Court: District Court, M.D. Florida; March 28, 2014; Federal District Court
The Court, presided over by District Judge Mary S. Scriven, is reviewing a Plaintiff's Complaint regarding the denial of Social Security Disability benefits and Supplemental Security Income benefits. A Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge Thomas G. Wilson concluded that the Commissioner of Social Security's decision was supported by substantial evidence and contained no reversible errors, recommending affirmation of this decision. The Plaintiff submitted an objection to this recommendation.
The standard of review in the Eleventh Circuit allows a district judge to accept, reject, or modify a magistrate judge's report after a thorough review, particularly focusing on any portions to which objections are raised. Specific objections demand a de novo review of those issues, while the absence of objections permits the acceptance or modification of findings without a fresh examination. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo regardless of objections.
The Plaintiff raised five objections to Judge Wilson’s findings:
1. The ALJ's hypothetical question to the vocational expert omitted the Plaintiff's moderate concentration limitation and restrictions on reaching and foot controls.
2. The ALJ did not adequately consider the Plaintiff's objections to the opinion of orthopedic surgeon Dr. James Melton.
3. The ALJ failed to acknowledge all of the Plaintiff's impairments, instead grouping them together.
4. The ALJ did not assign appropriate weight to the opinions of treating doctors, consultants, and state agency physicians.
5. The ALJ improperly applied the Eleventh Circuit pain standard.
Regarding the first objection, the Plaintiff argued that the ALJ's hypothetical question was incomplete; however, Judge Wilson disagreed, asserting that the question appropriately reflected the Plaintiff’s limitations, as the ALJ's residual functional capacity matched the hypothetical presented to the vocational expert.
Judge Wilson upheld the ALJ's assessment that the Plaintiff's moderate concentration impairment was accounted for by limiting the Plaintiff to "unskilled, routine, repetitive, entry-level work," as supported by Dr. Robert G. Moering’s mental status examination. The Plaintiff's argument that the hypothetical question lacked references to limitations for reaching and foot controls was dismissed, as those limitations were not included in the residual functional capacity (RFC) finding, which the Plaintiff did not challenge, leading to a forfeiture of that argument. Even if the challenge had not been forfeited, the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that such limitations were warranted based solely on Dr. Melton’s opinion. The ALJ had considered Dr. Melton’s opinions but ultimately rejected them.
According to Eleventh Circuit case law, for a vocational expert's testimony to be substantial evidence, the hypothetical must encompass all of the claimant’s impairments. However, limiting the hypothetical to unskilled work is sufficient when medical evidence indicates the claimant can perform simple, routine tasks despite limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace. The Plaintiff did not provide additional evidence or arguments in their objection to Judge Wilson's report to demonstrate any inadequacy in the hypothetical question. The Court concluded that the hypothetical question was adequate, as it implicitly accounted for the Plaintiff's limitations and did not need to include limitations that the ALJ had rejected as unsupported.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to address objections to Dr. Melton's report, which the ALJ heavily relied upon. Judge Wilson determined that Plaintiff forfeited this argument due to lack of legal citation but evaluated the objections and found them baseless, concluding there was no reversible error. The ALJ's omission of specific objections was not deemed a critical flaw, as the ALJ is not obliged to discuss every piece of evidence, especially when the objections lack merit.
Regarding impairments, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by not recognizing individual severe impairments, specifically degenerative disc and multi-level nerve issues. Plaintiff highlights a discrepancy between the findings of Drs. Sidhom and Abel regarding carpal tunnel syndrome and cubital tunnel syndrome. Judge Wilson noted that Dr. Abel's finding of no carpal tunnel syndrome was misapplied to counter Dr. Sidhom's cubital tunnel syndrome diagnosis. However, Judge Wilson affirmed that the ALJ acknowledged the severity of Plaintiff's spinal impairments, evident in the RFC limiting Plaintiff to a restricted range of sedentary work. Furthermore, Judge Wilson found Plaintiff's claim regarding "possible" right cubital tunnel syndrome unsupported, citing that subsequent tests showed no evidence of related conditions. The ALJ's determination that Plaintiff's combination of impairments was severe aligns with regulatory definitions, and Judge Wilson confirmed that unrelated findings were not used to discredit Dr. Sidhom's conclusions.
Dr. Abel's findings include references to carpal tunnel syndrome and cubital tunnel syndrome, specifically noting the absence of evidence for ulnar neuropathy, which is essential in evaluating Dr. Sidhom’s assessment of the Plaintiff's potential right cubital tunnel syndrome. The Plaintiff argues that the opinions of Dr. Sidhom, Dr. Bedi, and Dr. Lamm were not given appropriate weight by the ALJ. Dr. Sidhom, as the Plaintiff's long-time treating pain specialist, had his opinions deemed only of "some weight" by the ALJ, who noted that Dr. Sidhom's earlier reports did not support total disability and indicated that the claimant's work difficulties were likely related to medical conditions rather than a definitive inability to work. Additionally, a recommendation from Dr. Sidhom for a two-month work exemption was not supported by documented changes in the claimant’s condition.
The ALJ also provided reasoning for the weight given to Dr. Bedi’s opinion, stating it significantly influenced the conclusion that the Plaintiff had only mild social functioning difficulties, as Dr. Bedi reported the Plaintiff was managing well with medication. Judge Wilson found substantial justification for the ALJ's conclusions regarding Dr. Sidhom and Dr. Bedi’s assessments.
Regarding Dr. Lamm, Judge Wilson dismissed the Plaintiff’s claims as frivolous, clarifying that Dr. Lamm did not state that the Plaintiff could never stand but indicated the Plaintiff could not stand long enough to perform his previous job. Dr. Lamm's report specified that the Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work and could return to washing cars with restrictions on standing duration. Additionally, the Plaintiff's own testimony confirmed he could stand comfortably for about twenty minutes.
Judge Wilson determined that the Plaintiff's assertion regarding Dr. Lamm’s opinion was misrepresented, clarifying that the Plaintiff is capable of standing and there is no evidence to support the claim of inability to stoop. The legal standard emphasizes that the opinions of treating physicians should carry significant weight unless "good cause" to disregard them is demonstrated, as established in Lewis v. Callahan. Regulations also indicate that treating sources provide a comprehensive view of a patient's medical conditions, making their insights particularly valuable. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) must provide clear reasons for assigning less weight to a treating physician's opinion, with failure to do so resulting in reversible error, as noted in MacGregor v. Bowen.
The Eleventh Circuit recognizes "good cause" for discounting a physician's opinion when it lacks evidentiary support or contradicts existing evidence, as seen in cases like Schnorr v. Bowen and Sharfarz v. Bowen. Additionally, opinions may be disregarded if they are conclusory or inconsistent with the physician's own records, as indicated in Jones v. Department of Health and Edwards v. Sullivan. In this case, the Court found sufficient "good cause" for the ALJ's decision to give less weight to Dr. Sidhom’s opinions due to their conclusory nature and inconsistencies with his records.
Regarding the opinions of Dr. Bedi and Dr. Lamm, Judge Wilson noted that the ALJ appropriately considered and relied on their assessments. The Plaintiff's challenge to the ALJ's application of the Eleventh Circuit pain standard was addressed, with Judge Wilson recognizing that while medical evidence supported the existence of underlying impairments, the Plaintiff's statements about the severity and impact of symptoms were deemed not credible. Judge Wilson concluded that the ALJ provided valid reasons for questioning the Plaintiff's credibility.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the claimant's credibility lacking due to inconsistencies in his statements and his ability to perform various activities. Specifically, the claimant's claim of complete inability to work contradicted his 2010 statement to Dr. Bedi about potentially being able to work if he found a job. Additionally, he informed Dr. Moering that he earned money cleaning for family members. The ALJ also noted that the claimant's reports of significant medication side effects were inconsistent with Dr. Sidhom’s progress notes, which showed no evidence of such side effects. Observations from a field office employee noted the claimant lifting his child in 2008, which further undermined his claims. Although the claimant reported frequent anxiety attacks, none of his treating sources documented such occurrences, leading the ALJ to conclude that these reports lacked credibility. The residual functional capacity assessment was supported by objective medical evidence, opinions from DDS consultants, and the claimant's own statements regarding his work potential. The Eleventh Circuit's three-part pain standard was referenced, emphasizing the need for medical evidence to substantiate claims of disability. The court upheld the ALJ's decision to discount the claimant's subjective testimony due to the articulated inconsistencies and activities. The claimant's objections were deemed reiterations of prior arguments and were overruled, affirming Judge Wilson’s findings. The Court confirmed the Report and Recommendation, affirming the Commissioner of Social Security's decision and directing the case's closure.
LEON DAVIS seeks judicial review of the denial of his Social Security disability benefits and supplemental security income claims, which were based on alleged back problems. At the time of the administrative hearing, Davis, 48, with a high school education, had worked in various roles including warehouse worker and forklift operator. His claims were initially denied and upon reconsideration, he requested a de novo hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ identified multiple severe impairments, including degenerative disc disease and various mood disorders, concluding these limitations restricted Davis to a limited range of sedentary work with specific requirements: a sit or stand option, occasional postural activities (but no climbing), and avoidance of hazards. The ALJ determined that these restrictions prevented Davis from returning to his previous employment. However, based on vocational expert testimony, the ALJ found that there were significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that Davis could perform, such as food and beverage order clerk and sorter. Consequently, the ALJ ruled that Davis was not disabled, a decision upheld by the Appeals Council as the final ruling of the Commissioner of Social Security.
To qualify for Social Security disability benefits and supplemental security income, a claimant must demonstrate an inability to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable impairment lasting at least twelve months. A "physical or mental impairment" is defined as one resulting from identifiable abnormalities shown by clinical or laboratory techniques. In this case, the plaintiff must prove disability prior to the expiration of his insured status on December 31, 2009, while no such requirement exists for supplemental security income claims. The Commissioner’s determination of non-disability must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence, defined as evidence a reasonable mind would accept as adequate for a conclusion. Administrative findings can only be reversed if the record compels it, and mere contrary evidence is insufficient for reversal. The Commissioner is responsible for resolving evidence conflicts and assessing witness credibility. The court’s role is to determine if substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision without reweighing the evidence, while ensuring proper legal standards were applied.
The plaintiff sustained back injuries in workplace incidents in 2003 and 2006 and claims disability since August 8, 2007. The law judge identified back impairments and an affective disorder that limited the plaintiff to a restricted range of sedentary work. The plaintiff contends that the hypothetical question used to evaluate his case was inadequate, arguing it did not consider his moderate concentration limitations or exclude reaching and foot control limitations. However, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the hypothetical question was deficient, as the ALJ only needs to include impairments that are established and not those that have been properly rejected. The hypothetical must reflect the claimant’s vocational profile and residual functional capacity as determined by the law judge.
The law judge's assessment of the plaintiff's residual functional capacity aligns with the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert, and the plaintiff has not raised a specific challenge to this finding, thereby forfeiting any such claims. The plaintiff argues that the hypothetical question inadequately considered the law judge’s determination of a moderate limitation in concentration. However, the law judge found that this limitation was sufficiently addressed by restricting the plaintiff to unskilled, routine, repetitive entry-level work. The plaintiff cites Winschel v. Commissioner of Social Security to support their argument that such a limitation does not adequately accommodate a moderate concentration issue. Nonetheless, Winschel only requires that hypothetical questions account for limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace, without stating that a restriction to routine tasks is insufficient by itself. The relevant case law indicates that limiting a plaintiff to simple, routine tasks can adequately address moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace, provided that the record supports the plaintiff's ability to perform such tasks. Several cases, including Hurst, Dawson, Smith, Scott, and Jarrett, affirm that restrictions to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks are appropriate for addressing moderate concentration limitations.
The Eleventh Circuit case law supports the law judge’s determination that "unskilled, routine, repetitive, entry-level work" is suitable for the plaintiff, who has a moderate concentration deficit. Evidence includes Dr. Robert G. Moering's normal mental status examination and the treating psychiatrist's positive assessment of the plaintiff's psychiatric condition with medication. Dr. Moering assigned a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 63, indicating mild symptoms and generally effective functioning. A reviewing psychologist found the plaintiff's mental impairment to be non-severe. The plaintiff did not present evidence to challenge the law judge's findings regarding mental functional limitations. The plaintiff's argument that the vocational expert indicated unemployability due to neck and back pain affecting concentration is unfounded, as the law judge did not find such a significant limitation.
The plaintiff also claimed that the lack of limitations on reaching and foot controls in the hypothetical question constituted an error; however, the law judge did not impose these limitations in the residual functional capacity finding. The plaintiff did not specifically challenge this finding, resulting in forfeiture of that argument. Even if it were not forfeited, the plaintiff failed to provide a convincing rationale for imposing such limitations. Although Dr. James D. Melton, Jr. opined about limitations on reaching and foot controls, the law judge assigned this opinion significant but not controlling weight and implicitly discounted these limitations, indicating they were considered but ultimately excluded from the residual functional capacity assessment.
The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the residual functional capacity (RFC) finding should include limitations on reaching and foot controls based solely on Dr. Melton's opinion. The plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence from the medical record to support such limitations and did not meet the scheduling order's requirement to challenge findings with specific record citations. In contrast, the Commissioner presented substantial evidence supporting the absence of reaching limitations, including the administrative law judge's (ALJ) explicit rejection of issues related to the plaintiff's fingers and hands. Evidence cited included Dr. Naomi Abel's ruling out of cervical radiculopathy, X-rays indicating only mild osteophytes, an MRI showing no significant stenosis, and nerve studies negating conditions like carpal tunnel syndrome. Additionally, the plaintiff's ability to lift a child in May 2008 was noted. The Commissioner highlighted that the plaintiff's restriction to sedentary work inherently excludes tasks requiring leg-foot controls. The plaintiff's subsequent claim that the ALJ did not adequately evaluate Dr. Melton's opinions was inconsistent, as earlier he argued the ALJ failed to accept Dr. Melton's conclusions regarding reaching and foot controls. Dr. Melton diagnosed the plaintiff with multiple conditions and assessed his ability to lift and perform physical activities with caution that the plaintiff's complaints appeared exaggerated. Although the ALJ forwarded Dr. Melton's report to the plaintiff's counsel for comments, the ALJ ultimately assigned Dr. Melton's opinion significant but not controlling weight.
The plaintiff contends that the law judge's decision should be reversed due to a lack of discussion regarding objections to Dr. Melton's opinion. However, the plaintiff did not provide legal authority to support this claim, violating the scheduling order that requires discrete challenges to be backed by legal citations, resulting in the forfeiture of the argument. The argument is also deemed meritless, as the law judge is not obligated to address every piece of evidence or recount objections in his decision.
The plaintiff's assertion that Dr. Melton's opinion should carry less weight because he was unaware of Dr. George S. Sidhom's opinion on the plaintiff's part-time work capability is irrelevant to Dr. Melton’s assessment based on his comprehensive medical examination. The plaintiff's claims regarding Dr. Melton's lack of knowledge about carpal tunnel surgery and “possible” right cubital tunnel syndrome are countered by Dr. Melton's awareness of the surgery and subsequent studies indicating no ulnar neuropathy. Additionally, other medical findings, such as good grip strength and intact sensation, further undermine the claims of bilateral dexterity issues.
The plaintiff's claim that Dr. Melton overlooked radiology reports is unfounded, as his report acknowledges the degenerative changes noted in those studies. Although Dr. Melton may not have reviewed the 2010 MRI results, the law judge did and found that Dr. Melton’s opinion aligns with the objective evidence in the record. The plaintiff's references to severe osteoarthritic changes and other findings do not negate the law judge's conclusion, as a diagnosis alone does not demonstrate how the impairment affects the plaintiff's ability to work.
The court in Wind v. Barnhart determined that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his impairments caused disabling pain or functional limitations greater than those assessed by the law judge. Neurologist Dr. Abel’s evaluation indicated no significant cervical or lumbar canal stenosis, and only mild bilateral neuroforaminal narrowing at L5-S1, with no functional limitations assigned—only a recommendation for pain management. Additionally, Dr. Melton’s examination revealed no objective signs of debilitating pain, noting the plaintiff's normal physical condition and strength. The law judge’s opinion was supported by both Dr. Melton's and Dr. Lamm's consistent findings with the objective medical evidence, refuting the plaintiff's claims of error in equating their reports.
The law judge found the plaintiff had a severe combination of impairments, including degenerative disc disease and various mental health disorders, in line with regulatory definitions of severity. The plaintiff contended that spinal impairments were not deemed severe, but the judge's residual functional capacity determination indicated otherwise, as the plaintiff was limited to a restricted range of sedentary work due to these impairments. The plaintiff did not specify any additional functional limitations that the judge overlooked, rendering this argument unfounded. Lastly, the plaintiff claimed that the law judge failed to recognize "possible right cubital tunnel syndrome" as a severe impairment, based on a previous assessment by Dr. Sidhom, but this was not found to be a valid contention.
Subsequent electromyography and nerve conduction velocity studies have disproven the speculative diagnosis of the plaintiff’s conditions, showing no evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome, ulnar neuropathy, peripheral neuropathy, brachial plexopathy, or cervical radiculopathy. The law judge referred to these findings in his decision and acknowledged the plaintiff's claims regarding hand and finger issues but determined there was no severe impairment, citing normal study results, good grip strength from Dr. Lamm, and the plaintiff’s ability to lift his 30-pound child. The plaintiff has not provided a definitive diagnosis of right cubital tunnel syndrome nor evidence showing it significantly impacted his work ability, rendering his argument that the law judge erred in not recognizing it as a severe impairment without merit.
Furthermore, the plaintiff contends that the law judge did not accord proper weight to the opinions of treating doctors and state agency physicians, particularly Dr. Sidhom, the treating pain physician. Dr. Sidhom’s May 2010 "Work Status Certificate" recommended part-time light duty work with specific restrictions, but did not specify the duration of these limitations. While treating physicians’ opinions generally carry substantial weight, good cause exists to give them less weight if they are unsupported by evidence or inconsistent with medical records. The law judge acknowledged Dr. Sidhom's role and varied opinions on the plaintiff's functional capabilities, ultimately assigning only some weight to his assessments. Notably, a prior opinion from Dr. Sidhom indicated the plaintiff was not totally disabled, attributing his job search difficulties to underlying medical conditions rather than disability. Additionally, a March 2010 statement from Dr. Sidhom suggesting a two-month work exemption was disregarded by the law judge, as there was no corresponding deterioration in the plaintiff’s condition and the rationale for the two-month duration was unexplained.
In May 2010, Dr. Sidhom revised his assessment to indicate that the claimant could work only part-time in a light-duty capacity, despite noting no significant deterioration in the claimant's condition to justify this change. Imaging of the cervical and lumbar spine and findings from Drs. Lamm and Melton contradicted the claim that the claimant was unable to engage in full-time work, providing valid reasons to discount Dr. Sidhom's opinion. The plaintiff argued for acceptance of Dr. Sidhom's opinion based on MRI results from 2004 and 2007 and ongoing treatments, but failed to specify any test findings indicating disabling impairments, leading to the forfeiture of this argument. The law judge found that the earlier MRIs supported only mild conditions and did not substantiate Dr. Sidhom’s claims of disabling limitations.
The plaintiff further contended that the law judge arbitrarily favored the opinions of USF physicians, who were not treating sources or pain specialists. However, Dr. Abel, a neurologist, conducted diagnostic tests that showed no evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome or ulnar neuropathy, and the law judge reasonably preferred her definitive diagnosis over Dr. Sidhom's uncertain assessment. The plaintiff's claim that the opinions of consultative examining physicians should not outweigh those of treating physicians was countered by the law judge’s valid reasons for discounting Dr. Sidhom's assessment while still considering Dr. Melton's opinion, which allowed for light work. Ultimately, the law judge made an independent determination of the claimant’s residual functional capacity, asserting that the evaluation of evidence is within the factfinder's purview, not the district court's. The plaintiff's assertion that the opinions of reviewing nonexamining physicians lacked justification for minimizing Dr. Sidhom's opinion was also noted.
The law judge did not dismiss Dr. Sidhom’s opinion regarding the plaintiff’s condition but provided good reasons to give more weight to a non-examining physician's opinion instead. The law judge stated that Dr. Sidhom’s opinion warranted only partial consideration. The plaintiff's assertion that the opinions of non-examining physicians should be given little weight lacks merit, as established case law allows for non-examining opinions to be favored over a treating physician’s opinion when justified.
Regarding Dr. Dana Perrin, the law judge found no justification for the two-month work incapacity claim, citing a lack of explanation from Dr. Perrin. The plaintiff did not identify any unaddressed opinions from Dr. Perrin nor challenge the law judge’s rationale for discounting his opinion.
Concerning Dr. Bharminder S. Bedi, the treating psychiatrist, the plaintiff failed to specify any unaddressed opinions. The law judge appeared to give significant weight to Dr. Bedi’s findings, which indicated that the plaintiff experienced only mild social functioning difficulties and was managing well on medication, contradicting claims of disabling mental limitations.
The law judge’s assessment that the plaintiff had a severe mental impairment, as diagnosed with various conditions, aligned with or was more favorable than Dr. Bedi’s opinions. Lastly, the law judge limited the plaintiff to occasional stooping, and the plaintiff did not provide evidence to support claims of an inability to stoop.
The plaintiff's argument, suggesting that Dr. Lamm's assessment of his inability to stand equates to an inability to stoop, is dismissed as frivolous. Dr. Lamm did not state that the plaintiff could never stand; he indicated that the plaintiff could not stand long enough to perform his previous job. The plaintiff himself testified he could stand comfortably for twenty minutes. Consequently, there is no basis to claim that he cannot occasionally stoop, as concluded by the law judge.
The plaintiff's assertion regarding the "Failure to Properly Utilize 11th Circuit Pain Standard" is also addressed. The Eleventh Circuit requires evidence of a medical condition accompanied by either objective medical evidence supporting the severity of pain or evidence that the condition is severe enough to reasonably cause the alleged pain. The law judge must assess the credibility of the claimant's pain testimony and justify any rejection of that testimony.
The law judge acknowledged the need for a credibility determination, referencing relevant regulations and case law, indicating proper application of the Eleventh Circuit pain standard. While he recognized the plaintiff's claims of various physical ailments and their effects, he ultimately found the plaintiff's statements regarding the intensity and limiting effects of these symptoms not credible, as they were inconsistent with the residual functional capacity assessment.
Importantly, the law judge did not dismiss all of the plaintiff's subjective complaints; he credited many of them and limited the plaintiff to a restricted range of sedentary work. The law judge provided clear reasons for questioning the plaintiff's credibility, noting that the objective evidence did not substantiate the severity of the alleged pain or functional limitations as claimed. The plaintiff's allegations were deemed not fully credible due to inconsistencies and his ability to perform certain activities.
The claimant's assertion of complete inability to work contradicts his August 2010 statement to Dr. Bedi, where he indicated he might be able to work once he finds a job. Additionally, the claimant informed consultative examiner Dr. Moering that he earns spending money by cleaning for family members. His claims of significant medication side effects lack credibility, as Dr. Sidhom's progress notes consistently show no evidence of such side effects. A report from May 2008 noted the claimant picking up his child, further questioning his disability claims. Although the claimant reports frequent anxiety attacks lasting all day, his treating sources did not document these occurrences, suggesting they may not be as frequent or severe as claimed. The residual functional capacity assessment is supported by objective medical evidence, opinions from DDS consultants, and some of the claimant's own statements regarding his work capability. The law judge's reasoning is deemed reasonable and substantiated by evidence, justifying the rejection of the claimant's subjective complaints. The claimant argues the law judge failed to adequately address a 2010 MRI revealing severe osteoarthritis; however, the law judge considered this finding along with other tests in his credibility assessment. The law judge noted arthritic changes consistent with the MRI, and it is not necessary for the judge to address every piece of evidence. The claimant has not presented medical evidence showing that his osteoarthritis imposes greater limitations than those found by the law judge. Lastly, the law judge reasonably dismissed the claimant's testimony about medication side effects, as there were no reports of such effects in his medical records, undermining the credibility of his claims.
The law judge's decision to discredit the plaintiff's testimony regarding side effects from medication is upheld, as the plaintiff’s medical records do not reflect consistent complaints of such side effects. The court referenced previous cases to support the conclusion that the absence of documented complaints allowed for a reasonable determination that medication side effects were not a significant issue. The plaintiff's argument that the law judge failed to consider Dr. Sidhom’s opinion was countered by the judge providing valid reasons for affording limited weight to this opinion, particularly in light of electromyography and nerve conduction velocity studies which indicated no ulnar neuropathy. The judge's credibility assessment was deemed well-supported by substantial evidence, and the plaintiff did not contest the residual functional capacity finding. A report from Dr. Moering described the plaintiff as cooperative, with normal speech and gait, and no current suicidal ideations, although he self-reported feeling "down and out" with a dysphoric affect. The Acting Commissioner of Social Security was substituted as the defendant in the action. The plaintiff raised concerns about certain medical records not being reviewed by Dr. Melton but failed to argue their necessity for a probative opinion regarding his condition. Lastly, while the plaintiff claimed to have a herniated disc, this was not corroborated by MRI findings.
