DeJoseph v. Continental Airlines, Inc.

Citations: 18 F. Supp. 3d 595; 2014 WL 1891407; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65037Docket: Civ. No. 2:13-7714 (KM)(MAH)

Court: District Court, D. New Jersey; May 12, 2014; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The court addressed the motion to remand filed by Plaintiff DeJoseph, following the Report and Recommendation from Magistrate Judge Michael A. Hammer, which originally suggested denying the remand. DeJoseph, a New Jersey resident, is suing United Airlines (formerly Continental Airlines) for personal injuries sustained from a spilled hot liquid during a flight. He claims negligence, willful misconduct, and strict liability, seeking compensatory and punitive damages without specifying a monetary amount, as per New Jersey state court rules.

The case was filed in New Jersey state court on October 18, 2018, and removed to federal court on December 20, 2013. The Magistrate Judge found diversity jurisdiction apparent from the Complaint, noting the parties' diverse citizenship and the inferred damages exceeding $75,000. However, DeJoseph objected to this, stating he does not seek damages above the $75,000 threshold, thus negating diversity jurisdiction. The Defendants suggested federal question jurisdiction as an alternative, but the Magistrate Judge did not analyze this issue. Ultimately, the District Judge granted DeJoseph's motion to remand the case back to state court.

The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case and will remand it to state court due to the Plaintiffs' late concession affecting diversity. Under the federal removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)), a civil action can only be removed if it falls within the district court's original jurisdiction, either through federal question or diversity jurisdiction. The burden of proving jurisdiction lies with the party asserting it, and the Third Circuit mandates a strict interpretation of removal statutes, favoring remand when doubts exist. Plaintiff DeJoseph has moved to remand, claiming no subject matter jurisdiction exists. The Defendants argued for jurisdiction based on federal question and diversity grounds, with Judge Hammer recommending denial of the remand motion solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1332), without addressing the federal question claim. Parties may object to a Magistrate Judge's report within 14 days, and the district court will review these objections de novo and may modify the Magistrate's findings. The district court may also consider the existing record or accept additional evidence.

DeJoseph challenged Judge Hammer's determination of diversity jurisdiction, which was central to denying the motion to remand. The review of this issue is conducted de novo due to new information post-report. The Complaint is ambiguous regarding the damages sought, only indicating a request for compensatory and punitive damages along with attorneys' fees. DeJoseph's submissions did not clarify whether the amount-in-controversy was satisfied. Judge Hammer noted that punitive damages under New Jersey law could significantly exceed compensatory damages, justifying the conclusion that the amount in controversy was met. However, DeJoseph later stated he does not seek damages exceeding $75,000, a stipulation the Court will accept as clarifying the Complaint's ambiguity. This new evidence was not part of the record considered by Judge Hammer, leading to the conclusion that the amount in controversy is insufficient for diversity jurisdiction.

Regarding federal question jurisdiction, the Report and Recommendation did not address this, but both parties discussed it in their motions. Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal question must appear on the face of the complaint for removal to be valid. DeJoseph's Complaint only asserts state law claims, which typically would support remand. However, the Defendants argue these claims are completely preempted by the Montreal Convention, suggesting they should be classified as federal claims. The complete preemption doctrine allows Congress to define some areas where any related civil complaint must inherently be federal, thus potentially justifying federal question jurisdiction in this case.

The complete preemption doctrine indicates that when a federal statute's preemptive force is so strong that it entirely displaces any state cause of action, the claims become purely federal, even if framed in terms of state law. Such claims are removable to federal court under 28 U.S.C. 1441. In this case, Defendants contend that DeJoseph's claims, arising from an international flight, fall under the Montreal Convention, which they assert provides the exclusive remedy for such claims, thus establishing federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331. However, the court finds that complete preemption under the Montreal Convention is not a valid basis for removal jurisdiction, noting that neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has definitively ruled on the Convention's preemptive effect on state law. There is substantial disagreement among federal courts regarding this issue, particularly in light of the Montreal Convention's revisions from the Warsaw Convention.

The Montreal Convention governs international carrier liability for flights involving the U.S. and other countries party to the Convention, as well as domestic international flights. Article 29, which is central to the preemption inquiry, closely resembles Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention. Some courts have suggested that the Montreal provisions should be interpreted in the context of prior Warsaw Convention cases. However, the text has evolved; for instance, the 1998 Montreal Protocol No. 4 amended Article 24 to establish that any action for damages in passenger and baggage transport is limited to the conditions set out in the Convention, while also expanding the language regarding cargo damages. The court ultimately concludes that complete preemption of the plaintiff's claims is questionable, viewing preemption more as an affirmative defense, leading to the decision to remand the case back to state court.

The Montreal Convention, adopted in 1999, integrated provisions from the Montreal Protocol No. 4, specifically affecting liability in the carriage of passengers, baggage, and cargo. Article 29 establishes that any claims for damages, regardless of their basis—whether under the Convention, in contract, tort, or otherwise—are subject to the Convention's liability limits and conditions. Additionally, it states that punitive or non-compensatory damages are not recoverable. 

The preemptive effect of Article 29 is informed by previous interpretations of Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention. The Supreme Court case El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng established that a plaintiff cannot pursue claims under local law if they fail to meet the liability conditions set by the Convention. This ruling has led to varied interpretations among courts regarding the extent of preemption. Some courts adopt a complete preemption view, asserting that all state law claims within the Convention's scope are entirely preempted, treating them as federal claims. Conversely, other courts interpret the ruling as conflict preemption, allowing for state law actions that could be subject to treaty limitations, requiring defendants to demonstrate specific conflicts between treaty provisions and state laws to invoke preemption as a defense rather than a full displacement of state law.

The interpretation of the Tseng case suggests that removal jurisdiction should be narrowly construed, with any doubts favoring remand, as established in Samuel-Bassett. The Supreme Court did not explicitly declare complete preemption under the Warsaw Convention, unlike other contexts where it has done so, indicating a clear congressional intent for federal court removal (e.g., Metropolitan Life and Avco Corp. cases). The absence of unambiguous complete preemption in Tseng aligns with the notion that federal preemption is typically a defense. The Montreal Protocol No. 4 and the Montreal Convention further complicate the preemption analysis, as Article 29 explicitly allows for claims under both the Convention and state/local laws, suggesting that the Convention serves as an affirmative defense rather than a complete preemption of state law claims. Some courts have misapplied complete preemption concepts from the Warsaw Convention to the Montreal Convention, neglecting the textual differences between Article 24 and Article 29. While past judicial precedents should inform current interpretations, the distinct language of the Montreal Convention necessitates a reexamination of these precedents to avoid substantive errors. The legislative intent was to preserve relevant Warsaw Convention precedents, but careful analysis is required due to the differences in language.

Complete preemption under the Montreal Convention remains unresolved, with no definitive ruling from the Supreme Court or the Third Circuit. Key considerations include Tseng’s lack of explicit requirement for complete preemption, the language of Article 29, and the Third Circuit's advice to interpret the removal statute narrowly. Article 29 does not fully preempt state and local claims, meaning that a state-law complaint cannot be automatically deemed a federal-law issue. Consequently, federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 is not assured, and the removal of DeJoseph’s Complaint by the Defendants is deemed inappropriate. Although the Montreal Convention has preemptive effects, these are confined to the scope of the Convention and should be addressed in state court, not as a preemption of the plaintiff's claims from the outset. The court finds that Defendants failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction, as neither diversity nor federal question jurisdiction exists, leading to the granting of the Plaintiff’s motion to remand the case to state court. Additionally, DeJoseph's stated damages are below the $75,000 threshold, with pre-litigation and settlement demands at $6,000 and lower. Various cases are cited to illustrate differing interpretations of the Montreal Convention's preemptive effect compared to its predecessor, the Warsaw Convention. An order will follow this opinion.

Chapter III of the Warsaw Convention outlines three types of liability for air carriers. Article 17 addresses liability for passenger personal injuries; Article 18 pertains to damage to checked baggage or goods; and Article 19 deals with liabilities arising from delays. Article 24 originally stipulated that actions for damages related to Articles 18 and 19 could only be initiated under the Convention's terms and limits. This was amended by the Montreal Protocol No. 4, which reinforced that any damage claims in passenger and baggage transport must adhere to the Convention’s conditions, while also clarifying that claims related to cargo transport, regardless of their basis, are similarly restricted to the Convention’s limits. These limits are maximums that cannot be exceeded under any circumstances.

The Montreal Convention's objectives differ from those of the Warsaw Convention, reflecting the evolution of air travel and airline liability over time. The Warsaw Convention aimed to limit airline liability to promote the growth of the aviation industry, while the Montreal Convention was designed to enhance protections for international travelers and shippers, favoring passengers more than airlines. Additionally, some cases that did not find complete preemption under the Montreal Convention referenced Warsaw jurisprudence, though the text of Article 29 in the Montreal Convention underscores the rationale against complete preemption.