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Alabama v. PCI Gaming Authority
Citations: 15 F. Supp. 3d 1161; 2014 WL 1400232; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49606Docket: Case No. 2:13-CV-178-WKW
Court: District Court, M.D. Alabama; April 10, 2014; Federal District Court
The State of Alabama has initiated an equity action against PCI Gaming Authority and members of the Poarch Band of Creek Indians to halt alleged unlawful gaming at three casinos in Alabama, invoking state-nuisance law and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court's analysis revolves around whether Alabama has the authority to seek injunctive and declaratory relief regarding the gaming activities at these casinos, which involves complex issues of tribal sovereign immunity, the Ex parte Young doctrine, complete preemption, and congressional intent. The court ultimately concludes that each legal pathway leads to the conclusion that Alabama lacks jurisdiction, granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. The opinion also outlines the standards for reviewing motions to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). A 12(b)(1) motion can involve either a facial challenge, assessing whether the complaint adequately alleges jurisdiction, or a factual challenge, allowing consideration of evidence beyond the pleadings. A 12(b)(6) motion requires the court to accept the allegations as true and assess whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. The court's examination of these standards will determine the validity of the dismissal based on the specific legal and factual context presented. Facial plausibility in legal complaints requires factual content that allows reasonable inference of a defendant's liability, but courts do not accept legal conclusions as true. Courts may consider extrinsic documents that are central to a plaintiff's claim and whose authenticity is undisputed when ruling on a motion to dismiss. The background of the case involves the regulatory tension between the federal government, states, and Indian tribes regarding Indian gaming since the 1970s, particularly following the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). IGRA was established in response to the Supreme Court's decision in California v. Cabazon, which allowed tribes to conduct gaming without state interference in the absence of federal regulation. IGRA classifies gaming into three categories: Class I, which is solely under tribal jurisdiction; Class II, which includes bingo and is regulated by tribes and the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) but allows state control only if a statewide ban exists; and Class III, encompassing all other gaming forms. The case in question focuses on whether the defendants are engaging in permissible Class II or impermissible Class III gaming at the Poarch Band casinos. Class III gaming, which includes slot machines and casino games, is permitted on 'Indian lands' under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) only if such gaming is allowed by state law and conducted in accordance with a Tribal-State compact. 'Indian lands' are defined as lands within Indian reservations or lands held in trust by the U.S. for Indian tribes or individuals, over which tribes exercise governmental authority. In Alabama, Class III gaming is prohibited, meaning the state is not obligated to negotiate a compact that would allow the Poarch Band to conduct such gaming on Indian lands. The State of Alabama alleges that the Poarch Band's casinos are engaging in illegal Class III gaming under the pretense of Class II gaming. IGRA includes penalties, stating that state laws regarding gambling apply in 'Indian country,' except for Class I or Class II gaming regulated by IGRA or Class III gaming under an approved tribal-state compact. The U.S. has exclusive jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions related to unauthorized Class III gaming. The Poarch Band operates three casinos in Alabama—Wind Creek Casino, Creek Casino in Elmore County, and Creek Casino in Montgomery County—on lands held in trust by the U.S. for the Band. Gaming operations at these casinos are conducted under a tribal ordinance approved by the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC). Although the Poarch Band is not a defendant in the lawsuit, its commercial entity, PCI Gaming Authority, and its members, who are part of the Poarch Band Tribal Council, are named defendants. The State of Alabama claims that these casinos are unlawfully operating slot machines, violating state laws that prohibit most forms of gambling, including slot machines. The state seeks to halt the alleged illegal Class III gaming activities occurring at these casinos, as the legality of such gaming remains a contentious issue in Alabama. The State of Alabama's case hinges on its assertion that the Poarch Band operates unlawful Class III gaming, challenging the authority to pursue injunctive and declaratory relief under both state and federal law. The State claims jurisdiction to regulate the Poarch Band's casinos through a two-count Amended Complaint. Count One presents a state-law public nuisance claim based on two theories: first, that the casinos are not situated on "Indian Lands," arguing that the Poarch Band was not federally recognized before 1934, thereby allowing state regulation; second, if the casinos are deemed to be on "Indian Lands," the state contends that under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), it can enforce state laws prohibiting gambling as a public nuisance. Count Two asserts a federal-law public nuisance claim under IGRA, presuming the casinos are on "Indian Lands," stating that the Defendants lack authority for Class III gambling under federal law. The Amended Complaint seeks two equitable remedies: a declaratory judgment that the gambling activities constitute a public nuisance, and a permanent injunction against such activities. Initially filed in the Circuit Court of Elmore County, the State's complaint was removed to federal court by the Defendants, citing three grounds: IGRA's preemption of the state-law claim, the presence of substantial federal issues regarding Indian lands and gaming legality, and the Defendants’ interests connected to federal authority over Indian lands. The State did not contest the removal but instead filed the Amended Complaint to explore alternative legal theories. Count Two of the Amended Complaint includes a federal public nuisance claim under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which prompted the court to allow the United States and the State of Michigan to submit amicus briefs. The defendants' dismissal arguments are organized into four categories: 1. **Complete Preemption**: Defendants argue that IGRA completely preempts the state-law public nuisance claim in Count One regarding gaming governance on Indian lands, asserting a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 2. **Tribal Sovereign Immunity**: They contend that tribal sovereign immunity prevents the court from exercising jurisdiction over the PCI Gaming Authority and the individual Defendants in their official capacities concerning the state-law claim in Count One and the IGRA claim in Count Two. 3. **Collateral Challenge**: Defendants assert that Count One improperly challenges the validity of deeds indicating that the United States holds the relevant lands in trust for the Poarch Band, thus failing to state a claim regarding illegal gaming occurring off Indian lands. 4. **Failure to State a Claim**: Defendants also argue that Count Two does not present a valid claim because 18 U.S.C. 1166 does not grant Alabama the right to seek an injunction against alleged unlawful gaming on Indian lands. The State opposes these arguments vigorously. The court's discussion is structured into four parts: addressing jurisdictional issues related to Rule 12(b)(1), which include complete preemption and tribal sovereign immunity, followed by Rule 12(b)(6) issues concerning Count One's state-law theory and Count Two's claim for relief. In examining the complete preemption argument, the court agrees with the defendants that IGRA preempts state law claims associated with gaming governance on Indian lands. The court cites precedent indicating that IGRA is intended to preempt the field of gaming regulation on Indian lands, supported by the statute’s extensive regulatory framework and enforcement provisions. The court references both Eleventh and Eighth Circuit rulings that affirm IGRA’s comprehensive nature in this context. After analyzing the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) and its implications, the Eighth Circuit determined that IGRA possesses sufficient preemptive authority to satisfy the complete preemption exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. The court emphasized the significance of federal and tribal interests in Indian matters and Congress's authority to safeguard those interests. It identified that claims interfering with tribal governance of gaming fall under IGRA's complete preemptive scope. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the state-law nuisance claim in Count One, which seeks to enjoin allegedly illegal gaming on Indian lands, is preempted by IGRA, as it could disrupt the Poarch Band’s governance of gaming. The State of Alabama's assertion that IGRA preemption is merely an affirmative defense was rejected due to a lack of supporting authority and analysis. Additionally, the State's argument referencing 18 U.S.C. 1166 did not establish a different theory from Count Two, as it relied on the premise that the state could invoke a nuisance claim under federal law rather than state law. Ultimately, Count One's claim is dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction due to complete preemption by IGRA. The court also acknowledges a separate challenge regarding tribal sovereign immunity, which will be addressed distinctly for the PCI Gaming Authority and tribal officials, taking the Amended Complaint's allegations as true. PCI Gaming Authority, associated with the Poarch Band, is protected by tribal sovereign immunity, which can only be overridden by Congressional authorization or the tribe’s waiver of immunity, as established in Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs. Inc. The State of Alabama does not argue that the Poarch Band has waived its immunity or that Congress has abrogated it in this civil suit. Consequently, the State is not suing the Poarch Band directly but rather PCI Gaming Authority, which the State concedes shares in the Poarch Band’s sovereign immunity, as reaffirmed in two Eleventh Circuit cases: Freemanville Water System, Inc. v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians and Contour Spa at the Hard Rock, Inc. v. Seminole Tribe of Florida. Both cases confirm that PCI Gaming Authority is immune from suit, and the State acknowledges that the court must dismiss it from the lawsuit based on this immunity, despite the State’s belief that these precedents were wrongly decided. Thirteen tribal officials, named as defendants in their official capacities, also seek dismissal based on tribal sovereign immunity. They argue that the State's attempt to enjoin gaming activities on Indian lands is barred by this immunity. The State counters that these officials should not benefit from immunity for ongoing federal law violations, citing the Ex parte Young doctrine. While the State is correct regarding claims for federal law violations (Count Two), it is incorrect concerning state law claims (Count One). The Ex parte Young doctrine allows for lawsuits against state officials for prospective relief against ongoing violations of federal law, as seen in Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. Thus, Count Two is allowed to proceed, while Count One is barred by tribal sovereign immunity. In 1978, the Supreme Court indicated that the Ex parte Young doctrine applies in tribal contexts, a position the Eleventh Circuit adopted in 1995 during Tamiami I, which involved a federal claim for an injunction against tribal officials for alleged misuse of licensing authority under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The Eleventh Circuit held that tribal officials could be sued under Ex parte Young if they acted beyond their granted authority. This was later confirmed in Tamiami II, which stated that while tribal officers are generally protected by sovereign immunity when acting within their authority, they could be subject to suit for actions beyond that authority. Other circuits, including the D.C., Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth, have similarly recognized the applicability of Ex parte Young to tribal sovereign immunity. The doctrine allows for suits against tribal officials in their official capacities when they violate federal law, as such actions are considered beyond their authority. If tribal officials violate IGRA, they act outside their granted scope, making them liable under Ex parte Young without tribal immunity protections. The Ex parte Young analysis in this case involves determining whether the Amended Complaint alleges tribal officials acted beyond their authority under IGRA and seeks prospective relief. The Amended Complaint meets both criteria by asserting that tribal officials lack lawful authority to conduct Class III gaming at Poarch Band casinos, specifically referencing prohibited gaming activities as defined by IGRA. The Amended Complaint asserts that the Defendants are engaging in "Class III" gambling activities, which violate the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), by operating numerous slot machines and other gambling devices in a blatant manner. It alleges that the tribal officials have exceeded their authority under federal law. The State of Alabama seeks an injunction to prevent these unlawful gaming activities and a declaratory judgment, which is recognized as prospective relief. The Ex parte Young doctrine allows for claims against tribal officials in their official capacity, dismissing their assertion of tribal sovereign immunity concerning the IGRA claims. The tribal officials argue that their operations fall within permissible Class II gaming activities, but the Amended Complaint claims they are unlawfully conducting Class III gaming. The determination of the gaming classification pertains to the merits of Count Two, not to jurisdiction under Ex parte Young, which only requires an allegation of ongoing federal law violations. The officials also argue that the Amended Complaint must allege specific actions by them for Ex parte Young to apply, claiming the absence of such allegations makes the suit effectively against the tribe. However, the court agrees with the State's position that prior Eleventh Circuit rulings indicate that individual actions are not necessary for injunctive relief against state officers; it suffices that the officials have some connection to the alleged violations. The Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that the individual Defendants control the casinos, thereby implying their responsibility for the alleged IGRA violations. The Poarch Band exercises all inherent powers not expressly excluded by U.S. Congress, as outlined in their constitution and supported by 25 U.S.C. § 476, which allows Indian tribes to adopt constitutions. Tribal officials are deemed appropriate for prospective relief under the Ex parte Young doctrine, meaning they are not protected by tribal sovereign immunity in federal-law claims. Consequently, subject-matter jurisdiction exists for Count Two, although this does not imply a cause of action for Alabama under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) to seek injunctive and declaratory relief against alleged illegal gaming operations in Poarch Band casinos. Count Two is therefore not viable under Rule 12(b)(6) due to the absence of a proper cause of action. Regarding Count One, the tribal officials argue that the Ex parte Young doctrine does not apply since it addresses state law violations rather than federal ones, referencing the Eleventh Circuit's decision in National Association of Boards of Pharmacy, which indicated that Ex parte Young is inapplicable to state law claims. The officials assert that tribal sovereign immunity bars this state-law claim, and no precedent exists supporting the application of Ex parte Young against tribal officials for state law violations. However, the State of Alabama does not advocate for Ex parte Young's application in this context, acknowledging that Count One is based on state law. Instead, Alabama presents two alternative arguments to contest tribal sovereign immunity, with the first asserting that 18 U.S.C. § 1166 incorporates Alabama’s public nuisance law as federal law, thereby aligning Count One with the Ex parte Young exception. Count One’s state-law nuisance claim is conflated with Count Two’s federal-law nuisance claim, negating the need for separate analysis. The Ex parte Young exception allows the official-capacity claim in Count Two to proceed against tribal officials. The State of Alabama argues that Count One, despite being a state-law claim, is not barred by tribal sovereign immunity concerning tribal officials. It asserts a right of action in state court against these officials based on Alabama’s equivalent of Ex parte Young, claiming that governmental immunity does not extend to suits seeking declaratory judgments on state law. The State further contends that when governmental officers remove a case from state to federal court, they waive immunity they would have had in state court, citing Lapides v. Board of Regents. The State claims tribal officials cannot gain a strategic advantage by removing state-law claims for injunctive relief, which would be subject to state court jurisdiction, to federal court. However, the Alabama Supreme Court decision in Harbert, which addresses state officer immunity, does not apply to tribal officials’ tribal sovereign immunity, which has a distinct federal basis and historical context. The State fails to show how Harbert is relevant to tribal officials’ immunity. Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has ruled against extending Lapides's waiver of immunity to tribal immunity, asserting that a tribe does not waive its tribal sovereign immunity by removing a case to federal court. Therefore, the arguments presented by the State do not overcome the tribal officials' assertion of tribal sovereign immunity regarding the official-capacity, state-law claim in Count One related to gaming governance on Indian lands. Even if the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) does not entirely preempt the claim in Count One for injunctive and declaratory relief against tribal officials for state law violations regarding gaming on Indian lands, that claim can still be dismissed due to tribal sovereign immunity, which results in a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The focus then shifts to the defendants' challenge under Rule 12(b)(6) regarding the state's authority to enforce public nuisance laws against the Poarch Band casinos, arguing these casinos are not located on “Indian lands” as defined by IGRA. The State contends that the Secretary of the Interior lacked authority under 25 U.S.C. § 465 to take the Poarch Band's land into trust based on the Supreme Court's holding in Carcieri v. Salazar, which limits the Secretary's ability to take land into trust only for tribes recognized as under federal jurisdiction at the time of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) enactment in 1934. The Carcieri decision clarified that the term “Indian” includes members of tribes recognized under federal jurisdiction as of 1934, and because the Narragansett Tribe was not federally recognized until 1983, the Secretary lacked authority to take its land into trust. Justice Breyer's concurrence suggested that a tribe could be considered under federal jurisdiction in 1934 without formal recognition, indicating a nuanced interpretation of jurisdictional status. The interpretation of "under federal jurisdiction" in relation to the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) suggests a broader understanding than initially thought, indicating that a tribe could be considered under federal jurisdiction in 1934 despite the federal government's lack of recognition at the time. Consequently, the Narragansett Tribe lost IRA benefits due to a Supreme Court ruling, which established that the Secretary of the Interior lacks the authority to take land into trust for tribes not recognized as under federal jurisdiction in 1934. The Secretary has implemented a two-part test to determine a tribe's status. The State's argument against the Poarch Band's land-into-trust status, claiming it is too late for such actions since they were not recognized until 1984, does not require a determination of the validity of Carderi's application. Carderi’s case is distinguishable as it involved a direct, timely challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which provides a formal framework for contesting land-into-trust decisions. Unlike Carderi, the current action does not challenge the Secretary's decisions within the APA context, as the Secretary is not a defendant, and the challenge comes well beyond the APA's six-year statute of limitations. The State claims it can pursue a state-law nuisance action without invoking the APA, arguing that it seeks an injunction against tribal officers rather than contesting the Secretary's decisions. However, this rationale overlooks that the basis for the state-law claim is rooted in the assertion that the Secretary lacked the authority to take the lands in trust, as established by the Carderi ruling. Therefore, the State cannot sidestep the APA framework due to the timing and nature of its claims. The court declined to rule on the validity of the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC)’s decision, stating that challenges should be made under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and that the NIGC was not a party to the case. The State's attempt to bypass APA procedures by reframing its argument was rejected, particularly concerning the Secretary's historical land-into-trust decisions for the Poarch Band. It was noted that the U.S. holds title to the lands in trust for the tribe based on deeds from 1984, 1992, and 1995. The State referenced a recent split panel decision in *Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California*, asserting it supported its position. However, the court found the *Big Lagoon* analysis unpersuasive. In that case, the Ninth Circuit applied the *Carderi* holding, where California argued it was not obligated to negotiate a tribal-state gaming compact due to the land not qualifying as "Indian lands" under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The Ninth Circuit ruled that California could challenge the Secretary’s 1994 decision without adhering to the APA's time constraints. They concluded that since the tribe was not on the Bureau of Indian Affairs' list shortly after the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) and had no residents in 1934, it was not under federal jurisdiction, thus its land was not classified as "Indian lands." The court in the present case noted that *Big Lagoon* was the only instance of a court applying *Carcieri* outside of an APA challenge, allowing a collateral challenge to the Secretary’s land-into-trust decision. The court declined to adopt the majority’s reasoning from *Big Lagoon*, finding the dissent more compelling, which argued against permitting an untimely collateral attack on the Secretary's trust land designations. The dissent argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Carcieri was based on a timely challenge to the Secretary’s land trust plan for the Narragansett Tribe under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and does not address collateral challenges to trust property designations outside the APA. The dissent contends that California cannot initiate a collateral attack on trust land designations after the expiration of applicable administrative and legal remedies, which are subject to a six-year statute of limitations under the APA. Furthermore, it points out that Carcieri did not address the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) or consider untimely challenges to trust land designations. The dissent further critiques the majority opinion in Big Lagoon for several reasons: it effectively nullified a federal agency's final decision regarding land title without the agency's participation; it acknowledged that some jurisdictional issues were beyond its competence yet failed to consult the relevant federal agency; it did not apply the Secretary’s two-part standard for determining federal jurisdiction post-Carcieri; it improperly conducted a de novo review of Indian lands status, which is generally not within the purview of courts reviewing final agency decisions; and it is worth noting that Big Lagoon is currently subject to a pending petition for rehearing. The conclusion emphasizes that certified deeds from 1984, 1992, and 1995 affirm that the lands in question are held in trust for the Poarch Band with the Secretary of the Interior's approval. The State has not established that Carcieri allows a challenge to the Secretary’s prior decisions regarding these lands. Consequently, Count One, which alleges illegal gaming activities off Indian lands, is to be dismissed for failing to state a valid claim for relief. Count Two alleges a public nuisance claim under 18 U.S.C. 1166, which prohibits Class III gaming by tribes without an approved tribal-state gaming compact. The statute establishes that state laws regarding gambling apply in Indian country, allowing for similar punishments for gambling acts committed there as would occur within state jurisdiction. It also notes that gambling does not include Class I or Class II gaming or Class III gaming conducted under an approved compact. The United States holds exclusive jurisdiction for criminal prosecutions related to state gambling laws in Indian country unless jurisdiction has been transferred to a state through an approved compact. Defendants argue that 18 U.S.C. 1166 does not provide the state with a federal right of action for civil enforcement against non-compacted Class III gaming, claiming that such an interpretation undermines the jurisdictional balance intended by IGRA. They assert that Alabama lacks regulatory authority over tribal gaming due to the absence of a gaming compact. While the state acknowledges it cannot pursue criminal prosecutions under 1166(d), it contends that the exclusive jurisdiction granted to the United States does not extend to civil actions like the current claim. Alabama law allows the state to initiate civil-nuisance suits to combat illegal gambling, as defined in Ala.Code. 6-5-120. The case of Try-Me Bottling Co. v. State illustrates that the Attorney General has the authority to seek injunctions against public nuisances, including lotteries. The parties involved recognize that the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed whether the relevant statute, § 1166, grants the state a right to seek injunctions against illegal tribal gaming in Indian country. The Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Florida clarifies that IGRA does not imply a right for states to obtain injunctive relief against unregulated class III tribal gaming. The court noted that while Florida law permits actions to enjoin common nuisances, including slot machines, it expressed uncertainty regarding the application of § 1166 in federal court against tribal officials for violating state gambling laws. The Seminole Tribe decision left the question of an express cause of action under § 1166 unresolved, concluding that the state had not adequately raised this argument. Alabama now argues that this issue warrants resolution. The examination of whether § 1166 provides a basis for civil enforcement against tribal officials necessitates statutory interpretation, focusing on the construction of the statute itself. Statutory interpretation begins with the statute's language. If the language is clear and unambiguous regarding the dispute, and the statutory scheme is coherent, further inquiry is unnecessary. Courts assess whether a statute is plain or ambiguous by examining the language, context, and overall statute. Statutes favoring Indian rights must be construed liberally, with ambiguities resolved in their benefit. Section 1166 does not provide individual states an express right to enforce civil laws against illegal gambling on Indian lands; it lacks explicit language conferring authority to states or allowing them to sue Indian tribes. Instead, it grants the United States exclusive jurisdiction over criminal violations of state gambling laws applicable to Indian country. Section 1166 does not clarify whether civil enforcement actions are permissible or who may initiate them. Therefore, no right of action for the State to bring civil claims under Section 1166 exists. The broader context of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) supports this conclusion, as no IGRA provisions confer such rights to states. The State's arguments suggesting otherwise—claiming Section 1166(a) mandates Indian casinos to comply with state laws—do not establish state jurisdiction for civil enforcement. The incorporation of state law into federal law does not automatically grant a private cause of action for individuals harmed by a violation of federal statutes. The State argues that Section 1166 allows for public-nuisance suits to enjoin unlawful class III gambling on Indian lands, based on out-of-circuit authority. It cites cases such as *United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb.* and *United States v. Seminole Tribe of Fla.* to support this claim. The State infers that since Alabama law allows it to enjoin unlawful gambling as a public nuisance, it can apply this authority to Indian lands as well. However, the referenced cases involved federal actions and did not address a state's authority to bring civil actions under Section 1166. Both decisions confirmed that federal entities, not states, initiated the lawsuits. The State's interpretation that Section 1166 grants civil enforcement authority to states is not supported by these precedents. Furthermore, the State presents an alternative argument based on the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, suggesting that Congress implied states have a right of action incorporated by Section 1166. However, the Eleventh Circuit has indicated that discussions of this principle must also consider its limitations, which the State overlooks. Thus, the arguments presented do not substantiate Alabama's claim for enforcement authority under Section 1166. The legal analysis indicates that the State of Alabama lacks a right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1166 to bring a civil enforcement action against alleged illegal gaming at Poarch Band casinos. The court emphasizes that the legislative history and context of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) do not support the State's claims, as states can only assert jurisdiction over tribal lands through tribal-state compacts. The court cites that Congress has clearly articulated this limitation, prohibiting unilateral state jurisdiction over Indian gaming activities unless expressly agreed upon by the tribes. Consequently, the court dismisses Count Two for failure to state a claim. Additionally, the court grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction regarding the state-law claims in Count One, citing IGRA's complete preemption and tribal sovereign immunity. It further dismisses the claim related to off-Indian lands as an impermissible challenge to past federal decisions. While the federal claim against individual Defendants survives a jurisdictional challenge, it is still dismissed for failure to establish a legal basis under the relevant statute. In Bonner v. City of Prichard, the Eleventh Circuit established that all decisions made by the former Fifth Circuit before October 1, 1981, are binding precedents, including the case of Williamson, decided on May 20, 1981. The development of Indian gaming as a revenue source for tribes began in the 1970s, primarily through high-stakes bingo, leading to significant annual revenues by 1988. Currently, Indian gaming is a multi-billion dollar industry regulated under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), which established the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) to oversee class II gaming on Indian lands. In states allowing class III gaming, IGRA outlines a process for tribal-state gaming compact negotiations, allowing for agreements on jurisdiction, taxation, and operational standards for gaming facilities. The term "Indian country" encompasses all land within the boundaries of Indian reservations, with the U.S. asserting that all "Indian lands" qualify as "Indian country." The Poarch Band received federal recognition in 1984, and the individual defendants are officials of the Poarch Band, sued in their official capacities. An alternative theory in Count One alleges the operation of illegal gaming off Indian lands. Jurisdictional issues related to complete preemption will be evaluated under Rule 12(b)(1), a standard distinct from ordinary preemption. Preemption allows a defendant to counter a plaintiff's state-law claim by asserting federal law's supremacy as an affirmative defense. Complete preemption differs in that it has jurisdictional implications, transforming a state claim into a federal claim, thus permitting federal jurisdiction. The State of Alabama did not contest the removal's jurisdictional basis, which relied on IGRA’s complete preemptive force, validating the removal of the original state-law complaint. Once state law is completely preempted, any related claims are regarded as federal from the outset. The defendants, referred to as "individual Defendants" or "tribal officials," acted in their capacities as Poarch Band officials, a status assumed for the analysis. IGRA's complete preemption of the state-law claim provides grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). Alabama's total prohibition of class III gaming under IGRA means there is no obligation for the state to negotiate a tribal-state compact, preventing the defendants from offering such gaming at their casinos. Additionally, the court does not need to address whether the Ninth Circuit's decision in Imperial requires more for overcoming tribal sovereign immunity under the Ex parte Young doctrine, as the standards from Luckey are controlling. There are conflicting views on the applicability of Ex parte Young regarding tribal officials. Some authority suggests that this doctrine allows federal lawsuits against officials only for actions violating federal law, which was not the case here since the plaintiff's claims were solely state law. Thus, the Ex parte Young exception does not strip tribal officials of their immunity in this context. The State acknowledges the authenticity of deeds indicating that the United States holds certain lands in trust for the Poarch Band, and it does not contest that the Secretary of the Interior has taken lands into trust for the Band since 1984. These deeds, although extrinsic to the Amended Complaint, are relevant for consideration under Rule 12(b)(6) because they are central to the State's argument that the casinos are not situated on Indian lands, and the State does not challenge their authenticity. Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), individuals wronged by agency actions are entitled to judicial review, which mandates that courts must invalidate agency actions deemed arbitrary, capricious, or beyond statutory authority. The Secretary's interpretation of "under federal jurisdiction" is articulated in a January 2014 letter concerning land trust acceptance for the Mechoopda Indian Tribe, which includes a two-pronged test assessing historical federal jurisdiction over the tribe and the continuity of that status in 1934. Additionally, a separate pending case involves the Muscogee Creek Nation challenging the Secretary’s decision on trust lands for the Poarch Band. The State of Alabama also references a Michigan case where state officials claim tribal officials are unlawfully operating gaming at a non-Indian location, a situation distinct from this case as it was undisputed in Michigan that the property was not acquired in trust for the tribe. The Michigan case's appeal is currently before the Supreme Court. Federal court jurisdiction is evaluated regarding the ability to enjoin activities violating the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) that occur outside Indian lands, as well as the impact of tribal sovereign immunity on states suing tribes for such violations. In *Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community*, the court determined that the lawsuit does not challenge land-into-trust decisions relevant to Count One and does not involve a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), making certain procedural arguments unnecessary. The IGRA establishes federal authority and standards for gaming on Indian lands, granting Indian tribes the exclusive right to regulate gaming unless prohibited by federal law. It also permits states to sue to enjoin class III gaming activities that violate tribal-state compacts. The Eleventh Circuit has noted that tribal officials did not claim immunity under Rule 12(b)(1), and previous decisions suggest that the Ex parte Young doctrine may allow for claims against tribal officials in their official capacities regarding IGRA violations. The jurisdictional question under Rule 12(b)(1) has been resolved in favor of the State of Alabama. The analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on whether IGRA provides a cause of action against tribal officials, which depends on Section 1166 of IGRA. This section, part of the 1988 legislation, grants express rights to states derived from tribal-state compacts, allowing states to sue to enforce these agreements. IGRA meticulously delineates regulatory and enforcement authority among the federal government, states, and tribes, emphasizing that states have an enforcement role only through negotiated terms within tribal-state compacts. Section 1166(d) establishes that states can gain enforcement authority over gaming on Indian lands only through tribal-state compacts under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Criminal jurisdiction can be transferred from the federal government to a state if specified in a compact. Various court rulings, such as Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson and Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, reinforce that outside the scope of such compacts, the federal government retains exclusive enforcement authority over IGRA's prohibitions on class III gaming. The courts have consistently interpreted IGRA to limit state jurisdiction to situations where a compact exists, thereby preempting state criminal jurisdiction. Furthermore, while IGRA stipulates that Class III gaming is lawful only when compliant with a tribal-state compact, it does not grant states regulatory authority absent such a compact. The primary mechanism for state involvement in Indian gaming, as designed by Congress, is through these compacts. Conflicting legal interpretations generally oppose state enforcement claims. Courts have noted that legislative history should only be consulted when statutory language is ambiguous or leads to absurd results, emphasizing that the clarity of IGRA's language negates the need for such inquiry. The absence of certain phrases in the statute suggests that Congress deliberately chose not to include them, indicating a different legislative intent.