Court: District Court, D. Massachusetts; March 31, 2014; Federal District Court
On September 25, 1995, Massachusetts Assistant Attorney General Paul McLaughlin was murdered, and Jeffrey Bly was charged with the crime. After being tried in May 1999 and convicted, Bly was sentenced to life in prison, a decision affirmed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC). Bly's motion for a new trial was denied, as was his subsequent request for leave to appeal that denial. He then filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, initially presenting eight claims, which he later amended to include three additional claims.
The court denied Bly's petition, primarily because the claims added through amendment were deemed procedurally defaulted, as they had been considered by Massachusetts courts and found not to raise 'new and substantial' questions. Bly did not meet any exceptions to this procedural default.
The court evaluated the remaining ten claims on their merits, which included allegations of the admission of unreliable DNA evidence, incomplete data provided for DNA calculations, police retrieval of DNA samples without proper procedures, inadmissible evidence regarding Bly's refusal to provide hair samples, unreliable identification testimony, denial of expert testimony on identification weaknesses, lack of jury instruction on cross-racial identification, presentation of prior bad acts, denial of access to a witness's medical records, and denial of a motion to suppress pre-Miranda interview evidence. Ultimately, the court found that none of these claims demonstrated that any state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of established federal law, nor were they based on an unreasonable determination of facts, leading to the conclusion that Bly was not entitled to habeas relief.
On September 25, 1995, McLaughlin was fatally shot at the Highland Street commuter rail station in West Roxbury, Massachusetts, a day before he was set to prosecute Bly for attempted carjacking. McLaughlin had previously prosecuted Bly in two other cases, both resulting in not guilty verdicts. Bly was indicted for McLaughlin's murder on February 19, 1998, and his trial took place in May 1999.
Key evidence presented during the trial included testimonies from Bly’s acquaintances. Eric Hardy recounted a conversation in which Bly expressed concern about the upcoming trial and mentioned needing to take action without harming Dana Alston. Anthony Houston testified that he accompanied Bly to South Station on September 22, 1995, where Bly instructed him to track McLaughlin’s movements. Houston followed McLaughlin to the Highland Street station and noted his license plate number, which he later reported to Bly.
Sandra Brown testified that on the day of the shooting, she overheard Bly stating he needed to "get the prosecutor" that night, suggesting a premeditated intent. Additionally, Mario Thompson recounted that Bly directed him to follow him by car on the day of the murder, after which Bly sent Thompson away before carrying out the shooting. Bly was described as wearing dark clothing during these events.
Witnesses at Highland Street Station on September 25, 1995, provided critical testimony regarding the events surrounding McLaughlin's murder. Michael Duffy, arriving at approximately 6:50 p.m., observed McLaughlin heading to his car before hearing two gunshots and seeing a young black male, aged 14-16, in a black hoodie leaning into McLaughlin's vehicle. Maureen Woodsum noted seeing a man in dark clothing near the station around 6:00 p.m. and later recognized him from a news broadcast in 1998 as Bly, who was indicted for McLaughlin's murder.
Subsequent testimonies from Brown, Hardy, Houston, and Thompson revealed Bly's actions and statements after the shooting. Brown recounted seeing Bly later that night soaking his hands in bleach, claiming he had "no worries" and "no prosecutor." Janet Brown, Sandra's mother, testified that Bly admitted to killing McLaughlin to avoid returning to prison due to past legal issues with him. Hardy recounted a conversation with Bly the day after the murder, where Bly confessed to shooting McLaughlin and discarding evidence while fleeing in a car. Bly expressed concern about being sentenced to life for a prior carjacking case and asked Hardy to dispose of the getaway car, threatening him against revealing anything.
Houston recognized McLaughlin as someone he had been instructed to follow by Bly, who later warned him to remain quiet and avoid the area. Thompson also recognized the crime scene from Bly's prior directions and was told by Bly to claim they had been together that night if questioned.
Police investigators discovered a black hooded sweatshirt, gloves, a green bandana, and a knit cap near the Highland Street station. DNA testing from these items involved three laboratories. The first, CBR, matched blood stains on the clothing to McLaughlin's DNA. The FBI subsequently tested DNA from McLaughlin, Bly, and two other suspects, finding that the DNA on the bandana and right glove matched McLaughlin's, while Bly could not be excluded as a contributor to samples from seven locations on the garments. Bode Technology Group conducted two sets of tests comparing Bly's DNA with that from the sweatshirt. The first set, from December 1998, indicated a match with a random occurrence rate of one in 631,000 among African Americans. The defense's cross-examination of Bode’s Dr. Kevin McElfresh revealed that the second set of tests, conducted in January 1999, also matched Bly's DNA but had methodological issues. On May 29, 1999, the jury found Bly guilty, and he was sentenced to life in prison the same day.
Bly appealed his conviction to the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), raising several arguments: the trial judge improperly admitted certain DNA evidence; DNA from a water bottle and cigarette butts should have been suppressed; Bly's police statement was obtained without Miranda warnings and should have been suppressed; identification testimony from a Commonwealth witness was inadmissible; his identification expert was wrongly denied the opportunity to testify; evidence of his refusal to provide a court-ordered hair sample was improperly admitted; testimony regarding his prior bad acts was wrongly included; and the medical records of a Commonwealth witness were not timely produced or were deemed privileged. The SJC examined these arguments in detail and affirmed Bly's conviction.
On January 3, 2008, Bly filed a Petition that mirrored his appellate claims. After his motion for a new trial was denied on July 30, 2008, he sought leave from the SJC to appeal that denial under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 278, section 33E. While this petition was pending, Bly requested to submit a supplemental memorandum that included both his original claims and new grounds for the new trial. He also sought a stay of the proceedings on the Petition to exhaust his claims in the SJC. On November 25, 2008, Justice Greaney denied Bly's leave to appeal, which rendered his stay request moot. On March 22, 2009, the court allowed Bly's Motion to File, interpreting it as both a request to submit the supplemental memorandum and to amend the Petition to include additional claims. The court determined that his Motion was timely under the one-year limitation for 2254 habeas petitions, as part of the limitation period was tolled during his state post-conviction proceedings. Subsequently, the parties submitted supplemental briefing.
Claims added by amendment in Bly's case are procedurally defaulted under federal habeas standards. A federal habeas claim is not entertained if the state court decision is based on an independent and adequate state law ground. Procedural default acts as such a ground when the state consistently applies the relevant procedural rule without waiving it. A habeas court must assess procedural default before addressing the merits of claims. If the last state court ruling on a federal claim addresses the merits, the procedural default bar may be lifted. Additionally, a procedurally defaulted claim can be reviewed if the petitioner shows either cause and actual prejudice or demonstrates that failing to consider the claim would lead to a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
Bly's amended Petition includes several claims: he alleges the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing arguments, including misstatements of evidence and character attacks, and contends his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting. Bly also challenges jury instructions regarding malice aforethought and deliberate premeditation, asserting that his trial counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance, as did his appellate counsel's inaction on appeal. These claims were first raised in his motion for a new trial and later presented to the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) via a petition for leave to appeal under Massachusetts General Laws ch. 278, § 33E. The SJC's denial of these claims under § 33E results in their procedural default, barring consideration in habeas proceedings unless exceptions to this rule apply, which, in this case, do not.
Section 33E allows appeals from decisions denying new trial motions only if a single justice of the SJC identifies a "new and substantial question" appropriate for full court review. A question is deemed "new" if it could not have been raised during the trial or direct review. It is considered "substantial" if it is meritorious or has a reasonable chance of success on appeal. Massachusetts courts consistently apply Section 33E, establishing it as an adequate bar to collateral relief. The First Circuit has ruled that a finding of lack of substantiality under Section 33E does not constitute a merits decision and acts as an independent and adequate state ground, thereby barring federal review. In the case at hand, the single justice denied Bly’s application based on the Commonwealth's argument that it did not present any new and substantial issues. This determination by the single justice, under the precedent set by Costa, serves as an independent state ground that precludes federal habeas review.
Bly's procedurally defaulted claims cannot be considered on their merits as he fails to meet the necessary exceptions. To overcome procedural default, a petitioner must demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice from the alleged violation of federal law, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Bly does not provide any justification for his failure to raise his arguments on direct review, and his claims of ineffective assistance from counsel do not satisfy the 'cause' requirement, as they themselves were procedurally defaulted. The courts do not allow ineffective assistance claims to bypass the need for showing cause, as this would undermine the exhaustion requirement. Additionally, Bly does not present any objective external factors that impeded his counsel's compliance with state procedural rules. Without satisfying the 'cause' element, a determination of prejudice is unnecessary. The miscarriage of justice exception, which applies only in rare cases of factual innocence demonstrated by new evidence, does not pertain to Bly, as he does not claim factual innocence nor provide new evidence suggesting that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. Consequently, the court will not address the merits of Bly’s procedurally defaulted claims.
A federal court addressing a habeas claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 assesses whether a state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. A state decision is 'contrary to' federal law if it applies a legal rule that contradicts Supreme Court holdings or reaches a different conclusion on materially indistinguishable facts. A decision is deemed an 'unreasonable application' if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of the case, unreasonably extends a legal principle to an inappropriate context, or unreasonably refuses to apply it where it should. A federal court cannot grant relief solely based on an erroneous application of law; it must find that the application was 'objectively unreasonable.' Furthermore, federal courts rely on state court factual findings, presuming their correctness unless the petitioner presents clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. This presumption applies to factual determinations from both state trial and appellate courts.
Bly's first claim challenges the introduction of potentially unreliable DNA evidence at his trial, specifically targeting the second set of DNA tests conducted by Bode. He identifies two main methodological flaws: first, evidence of contamination in the genetic material, and second, the use of a process called 'reamplification,' which heightens contamination risks and indicates a small DNA sample. Additionally, Bly questions the reliability of Bode's calculations regarding the DNA patterns, arguing that Bode improperly combined two databases—one from Bode and another from Promega. The legal basis for Bly's arguments relies on Massachusetts evidentiary law rather than federal law, despite his citation of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., which pertains to federal court standards. The state court's adoption of Daubert's reasoning aligns with its own reliability tests and does not expand federal jurisdiction. Bly's assertions, therefore, lack any contravened federal law relevant to his case. Although pro se litigants like Bly are afforded liberal interpretation of their claims, his challenge does not effectively frame the reliability issue as a constitutional due process violation. Furthermore, habeas relief requires exhaustion of state court remedies, which Bly has not fulfilled.
To exhaust a claim, a petitioner must present it to state courts in a manner that alerts reasonable jurists to its federal nature. In Bly's case, he failed to assert a federal claim regarding the reliability of DNA evidence in state courts, making any such claim unexhausted and thus not eligible for relief. Mixed petitions that contain both exhausted and unexhausted claims are subject to total dismissal. Bly's argument about the reliability of the DNA testing, if construed as a federal claim, would jeopardize his entire petition. While the court may stay proceedings to allow for the exhaustion of unexhausted claims if the petitioner shows good cause, potential merit, and no dilatory tactics, Bly has not demonstrated good cause for failing to raise a federal claim earlier. Furthermore, to qualify as potentially meritorious, a due process challenge to trial evidence must show a denial of fundamental fairness, which Bly's challenges to the DNA evidence do not appear to meet. Consequently, the court does not recognize Bly's argument regarding the DNA testing as a federal claim; it is based solely on state law and cannot support habeas relief.
Bly argues that his rights were violated due to the prosecution's failure to provide the complete database used by Bode for DNA analysis, which he sought to challenge for reliability. His pre-trial motion for discovery was denied by the trial court, citing a reproduction cost of $250,000. This claim is grounded in the constitutional standard established by Brady v. Maryland, which requires that a petitioner demonstrate three elements to prove a Brady violation: favorable evidence, government suppression of that evidence, and resulting prejudice. Prejudice is defined as a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have differed had the evidence been disclosed. The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) evaluated Bly's complaint and confirmed the database was potentially exculpatory. However, the SJC found that Bly failed to show a substantial basis for claiming prejudice, as he had alternative means to challenge the database's reliability, such as comparing it with peer-reviewed databases. Bly had also presented expert testimony at trial indicating discrepancies between Bode's and Promega's database results. The SJC concluded that Bly's arguments did not sufficiently demonstrate that the nondisclosure affected the trial's fairness.
Bly has failed to demonstrate a substantial basis for claiming prejudice regarding the Bode database, as he did not provide an acceptable reason for its absence as evidence. Under federal law, a Brady violation is only established if there is a "reasonable probability" that the trial outcome would have differed with the database's disclosure. Bly had the opportunity to challenge the database's reliability in court without access to the complete data. The trial court found the database scientifically reliable based on substantial evidence. Given the strong evidence of Bly's guilt presented at trial, it is unlikely that an increased effort to discredit the database would have altered the verdict. Therefore, Bly received a fair trial, and the state court's decisions align with federal Brady doctrine, leading to the denial of his claim.
In a separate issue, Bly contends that the police's seizure of DNA samples from a water bottle and cigarette butts he used during an interrogation constituted an unconstitutional search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Although this claim was properly exhausted in state courts, the federal court cannot address whether his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The Constitution does not mandate federal habeas relief for state prisoners when the state has provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate Fourth Amendment claims. The focus in these proceedings is on whether Bly had a realistic opportunity to fully litigate his claim in the state system.
A ‘full and fair’ hearing allows a defendant to present evidence and be heard, as established in Companonio v. O’Brien and Neron v. Tierney. Bly received such a hearing regarding his Fourth Amendment claim, which spanned three days, during which he cross-examined witnesses and introduced his own. The trial court ordered the production of relevant documents and ultimately issued a ten-page decision with findings of fact and legal rulings. The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) later reviewed Bly's Fourth Amendment claim and determined that no search and seizure had occurred, thus denying the basis for habeas relief.
In a separate matter, the prosecution sought to compel Bly to provide blood and hair samples for DNA testing, which the trial court granted. While Bly provided a blood sample, he did not allow an adequate hair sample to be taken, leading to the admission of this testimony at trial. Bly contended that this violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The SJC evaluated this under both federal and state law, concluding that neither standard was breached. Federal law permits states to compel non-invasive examinations, with the option for suspects to refuse, while allowing evidence of such refusals to be presented in court. This principle was upheld in Bly’s case, as his refusal to provide a hair sample was permissible evidence during the trial.
The admission of evidence regarding Bly's refusal did not breach his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and state court decisions were consistent with established federal law, thus not warranting habeas relief. Bly sought to exclude Woodsum’s identification testimony, citing reliability issues such as the cross-racial nature of the identification, a 27-month delay before identification, and suggestiveness due to Bly's courtroom presence during indictment. The trial court allowed Woodsum to testify, and the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) upheld this decision, stating that while Bly’s concerns were legitimate, the judge did not abuse discretion. Bly contended that this admission violated his due process rights, which can be compromised if trial fairness is significantly impaired. However, due process does not necessitate that all admitted evidence be completely reliable; some untrustworthy evidence is permissible in adversarial trials. The court noted that while Woodsum’s testimony had weaknesses, these could be challenged through cross-examination and closing arguments, allowing the jury to assess credibility. Consequently, the trial court's decision to admit Woodsum’s testimony did not undermine trial fairness or the integrity of the adversary process.
The court determined that Woodsum’s identification testimony was admissible and did not violate any established federal law, thus failing to justify habeas relief. In Ground Four, Bly sought to introduce expert testimony from Dr. Alexander Yarmey regarding factors influencing identification reliability, particularly cross-racial identification, but the trial court excluded this testimony after a voir dire. Bly's challenge to this exclusion is interpreted as an exhausted federal due process claim linked to Woodsum’s identification testimony. To establish a constitutional violation, Bly needed to demonstrate that the exclusion rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, a standard not met according to the court’s findings. The trial court believed the jury could adequately assess Woodsum's reliability without expert input, supported by corroborating witness testimonies. In Ground Five, Bly contested the trial court’s refusal to provide a jury instruction on cross-racial identification unreliability, a decision upheld by the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) as within the trial court’s discretion. This claim is also connected to Bly's due process argument regarding Woodsum's testimony. Overall, the court maintained that state jury instruction matters generally warrant deference and do not typically justify federal habeas relief.
Habeas relief is warranted only when a flawed jury instruction fundamentally undermines the trial, violating due process. In this case, the trial court's refusal to provide Bly's specific instruction regarding racial identification issues was deemed appropriate, as the judge offered a broader set of guidelines on identification testimony, addressing factors such as observation conditions, time lapses, and the potential for honest mistakes. This decision did not infect the trial's integrity to the extent that due process was compromised, thus not warranting habeas relief.
In addressing evidence of prior bad acts, the court allowed testimony from witnesses regarding Bly’s previous attempts to intimidate or harm Alston, the victim and key witness. This included accounts of coercion and violent threats directed at Alston by Bly and his associates. Despite Bly's objections, the court admitted this evidence, which he argued was unfairly prejudicial. However, Bly's challenge did not rely on established federal law, and since he did not present this claim in state court, it could not be pursued as a federal constitutional issue.
The claim made by Bly is unviable and could lead to the dismissal of the entire Petition as a mixed petition. The court finds no good cause for Bly's failure to exhaust the claim regarding the testimony of witnesses Alston, Hardy, and Pope, nor does it consider the due process argument against their admission to be likely meritorious. As Bly's argument regarding the testimony of his prior bad acts is based solely on state law, it does not support his request for habeas relief.
In Ground Seven, Bly sought an order for the production of medical records of witness Janet Brown, arguing her mental health history was pertinent to her credibility. The trial court denied this motion, which Bly claims impaired his cross-examination ability. His challenge to this ruling was arguably exhausted in state court, where he referenced Commonwealth v. Bishop, which discusses a defendant's right to confront witnesses. The state supreme court's analysis in Bishop relied on both state and federal constitutional law, potentially satisfying the exhaustion requirement.
However, the court ultimately finds Bly's claim regarding Brown's medical records to be without merit, allowing it to deny unexhausted claims on their merits without a definitive exhaustion determination. The SJC concluded that any trial court error concerning Brown's records was harmless. The court noted that while certain constitutional violations mandate reversal, excessive limitations on cross-examination do not automatically warrant such treatment. Instead, these claims undergo harmless error review, which requires a judgment to be set aside only if the error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Given the trial court's handling of Brown's medical records, any pretrial error is deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Brown exhibited confusion regarding the timeline of events while testifying, prompting the trial judge to suspend her testimony and subpoena her medical records for review. A portion of these records was provided to the defense on May 19, 1999, with the remainder available on May 21, 1999. Cross-examination of Brown resumed the following Monday, revealing her medications, history of hospitalization due to hallucinations, and a prior diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Bly had sufficient opportunity to review and utilize Brown’s medical records during his cross-examination, negating any claims of violation of his right to cross-examine her. Consequently, even if there was a constitutional error in the trial court's pretrial decision, it was deemed harmless as Bly's defense was not ultimately compromised.
Bly's final claim involved a police interview conducted on September 26, 1995, the day after the shooting of McLaughlin. He asserted his innocence during this interview but made a statement interpreted by the prosecution as indicative of motive. Bly sought to suppress this interview's evidence, arguing that it occurred without Miranda warnings. The trial court found that Bly was not in custody during the interview, a determination upheld by the SJC. Under federal law, Miranda warnings are required only if a person is "in custody." The determination of custody involves analyzing the interrogation circumstances and whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave. In this instance, Bly was approached by plainclothes officers who recognized him; he was not the primary suspect and voluntarily accompanied detectives to the police station for questioning.
Bly willingly participated in a 45-minute interview with detectives, during which he consented to be tape-recorded and did not request an attorney or attempt to leave. The interview was held in a detectives' office with the door open, and Bly confirmed that he had come voluntarily. After the interview, he reviewed the recording and was allowed to make corrections. The state courts concluded that Bly was not in custody for Miranda purposes, a determination supported by several factors: the open door, his voluntary appearance, the nature of the conversation, and the detectives' requests for consent. The federal habeas court cannot grant relief solely based on disagreement with the state court; it must find the state court's decision objectively unreasonable, which it did not in this case. Consequently, the court denied Bly's habeas relief claims. Regarding the certificate of appealability (COA), it is required to issue or deny one upon an adverse final order. A COA is warranted if there is a substantial showing of a constitutional rights denial and if reasonable jurists could debate the petition's resolution. The court found no basis for such debate regarding the initial claims and denied the COA for them, although it granted a COA for claims added by amendment. Bly may seek a COA from the court of appeals.
The court did not examine the substantive merits of the claims because a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) deemed them not "new and substantial," which led to their procedural default according to the ruling in Costa. There is a noted conflict between Costa and earlier First Circuit decisions regarding whether a denial of leave to appeal under 33E automatically results in procedural default. The court acknowledges that reasonable jurists might disagree on the procedural status of the amended claims in Bly’s Petition, thus justifying the issuance of a certificate of appealability (COA) for these specific claims. Consequently, Bly’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is denied, with a COA granted only for the amended claims (pages 59-81 of Bly’s Memorandum) and denied for all others. Additionally, it is noted that exhaustion of state court remedies is not necessary if there is no available corrective process or if such process is ineffective. The court clarifies that any potential issues in the database would not have impacted the conclusion that Bly's DNA matched the sample found on the sweatshirt, but could have affected the statistical likelihood of that match. Lastly, while Bly had previously presented a different account of events, he has now accepted the facts established by the trial court.
