Court: District Court, M.D. Tennessee; April 18, 2014; Federal District Court
Defendant Touchstone Imaging, LLC (TMI) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment regarding claims brought by plaintiff Maggi Quillen, including disability discrimination under the ADA, retaliation under the FMLA, and violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act and Tennessee Disability Act. Quillen conceded that summary judgment was appropriate for the FMLA claim but contended that genuine disputes of material fact exist concerning pretext for the remaining claims. TMI operates radiologic imaging centers and employs fewer than 50 individuals within a 75-mile radius of its Brentwood, Tennessee headquarters. Credentialing, a critical administrative function, was primarily performed by Linda Turpin until her termination in early 2011, after which Wendy Cripe temporarily took over. TMI aimed to fill a credentialing position before Cripe's maternity leave in August 2011, offering health benefits in the job advertisement. Quillen, diagnosed with Crohn's disease in August 2010 while employed at the Tennessee Orthopedic Alliance, applied for the position and disclosed her condition during interviews. TMI formally offered Quillen the job on May 19, 2011, which she accepted after resigning from her previous role.
Quillen started working at TMI on June 11, 2011, under Cripe's supervision, and Cripe took maternity leave about a month later, returning at the end of August. TMI typically conducts initial performance reviews after 90 days, but due to Cripe's absence for two-thirds of Quillen's initial period, Gentry advised delaying the review by an additional 30 days. Although there were concerns regarding Quillen's tardiness and phone usage, no formal documentation existed. Cripe conducted Quillen's review in October 2011, approximately 120 days after her start date, giving her positive evaluations across all categories. Subsequently, Rice expressed dissatisfaction with the timing of Quillen's review, asserting that there was an agreement for a 90-day extension and criticizing Cripe for not consulting others before proceeding with the review. Despite Rice's concerns about Quillen's performance, he did not take disciplinary action against Cripe nor request a review modification. Shortly after this exchange, Quillen requested short-term disability leave for Crohn's disease, which TMI approved without discrimination. During Quillen's absence, Cripe struggled to manage both her own and Quillen's responsibilities, ultimately leading to discussions among Rice and Smith about the necessity of a full-time credentialing position, given Cripe's ability to manage the tasks effectively while Quillen was on leave. Sabolik was assigned to observe Cripe's work to determine the future need for the full-time role.
Cripe and Smith had multiple meetings before January 23, 2012, regarding the credentialing position, with conflicting accounts of their discussions. Cripe asserted that the role should remain full-time, stating she could only manage her duties while Quillen was away by neglecting other responsibilities. In contrast, Smith claimed they agreed the position should be part-time. Rice supported Smith's view, stating Cripe acknowledged there wasn't enough work for a full-time role, and he recalled an email from Cripe confirming this, which TMI failed to produce. On January 23, 2012, Sabolik emailed Shupe and Smith recommending the transition to part-time. Following this input, Rice and others agreed to the recommendation.
When Quillen returned on February 6, 2012, she found her role reduced to part-time, losing health benefits, which led her to resign on February 10, 2011. Quillen informed Cripe of the decision, leading to Cripe's confrontation with Smith, who indicated he had to comply with Rice's directives. Cripe later learned from Sabolik that he believed the position required full-time work but had been instructed otherwise. Cripe expressed concern that the reduction was motivated by TMI's desire to avoid future medical costs related to Quillen's Crohn's disease. Subsequently, Cripe was placed on probation for her earlier evaluation of Quillen and for not supporting company decisions, after which she resigned. Shortly thereafter, TMI hired Keith Bukowski, who effectively managed the credentialing and other responsibilities.
Rule 56 mandates that a court grant summary judgment if the moving party demonstrates that no genuine dispute exists regarding any material fact and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party must initially identify portions of the record showing the absence of genuine issues of material fact. If seeking summary judgment on an issue where it does not have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can fulfill its burden by illustrating a lack of evidence supporting the non-moving party's case. The non-moving party must present specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial, rather than relying on mere allegations or denials. The judge's role at this stage is to assess whether a genuine issue for trial exists, not to weigh evidence. All inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party, but a mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient; the proof must be more than merely colorable, leading a rational trier of fact to potentially favor the non-moving party.
Regarding the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), it does not apply to employees of an employer with fewer than 50 employees at a worksite, or if the total employees within 75 miles is also fewer than 50. The facts establish that TMI employs fewer than 50 employees within 75 miles of Quillen's work location, and Quillen agrees that summary judgment is appropriate for this claim.
In terms of discrimination claims under federal and Tennessee law, which follow the ADA standard, Quillen aims to establish her case through circumstantial evidence. To prove a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the ADA, Quillen must demonstrate that (1) she is disabled, (2) she is qualified for the position, (3) she experienced an adverse employment decision, (4) the employer was aware of her disability, and (5) she was replaced.
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer must provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for their employment action. In this case, TMI acknowledges that Quillen has met this initial burden due to the reduction of her credentialing position from full-time to part-time in February 2012. TMI claims this change was due to inadequate growth in operations and the ability of another employee, Cripe, to perform Quillen's duties during her short-term disability leave. This explanation shifts the burden back to Quillen to demonstrate that TMI's reasoning is a pretext for discrimination.
To prove pretext in an ADA case, Quillen can show that the employer's stated reason is factually baseless, did not motivate the actions taken, or was insufficient to motivate the decision. Although Quillen raises several arguments regarding pretext, including mischaracterizing the case as one of denied accommodation and disputing the initial classification of her position, these are deemed immaterial. One argument suggesting TMI's motivation was to avoid costs associated with Quillen's medical insurance is supported by evidence indicating that TMI management sought to alter the position's classification against prior recommendations to keep it full-time. Additionally, the timing of disciplinary action against Cripe could further suggest pretext.
In February 2012, Cripe reported to Smith and Gentry that TMI had not followed her recommendation regarding the credentialing role and suggested that TMI's actions were an attempt to avoid covering Quillen's medical bills. Subsequently, TMI disciplined Cripe in relation to the review of Quillen conducted in October 2011. The timing of the discipline, occurring four months after her complaint, leads to a reasonable inference that it was retaliatory for Cripe's efforts to reveal TMI's true motivations for reducing Quillen's position to part-time. Although TMI argued that Quillen's medical bills did not influence their decision and that they were merely exercising business judgment, conflicting testimony, particularly from Cripe, raises a genuine dispute about the legitimacy of TMI's stated reasons. Consequently, TMI's Motion for Summary Judgment is partially granted and partially denied: Quillen's FMLA claim is dismissed, while her discrimination claims under federal and state law will proceed to trial. In support of its motion, TMI submitted various legal documents and deposition transcripts, while Quillen countered with her own factual statements and evidence, including emails and a resume. A dispute arose regarding whether TMI initially intended the role to be part-time, with differing testimonies from TMI officials and Cripe contributing to the uncertainty. Additionally, there is ambiguity in the application of TMI's stop-loss policy concerning health insurance costs, with testimonies differing on whether it applied to individual employees or in aggregate.
Quillen's medical claims are subject to a $50,000 attachment point, meaning TMI would be reimbursed for amounts exceeding this limit, but Rice’s testimony suggests Blue Cross would cover any claims exceeding this threshold. TMI faces potential additional expenses regarding Quillen’s disability-related medical bills. Rice initially claimed he had not seen Quillen's performance appraisal until later, but later acknowledged he likely reviewed it shortly after Cripe issued it. Quillen was hospitalized for Crohn's disease complications and was required by Gentry to submit an updated doctor's note to return to work; however, Gentry did not receive it before leaving for a retreat, resulting in Quillen returning to work on February 6, 2012. Cripe’s testimony may contain double hearsay, which TMI did not challenge. The timeline regarding Cripe's probation status in relation to Quillen’s resignation on February 10, 2012, is unclear. The court notes Rice's personal connection to Crohn's disease through his daughter. The parties have not clarified the causation standard for Quillen's discrimination claims. The Sixth Circuit, in Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., previously established a "but for" causation standard for ADA claims under the pre-2008 statute, but has not addressed its application under the amended ADA language. District courts in the circuit have continued to apply the "but for" standard without thorough analysis, possibly due to the issue not being raised by the parties.
Molina-Parrales v. Shared Hosp. Servs. Corp. and other cases highlight that courts have approached the issue of causation standards in ADA discrimination claims differently. Some courts, like Johnson v. Benton Cnty. Sch. Dist., find no distinction between 'because of' and 'on the basis of' language, applying a 'but for' standard, while others, such as Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, apply a motivating factor test post-2008 amendments. In the current case, TMI is not entitled to summary judgment under the 'but for' standard, making further causation discussions unnecessary at this stage. The plaintiff does not seem to dispute the applicability of this standard at trial. Quillen's counsel describes her claim as a 'failure to accommodate,' but the essence of her claim revolves around TMI's reduction of her position to part-time to avoid medical expenses related to her disability. The court expresses frustration with Mr. Allman’s firm for not clearly articulating the theories of pretext in discrimination cases, creating confusion and unnecessary work. Similar issues have arisen in other cases, where plaintiffs failed to specify the pretext theories being advanced. Quillen's counsel inaccurately labels Bukowski as a 'cheerleader,' which is irrelevant to the case. The court notes that TMI's lack of thorough documentation may have affected the case's outcome, ultimately leading to credibility issues that are left for a jury to resolve.
