Landerman v. Tarpon Operating & Development, L.L.C.
Docket: Civil Action No. 14-381
Court: District Court, E.D. Louisiana; May 1, 2014; Federal District Court
Plaintiff Jerry Landerman's motion to remand his lawsuit to state court is denied by the Court, which holds removal jurisdiction under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. However, the Court severs Landerman's Jones Act claim and remands it to state court as per 28 U.S.C. 1441(c). The case began on January 15, 2014, when Landerman filed suit in Louisiana against six defendants related to injuries sustained while working on an offshore platform. The incident occurred on May 20, 2013, when Landerman was being transferred from the West Cameron 661 “A” Platform to the vessel MTV RENE. He fell from a personnel basket due to alleged negligence and unseaworthiness, leading to serious injuries. Landerman's claims include damages for lost wages, medical expenses, and other forms of suffering under the Jones Act and general maritime law, along with potential claims under various federal statutes and Louisiana negligence laws. The lawsuit was removed to federal court by Hoplite on February 19, 2014, with consent from the other defendants, citing federal jurisdiction. Landerman contends that cases based on general maritime law are non-removable. The legal standard for removal emphasizes that the burden rests on the removing party to establish federal jurisdiction.
The Court emphasizes that removal statutes should be strictly construed in favor of remand, according to established legal principles regarding federal jurisdiction. The plaintiff asserts that the Court lacks removal jurisdiction for cases under general maritime law, but Hoplite argues for removal based on two grounds for original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1441. Firstly, Hoplite claims federal question jurisdiction exists under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), which provides jurisdiction over cases related to operations on the outer Continental Shelf. Secondly, Hoplite cites original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1333 for admiralty and maritime cases. While Hoplite acknowledges that the plaintiff's Jones Act claim is not removable, it suggests severing this claim for remand to state court under 28 U.S.C. 1441(c). Other defendants, including Pan Ocean, echo Hoplite’s arguments and additionally challenge the validity of the Jones Act claim, asserting that the plaintiff does not qualify as a seaman due to his role as a welder on an offshore platform. The Court concludes that it possesses removal jurisdiction under OCSLA and that the Jones Act claim should indeed be severed and remanded to state court. The Court applies a "but-for" test to determine if the plaintiff's claim arises under OCSLA, confirming that all necessary criteria are met: the complaint's facts occurred on the appropriate site, the plaintiff's employment advanced mineral development on the outer Continental Shelf, and the injury would not have occurred without this employment.
Plaintiff's alleged injuries occurred on a site recognized under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), which governs artificial islands and structures attached to the seabed for resource exploration, development, or production. The platform where the plaintiff was injured qualifies as an "artificial island," satisfying the OCSLA situs requirement. The plaintiff was injured while in a basket connected to a crane on the platform, demonstrating a physical connection to it at the time of the incident. His employment was directly related to mineral development on the Outer Continental Shelf, as the platform was engaged in drilling operations. The injury was a direct result of his employment activities, as he was being transported from the platform to a vessel due to his work-related duties.
Consequently, the lawsuit is deemed to arise under OCSLA and was appropriately removed to federal court. However, any Jones Act claims included in the action must be severed and remanded back to state court, as Jones Act claims are not subject to removal based on federal law, aligning with the Federal Employers’ Liability Act provisions. The federal removal statute allows the severance of non-removable claims after removal, ensuring that state court claims are returned to their original jurisdiction.
Pan Ocean argues that the plaintiffs' Jones Act claim should not be remanded because it was fraudulently pleaded to obstruct removal. Generally, a court can examine pleadings to determine the potential merit of a Jones Act claim if a defendant alleges fraudulent pleading. If found meritless, the case remains removable despite the Jones Act claim, which can be dismissed. However, the court concludes that it need not assess the merits of the Jones Act claim in this instance; the claim should simply be remanded to state court. The principle behind this decision is that plaintiffs should not include baseless claims to hinder federal jurisdiction. The presence of the Jones Act claim does not impact the court's jurisdiction, as 28 U.S.C. 1441(c) allows for removal despite such claims. Therefore, regardless of the validity of the Jones Act claim, it does not obstruct federal jurisdiction. Consequently, the court will sever the Jones Act claim and remand it to state court, allowing Pan Ocean to pursue dismissal in the appropriate state trial court if it chooses.
The Court denies the plaintiff's motion to remand, with the exception of the Jones Act claim, which is to be severed and remanded to state court. The plaintiff, Landerman, began working sporadically offshore for Pan Ocean Energy in July 2011, primarily as a welder on fixed platforms. The Court notes that Hoplite has cited 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1333 as bases for removal jurisdiction, but it refrains from ruling on the removability of general maritime law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, given the ambiguity following the statute's 2011 amendments. Previous case law indicates a split among district courts regarding the removability of such claims, with some courts finding them non-removable while others indicate they may be.
