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Karsjens v. Jesson
Citations: 6 F. Supp. 3d 958; 2014 WL 3908772; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110269Docket: Civil No. 11-3659 (DWF/JJK)
Court: District Court, D. Minnesota; August 11, 2014; Federal District Court
The Court, led by District Judge Donovan W. Frank, addressed three key motions: an Order to Show Cause, a Motion for Declaratory Judgment and Immediate Discharge from Civil Commitment, and a Motion to Transfer an individual to an appropriate treatment facility. All motions were denied without prejudice, but the Court expedited the trial for this class action case concerning individuals civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). The class action, filed against MSOP and related Minnesota statutes (Chapter 253B, now Chapter 253D), was certified on July 24, 2012, covering "all patients currently civilly committed" to MSOP. The Court's Order to Show Cause and the plaintiffs' motions were influenced by reports from court-appointed Rule 706 experts concerning two class members. Recognizing the need for expert input, the Court appointed four experts on December 6, 2013, who were tasked with developing a methodology to evaluate the program. In subsequent meetings, the experts proposed a plan focused on initial chart reviews to assess the program without commenting on individual residents' risks. The Court highlighted systemic issues within MSOP and the application of commitment statutes, indicating that if the plaintiffs can demonstrate that these statutes lead to indefinite commitments of individuals deemed no longer dangerous, or if MSOP functions as a punitive system rather than a treatment program, their claims are likely to succeed. Evidence presented to the Court included the March 2011 Evaluation Report by the Office of the Legislative Auditor (OLA) and the December 2013 final recommendations from the Sex Offender Civil Commitment Advisory Task Force (Task Force). Both reports highlight potential systemic issues within the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) and its application of commitment statutes. The Task Force Report indicates a consensus that the civil commitment system captures excessive individuals and overly prolongs their confinement. It notes that all offenders are presumptively placed in high-security settings, which may not be necessary for all, suggesting the need for regular reviews of commitment necessity and placements. The OLA Report reveals that Minnesota has the highest per capita rate of civilly committed sex offenders in the nation, with significant growth in the population over the last decade. The report emphasizes the high costs associated with MSOP compared to other alternatives and identifies considerable variability in commitment practices among prosecutors. It also points out the lack of reasonable alternatives to high-security commitment and the challenges MSOP faces in providing adequate treatment, particularly at the Moose Lake facility. Notably, no civilly committed sex offender has ever been discharged from MSOP, and Minnesota's release standards are stricter than those in other states. In light of these findings, the Court sought assistance from Court-appointed experts to further investigate systemic issues. The Court outlined specific tasks for the experts, including reviewing the current treatment program at MSOP for adherence to professional standards and evaluating the conditions of confinement to ensure a proper balance between safety and therapeutic needs, with recommendations for necessary changes. Experts are tasked with reporting to the Court on several key areas regarding the treatment of civilly committed sex offenders within the MSOP program. They will assess the alignment of MSOP’s design with current professional standards, examine reintegration practices from other civil commitment programs, and analyze treatment and management approaches for lower-functioning offenders in community settings. Additionally, experts must evaluate each class member’s level of dangerousness, eligibility for discharge, appropriate treatment phase, and potential for placement in less restrictive facilities, along with the specific needs for such alternatives. The Court emphasized that independent risk assessments and treatment recommendations for class members are essential for evaluating the constitutionality of the commitment statutes and the implementation of MSOP. Experts are ordered to review the MSOP treatment and screening processes, conduct site visits to St. Peter and Moose Lake, interview patients and staff, and review a significant percentage of resident charts, focusing particularly on those in the Young Adult, Assisted Living, and Alternative Program Units. Concerns have been raised regarding the adequacy of services for clients with cognitive deficits and psychiatric issues, with indications that some low-functioning individuals may require alternative commitment settings. The MSOP's administration structure has changed, and low-functioning clients were moved back to MSOP without sufficient clinical input, raising further concerns about their treatment adequacy. The MSOP executive director made a decision during a period without an executive clinical director or a clinical director on the St. Peter campus. The program has not yet established an alternative release path for low-functioning clients, some of whom may not require the same security level as other MSOP residents. Certain clients, particularly those with age or disabilities, could potentially be managed in less restrictive settings. The OLA Report recommends reassessing existing residents for suitability in alternative placements, detailing the rationale and descriptions of proposed settings for various groups. It suggests the use of outside experts for more objective assessments. MSOP should also create plans for identifying low-functioning clients who cannot complete treatment and petition for their transfer to alternative settings. The Task Force highlighted the need for special criteria and procedures for juvenile offenders and individuals with developmental disabilities in the commitment system, asserting that no one should be civilly committed solely based on juvenile behavior. Rule 706 experts began their work as per a court order by touring MSOP facilities, interviewing patients and staff, and reviewing case files. They identified specific cases, including Terhaar and Bailey, as requiring immediate court attention. Their interim reports provided summaries and discharge recommendations, noting that Terhaar, who had no adult criminal history and was committed at 19 for actions taken between ages 10 and 14, should be considered for discharge. Terhaar's file includes incidents from juvenile placement facilities that did not result in charges. Experts suggest that Terhaar's history of general delinquency, such as fighting and running away, contributed to his commitment to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). They conclude that he has no adult criminal history and that his sexual offenses, committed as a juvenile, were likely influenced by his own history of sexual victimization and trauma. Factors such as ADHD and untreated complex trauma may have exacerbated these issues. The panel unanimously agrees that Terhaar poses little risk to public safety and should be unconditionally discharged from MSOP. They identify a family member who can provide support upon his release and note his compliance with medication. The experts believe he completed necessary treatment before his placement at MSOP and likely does not need further intervention. They emphasize that juvenile sexual offending is distinct from adult offending, highlighting the importance of specialized assessment tools for juveniles, which have limited predictive validity. Research indicates that juvenile offenders have low recidivism rates and are generally more amenable to change than adults. Additionally, a report addresses Rhonda Bailey, the only woman committed to MSOP since 1993. Experts recommend her transfer or provisional discharge, noting that her sexual offending likely stems from severe abuse experienced during her youth. Bailey has been housed in a male-dominated unit and participates in treatment as the sole female among high-risk offenders. Bailey experienced a traumatic upbringing characterized by physical and sexual abuse from family members starting at a young age. At the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP), she has been diagnosed with multiple paraphilias and Intellectual Disability, with an IQ of 66, alongside a long history of depression. Bailey demonstrates poor boundaries with peers and staff, exhibiting predatory behavior towards vulnerable adult patients, including sexual assaults. Experts indicate a lack of acknowledgment in her records of how her childhood trauma has influenced her adult sexualized behavior. Although symptoms consistent with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) have been reported, this diagnosis has only recently been addressed by MSOP psychiatrists. The experts criticize the absence of specialized treatment for female sexual offenders in Bailey's program and highlight the inadequacy of her treatment within a male-centric framework. They note significant differences in risk assessment and recidivism rates between male and female sexual offenders, emphasizing that female sexual offenders represent only 2% to 5% of the total. The literature indicates that female offenders have a much lower reoffense rate (around 2%) compared to males (about 15%). Furthermore, there are no specialized assessment tools for female sexual offenders, and existing frameworks largely focus on male behavioral concerns. Finally, the experts stress that the standard practice is to separate men and women in treatment environments, which has not been adhered to in Bailey's case. Experts express skepticism regarding the diagnosis of Ms. Bailey, suggesting it is unlikely she has five separate paraphilias. They propose that her sexual difficulties may stem from untreated bipolar disorder, as indicated by her psychiatrist, Dr. Johnson. The experts raise concerns about the appropriateness of Ms. Bailey's civil commitment, asserting that the current treatment program does not meet her needs and may worsen her condition due to her trauma history and potential PTSD. They recommend trauma-specific and gender-sensitive assessments and treatments tailored to her experiences of sexual victimization, including EMDR and Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT) for PTSD and emotional regulation. While acknowledging her high risk for future inappropriate conduct requiring management, the experts are gravely concerned about her treatment and housing situation at a facility designed for men. They believe that, with appropriate treatment in a non-male environment and proper medication, Ms. Bailey could be managed in a less secure setting. The unanimous consensus is that her current placement is inappropriate and exacerbates her issues rather than alleviates them. They recommend her transfer to a gender-responsive, trauma-informed treatment facility that adequately addresses her needs related to sexual offending, personal victimization, and mental health maintenance, ideally without male sexual offenders present. Following an interim report concerning another individual, Terhaar, the Court ordered the Defendants to justify Terhaar's continued confinement and to consider the unanimous recommendations of the Rule 706 experts for his immediate and unconditional discharge from MSOP. On June 4, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment to discharge E.T. from civil commitment and subsequently sought to transfer R.B. to a suitable treatment facility after receiving expert reports. Plaintiffs also submitted habeas petitions for Terhaar and Bailey, requesting Terhaar's discharge from the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) and Bailey's transfer to a more suitable residential facility. On June 10, 2014, MSOP psychologists Pascucci and Herbert assessed Terhaar and concluded he did not meet the criteria for unconditional discharge but recommended a transfer to a structured facility. In contrast, independent psychologist Amanda Powers-Sawyer evaluated Terhaar on the same day and opined he qualified for unconditional discharge, citing a lack of dangerousness and the absence of a need for residential treatment. The MSOP Executive Director, Nancy Johnston, petitioned for Terhaar's transfer to Community Preparation Services, a facility aimed at reintegration, which was noted as an unusual request given Terhaar's phase in treatment. Johnston supported the Rule 706 experts' assessment of Terhaar's low risk of re-offending. However, the following day, Pascucci and Herbert issued a contrary assessment stating Terhaar did not meet the requirements for custody reduction. A Show Cause hearing took place on June 25, 2014, where Defendants argued that Terhaar remained a danger to the public and required ongoing inpatient treatment. Opposition to the unconditional discharge of Terhaar is expressed by the Defendants, who request adherence to Minnesota's statutory process for custody reduction and discharge. They seek an evidentiary hearing to examine the Rule 706 experts' report. The Court has scheduled this hearing for July 14-15, 2014, to allow for the exploration of reports related to Terhaar and Bailey, during which the Court received expert testimony and evidence. On June 4, 2014, following a Court order regarding Terhaar’s confinement, Plaintiffs renewed their motion for a declaratory judgment, arguing that Minn. Stat. 253D is unconstitutional as it lacks a requirement for automatic independent reviews of civil commitment. The Plaintiffs requested the Defendants to develop a policy for annual reviews by June 1, 2015, and the immediate discharge of Terhaar. However, Plaintiffs later narrowed their request to a declaration of unconstitutionality regarding Terhaar’s detention, reserving broader arguments for future consideration. Defendants oppose the motion, asserting their compliance with the Court's Show Cause Order and providing various arguments against the appropriateness of declaratory relief. The Declaratory Judgment Act allows federal courts to declare the rights of parties in cases of actual controversy but grants discretion to courts in deciding whether to entertain such actions, as affirmed by precedent in cases such as Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. and Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. The Declaratory Judgment Act enables district courts to provide new forms of relief to litigants but does not impose an obligation to do so. Plaintiffs assert that findings from Rule 706 experts indicate that Mr. Terhaar is not a dangerous sexual offender and thus no longer meets the constitutional criteria for civil commitment, claiming that his continued confinement violates his due process rights. The Constitution allows for civil commitment only while an individual poses a danger to themselves or society, as established in Jones v. United States and Foucha v. Louisiana, which affirm that release is required when an individual is no longer deemed dangerous. The experts, after thorough review of Terhaar's treatment file, unanimously concluded he does not require further treatment and poses little risk to public safety, recommending his unconditional discharge from the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). Although internal MSOP psychologists disagreed, stating he did not meet discharge requirements, MSOP's Executive Director acknowledged Terhaar's low risk for reoffending and supported his transfer to a community-based setting. Evidence favoring Terhaar’s confinement is compelling, but the case involves a Rule 23(b)(2) class-action aimed at broad relief for the entire class, and liability has not yet been determined. The court notes that individual relief, while permissible, should be incidental to class-wide issues and may require further proceedings post-liability determination. A declaratory judgment is appropriate only if it clarifies legal relations and resolves uncertainty, which is not the case here as declaring Terhaar's confinement unconstitutional would not address systemic issues within MSOP or benefit the class. Granting such a motion would not provide a comprehensive solution to the conflict and might lead to duplicative litigation. Moreover, the court declines to grant specific relief to Terhaar since the declaration would not contribute to resolving the broader litigation and an expedited petition for his custody reduction is already in process. If this petition succeeds, it is likely to provide an adequate remedy for Terhaar. A determination by the SCAP approving Terhaar’s discharge would eliminate the need for a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of his confinement. Plaintiffs’ counsel plans to initiate a state habeas action for Terhaar. Although the existence of an alternative remedy does not prevent a declaratory judgment, a court has discretion to deny such relief if a more effective remedy is available. Citing relevant case law, the document emphasizes that if another remedy provides better relief, the court may refuse jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment. The ongoing petition for Terhaar’s discharge and the MSOP’s commitment to expedite his case create a more suitable forum for addressing his situation. The court suggests that, should the MSOP fail to expedite Terhaar's case, it would reconsider its position on issuing a declaratory judgment and may impose a timeline for resolution. Additionally, regarding Rhonda Bailey, after reviewing the Rule 706 experts’ report, Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a motion to transfer her to an appropriate treatment facility, asserting her confinement is unconstitutional. The motion raises two issues: the constitutionality of the lack of less restrictive alternatives for Bailey’s confinement and the fact that the only available MSOP facilities are at Moose Lake and St. Peter. MSOP does not offer less restrictive confinement alternatives such as halfway houses for individuals at Moose Lake or St. Peter. Plaintiffs argue that the treatment provided to Bailey is so inadequate that it infringes on her constitutional rights. In response, Defendants assert that the Department is providing appropriate care for Bailey but express a willingness to enhance her treatment based on the Rule 706 Experts Report and are consulting with specialists in female sex-offender treatment. They are also open to exploring transfer options for Bailey but currently believe no suitable facilities meet her treatment and safety needs. The Rule 706 experts indicated that, with sufficient funding, they could establish an appropriate residential treatment situation for Bailey. Ongoing discussions between both parties aim to reach an agreement on Bailey's placement and treatment, which, if achieved, could render the Plaintiffs' motion moot. The Court has denied the motion without prejudice and stayed Bailey's habeas case, allowing time for a resolution that meets her needs. If no agreement is reached promptly, the Court will address Bailey's relief petition after the trial. The excerpt expresses concern over systemic issues within MSOP, highlighted by the inadequate treatment of Bailey, the only female sex offender in a predominantly male facility, and reflects on the broader implications of such deficiencies in the system. Defendants did not present evidence at trial to support the constitutionality of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). The court emphasizes its duty under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to expedite the trial to address significant constitutional issues for the certified class. Accelerated trials are often warranted when a preliminary injunction is sought, as they help mitigate the risk of irreparable harm to plaintiffs. Consequently, parties are required to attend a scheduling conference on August 21, 2014, with the intention of setting trial dates in 2014. While the court will refrain from issuing any declaratory judgment at this time, it may conduct further proceedings post-liability phase to determine individual relief. It acknowledges that injunctive relief might be granted to both the class and its members, with the possibility of release from MSOP through habeas corpus or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Civil rights actions can challenge civil commitment statutes, with declaratory and prospective injunctive relief available. The court aims to expedite the trial and allow state petitioning to proceed to potentially moot habeas relief. However, federal habeas may still be necessary if state processes are slow or ineffective. The court stays the federal habeas cases (Civ. Nos. 14-2002 and 14-2362) to avoid disrupting the class-action trial and state processes, with the possibility of lifting the stay if necessary. The court orders the following: 1. Denies without prejudice the plaintiffs' motion for a declaratory judgment and immediate discharge of E.T. from civil commitment. 2. Denies without prejudice the motion for an aftercare plan for E.T. 3. Denies without prejudice the amended motion for a declaratory judgment and transfer of R.B. to a treatment facility. 4. Stays Eric Terhaar’s federal habeas case. 5. Stays Rhonda Bailey’s federal habeas case. The Court has scheduled a meeting with the parties for August 21, 2014, to discuss potentially moving the trial date to later in 2014. Relevant facts regarding pending motions are summarized, with a comprehensive overview available in the Court's February 20, 2014 Memorandum Opinion and Order. The Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor (OLA) reported that the annual cost per resident at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) is $120,000—three times higher than the cost of incarcerating an inmate in a Minnesota correctional facility. The term “low functioning,” used by the OLA, is criticized by the Court for its imprecision and potential to perpetuate stereotypes. Individuals not progressing in the MSOP may face various conditions, including learning disabilities or intellectual disabilities. Rule 706 experts expressed shock at the treatment and living conditions of patients Terhaar and Bailey at MSOP, prompting their cases to be brought to the Court's attention for urgent action. Reports on both individuals were provided to the parties in late May and early June 2014. The Young Adult Unit at MSOP serves 24 patients aged 18-25 with specialized needs due to emotional immaturity. In 2008, MSOP was functionally separated from State Operated Services, leading to the transfer of 33 clients with cognitive impairments from the Minnesota Security Hospital to MSOP. Experts noted that group therapy in Phase II at MSOP could exacerbate PTSD symptoms for Bailey and highlighted the lack of specialized training for clinical staff dealing with female sexual abusers. They also referenced the UN's Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, advocating that women should be housed separately from men. A Special Review Board hearing occurred on July 2, 2014, recommending Terhaar's placement into a modified Community Preparation Services program tailored to his needs. Johnston indicated that if Terhaar is successfully transferred to CPS following SCAP approval and if the initial transition period is favorable, she plans to file a new petition for Terhaar's provisional discharge in 2014. On July 2, 2014, Plaintiffs submitted a Motion for the Creation of an Aftercare Plan for E.T. under Minn.Stat. 253D.35. Although the Court initially scheduled a hearing for July 15, 2014, it decided to address the motion at a later date and allowed for additional briefs. Plaintiffs had previously filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment on November 19, 2013, which was denied without prejudice by a February 20, 2014 Order. The Supreme Court's decision in Foucha emphasized that a committed acquittee is entitled to release once they have regained sanity or are no longer dangerous. The Court referenced O’Connor v. Donaldson, asserting that it is unconstitutional to confine a harmless, mentally ill person beyond the necessity of initial commitment. In Minnesota, discharge from the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) requires a judicial appeal panel to determine that the individual can adjust to society, is no longer dangerous, and does not need inpatient treatment. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of civil commitment discharge statutes, asserting that confinement is permissible only as long as the individual poses a danger and requires treatment for their mental condition. Civil commitment to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) is constitutionally limited to individuals deemed a "real, continuing, and serious danger to society." The court emphasized that if evidence shows MSOP confines individuals who do not meet this criterion, such confinement could be deemed unconstitutional. The upcoming evidentiary hearing will focus on the opinions of various experts regarding specific individuals in the Karsjens class action. The court highlighted concerns regarding the lack of independent annual reviews of commitment statuses, which could violate due process rights for those no longer meeting commitment criteria. Evidence suggests that periodic reviews are essential for upholding civil commitment standards. The MSOP Executive Director indicated plans to petition for a provisional discharge for Terhaar, who requires individualized transition services for community reintegration. A dispute exists over whether these services should come from community providers or MSOP. While the Defendants oppose the Plaintiffs' motion for an aftercare plan for Terhaar, they have agreed to provide aftercare, rendering the motion moot. However, Plaintiffs can renew their motion if the promised aftercare plan is not created. The motion for the creation of an aftercare plan is denied without prejudice as moot. Defendants argue that the appropriate legal standard for evaluating Plaintiffs' inadequate treatment claims is whether MSOP’s treatment shocks the conscience, referencing Strutton v. Meade. Prior to this case, the Eighth Circuit employed the Youngberg standard for sex offenders' treatment rights. The Court does not decide the applicable standard at this time but acknowledges evidence supporting both standards. An expert report indicates a lack of specialized sexual offender treatment for females and highlights concerns regarding Ms. Bailey's clinical management, noting that her treatment environment does not align with contemporary practices. The report suggests that her current placement at MSOP is inappropriate and may worsen her issues, recommending relocation to a more suitable facility. The Court expresses frustration that Defendants only began exploring options for Bailey after the expert report and Plaintiffs' motion, despite her long-term treatment at MSOP. It raises concerns about MSOP's overall placement practices, highlighted by expert testimonies suggesting that Ms. Terhaar's case is representative of broader issues. An OLA Report from March 2011 noted that only 7% of MSOP clients were in the final treatment phase, while a Task Force Report pointed to a negligible number of releases from the program. The Task Force recommended significant changes to the commitment process to address prolonged commitment durations and lack of meaningful release options. The Court concludes that a 1983 challenge can proceed even without a request for release, as plaintiffs do not seek release from custody and therefore are not limited to habeas corpus remedies. Plaintiffs challenging a civil commitment statute can seek a declaration of its unconstitutionality and an injunction preventing its enforcement in its current form. In Wallace, the Fifth Circuit highlighted that plaintiffs were requesting a constitutional assessment of their commitment procedures to state mental institutions. If such procedures are found unconstitutional, the plaintiffs would be entitled to a review of their confinement under revised procedures. The District Court could outline necessary constitutional standards for involuntary confinement, and if the legislature fails to implement these within a reasonable timeframe, the court may consider relief requests. Furthermore, subsequent cases following Preiser v. Rodriguez have clarified the relief available under Section 1983 for individuals claiming unconstitutional confinement procedures. For instance, a prisoner’s request for an injunction against future unconstitutional procedures does not fall under the exclusive purview of habeas corpus. Claims seeking new hearings or eligibility reviews can proceed under Section 1983, as they do not necessarily imply immediate release. Additionally, actions that do not contest the validity of a criminal judgment, such as challenges to improper procedures regarding good-time credits, are permissible. The courts have also allowed inmates to use Section 1983 to declare disciplinary procedures invalid and to secure injunctions against enforcing invalid prison regulations.