Court: District Court, C.D. California; April 17, 2014; Federal District Court
The court addressed a joint motion for summary judgment in a wrongful death product liability case concerning David Sclafani, who died from mesothelioma linked to asbestos exposure. It is undisputed that Sclafani was exposed to asbestos-containing products during his Navy service from 1960 to 1963, specifically while working on pumps, valves, and boilers. The remaining defendants, which include Air and Liquids Systems Corporation, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, Foster Wheeler LLC, and Crane Co., contended that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding causation—whether Sclafani's exposure was a substantial factor in causing his cancer. The court assumed the defendants manufactured or supplied the asbestos products and focused solely on the causation aspect, referencing the legal standard from *Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.* for evaluating whether the exposure contributed to Sclafani's cancer risk.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is warranted when there is no genuine dispute regarding any material fact, allowing the moving party to prevail as a matter of law. The burden initially lies with the moving party to demonstrate the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's claims. If successful, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial, which must be more than just a scintilla of evidence. Only disputes that could affect the trial's outcome will prevent summary judgment.
The California Supreme Court's ruling in Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. establishes a two-part test for determining causation in asbestos-related personal injury cases. First, plaintiffs must demonstrate threshold exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing products. Second, they must show, with reasonable medical probability, that this exposure was a substantial factor in causing their injury. The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, who must establish that the defective products were substantial contributors to their injury. The court rejected the idea of shifting this burden to manufacturers to prove non-causation.
Despite recognizing scientific uncertainties about the mechanisms linking asbestos exposure to diseases like lung cancer and mesothelioma, the court ruled that plaintiffs can prove causation by showing their exposure contributed, in a substantial way, to their overall asbestos dose and risk of developing cancer, without needing to identify specific fibers responsible for the malignancy.
To prevent jurors from imposing an incorrect standard of proof, they must be instructed that a product is a substantial factor if it reasonably contributed to the plaintiff's risk of developing cancer. Furthermore, while juries can typically assess causation, the complex nature of cancer requires expert medical testimony to establish causation within a reasonable medical probability, as laypersons cannot adequately understand these issues without such guidance.
Expert testimony is essential for establishing causation in asbestos-related personal injury cases, where a plaintiff must demonstrate that exposure to a defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing their illness. The California Supreme Court's ruling in Rutherford allows plaintiffs to prove causation based on "reasonable medical probability" rather than certitude. This standard is particularly applicable in cases involving medical evidence, which necessitates competent expert testimony to link exposure to a specific product to the development of diseases like mesothelioma.
Defendants argue that the plaintiffs lack admissible evidence to establish that Sclafani's exposure to their products was a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma. For the plaintiffs to overcome summary judgment, they must present expert testimony that, combined with other evidence of exposure, allows a reasonable jury to conclude that the exposure likely contributed to the disease. The primary expert for the plaintiffs, Dr. Arnold Brody, claimed that all exposures to asbestos contribute to the disease's development. However, he did not specify whether Sclafani's exposure to any particular defendant's asbestos product was substantial. The court deemed Dr. Brody's testimony inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Daubert standard, noting that his theory lacked testability and peer-reviewed publication, failing to meet two of the four Daubert criteria.
Plaintiffs present three arguments against summary judgment. First, they contend that Dr. Barry Horn, their epidemiologist, can demonstrate that Sclafani's exposure to each defendant's product was a 'substantial factor' in his mesothelioma risk. However, Dr. Horn's report only suggests that Sclafani's work with gaskets and packing contributed to his risk, without establishing a reasonable medical probability that exposure to specific products from Goodyear, Foster Wheeler, or Crane was a substantial factor, which is necessary under the Rutherford standard. Dr. Horn's deposition indicated that any inhalation of asbestos increases mesothelioma risk, but this opinion is inadmissible at trial because it was not included in his Rule 26 report, violating Rule 37(c)(1). Additionally, Dr. Horn did not perform any calculations regarding Sclafani's exposure to specific products, undermining the reliability of his opinion under Daubert standards.
The second argument references the California Court of Appeal decision in Hernandez v. Amcord, Inc., where a trial court granted a non-suit in a similar mesothelioma case based on the plaintiffs' reliance on an epidemiologist's testimony. The court determined that an M.D. must link causation with reasonable medical probability; however, the appellate court reversed this decision, stating that Rutherford does not require an explicit link from a medical doctor. The plaintiffs note that the evidentiary contexts in Rutherford and Hernandez differ from the current case, as the previous trials admitted relevant epidemiological opinions while the current one has not.
Dr. Brody's opinion has been excluded as inadmissible under Rule 702 and the Daubert standard, despite similar opinions being accepted in other trials. The Court emphasizes that its judgment on expert testimony is governed by its own standards, and the admissibility decisions of state courts using different criteria do not influence its ruling. Notably, California employs the Kelly/Frye test rather than Daubert.
In previous cases like Rutherford and Hernandez, substantial additional evidence linked exposure to specific products with the decedents' diseases, demonstrating clear exposure and causation. In contrast, the current plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence to establish that Sclafani's exposure to any defendant’s asbestos product was a significant factor in his risk of developing mesothelioma. Factors such as frequency, regularity, and proximity of exposure are critical in establishing causation.
The plaintiffs provided only speculative evidence regarding Sclafani’s exposure, particularly concerning Crane and Goodyear, where he could not estimate how often he worked with their gaskets. His testimonies regarding the time spent working with the gaskets do not specify the duration of dust creation, leading to speculation about the significance of his exposure. Consequently, the Court concludes that such speculative evidence is inadequate to overcome summary judgment, reinforcing the necessity of concrete proof linking exposure to risk.
A plaintiff must demonstrate that their asbestos exposure was a significant factor in increasing the risk of cancer, requiring proof beyond trivial or theoretical contributions. In the case referenced, despite potential weaknesses in expert testimony regarding asbestos exposure quantification, plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence of consistent exposure to the defendant's asbestos product over 30 years, allowing a jury to infer its substantial role in causing the plaintiff's asbestosis. The court granted the defendants' joint motion for summary judgment, noting that plaintiffs reached a settlement with Air Liquid Systems Corporation, rendering certain evidence related to Sclafani's exposure irrelevant. Dr. Brody's expert report, which claimed that any exposure above background levels could induce mesothelioma, lacked the requisite supporting publications and did not meet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) standards. Consequently, the court emphasized that opinions without factual basis or grounded in speculation are not suitable for summary judgment considerations. Ultimately, the plaintiffs relied solely on Dr. Brody's opinion, without substantiating it with the mentioned publications. The appellate court assumed sufficient exposure factors were present due to the defendant's failure to challenge this evidence during the motion for nonsuit.
