports teams.
In the current case, similar reasoning applies. Various factors, both national and international, influence an individual's decision to immigrate to the U.S. or engage in criminal activity, independent of the deferred action programs in question. A court ruling against these programs would not significantly impact the complex decision-making of undocumented immigrants. The plaintiff acknowledges that millions more undocumented immigrants may continue to enter border states regardless of the challenged programs, and that the defendants possess limited resources for enforcement and removal. Thus, any relief granted by the court would not alleviate the plaintiffs' alleged harms related to the presence of undocumented immigrants in Maricopa County.
The court highlighted that the plaintiffs could not establish that their injuries would be redressed by a favorable ruling, referencing prior case law that emphasizes the necessity of demonstrating causation and redressability, especially when third-party actions are involved.
Relief for the petitioner hinges on actions by a third party not present in the court, requiring the petitioner to prove that a favorable decision would significantly enhance the likelihood of obtaining relief that addresses the injury sustained. The petitioner has failed to meet this burden due to three main points: 1) the absence of a concrete, particularized injury, as opposed to a speculative grievance; 2) the inability to trace the injury to the challenged deferred action programs; and 3) a lack of assurance that a favorable ruling would remedy the alleged injury. Disappointment resulting from the government's non-enforcement does not equate to the requisite injury for Article III standing, leading to the conclusion that the plaintiff lacks standing and, consequently, the lawsuit must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Regarding the motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits or show irreparable harm, which are both prerequisites for such relief. Since standing is essential for jurisdiction, the plaintiff's claims lack a likelihood of success. Additionally, the inability to obtain redress from the court undermines the assertion of irreparable harm. Even if standing were established, numerous legal challenges would prevent the plaintiff from succeeding on the merits. The deferred action programs in question align with a longstanding practice of enforcement discretion in immigration law, supported by statutory authority and congressional endorsement, indicating their consistency with legislative policy.
Jackson, J. concurring, emphasizes that the challenged deferred action programs, while broad, do not exceed the lawful execution of immigration enforcement due to their mechanisms for case-by-case review. This review process is essential as it allows for a discretionary assessment of individual circumstances, preventing arbitrary decisions and ensuring adherence to congressional priorities. The plaintiff's argument for irreparable harm is weakened by a two-year delay in filing the challenge and the likelihood that any harm would occur regardless of the programs in question. Additionally, the public interest and equity considerations do not favor a preliminary injunction, as halting the programs would disrupt the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) enforcement priorities and negatively impact current and prospective participants in the DACA program and similar initiatives. Consequently, the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is denied, and the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is granted, with the earlier motion being rendered moot.
Katrina-impacted foreign academic students who have lost their F-1 status, along with their F-2 dependents, can request deferred action and short-term employment authorization due to economic necessity, as stated in the USCIS memorandum from Donald Neufeld. This is part of the broader Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which is being contested by the plaintiff. Historical context is provided, referencing past use of similar deferred action programs for undocumented immigrants awaiting visa approvals, including nurses and family members of individuals who obtained legal status under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
A November 20, 2014 DHS memorandum outlines three priority categories for the removal of undocumented immigrants: those posing threats to national security or public safety, those with specific misdemeanors or recent immigration violations, and those with final orders of removal issued after January 1, 2014. The plaintiff does not dispute these guidelines but focuses instead on a sliding-scale analysis, neglecting extensive case law regarding its applicability in this Circuit. Recent Supreme Court commentary suggests that "generalized grievances" should be evaluated under Article III standing rather than prudential standing.
Reluctance to entertain lawsuits regarding generalized grievances is based on prudential considerations closely connected to Article III policies. Courts have determined that such suits do not present constitutional "cases" or "controversies," as established in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State. Within this Circuit, there is debate on whether prudential standing is jurisdictional; however, if a plaintiff fails to satisfy the constitutional minimum for Article III standing, prudential standing issues need not be addressed.
In this case, the plaintiff attempts to invoke the doctrine of competitor standing to circumvent limitations associated with harm from third-party actions. However, relevant case law (Mendoza v. Perez, Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. EPA, and Washington Alliance of Tech. Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.) does not support the plaintiff's standing claim, as those cases involved direct injuries from regulatory changes affecting competition. The plaintiff's situation does not invoke competitor standing because the plaintiff does not face competitive strain from undocumented immigrants.
Additionally, the plaintiff's argument of a "procedural injury" fails, as they lack authority to enforce federal immigration laws and cannot demonstrate a specific concrete interest threatened by the challenged deferred action programs, which instead reflect a common injury shared by the public. The plaintiff cites a recent out-of-Circuit ruling to bolster claims about potential success on the merits, concerning the DAPA program's impact on a criminal defendant's sentencing. This court noted concerns regarding fairness in immigration law enforcement, particularly highlighting disparities in treatment based on geographical location, which potentially influenced the defendant's legal circumstances.
The court noted concerns regarding the "arbitrariness" of the defendant's arrest and criminal prosecution, particularly in the context of sanctuary cities where local law enforcement does not notify ICE about minor offenses involving undocumented immigrants. The defendant faces a criminal prosecution that will likely lead to a civil deportation hearing, raising issues about potential sentencing disparities as mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The court examined the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) program to determine if it would unjustly affect the defendant compared to similarly situated individuals who might receive deferred removal.
Ultimately, the Pennsylvania court found DAPA inapplicable to the defendant for two reasons: it deemed the program unconstitutional and determined that the defendant did not meet eligibility criteria for DAPA's deferred action. As a result, the defendant does not qualify for any deferment that would prevent deportation. Despite this, the court acknowledged the defendant's strong familial ties, specifically his relationship with a brother in the U.S., and offered him the chance to withdraw his guilty plea or proceed to sentencing.
However, the assessment of DAPA's constitutionality by the Pennsylvania court was criticized for disregarding established principles that advise against deciding constitutional questions when other grounds suffice for case resolution. The excerpt underscores the tension between prosecutorial fairness, the implications of DAPA, and the legal principles guiding judicial discretion.
The Pennsylvania court improperly assessed the defendant's eligibility for the DAPA program, leading to an unnecessary examination of its constitutionality. The court's rationale, aimed at preventing sentencing disparities as mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), is flawed because the DAPA program does not influence sentencing outcomes; removal proceedings are civil matters, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2499. The defendant's potential deportation does not create a sentencing disparity since his ineligibility for DAPA means he is not similarly situated to eligible individuals. Even if there were concerns about unequal enforcement of a criminal statute in different districts, such disparities arise from prosecutorial discretion and do not pertain to § 3553(a)(6), which focuses on sentencing disparities among defendants convicted of the same offense in federal court. Precedent from United States v. Washington and United States v. Clark supports the notion that the U.S. Attorney’s discretion in choosing to prosecute under federal law does not justify deviations in sentencing based on enforcement disparities. Statistics indicate that the review of cases is already occurring, with significant numbers of DACA requests denied or deemed ineligible. The plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction argues that the implementation of challenged programs would deplete congressional appropriations for immigration enforcement; however, the costs would largely be covered by application fees collected by USCIS, challenging the assertion that it would frustrate congressional intent. Congress retains the authority to allocate funds specifically for removal, and the President must adhere to such appropriations as established in Train v. City of New York.
The plaintiff claims that the deferred action programs violate INS v. Chadha by constituting unlawful legislation or rule-making. However, this assertion is incorrect, as Congress has delegated authority to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to set enforcement priorities for immigration laws. According to Chadha, DHS operates within its Article II enforcement capacity when addressing deportation matters. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that these programs breach the non-delegation doctrine, but such findings of excessive delegation are rare. The threshold for overcoming a non-delegation claim is low, and the Supreme Court has only invalidated statutes on this basis twice, not since 1935. The Court typically refrains from second-guessing Congress on the extent of policy judgment permissible in law execution.
