Munn v. Hotchkiss School

Citations: 24 F. Supp. 3d 155; 94 Fed. R. Serv. 811; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76594; 2014 WL 2535562Docket: No. 3:09-cv-919 (SRU)

Court: District Court, D. Connecticut; June 5, 2014; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Cara Munn contracted tick-borne encephalitis (TBE) during a trip to China organized by The Hotchkiss School, resulting in severe neurological damage, including loss of speech and cognitive deficits. Munn and her parents sued Hotchkiss, alleging negligent trip planning and supervision. A jury found Hotchkiss solely liable, awarding the Munns $10.25 million in economic damages and $31.5 million in non-economic damages. Hotchkiss subsequently filed motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, asserting five claims: (1) unforeseeability of Munn’s infection, (2) lack of proof regarding the specific site of infection, (3) mismanagement of expert testimony, (4) contributory negligence by the Munns, and (5) the verdict amount being excessive. Additionally, Hotchkiss sought to alter the judgment, which was rendered moot due to a joint stipulation regarding collateral source reduction. The motions were ultimately denied. Background details included Munn's enrollment in Hotchkiss, her decision to join the summer trip after discussions with her mother, and the information provided by trip leaders about the trip, which included a legally questionable waiver and inaccurate medical advice regarding health risks in China.

The packing list included bug spray under "Miscellaneous," but the travel handbook lacked warnings about insect-borne diseases, focusing instead on other health risks. Munn and her parents were unaware of plans to visit a forested area that could harbor disease-carrying insects. Initially, Munn's trip was incident-free, but on June 23, 2007, during a weekend excursion to Mount Panshan, students were not advised to dress appropriately for hiking or to use bug spray. Munn, accompanied by a few peers, opted to hike down the mountain on unpaved trails, becoming lost before rejoining the group. After the hike, Munn developed numerous insect bites and later experienced flu-like symptoms. Her condition worsened rapidly, leading to hospitalization in Beijing, where she was subsequently airlifted to New York. Despite treatment, Munn was left permanently disabled, unable to speak and with limited dexterity in her hands, significantly impacting her quality of life.

Munn has significant limitations in controlling her facial muscles, leading to drooling, difficulty with eating and swallowing, and socially inappropriate expressions. Her cognitive functions are impaired, particularly in executive functioning, making it challenging for her to solve multi-step problems, as evidenced by a drastic decline in her problem-solving test scores. Despite maintaining high verbal comprehension scores, her performance in reading and math has sharply decreased to the third and first percentiles, respectively, while her perceptual reasoning scores are at the twelfth percentile. Munn is described as highly intelligent but struggles to utilize her cognitive abilities effectively. Nonetheless, she functions normally in many respects, retaining understanding of her surroundings, completing high school, and enrolling at Trinity University in Hartford, Connecticut.

In the procedural history, on June 11, 2009, Orson and Christine Munn filed a lawsuit against Hotchkiss, claiming negligence during its 2007 China Summer Program, which allegedly caused Munn's injuries. The Munns accused Hotchkiss of failing to adequately warn of, and protect against, insect-borne diseases, lacking appropriate medical support, and not informing them about vaccine availability. At trial, the Munns narrowed their claims to focus on inadequate warnings and protection from insect-borne disease. Hotchkiss denied negligence, invoking defenses such as assumption of risk due to a signed waiver, claims of force majeure, contributory negligence, and the enforceability of the signed release barring claims except for its own misconduct. Following extensive pre-trial proceedings, a ten-day jury trial took place, during which numerous witnesses testified. After the Munns concluded their case, Hotchkiss sought a directed verdict, arguing Munn's contributory negligence and the unforeseeability of disease risk, which was denied on the grounds that these issues were factual disputes for the jury to resolve.

The jury concluded that Hotchkiss was negligent in several respects: failing to warn Munn about insect-borne illness risks, not ensuring Munn utilized protective measures, and that one or more negligent acts directly caused Munn's injuries from an insect-borne disease contracted during a visit to Mount Panshan. The jury determined that Munn did not contribute to her injuries and awarded her $450,000 in past economic damages, $9.8 million in future economic damages, and $31.5 million in non-economic damages. A judgment was entered for the Munns on April 9, 2013. Following the trial, Hotchkiss filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) and, alternatively, for a new trial and alteration of judgment under Rule 59. The court's review under Rule 50(b) requires that no reasonable jury could have reached the same verdict based on the evidence presented. Conversely, Rule 59 grants the trial judge discretion to order a new trial if the jury's verdict is seriously erroneous. Hotchkiss raised multiple arguments, asserting insufficient evidence of foreseeability regarding Munn's injury, public policy limitations on liability, and challenges to jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and the size of the non-economic damages awarded.

Hotchkiss’s arguments are addressed in several key areas concerning common law negligence under Connecticut law: 

1. **Duty and Foreseeability**: A plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a duty, a breach causing injury, and actual harm. While Hotchkiss does not dispute that Munn was harmed, it contests that its negligence was the proximate cause of her injuries. The court must evaluate the existence and scope of duty, with the existence being a legal question and the scope being a factual question typically for the trier of fact.

2. **Public Policy**: Hotchkiss argues that public policy should relieve it from liability despite the jury's findings on duty and foreseeability.

3. **Legal Duty**: Hotchkiss acknowledges a general duty to inform students of the risks associated with insect-borne diseases during its China program. This duty is heightened for boarding schools, which carry additional responsibilities for student safety and well-being. 

4. **Testimony and School Policy**: The Head of School testified about the school’s duty to protect students from dangerous conditions and the measures taken to inform them about health risks, such as malaria, during the trip.

Hotchkiss contends that it could not foresee the risk of students contracting diseases like TBE during the summer program, but the court emphasizes that it has a legal obligation to protect Munn, a minor under its care, from known health threats.

Hotchkiss contends that it lacked a legal duty to warn the Munns about insect-borne disease risks associated with its 2007 summer China program, framing this as a challenge to the jury's factual determination of duty of care. Connecticut state courts regard the scope of duty as a factual question, requiring evidence from experts to define what a reasonable school should know regarding care standards. Disputes among qualified experts create factual issues that must be resolved by the jury. A court can only vacate a jury's verdict on duty if the defendant's actions clearly meet community standards or if the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. In this case, neither condition for vacating the verdict applies, as Hotchkiss failed to show its actions aligned with community expectations.

Hotchkiss also argued that Munn’s infection was unforeseeable, which was rejected. Connecticut law limits tort liability to foreseeable harms, focusing on whether an ordinary person in the defendant's position would anticipate the general nature of the harm. The foreseeability of injury is typically a factual question for the jury. The jury concluded that Hotchkiss knew or should have known of the risk of contracting insect-borne diseases in China, particularly at Mount Panshan, a critical finding. To succeed, Hotchkiss must either demonstrate a misjudgment by the jury regarding foreseeability or argue it had no legal duty to protect students from known diseases abroad, despite foreseeability.

Foreseeability in tort law mandates that individuals with a duty to others take reasonable precautions to mitigate identifiable risks while limiting liability for risks that are excessively novel or extraordinary. Foreseeability involves recognizing potential dangers based on existing knowledge and a reasonable expectation of harm. It assesses whether the injury falls within a reasonably foreseeable category of risks rather than determining if the specific harm was anticipated. The standard of foreseeability in duty analysis is distinct from that in proximate cause, necessitating a lesser burden of proof.

Hotchkiss's argument for imposing a higher burden of proof on plaintiffs constitutes an unprecedented shift from Connecticut law. In the case of Munn, her health was compromised when a tick, known to be in a risk area for insect-borne diseases, bit her. The potential for harm from other insect-borne diseases underlines that the injury stemmed from a recognized risk rather than the specific illness. A tort occurs when an individual fails to foresee a risk that leads to another's injury. The factfinder must evaluate whether the defendant should have recognized the situation as likely to result in injury without preventive measures.

The jury concluded that Hotchkiss had a duty to warn Munn about the risk of insect-borne diseases. The Connecticut Supreme Court case Jaworski v. Kiernan illustrates this distinction, where the court found that players in soccer should foresee the risk of bodily injury during play, as aggressive actions inherently increase the likelihood of injuries, even if the specific harm (like a torn ligament) was not anticipated.

In soccer, players contesting possession of the ball face a heightened risk of injury to their lower limbs, making injuries foreseeable during such contact. The court concluded that the plaintiff's injury was within the realm of foreseeability. A jury found that Hotchkiss could have anticipated its actions might lead to injury, though the severity of the injury could not be predicted. Hotchkiss countered this interpretation by citing the Connecticut Supreme Court case, Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp., which established that defendants cannot be held liable for unforeseen tertiary effects of their actions. In Lodge, firefighters were injured due to faulty brakes on their engine after responding to a false alarm, and the court ruled that the alarm companies could not foresee this specific outcome, as their actions were too distantly connected to the crash. The court emphasized that the concept of foreseeability must be assessed in relation to causation and duty. It concluded that the harm was too remote from the defendants' actions to impose liability. Importantly, the term "remote" referred to the relationship between the harm and the conduct, not the likelihood of the harm occurring. The court suggested that the plaintiffs had misidentified the proper defendant. In the case involving Hotchkiss, the Munns’ claim directly linked to Hotchkiss's actions regarding Munn’s exposure to insect-borne diseases. Munn contended that the school failed to warn her about the risk of such diseases, leading her to walk without protection against potentially disease-carrying insects.

The Lodge plaintiffs faced challenges in linking their injuries to the negligence of alarm companies, as it was deemed unforeseeable that a false alarm would interact with a fire truck that had poorly-maintained brakes. The court noted that the alarm companies could not be held liable for the vehicle's condition, nor could the plaintiffs claim that accurate signals would have prevented the accident. In contrast, Munn successfully demonstrated that Hotchkiss’s negligence directly contributed to her contracting insect-borne diseases, including TBE, by failing to provide adequate bug spray. Hotchkiss attempted to argue comparative negligence and introduced expert testimony suggesting Munn may have contracted a different form of encephalitis elsewhere, but the central issue remained a factual dispute over causation, necessitating expert input from both sides. 

The jury was informed that Hotchkiss had a duty to protect students from disease-carrying insects, supported by CDC advisories warning of various insect-borne diseases in China, including TBE, and recommending preventive measures such as DEET-based repellents and appropriate clothing. Evidence presented showed that Mount Panshan, where Munn traveled, was within a region described by the CDC as having these risks, with photographic evidence depicting its forested terrain. The Munns presented maps to support their argument that Mount Panshan was in the TBE-endemic area, despite Hotchkiss’s counterarguments regarding its geographical classification.

The jury could reasonably conclude that Mount Panshan is located within "northeastern China," as indicated in the CDC's advisory, supported by testimony from Hotchkiss’s witnesses. Thompson acknowledged that Tianjin is in northeastern China. Dr. David Freedman, Hotchkiss’s liability expert, initially claimed ignorance of the CDC listing Tianjin as part of the northeastern provinces but later admitted its location. Freedman recognized the Munns’ authoritative map, which identified Mount Panshan as part of the TBE-endemic region, citing its inclusion in a travel medicine textbook he edited.

Even if the CDC evidence was deemed inconclusive, expert opinions indicated foreseeability of insect-borne diseases in the area. Dr. Stuart Rose, the Munns’ expert, testified that rural China was known to be endemic for diseases like TBE, Japanese encephalitis, and Lyme disease as per 2007 travel medicine reports. He asserted that a competent trip planner would have taken precautions, such as advising children to wear protective clothing and using insect repellent.

Freedman expressed a strong belief that the school acted correctly but acknowledged that Lyme disease and Japanese encephalitis were present in Tianjin. He conceded that TBE existed locally and that there were known cases at the time, which should have alerted the school to the associated risks. Under questioning, Freedman suggested that the school should have taken the CDC warning seriously regarding TBE. The Munns presented additional evidence from a commercial service advisory, which highlighted the risk of TBE in rural China, and Freedman could not dispute its accuracy, given his role on the service’s editorial board. A British health advisory also corroborated the presence of TBE in forested regions of China and Japan.

Hotchkiss contests the sufficiency of the Munns’ case by highlighting that the CDC had no prior records of American travelers contracting tick-borne encephalitis (TBE) in China before Munn’s illness in summer 2007. Hotchkiss argues that this unprecedented nature of Munn's illness indicates it was unforeseeable and constituted a "freak accident," thus relieving the school of a duty to protect against it. However, the jury determined that Hotchkiss failed to meet the standard of care regarding insect-borne diseases, establishing that Munn’s severe illness, despite its rarity, was a foreseeable risk. 

The legal framework indicates that previous incidents are not the sole means of proving foreseeability; sufficient evidence of negligence can exist independently. Citing Stagl v. Delta Air Lines, the Second Circuit maintained that prior accidents are not essential to establish negligence if other evidence suffices. The rarity of an injury is significant in evaluating negligence and reasonable care standards, as articulated in the Hand Rule. The jury found that Hotchkiss should have foreseen the risk posed to Munn by insect-borne diseases, and despite Hotchkiss's arguments, the jury's judgment was upheld.

Additionally, Hotchkiss contends that the court incorrectly instructed the jury regarding foreseeability, asserting that liability only arises from known risks. The court provided guidance for the jury to objectively assess whether a reasonable school would have anticipated harm.

Foreseeability is not strictly a matter of probability; rather, it involves the capacity to anticipate potential harm based on the circumstances known to a defendant. The Connecticut Supreme Court established in *Jarmie v. Troncale* that the key test for determining a duty of care is whether an ordinary person in the defendant's position would foresee that harm could result from a lack of caution. It is clarified that foreseeability also considers the salience of risks; significant potential harm can create a duty to act even if the likelihood of occurrence is low. The school argues that an instruction conflated the scope of a duty with whether a duty arises, but this argument is dismissed. The instruction accurately reflects legal principles, explaining that foreseeability encompasses factors beyond mere probability, such as the seriousness of possible consequences. Courts have consistently accepted the idea that the gravity of potential harm influences whether a reasonable person would foresee an unusual risk. This principle is supported by multiple jurisdictions, including references to *Prosser & Keeton on Torts* and various case law affirmations that consider the interplay of likelihood and severity of harm in assessing foreseeability.

Hotchkiss implemented the principle that salience influences risk perception by informing students of serious but unlikely risks associated with their trip to China. In its pre-trip manual, the school warned students about potential medical risks, including the dangers of inadequate blood screening for HIV in foreign countries and the importance of consulting the Red Cross for safe blood sources. Additionally, it cautioned students regarding sexual activity abroad, highlighting that foreign condoms might not meet safety standards and advised students to bring their own supplies. Despite the low likelihood of students suffering harm from these issues, the school took proactive measures to warn students due to the severe consequences associated with such risks, including the potential for contracting HIV.

Regarding jury instructions, Hotchkiss contended that the instructions could mislead the jury about the scope of duty, arguing that foreseeability should hinge solely on the likelihood of harm, rather than the existence of serious, knowable potential harms. However, the court maintained that the instructions provided a clear definition of negligence, stating that a defendant cannot be liable unless aware of a risk that a reasonable entity should foresee. The instructions consistently emphasized that Hotchkiss could only be held liable for risks that were predictable, thus ensuring that the jury was not misled in a way that would prejudice the school's defense.

Hotchkiss was not held liable for unforeseeable harm, but the jury determined that the school could have anticipated the risk of students contracting insect-borne diseases. Regarding causation, Hotchkiss contended that plaintiffs did not prove Munn contracted tick-borne encephalitis (TBE) on Mount Panshan. Munn testified to multiple bug bites on the trip, including a notable bite on her arm that became red and itchy. She developed symptoms of encephalitis approximately ten days post-trip, aligning with the typical incubation period for TBE, as stated by defense expert Freedman. Munn indicated that Mount Panshan was the only location where she encountered wooded and grassy areas, while there was only one other reported incident of bug complaints during the trip. Munn's expert, Rose, opined that she contracted TBE on Mount Panshan after reviewing relevant evidence. Hotchkiss argued that Munn needed conclusive proof of contracting TBE there, but this argument was likely waived because it was not specified in a prior Rule 50(a) motion, which is required for preserving issues for a subsequent Rule 50(b) motion. The requirement for specificity in the motion is meant to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to address any evidentiary deficiencies. Although Hotchkiss proposed an alternative theory that Munn contracted the Powassan virus in New York, it did not contest the evidence's sufficiency in its original Rule 50(a) motion, having only raised two grounds for judgment at that time.

Hotchkiss contended that Munn failed to demonstrate that a warning about the risk of insect-borne diseases would have altered her behavior, and that the Munns did not show the school could have anticipated Munn’s injury. Hotchkiss did not address any specifics regarding Mount Panshan, causation, or the source of Munn's tick-borne disease in its initial motion. It later attempted to introduce a causation argument in its Rule 50 motions, asserting that its previous comments implied a connection to duty and foreseeability. However, this assertion contradicted the recorded proceedings and was deemed unpersuasive. 

The Munns’ counsel argued they had established that Munn would have taken precautions if warned, had contracted TBE while hiking on Mount Panshan, and had not previously contracted TBE or a similar virus. Following Hotchkiss’s Rule 50(a) motion, the Munns’ counsel focused primarily on whether appropriate warnings would have influenced Munn's actions, as Hotchkiss did not raise any issues regarding Munn contracting TBE during the hike. 

In Connecticut, plaintiffs must demonstrate two elements for legal causation: cause in fact and proximate cause. The jury is tasked with determining if the injury would have occurred but for the defendant's actions and whether those actions were a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. The Munns presented compelling circumstantial evidence, supported by expert testimony linking Munn's symptoms to the timeline of her visit to Mount Panshan. Munn testified that she would have taken precautions had she been warned, and evidence showed that Hotchkiss’s actions significantly contributed to Munn’s injuries, particularly given the tick habitat on Mount Panshan and Munn's reported bug bites during the hike.

No evidence was presented to disrupt the causal chain between Munn's hike on Mount Panshan and her subsequent symptoms. Hotchkiss failed to provide evidence of an intervening event or alternative source for Munn's infection. Although Munn did not testify about finding a tick on the day of her hike, the burden of proof does not require her to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she contracted TBE during the hike. Instead, the Munns can establish their case based on reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, as supported by Connecticut law. 

Hotchkiss contends that direct evidence is necessary to prove Munn contracted TBE on Mount Panshan, citing the case of Paige v. St. Andrew’s Roman Catholic Church. In Paige, the court overturned a jury award because the plaintiff could not directly link the defendant or its employees to the cause of his injury, due to the presence of third parties who might have been responsible. The court highlighted the need for a clear causal connection, which was lacking in that case due to contradictory jury findings. In contrast, the jury in Munn’s case reached a clear verdict, suggesting a more straightforward causal link.

Hotchkiss was found negligent in both pre-trip planning and supervision of students, directly causing Cara Munn’s injury. The jury concluded that there was no evidence of third-party liability or that Munn would have been infected if appropriate precautions had been taken. Although the Munns could not produce the tick that bit Cara, they established a clear connection between her illness and a bug bite received during a school trip.

Hotchkiss sought to introduce evidence of contributory negligence by the Munns, proposing three theories. First, it claimed that by signing a release and waiver, the Munns assumed the risks associated with the trip, which constituted an affirmative defense of assumption of risk. Second, Hotchkiss argued that it fulfilled its duty by providing risk information to the Munns, suggesting its own liability could be negated. Third, it asserted that the Munns had an independent duty to protect their child, positing that their decision to allow her to travel constituted negligence.

However, Hotchkiss's theories were deemed ineffective. The assumption of risk defense was waived as it was not raised during pretrial motions or at trial, nor supported by evidence. The burden of proof for asserting an affirmative defense lies with the party claiming it, and Hotchkiss failed to meet this burden under relevant state law.

Assumption of risk is classified as an affirmative defense, placing the burden of proof on the defendant to demonstrate it, as established in Freedman v. Hurwitz. However, Connecticut law has eliminated this doctrine following the adoption of a comparative negligence regime in 1973, as noted in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-572h(i) and supported by case law. The Connecticut Supreme Court has not permitted parties to contractually agree to an assumption of risk.

Hotchkiss's attempt to equate parental permission for sports participation with parental assumption of risk regarding a school-organized trip is flawed. This analogy overlooks the significant disparity in information between the school and the students or their parents, as Hotchkiss possessed detailed knowledge of the trip that was inadequately disclosed. This incomplete information underpins the school's potential negligence.

Public policy prohibits releasing a defendant from liability when they possess greater knowledge of risks than the plaintiff, as reaffirmed in Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp. Additionally, under Connecticut law, parents cannot waive claims for their minor children’s injuries resulting from a defendant's negligence, particularly when damages exceed $10,000. This principle is reinforced by various cases, including Hyson v. White Water Mtn. Resorts of Conn. Inc. and others.

Hotchkiss contends it fulfilled its duty of care by adequately warning parents about the trip. However, this argument shifts the focus back to Hotchkiss's own negligence, which it did not pursue as a theory of parental contributory negligence during the trial, failing to preserve the argument in its initial Rule 50(a) motion.

Evidence presented at trial included discussions about the adequacy of parental preparation and communication regarding a trip to China taken by Cara Munn. Defense counsel aimed to demonstrate that the parents were well-informed about the trip itinerary and risks, having received multiple packets of information, signed necessary paperwork, and coordinated with school officials. The defense did not assert that the parents' negligence in supervision directly caused any injuries but instead focused on the school's fulfillment of its duty by adequately informing both Cara and her parents about the trip.

The court allowed the school to argue its defense, highlighting that the information provided to the Munns could absolve the school of liability. Jury instructions indicated that the jury should determine whether the school had indeed discharged its duty by informing the parents. Certain evidence was admitted regarding the information parents received, but inquiries into the Munns’ reactions to the school's warnings were excluded due to potential prejudice and violation of parental immunity under Connecticut law.

The defense argued that the parents might have a comparative negligence claim for failing to properly supervise Cara's preparation, which could invoke a liability release clause. Ultimately, the case hinged on whether the school met its obligation to inform the parents adequately, irrespective of the parents’ subsequent actions or inactions regarding the trip's preparations.

The Munns' decision to allow their minor daughter to travel to China with the school is argued to be an act of negligence that could either be attributed to Munn as comparative negligence or sever the chain of proximate causation. However, Connecticut law does not support these arguments. Under Connecticut's parental immunity doctrine, unemancipated minors cannot sue their parents for injuries occurring during their minority due to parental actions, which extends beyond negligence to all torts involving personal injuries to minors. This doctrine also prevents defendants from bringing parents into lawsuits as third-party defendants to apportion negligence or make claims regarding parents’ comparative negligence. The Connecticut Supreme Court reaffirmed that allowing such actions would undermine familial privacy and management. Furthermore, the Munns signed a release form waiving liability for the school regarding injuries, with an exception for the school’s sole negligence or willful misconduct. Hotchkiss contends that evidence of the Munns’ alleged negligent supervision should have been admissible to demonstrate the school was not solely responsible for any negligence.

Hotchkiss contends it should have presented evidence regarding Mr. and Mrs. Munn's negligence as a factor in their daughter Munn's injuries, arguing that their failure to adequately supervise her travel to China was independently negligent. However, the court found no support in the record for characterizing the Munns' actions as independently negligent. Instead, Hotchkiss focused on whether the Munns researched travel risks and reviewed school information, ultimately admitting it had no evidence that the Munns received additional information beyond what the school provided. The court noted that Hotchkiss's theory of parental negligence was speculative and lacked sufficient evidence, primarily relying on cross-examination of the Munns without substantiation.

Importantly, while Hotchkiss did not plead Munn's negligence in its response, the court permitted evidence of Munn’s comparative negligence. The court highlighted a logical inconsistency in allowing claims of parental negligence to trigger liability waivers while simultaneously barring claims between parties regarding tort liability. Connecticut courts have consistently avoided allowing parental negligence to diminish a child's recovery from a parent's negligence, regardless of how the claim is framed. Several cases were cited to support this position, emphasizing the prohibition against using parental negligence as a defense to reduce a child's damages or affect proximate cause. Ultimately, the court reinforced that attempts to attribute blame to the Munns for their daughter's injuries under the guise of parental negligence are not permissible under current law.

Parents cannot recover damages for injuries sustained by their minor child due to another's negligence; only the child can seek recovery. The alleged negligence of Mr. and Mrs. Munns is irrelevant to the case as it cannot bar their child's negligence claim. The Munns seek damages dependent on their daughter's recovery. Hotchkiss's argument that the school should not cover parental negligence misinterprets the case’s context. Hotchkiss wished to present the waiver to the jury, claiming it would clarify the applicability of the release clause, but introducing it would likely confuse the jury and be more prejudicial than beneficial, especially given Connecticut's disfavor of liability waivers that absolve defendants from their own negligence. The court emphasized that the interpretation of the waiver is a legal question, and its exclusion posed no harm to the defendants. The school had no valid claim of parental comparative negligence and had waived such claims against Munn and her parents. The jury determined that Munn was not responsible for her injuries, and the school could not request an interrogatory regarding the Munns' fault, as it failed to plead any other affirmative defenses or theories of comparative negligence. Ultimately, the jury concluded that only the school was liable for Munn's injuries.

If the court had determined that the school could enforce a waiver, it would not have changed the case's outcome since the jury found the school solely negligent. The parental negligence theory presented by Hotchkiss does not fit within the exceptions to the parental immunity doctrine as recognized by Connecticut courts, which include only a parent's negligent operation of certain vehicles, negligent conduct in a business context outside the home, or serious misconduct such as sexual assault that undermines familial harmony. The courts have emphasized that exceptions to parental immunity should align with public policy and the specific circumstances.

Furthermore, the question of whether a jury could consider parental negligence when parents cannot be held liable is unlikely to be permitted in Connecticut, as established precedents indicate that parental negligence cannot be attributed to a minor child, and parents are immune from negligence claims. Hotchkiss incorrectly argued that a parent's decision to allow a child to participate in a school trip constitutes negligence, which the jury could not evaluate regarding the child's injury. The assertion that a school is absolved of liability every time a parent consents to a school trip contradicts Connecticut law and public policy.

Additionally, Hotchkiss contended that even if it had a duty to warn about insect-borne diseases, public policy should limit its liability. Under Connecticut law, liability may not extend to specific consequences or plaintiffs based on public policy considerations, even if a risk was foreseeable.

A public policy exception to liability is determined by four factors: the normal expectations of participants in the activity, the public policy of encouraging participation while ensuring safety, the avoidance of increased litigation, and decisions from other jurisdictions. Hotchkiss argues that Connecticut public policy opposes liability for an unprecedented illness contracted by a student during a foreign trip but has likely waived this argument by not raising it in its Rule 50(a) motion at trial. A court must consider the specific consequences to the plaintiff when assessing public policy, which is a case-specific standard. Public policy arguments are not for juries to resolve but require a judge to evaluate evidence regarding the injury circumstances. Addressing public policy at this stage would prevent the Munns from countering Hotchkiss’s claims, as they were not aware they needed to provide evidence of participant expectations. Even if the argument were preserved, it would not absolve Hotchkiss from liability since the concepts of foreseeability and public policy are distinct. Connecticut law dictates that a court must first evaluate whether a plaintiff's injury stemmed from foreseeable risks to establish duty, then proceed to a public policy analysis. There is no public policy exemption for unforeseeable risks, as there is no duty to protect against them; public policy only shields defendants from liability in rare cases where a foreseeable risk exists but is not deemed a societal expectation.

Defendants cannot use this ruling as a means to relitigate the foreseeability of risks in negligence cases. The Connecticut Supreme Court has set a precedent through cases like Jaworski, where the court vacated a jury award for an injury in a contact sport, emphasizing that participants in competitive sports accept certain inherent risks, and negligence liability is inappropriate except in cases of intentional or reckless behavior. Similarly, in Lodge, the court ruled an alarm company was not liable for a city's negligent maintenance of fire trucks due to a lack of proximate causation. In RK Constructors, an employer could not sue for increased insurance premiums resulting from a subcontractor's injury due to the attenuated relationship between the harm and the defendant's conduct. These cases suggest that while foreseeability might exist, other negligence elements or tort principles may disfavor liability. Hotchkiss has not identified a comparable principle or adequately assessed the four factors that determine public policy exceptions to liability. The critical issue is whether Connecticut public policy opposes holding schools accountable for failing to warn students about foreseeable risks, such as insect-borne diseases. Based on these four factors, it is unlikely that Connecticut would disfavor liability in this context. Participants in study-abroad programs at boarding schools expect to be warned about health risks, and Hotchkiss acknowledges its duty to inform and protect students regarding such risks while traveling abroad.

The school committed to providing travel medicine advice and on-trip care for participants in its China program, suggesting specific health precautions. The Hotchkiss infirmary is designated as a travel clinic, and there are medical advisories and insurance information available for students and parents. These assurances may lead participants to expect adequate health warnings and protections from the school. Despite Connecticut's public policy favoring international studies, Hotchkiss has not cited any legal framework prioritizing student experiences over health and safety. The jury concluded that Hotchkiss was aware of diseases that could endanger students during the trip. The core issue is whether boarding schools have a duty to protect students from foreseeable medical risks in unfamiliar environments. Unlike inherent sports injuries, contracting insect-borne diseases is not an inherent risk of foreign travel, and schools can take reasonable precautions to mitigate such risks. Liability for the school in this instance is unlikely to increase litigation, as parents are generally concerned about children's safety. Additionally, precedents cited by Hotchkiss from other jurisdictions do not directly address the duty to protect students from foreseeable health risks.

Hotchkiss has not identified any jurisdiction that exempts schools from liability for exposing students to foreseeable harmful diseases during school-organized activities. The argument presented by Hotchkiss, suggesting that recognizing liability would lead to the cancellation of extracurricular activities, was rejected by the jury and the court. The court found that the burden on schools to remind students to use insect repellent during trips is minimal compared to the risk of serious diseases. Imposing liability may result in some schools canceling programs, others improving safety measures, or purchasing more insurance, but it will not halt high school extracurricular activities. 

Regarding expert testimony, Hotchkiss claims improper admission of two witnesses for the Munns and exclusion of a defense witness, but the court maintains that the admission of expert testimony is at the judge's discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The judge has a "gatekeeping responsibility" to ensure the relevance and reliability of scientific evidence. Peter Tarlow was accepted as an expert in tourism risk management and related policies, possessing over twenty years of experience and relevant publications. Though he lacked experience in China, he acknowledged the foreseeability of insect-borne disease risks and suggested precautions schools should adopt.

Tarlow had no prior knowledge of a standard of care for secondary schools offering study-abroad programs, and it was acknowledged that, in 2007, no such published standard existed. He developed a hypothesis that schools had a duty to inform students about insect-borne diseases, advise on precautions, and mandate those precautions. Tarlow supported his hypothesis by referencing existing safety standards for adults, assuming these would serve as a baseline for minors. He found pre-existing government documents and educational manuals that recommended insect precautions for adults and believed those should apply to students. This method was deemed reasonable, aligning with practices used by Thompson, who designed pre-trip materials for Hotchkiss students based on university-level standards due to the lack of published guidelines for high school programs.

Tarlow's approach was considered appropriate for testing, and any issues with his research would affect the weight of his testimony rather than its admissibility. Concerns about his methods were valid grounds for cross-examination instead of exclusion. Even if Tarlow's expertise or methods were questioned, any potential errors were deemed harmless. Defense witnesses conceded that they typically warn students about insect-borne disease risks and advise on precautions when aware of such risks, thereby affirming the standard of care Tarlow articulated. 

Stuart Rose was qualified as an expert in travel medicine, with a focus on standards for foreign travel preparation. Hotchkiss did not challenge his qualifications due to his extensive experience but argued that his lack of experience with secondary schools limited his ability to comment on the relevant standard of care for advising adolescents on travel risks. This argument was seen as an unreasonable attempt to restrict the scope of evidence.

Rose is qualified to provide expert testimony on the reasonable precautions trip planners should take to protect minors from medical risks during international travel, despite not being a specialist in infectious diseases. His expertise is based on relevant knowledge, training, and decades of experience in travel medicine, including extensive publications and advising young travelers on health risks. He has specifically studied organizational practices for safeguarding minors during trips abroad, making him capable of assessing whether Hotchkiss could have anticipated risks from insect-borne diseases and if the school implemented adequate medical precautions. The challenges raised by Hotchkiss regarding Rose's testimony pertain to its weight rather than its admissibility, aligning with the Daubert standard, which emphasizes cross-examination and evidence presentation as means to address concerns over expert testimony.

Fluharty is also presented as an expert in study-abroad programs, focusing on standards of care regarding insect-borne disease prevention in similar educational settings. His qualifications stem from his role as head of global studies at a Virginia boarding school since 2001 and his involvement with the Global Education Benchmark Group, which conducted surveys of private school international travel practices in 2008 and 2012. His insights are drawn from both survey data and personal experience, leading to his qualification as an expert witness.

Fluharty's testimony was deemed inadmissible as it lacked a foundation in reliable data or facts, relying instead on personal opinions presented as industry standards. This led to the first instance in over fourteen years where testimony was struck for being false and misleading. Under Rule 702, district judges must act as “gatekeepers,” ensuring that expert testimony is based on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the case. The rule outlines four key factors for admissibility: (1) the testimony must provide specialized knowledge relevant to the facts at issue; (2) it must be based on sufficient facts or data; (3) it should result from reliable principles and methods; and (4) the principles and methods must be applied reliably to the facts of the case. Testimony may also be excluded if it extrapolates unfounded conclusions from accepted premises or if the expert fails to apply the same rigor in court as in their professional practice. District judges have discretion in evaluating the relevance and reliability of expert testimony, requiring a thorough examination of the facts, methodologies, and their application to the case. Additionally, expert opinions that rely on inadmissible hearsay may only be admitted if based on data that experts in the field typically rely on. The reliability assessment must focus on the expert’s principles and methodologies, independent of their conclusions.

The Supreme Court emphasizes that expert conclusions and methodology are interrelated and that district courts should not admit opinion evidence lacking a solid connection to reliable data or methodology. Under Daubert and Rule 702, an expert's opinion must be well-reasoned, not speculative, and grounded in established knowledge or experience. The district judge has a gatekeeping role to ensure the reliability and relevance of expert testimony. In this case, Fluharty’s testimony was struck because it was based on insufficient facts and data, leading to fabricated support for his opinions, which he misrepresented as expert testimony. The judge found that Fluharty could not substantiate his claims with the 2008 GEBG survey results and relied instead on anecdotal evidence from a few schools, applying contemporary standards incorrectly to past conduct. Despite initial qualification, Fluharty's testimony ultimately failed to meet the criteria set forth by Rule 702.

Fluharty testified about his involvement in the 2008 GEBG survey, claiming to have consulted numerous schools to form his expert opinion. His testimony faced objections from the Munns’ counsel, which were overruled. However, it became evident that Fluharty's assertions were not based on a comprehensive survey but rather on informal discussions with a limited number of schools. He admitted to having only informally spoken with one other school about trips to temperate areas of China before 2008, which was deemed insufficient to establish an industry-wide standard of care.

As his testimony progressed, Fluharty's reliance on personal opinion became apparent, particularly when lacking adequate data. He claimed to know the "common practice" for protecting against insect-borne diseases on school trips, attributing his insights to the GEBG survey and conversations with other schools. Yet, he later acknowledged that his understanding was significantly influenced by practices from his own school in 2010, three years after Munn’s participation in a relevant trip. Furthermore, the 2008 GEBG survey did not address insect-borne disease prevention practices specifically.

Recognizing that Fluharty's testimony was not grounded in factual data regarding pre-2007 practices, the court instructed Hotchkiss’s counsel to ensure that Fluharty limited his testimony to established practices from before 2007 and could only label practices as "standards" if they were factually supported. In an effort to reinforce Fluharty's credibility, Hotchkiss’s counsel proposed to base his opinions on insights from the 2008 survey, which included questions about schools’ assessments of medical risks and consultations with travel medicine experts regarding insect-borne diseases.

Fluharty's testimony was found to lack sufficient factual support and methodology, leading to concerns about its reliability under Rule 702. During the trial, it was revealed that Fluharty's responses were based on data from a 2012 survey rather than the 2008 survey he initially referenced, and he could not confirm if the 2008 survey included relevant queries about medical risks or insect-borne diseases. Despite Fluharty's qualifications, the testimony was deemed misleading and unfounded, prompting the judge to discuss the issues with counsel and ultimately strike his entire testimony after reviewing the 2012 survey results, which contradicted Fluharty's claims regarding CDC advisories and schools' risk mitigation practices. The judge emphasized that Fluharty's inability to provide truthful and reliable bases for his testimony warranted exclusion, not due to a lack of expertise but due to the absence of factual grounding. Hotchkiss's objections centered on Fluharty's qualifications, but the ruling was firmly based on the unreliability of the testimony, ensuring adherence to standards for expert evidence. Following this, Hotchkiss raised concerns about the admissibility of expert Lawrence Forman's testimony.

For-man, a lifecare planner, is criticized by the school for allegedly relying on inadmissible hearsay by referencing another expert, Dr. Andrew Yuan, in his testimony regarding Munn's need for a life coach. The school argues that under Rule 703, while experts may rely on inadmissible information, the reliance on another expert's opinion, especially one that the school could not cross-examine, introduces bias. Hotchkiss claims that this reliance could justify a reduction of the damage award by approximately $5.9 million. However, it is asserted that For-man’s opinion was valid and appropriately admitted, as he formed his conclusions based on his own assessments and conversations with Dr. Robert Tepley, a neuropsychologist who testified at trial. For-man's determination that Munn required a life coach stemmed from Tepley's evaluations, not solely from Yuan's input. Additionally, both Tepley and Yuan agreed on the necessity of assistance for Munn, affirming For-man's conclusions. Ultimately, Yuan’s opinion was not the primary basis for For-man’s recommendation of a life coach, and even if For-man had relied on hearsay, it did not prejudice Hotchkiss's case, as the foundation of For-man's opinion was supported by credible evidence from Tepley.

Forman recommended a life coach for Munn after identifying her primary challenges as cognitive issues. Yuan's influence on Forman's opinion was limited to highlighting Munn’s greater physical capabilities than initially perceived. Forman's testimony was admissible under Rule 703 and did not prejudice Hotchkiss. Hotchkiss sought a significant reduction of the jury's non-economic damages award and a collateral source reduction. However, the jury's award, especially for non-pecuniary damages, is considered a matter for the jury's discretion, as established in Mahon v. B.V. Unitron Mfg. Inc. Hotchkiss's request for a remittitur of Munn’s non-economic damages was denied, and their motion for collateral source reduction was rendered moot due to a joint stipulation. Consequently, economic damages were reduced by $284,094.61, resulting in total economic damages of $9,965,905.39 and total damages (economic and non-economic) of $41,465,905.39.

A trial court can only reduce an award if there is an "extraordinary departure from reasonableness" in the jury's calculations, as noted in Saleh v. Ribeiro Trucking. The court must provide clear reasons for any remittitur, beyond simply stating the award is shocking or unreasonable. In evaluating remittitur, the trial court must view evidence favorably toward sustaining the jury's verdict. Munn's case presented her as suffering from a severe disability that hampers her communication abilities: she is mute, cannot sign, struggles to type, and has difficulty with social exchanges due to her inability to express emotions or manage physical symptoms, such as drooling.

Munn experiences significant social alienation and disgust from others, largely due to her limited cognitive skills, specifically in executive function, although she retains a degree of her pre-injury intelligence. Her cognitive injuries prevent her from implementing perceived solutions, likened to a "world-class sprinter forced to live in a box." Munn's life is dominated by therapy and self-improvement efforts, resulting in a lack of social interaction outside of online contact, as she does not attend social events like college parties. Witnesses describe her existence as monk-like, highlighting her isolation and absence of friendships, with family being her primary social contact. Munn fears she will remain an "old spinster" without the ability to raise children, as experts indicate she struggles with basic life management tasks. Her solitude leads to acute emotional pain, suicidal thoughts, and a predicted return to depression after leaving the structured school environment. Munn feels shame regarding her eating habits, which appear childlike due to her inability to chew and swallow normally. Past relationships have compounded her emotional distress, particularly after being publicly criticized by an ex-boyfriend. She expresses frustration over being perceived as mentally retarded and feels powerless to change this misconception.

Munn experiences intense emotional distress due to her awareness of personal losses, which is compounded by her physical limitations following a severe illness. Despite having a normal life expectancy, she faces a long future of suffering, as she endured paralysis, semi-coma, and painful feeding tube experiences. Although she has regained some independence, Munn still struggles with muscle tightness and stiffness that hinder her mobility and communication. Her reliance on her mother for assistance in calling cabs highlights her isolation and limitations. Expert testimony suggests that significant improvement in her condition is unlikely. While Munn has moments of fulfillment, such as blogging and traveling with assistance, the evidence presented to the jury supports the view that these instances are rare, justifying a substantial monetary award. The court evaluated whether the jury's award of $31.5 million in non-economic damages was excessive but found no evidence of jury misconduct or unreasonable decision-making.

Remittitur should be ordered only when it is clear that the jury awarded damages that are legally unsupported, contrary to court instructions, or indicative of jury misconduct. The verdict must be so excessive as to undermine the fairness of the process. Courts often employ a common-law approach by comparing verdicts in similar cases, suggesting that if other juries value similar suffering comparably, the original jury likely acted reasonably. Munn's case is unique due to her young age, significant physical ailments, social stigma, and retained intelligence that she cannot utilize. Previous cases have awarded large sums for comparable suffering, such as $50 million for long-term pain in a birth injury case and $16.5 million where life expectancy was uncertain. Although Munn may not need as much assistance as other plaintiffs, she faces similar social isolation. Other cases involving adults with life-altering injuries and intact cognition also received significant awards. Munn's verdict aligns with awards ranging from $15 million to $50 million for similar injuries and life expectancies. If Munn's award were annualized, it would provide about $477,272 per year, which is on the lower end compared to similar cases. Her substantial award ensures her material needs are met, and while the judge might have awarded less, a jury's higher verdict does not automatically indicate excessiveness.

Disparities in non-economic damages awarded by judges and juries are expected due to the subjective nature of such inquiries. Specific examples illustrate the challenges in quantifying non-economic losses, such as the emotional impact of relying on parents for social events or the loss of joy from hobbies. The jury's award for Munn’s non-economic damages is deemed reasonable in light of the total harms suffered. Under Connecticut law, past economic damages in personal injury cases can be reduced by the amount received from collateral sources, such as health insurance, to prevent double recovery. In this case, the Munns’ past economic damages were $450,000, but after accounting for $284,094.61 from collateral sources, the adjusted amount is $165,905.39, leading to total damages (economic and non-economic) of $41,465,905.39. Hotchkiss's motions for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, and to alter judgment were denied, and the stipulation regarding collateral source reduction was approved. Additionally, there was debate regarding the classification of Lyme disease as a dangerous condition, with Hotchkiss arguing against its severity despite the school's precautions for student safety. The testimony indicates that Lyme disease can have serious consequences, contrary to Hotchkiss's assertions.

In a scenario where students are instructed to wear boots but arrive in flip-flops, the speaker's established practice is to send them back to school. The legal discussion centers on the duty of care owed by the school regarding insect-borne diseases, specifically Lyme disease and Tick-Borne Encephalitis (TBE). The court finds that the comparative severity of these diseases is not relevant to the school’s general duty of care. Foreseeability is crucial in negligence cases, influencing both the duty owed and proximate cause. The speaker cites Malloy v. Town of Colchester, indicating that legal causation often overlaps with the extent of the tortfeasor's duty. 

Hotchkiss's argument frames foreseeability as a question of duty rather than proximate cause, which is a factual matter subject to jury determination. The reasonable person's perspective, based on available information and professional advice, guides this assessment. The speaker references Miranti v. Brookside, emphasizing that contested facts should prevent summary judgment, and notes that a jury's verdict will be upheld if reasonable based on the evidence. 

Further, to establish proximate cause, a plaintiff must show the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm, without needing to predict the harm's extent or manner. The Connecticut Supreme Court's comments on liability for unrelated accidents suggest a focus on intervening causes rather than foreseeability alone. Hotchkiss presented theories that Munn contracted TBE from unpasteurized milk or the Powassan virus, but failed to provide evidence for the dairy theory, which was excluded for being prejudicial. However, expert testimony regarding the Powassan virus was permitted, with defense expert Dr. David Freedman referencing CDC standards for travel medicine advice.

The CDC serves as the primary source for national travel medicine guidelines, agreed upon by multiple witnesses during the trial. Conflicting findings from CDC sources regarding insect-borne disease risks in certain areas of China were noted, particularly a 2008 report indicating no reported cases among foreign travelers visiting clinics in China. The jury likely found the CDC's webpage on China persuasive regarding the foreseeability of contracting tick-borne encephalitis (TBE) and other diseases. 

Although Hotchkiss contested the relevance of a December 2007 advisory, arguing it was outdated since Munn's trip occurred earlier, the advisory was last reviewed in August 2007, shortly after Munn’s illness began. The jury could infer that the information on the earlier webpage was consistent with the later version. Additionally, Thompson testified that a link to the CDC's Central America page was mistakenly included in communications regarding the trip to China, and he recalled warnings about TBE from the relevant webpage.

No increase in TBE infections in northeastern China was reported during the timeframe in question, and Munn was diagnosed with TBE months after returning. Therefore, references to TBE in the advisory could not logically pertain to Munn’s case. Róse utilized a report from Shore-land Travax, which was considered a learned treatise but not admitted as evidence. Hotchkiss argued that the Munns’ counsel should have inferred issues regarding causation from pretrial motions, but this interpretation was deemed difficult to support based on the context. Hotchkiss's claim that Munn would have taken preventive measures against insect-borne diseases with proper advice was speculative and unsupported by evidence.

At the post-trial hearing, Hotchkiss’s counsel contended that the Munns’ counsel was aware that Hotchkiss's motion focused on the evidence of Munn’s infection, asserting that this was Hotchkiss's sole causation theory. However, this claim was deemed inaccurate, as Hotchkiss had argued throughout the trial that Munn might have contracted the Powassan virus prior to her trip, which shares a genetic likeness to TBE. Despite the court's refusal to preclude evidence regarding Powassan, Hotchkiss did not present witnesses to support this theory during the trial, yet it remained a topic of discussion during the school's summation.

Connecticut tort law operates under the doctrine of comparative negligence, despite references to contributory negligence in state statutes. This means that if the school provided adequate warnings to parents and children, it could be considered to have fulfilled its duty, regardless of whether the advice was followed. Following the Connecticut Supreme Court ruling in Crotta, trial courts have maintained that the parental immunity doctrine prevents the imputation of parental negligence to a minor child and bars claims for parental comparative negligence and related defenses. Various case precedents establish that parents cannot be held liable for negligence towards their minor children, cannot be made apportionment defendants, and that parental immunity extends to claims of assumed risk on behalf of minors.

Hotchkiss argues that the parental immunity doctrine does not apply if parents bring a claim separate from their child's negligence action, asserting that the Munns' claim against the school qualifies as such an independent claim.

Mr. and Mrs. Munns’ claims in the litigation are dependent on Munn's negligence claim, as stipulated by Hotchkiss, which categorizes them as dependent rather than independent claims. This aligns with case law, particularly Krause v. Almor Homes, where the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that a parent's claim for treatment costs related to a child's injuries is contingent upon the success of the child's negligence claim. The court maintained that while parents and children can be seen as distinct parties for peremptory challenges in jury trials, this distinction does not alter the dependent nature of the parent's claim. Subsequent cases reaffirm this principle, emphasizing that recovery for a parent's treatment costs is effectively on behalf of the child and underscores the family's economic unity. Hotchkiss's comparative negligence defense regarding Munn was waived due to its failure to plead this in its Answer. The court allowed certain information about the waiver to be presented to the jury but required redaction of any liability language, maintaining that the jury could still access information about travel risks. The court reaffirms its earlier decisions regarding the waiver's validity.

Study-abroad programs are not inherently dangerous, unlike activities such as skydiving, and Hotchkiss could have taken basic measures to inform students about the risks of insect-borne diseases. The school's argument that it could be absolved of responsibility if any outside factor contributed to an accident—even minimally—is inconsistent with Connecticut's comparative negligence standards and attempts to revive outdated legal doctrines that completely bar recovery. A hypothetical scenario illustrates this: under the school's logic, a negligent bus driver could absolve the school of liability if an unrelated factor, like a broken taillight, contributed to the accident, which is an unreasonable expectation in tort law.

Hotchkiss referenced the case of Archambault v. Soneco/N.E. Inc. to justify its stance, but the legal foundations of workers' compensation and parental immunity are not interchangeable. The school acknowledged the seriousness of certain diseases, requiring vaccinations for typhoid before travel to China, yet failed to take adequate precautions against insect-borne diseases. The jury could reasonably conclude that a responsible school would have taken steps to mitigate these risks. The school's inadequate measures—including not warning students or advising them to use insect repellent—contributed to the situation. The case highlights that too many failures occurred to simply determine the minimum duty of care required of a school for student safety during international trips. Additionally, Hotchkiss's criticism of the expert Tarlow for using the internet for research lacks substance; the focus should be on the reliability and relevance of the sources, not the medium used.

The excerpt addresses the use of information gathering methods by educational professionals regarding travel programs, specifically in the context of international student travel. Freedman's approach to discussing cases, whether via phone or online forums, is deemed irrelevant. Fluharty's testimony reveals that in 2012, there were 1,400 independent schools affiliated with the National Association of Independent Schools (NAIS), with 250 offering travel-abroad programs. A survey by GEBG included 40 schools in 2008 and 85 in 2012. Prior to 2007, Fluharty had minimal interaction with other schools about international programs, primarily communicating with four schools. When developing travel programs, he utilized resources from those schools, yet his knowledge regarding practices before 2008 was limited and did not inform GEBG's standards discussions. He confirmed that in 2007, only one school had a China program, indicating a lack of widespread dialogue about insect disease protections in temperate zones among schools during that time. Definitions provided clarify that temperate zones lie between the Tropics and the Arctic/Antarctic Circles. Fluharty acknowledged awareness of common risk assessment practices for tick-borne encephalitis (TBE) in temperate zones, derived from his associations and GEBG's benchmarking efforts.

The risk assessment for tick-borne encephalitis (TBE) in temperate zones is considered extremely low, leading to the absence of preventive measures prior to 2007 at Fluharty's school, which had no reported cases involving American travelers. Fluharty confirmed having led trips to China, including locations near Beijing, but did not implement any insect protection measures during a 2010 trip. He acknowledged that the 2008 GEBG survey did not include inquiries about precautions against insect-borne diseases. Upon further questioning, he clarified that discussions regarding "the standards" occurred in 2010 and did not pertain to practices before 2008. Although he initially presented his testimony as based on survey data, he later admitted that relevant questions were not included in the surveys. The survey aimed to identify primary sources for health information but did not address circumstances under which schools would seek information outside the CDC and State Department prior to 2007. Fluharty could only reference the 2012 survey but claimed it was similar to the 2008 survey, although the court lacked access to the 2008 results, preventing verification of his testimony. Hotchkiss contended that written standards are unnecessary to establish industry customs, but this argument did not adequately address the issues raised concerning Fluharty's credibility and the reliability of his evidence.

An expert's opinion on the standard of care must be fact-based, utilize sound methodologies, and directly relate to the specifics of the case. In this instance, expert Fluharty failed to present factual data or establish a credible connection between his opinion and the evidence. Hotchkiss did not provide a strong counter-narrative to the Munns’ account of Munn's disabilities, relying solely on life-care planner John Dahlberg, who lacked familiarity with Munn. Dahlberg's testimony contradicted the jury's observations of Munn's condition, including misunderstandings about her ability to smile, manage drooling, and communicate. The jury was left with two conflicting representations of Munn's life, ultimately favoring the Munns' portrayal of her suffering. 

The jury was attentive and took their deliberation seriously, reflecting on the evidence presented over seven days. Munn, injured at fifteen, is expected to live until eighty. Hotchkiss contended that any award should be discounted for the time value of money, but failed to request such an instruction and thus waived the argument. The court determined that it only needs to assess the reasonableness of the award by comparing it to other cases without requiring precise calculations or adjustments for inflation. Notably, past awards in similar situations, such as in Jacobs v. Yale University, varied significantly, suggesting the jury’s decision in Munn's case was not excessive.