Court: District Court, D. Minnesota; June 4, 2014; Federal District Court
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are granted, while Motions to Sever are denied as moot. Plaintiff Michelle Ray alleges that her driver’s license information was accessed illegally approximately 440 times between 2003 and 2018 without a legitimate law-enforcement purpose, primarily suspecting her ex-husband and his associates, who were former law enforcement officers. Ray provides no specific supporting facts for this claim. The Minnesota Department of Public Safety (DPS) maintains a comprehensive database of driver information, which was accessed 66 times by various defendants and three unnamed entities, as shown in a DPS audit. A Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) audit indicates that nearly 400 accesses occurred, but it is unclear whether all instances constitute separate accesses. For example, a single access recorded multiple entries within five seconds suggests inflated numbers. Ray claims all accesses were unauthorized since she has never been charged or suspected of any crime in the jurisdictions of the defendants and speculates that the accesses were for personal reasons. Ray filed suit on February 26, 2014, alleging violations under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and common-law invasion of privacy, seeking damages and injunctive relief. There are at least 27 similar cases in the district, many dismissed, with others pending. The court notes that the issues in this case are identical to those in other cases and adopts existing reasoning from similar cases without further elaboration.
For a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court accepts all allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in favor of the plaintiff, dismissing the case only if it is clear that no set of facts could establish a claim for relief. A complaint must present enough facts to make a claim plausible.
In the DPPA claim (Count I), the DPPA prohibits knowingly obtaining or disclosing personal information from motor vehicle records for unauthorized purposes. Personal information includes identifiers such as names, addresses, and social security numbers, but excludes data regarding accidents and driving status. The DPPA allows disclosures for specific purposes, including law enforcement and research. It aims to prevent stalking and the unauthorized sale of personal information for marketing.
Ray alleges that all defendants violated the DPPA by improperly accessing her motor vehicle records from 2003 to 2013 without a valid purpose. The defendants argue that most of her claims are barred by the statute of limitations, which is four years. The court previously ruled that the discovery rule does not apply, and therefore, any claims from before February 26, 2010, are time-barred. As a result, the court dismisses claims against certain entities with prejudice, noting that only specific dates of improper access remain relevant.
Regarding the claims against the Commissioner Defendants, Ray argues that they failed to protect her records from improper access. However, she does not claim that they personally accessed her data. The court has determined that the DPPA does not hold individuals liable for indirectly facilitating access through database maintenance. Liability is limited to those who directly obtained or disclosed personal information for impermissible purposes. Since Ray does not allege direct involvement by the Commissioner Defendants in the misuse of her information, her claims against them are also dismissed.
To establish a claim under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), Ray must demonstrate that her data was 'obtained' for an improper purpose. The Court previously ruled that accessing motor vehicle records constitutes 'obtaining' even without further use. The critical question is whether Ray's allegations create a plausible inference of improper purpose. Ray asserts that her data was accessed over 440 times, often in the early morning, without using her license number, and emphasizes her ex-husband's law enforcement connections, alongside her clean criminal record. However, the Court finds her claims to be conclusory and lacking specific factual support necessary to elevate them above speculation. It draws parallels to the case of Mitchell, where similar allegations were dismissed due to insufficient connection between the plaintiff and law enforcement. Ray's assertion of a personal connection through her ex-husband does not explicitly link him or his friends to the alleged DPPA violations, undermining her claims. Therefore, the Court concludes that her allegations do not meet the necessary standard for a DPPA claim and presumes public officials act properly in their duties.
Additionally, Ray's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which are based on the same conduct as her DPPA claims, are also dismissed. The Court previously determined that § 1983 is not available for violations analogous to the facts presented in her complaint. Without unique allegations that could support a different conclusion, and given the failure of her DPPA claims, her § 1983 claims lack viability. Moreover, her Monell claim against the City and County Defendants fails as there are no underlying actionable claims.
Ray asserts a common-law invasion of privacy claim for intrusion upon seclusion under Minnesota law, which requires proving three elements: an intentional intrusion, that the intrusion is highly offensive, and that it involves a matter in which the individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy. The Court has previously ruled that accessing motor vehicle records does not meet the threshold for offensiveness or privacy expectation. Additionally, all defendants except the Commissioner Defendants filed motions to sever, arguing that Ray improperly joined them. The Court found that Ray failed to state viable claims against the defendants, rendering the severance motions moot. In conclusion, the Court's orders include partial granting and denying of motions to dismiss and sever by Hennepin County, Minneapolis, and several other municipalities, while granting the motions to dismiss for Campion and Dohman. The Complaint is dismissed with prejudice against all defendants except Anoka County, which did not file a motion to dismiss and is not reflected as having appeared in the action. The document references prior rulings in the Kost cases, noting that only one non-time barred acquisition of Ray’s data occurred, with the timing of the acquisitions deemed irrelevant to police work.
