Court: District Court, D. Massachusetts; June 9, 2014; Federal District Court
Plaintiffs Carlos A. Palacio, Sidney G. Gaviria Orrego, and Carlos D. Palacio seek to amend their complaint to replace five 'John Doe' police officers with their actual names—Greg Bigda, Clayton Roberson, Steven Kent, Sean Arpin, and Barry Delameter. The City of Springfield and Police Commissioner William Fitchet oppose this motion, arguing it is untimely and does not meet the 'relation-back' provision under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C). However, the court grants the motion based on Rule 15(c)(1)(A).
The original complaint was filed on July 31, 2013, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985 and Massachusetts laws regarding civil rights and privacy, related to an alleged unlawful entry and search of the plaintiffs' home on August 4-5, 2010. The case was removed to federal court on August 14, 2013, and a scheduling order set the deadline for amending pleadings to April 15, 2014. Plaintiffs filed their motion on April 14, 2014.
The court emphasizes that amendments should generally be allowed unless there are valid reasons to deny them, such as futility or undue delay. The substitution of named defendants for 'John Does' is considered a commonplace amendment, timely filed before the close of discovery on August 25, 2014, and would not cause undue prejudice to the newly named defendants. While the amendment occurs over three years after the incident, Plaintiffs argue it should relate back to the original filing date, July 31, 2013, thus addressing the statute of limitations concern.
Plaintiffs invoke Rule 15(c) to argue for the relation back of an amended complaint to the original filing. Rule 15(c)(1)(A) permits relation back if Massachusetts law allows it, while Rule 15(c)(1)(C) requires four conditions: 1) the new claim must arise from the same conduct as the original; 2) the new party must have received notice of the action without being prejudiced; 3) notice must have been given within 120 days as per Rule 4(m); and 4) the new party must have known or should have known that the action would have been initiated against it but for a mistake regarding its identity. The City and Fitchet focus solely on subsection (c)(1)(C) in their opposition, arguing that John Doe substitutions do not relate back if made after the statute of limitations has expired. While the First Circuit has not addressed this directly, other circuits consistently hold that ignorance of a defendant's identity does not constitute a mistake under Rule 15(c)(1)(C). Recent district court rulings have echoed this, with Magistrate Judge Hennessy suggesting that equitable tolling might allow for amendment. The stance that John Doe naming results from lack of knowledge, not error, has been criticized by the Third Circuit, which recognizes this view as a plausible but contentious theory.
Victims of civil rights violations often lack knowledge of the identities of their assailants, which typically hampers their ability to file timely lawsuits. If plaintiffs are barred from amending 'John Doe' complaints to identify these individuals, they face a significantly shorter statute of limitations compared to those who know their assailants' names. The Third Circuit, bound by its precedent in Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., recognized that 'John Doe' amendments could satisfy Rule 15(e)(1)(C) conditions but upheld a lower court's decision denying a plaintiff's amendment, as the proposed substitute did not match the original complaint's scope. The court emphasized the sufficiency of Rule 15(c)(1)(A) for allowing the relation-back of amendments, noting that changes to Rule 15(c) in 1991 permit relation back under state law even if federal standards are not met. It highlighted that less restrictive state relation-back rules take precedence over federal rules, enabling plaintiffs to benefit from more lenient state provisions. Thus, even if subparagraph (C) is deemed inapplicable, subparagraph (A) still grants the plaintiffs the necessary relief to amend their complaints. This principle applies to section 1983 claims, allowing for relation back under borrowed state law limitations.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, particularly subparagraph (c)(1)(A), allows courts to consider state law when determining the applicability of statutes of limitations in federal question cases, including section 1983 claims. When assessing relation back of amendments, if state law offers a more lenient principle than federal law, it governs. In section 1983 cases, the statute of limitations is derived from state law; Massachusetts has a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which the First Circuit has adopted for such cases. Under Massachusetts law (Mass. Gen. Laws c. 231, 51), amendments can relate back to the original pleading, allowing for the addition of new parties even after the limitations period has expired. This liberal relation back principle is more accommodating than federal law. However, amendments to substitute or add defendants are not automatic; courts consider factors such as the presence of an honest mistake, the timeliness of the request for joinder, necessity to prevent injustice, and potential prejudice to the non-moving party, paralleling the considerations under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
The court is tasked with determining if an amendment to a complaint can be permitted before trial, and whether it relates back to the date of the original pleading. Both issues are typically considered simultaneously, but it is not procedurally fatal for a court to allow an amendment to join a defendant and later rule against the plaintiff on relation back or limitations grounds. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) permits amendments without addressing relation back, which is governed by Rule 15(c). The court notes that plaintiffs lacked knowledge of the John Doe defendants’ identities at the time of filing but contends that this does not preclude their current motion for relief. The court finds no undue delay or prejudice resulting from the amendment, although potential 'futility' linked to relation back could arise. However, Rule 15(c)(1)(A) applies, allowing the amendment to relate back and bypass the statute of limitations. The court acknowledges a procedural oversight in not serving the motion to amend on the new parties as required by Local Rule 15.1, yet notes that the City and Fitchet did not raise this issue, possibly due to their shared interest with the John Doe defendants. The court concludes by allowing the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint, noting the statute of limitations for the plaintiffs’ state law claims, which is three years for both the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act and the Massachusetts right to privacy claim. Section 51 of Massachusetts General Laws grants courts the authority to permit amendments that add parties or enable plaintiffs to sustain their actions.
