Court: District Court, N.D. Illinois; December 18, 2013; Federal District Court
The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in a case brought by pro se plaintiff Andre Sneed, a former police officer with the City of Harvey. Sneed filed a ten-count complaint against the City, its mayor, corporation counsel, and various police department members, stemming from his time at the Harvey Police Department (HPD), where he was assigned to the Special Operations Unit (SPU) in May 2007. In 2008, Sneed and former officer Archie Stallworth investigated Carlos Vargas, who was later revealed to be an undercover FBI agent. Stallworth was convicted for attempting to provide security for a drug transaction, using a report Sneed had submitted regarding the investigation, which did not disclose Vargas’s true role. Sneed logged a falsified report into the HPD’s evidence room, which Stallworth later used to support his defense, leading to Stallworth's conviction for falsifying a police report.
Sneed claimed he would have testified in Stallworth’s defense but was instructed by Police Chief Denard Eaves to remain silent. Following Stallworth's arrest in November 2008, the SPU was disbanded, and Sneed was reassigned to the Patrol Division. Although the defendants asserted Sneed was placed on administrative leave pending an investigation, evidence did not support this claim. Sneed believed his leave was a retaliatory action for his criticisms of Eaves. He was placed on medical leave in January 2009 due to a shoulder injury, and a psychiatrist later declared him unfit for duty due to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in April 2009. Sneed was never criminally charged or called to testify at Stallworth’s trial.
On April 1, 2010, Sneed filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC against the City of Harvey, alleging a denial of 'reasonable accommodation.' A letter from Dr. Rowles on April 21, 2010, indicated that Sneed experienced 'significant paranoia (psychotic episode)' following shoulder surgery in August 2009 and recommended desk duty and midnight shift work restrictions due to unresolved symptoms. Sneed had been on medical leave for a year, during which the defendants stated there were no available midnight-shift, light-duty assignments. However, Sneed claimed to have seen two officers, Henry Harris and Richard Jones, in light-duty roles in the HPD’s radio room between May 2007 and October 2011, without providing further context.
While still on paid medical leave, on April 23, 2010, Sneed videotaped Eaves at a bowling alley and subsequently reported him to the Dolton police for alleged intoxication. Eaves was detained but not charged, and upon exiting the station, he confronted Sneed. Sneed later submitted a memorandum to the HPD’s Internal Affairs Department requesting an investigation into the incident and asked for confidentiality due to fears of retaliation from Chief Eaves or his associates.
In June 2010, Sneed alleged that Detective Escalante denied him access to police headquarters for a check stub and that Marcus Patterson prevented him from filing a complaint against Escalante in retaliation for the earlier incident. Sneed also contacted Bettie Lewis, the City’s corporation counsel, to report misconduct by Eaves and other officers, leading Lewis to hire outside counsel to investigate. The defendants noted that Sneed refused to cooperate with this investigation, and correspondence indicated he provided the City with photographs related to surveillance of City employees.
The City’s attorney requested unedited copies of the surveillance material from Sneed’s attorney. It is unclear if all relevant correspondence between the parties has been provided. Sneed’s attorney was primarily retained to address claims from the Dolton incident and believed the City's demands for surveillance material exceeded appropriate investigative scope. Initially, the investigation was focused on Denard Eaves, but it shifted to target Sneed instead. The City’s outside counsel deemed the investigation inconclusive due to Sneed’s attorney not supplying the requested materials.
On September 3, 2010, Sneed filed an EEOC charge regarding failure to accommodate, alleging retaliation for a prior charge related to denied uniform allowance and pay raises. On December 6, 2010, Sneed sued the City of Harvey, claiming unfair denial of promotion in favor of less qualified candidates. In January 2011, Sneed reported to the Internal Affairs Division (IAD) that Harvey Police Department officers were improperly compensated for multiple jobs simultaneously, citing a memorandum and time records as evidence. Sneed returned to active duty in March 2011 and was assigned to the Patrol Division, working with officer Lavandus Kirkwood for orientation. However, this orientation concluded prematurely due to Sneed accusing Kirkwood of violating the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) regarding performance evaluations.
While the defendants acknowledged Kirkwood completed evaluation forms during the orientation, they argued these were merely outlines of patrol matters. Sneed contended that Kirkwood claimed to be his Field Training Officer (FTO), a designation the defendants contested, asserting it did not impact Sneed’s employment status.
On March 30, 2011, Sneed's attorney initiated a lawsuit against Eaves and others for constitutional violations related to an incident in Dolton. Following the lawsuit, Sneed reported receiving death threats, which he attributed to Eaves as retaliation. He sent multiple memoranda accusing Eaves of corruption and requesting relocation for his safety. In one instance, officer Cameron Forbes allegedly coerced Sneed into the HPD Roll Call Room under the pretense of a meeting with Commander Roy Wells. Sneed claimed he was unlawfully confined when he attempted to leave to contact his union representative. Wells later informed Sneed that he was not confined and would speak with him shortly. Sneed later filed a FOIA request for security footage from the Roll Call Room to support his detention claim, but was informed that no footage was available due to equipment failure.
On April 11, 2011, Sneed accused Eaves and HPD officers of nepotism and corruption after they allegedly provided preferential treatment to a well-connected individual he had arrested. Following this, Sneed submitted a union grievance to Forbes on May 25, 2011, but Forbes refused to acknowledge receipt. When Sneed sought Sergeant John Rizzi as a witness, Forbes exited his office and closed the door behind him. Surveillance footage indicated Sneed tried to prevent the door from closing but did not make contact with Forbes, and he left the Roll Call Room without showing signs of distress or injury.
Sneed drafted a memorandum on May 25, 2011, detailing an incident where Commander Forbes aggressively shoved a door towards him, attempting to strike him. Sneed managed to block the door with his body but later sought medical treatment for soreness in his surgically repaired left shoulder, which he attributed to the incident. He intends to pursue criminal charges against Forbes for the attempted assault. Sneed filed a police report and a worker’s compensation claim, both stating that the door had injured his outstretched arms. An investigation was initiated by the Internal Affairs Division (IAD), led by Kirkwood, but Sneed refused to be interviewed without legal representation and due to medication effects. Kirkwood later concluded that Sneed had lied in his reports, prompting the Harvey Police Department (HPD) to schedule a hearing for potential termination. Prior to the hearing, Sneed sent a letter accusing Lewis of legal violations and Kirkwood of bias, and filed an emergency motion challenging procedural defects, which was denied. The hearing, initially set for September 22, 2011, was rescheduled to October 10, 2011, and ultimately resulted in Sneed's termination for falsifying reports about the incident. An arbitrator upheld this decision, determining that Sneed's allegations and reports were inaccurate and constituted unbecoming conduct in violation of city rules.
Sneed's ten-count complaint includes various claims against the defendants, specifically: 1) failure to accommodate and retaliation under the ADA (Count I); 2) a § 1983 claim related to the ADA violation (Count II); 3) a Monell claim alleging discrimination against disabled police officers (Count III); 4) First Amendment retaliation (Count IV); 5) state-law retaliatory discharge (Count V); 6) a § 1985 conspiracy claim for equal protection denial (Count VI); 7) a § 1983 claim for retaliatory discharge (Count VII); 8) neglect to prevent civil rights violations (Count VIII); 9) assault and battery (Count IX); and 10) indemnification (Count X). The defendants have filed for summary judgment on all claims.
The legal standard for summary judgment requires the court to grant it if there is no genuine dispute over material facts and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must view evidence favorably for the nonmoving party and may consider all materials in the record. Summary judgment is denied if a reasonable jury could rule in favor of the nonmoving party.
Regarding Sneed's ADA claims, to establish a failure to accommodate, Sneed must demonstrate he is a qualified individual with a disability, the employer was aware of this disability, and the employer failed to provide reasonable accommodation. Employers must make reasonable accommodations unless it causes undue hardship, and they are not required to create new positions or displace other employees for reassignment.
Sneed's psychiatrist recommended desk duty and a midnight shift due to ongoing paranoia following a psychotic episode after shoulder surgery. Only one position met these criteria—a late-night shift in the HPD’s Radio Room, which was fully staffed at the time. Although Sneed claims he observed additional officers working in that area, this evidence is deemed too vague to create a material dispute of fact, especially since discovery has closed.
Sneed's failure-to-accommodate claim is insufficiently supported, with only a brief mention in his response and no legal authority cited, leading to the conclusion that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), a disabled plaintiff can prove discrimination and retaliation through either a direct or indirect method. The direct method requires showing that an adverse employment action was caused by the plaintiff's disability or ADA activity, while the indirect method involves establishing a prima facie case by demonstrating the plaintiff's disability, adherence to employment expectations, suffering an adverse action, and more favorable treatment of similarly situated non-disabled employees.
Sneed lists several employment actions he believes were discriminatory or retaliatory. To assess these claims, the court examines whether Sneed suffered materially adverse employment actions, which must be more than mere inconveniences. Sneed alleges that during his medical leave, he was denied a uniform allowance, a union-negotiated pay raise, and faced issues with payroll. However, he admits these were resolved once reported. He also claims he was barred from participating in a morale survey, but the survey was abandoned, and his lack of participation is deemed trivial. Additionally, Sneed's performance evaluation and claims regarding undermined work efforts do not constitute actionable adverse actions, as they did not result in tangible job consequences. Overall, minor grievances do not meet the threshold for actionable discrimination under the ADA.
Sneed claims he was denied promotion to detective in 2009 and 2010, which he categorizes as a 'tangible job consequence.' However, his claim is procedurally barred because Title VII prohibits claims not included in an EEOC charge. Although the EEOC charge requirement is interpreted liberally, Sneed's 2010 charges focused solely on a lack of reasonable accommodation and did not mention being overlooked for promotion. The court noted that even if the claim were not barred, there is insufficient evidence to support Sneed's assertion of discriminatory or retaliatory motives for the failure to promote, especially since he was on medical leave throughout much of that period.
Regarding his termination claim, defense counsel indicated Sneed had a pending EEOC charge and suggested he seek a right-to-sue notice. Sneed received this notice on August 16, 2012, but did not amend his complaint within the required 90 days, which the defendants argue bars his ADA wrongful termination claim. Nonetheless, Sneed's amended complaint addresses his termination on First Amendment grounds.
The court will analyze Sneed's claims of discrimination or retaliation under both direct and indirect methods. Direct evidence would require an admission from the decision-maker that prohibited animus influenced their actions, which Sneed has not provided. Circumstantial evidence that might support his claim includes suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, evidence of better treatment for similarly situated employees outside the protected group, and indications that the employer provided a pretextual reason for the adverse action.
Sneed filed an EEOC charge in September 2010, seven months before the IAD investigation began at his request. There are no indications of suspicious timing regarding his termination or the investigation. Sneed has not provided evidence of ambiguous statements or behaviors that could question the defendants' motives. Eaves' comment calling Sneed a 'psycho' in April 2010 is considered a stray remark, insufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent.
Sneed claims that similarly situated employees received better treatment, specifically mentioning Eaves and Kirkwood. However, Sneed's comparison to Eaves, who allegedly drove intoxicated but was not charged, is flawed, as off-duty misconduct does not equate to Sneed's on-duty violations. Sneed's allegations against Kirkwood regarding perjury in a divorce case lack substantiated evidence and also do not represent similar misconduct to Sneed’s accusations against a police officer.
The court finds Sneed's arguments regarding pretext unconvincing, emphasizing that to demonstrate pretext, he must show significant weaknesses in the defendants' rationale. Sneed’s disagreement with the assertion that he was not struck by a door, which was aggressively pushed by Commander Forbes, lacks support, as Sneed's own actions suggest he may have prevented a more serious impact. His attempts to claim injuries from a purported attack were deemed false, and the inconsistencies he noted in the defendants' accounts are considered irrelevant.
Sneed's claims against the defendants are undermined by a videotape that contradicts his account and indicates his reports were false. He argues the absence of a videotape expert at his pre-termination hearing suggests it was a sham; however, this only implies an error rather than dishonesty regarding the reasons for his termination. Sneed has not provided any rationale for questioning the videotape's reliability. Although he claims the defendants could not have honestly believed he fabricated his account due to a medical professional's determination of his injury, the video evidence shows he acted recklessly, undermining his argument.
The defendants assert that Sneed cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation, as he did not meet their legitimate employment expectations. This overlaps with the pretext issue, and the evidence does not support Sneed’s claims of discrimination or retaliation under the ADA using the indirect method.
In Counts II and III, Sneed seeks damages under § 1983 for alleged discrimination by the City of Harvey against disabled police officers, referencing Monell claims regarding the city's customs and policies. However, he fails to demonstrate any individual defendants violated his ADA rights, negating grounds for municipal liability under Monell.
For Count IV, regarding First Amendment retaliation, Sneed must show that the defendants caused or participated in a constitutional violation. He claims Mayor Kellogg allowed constitutional violations and that Lewis influenced decisions leading to his termination, but lacks evidence to substantiate her involvement. Consequently, both Kellogg and Lewis are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
Sneed must demonstrate three elements to succeed in his First Amendment retaliation claims against the defendants: (1) his speech is constitutionally protected, (2) he experienced a deprivation likely to deter free speech, and (3) his speech was a motivating factor in the employer’s actions. Claims of retaliation occurring more than two years prior to Sneed's original complaint filed on November 28, 2011, are barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to section 1988 claims in Illinois.
To determine whether Sneed's speech is protected, a two-part test is applied: first, it must be established if he spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern; if so, the interests of the employee in speaking are balanced against the employer’s interest in maintaining effective public service. The defendants argue that some of Sneed’s speech occurred in his capacity as an employee rather than as a citizen. The Supreme Court case Garcetti v. Ceballos establishes that statements made pursuant to official duties do not receive First Amendment protection. In Garcetti, a deputy district attorney's concerns about an affidavit were deemed not protected because they were made in the course of his official responsibilities.
Sneed's speech includes instances where he acted as a citizen, particularly when he filed lawsuits and EEOC complaints against the city and reported alleged corruption to individuals outside the department, such as in a memorandum sent on March 28, 2011, to multiple recipients, including the Mayor. Thus, while some of Sneed's statements may be protected, others may not, depending on the context in which they were made.
Mike Hood, Deputy Attorney General for Criminal Justice, and ASA Lynn McCarthy from the States Attorney Office of Special Prosecutions were involved in a memorandum dated March 28, 2011, which referenced approximately 50 pages of documents provided to Sneed by an anonymous source. This documentation purportedly highlighted unlawful behaviors and disciplinary issues concerning Eaves, the highest-ranking officer in the Harvey Police Department (HPD). Sneed claimed to have knowledge of alleged extrinsic fraud by Eaves in lawsuits where Eaves was deposed.
On April 11, 2011, Sneed sent a memorandum accusing Eaves of nepotism and corruption, positioning himself as a whistleblower on HPD misconduct, which he communicated to the mayor of Harvey and state prosecuting authorities. While Sneed made complaints through established channels within the HPD, it indicated a blend of citizen and employee speech, as he initiated his own investigation into HPD misconduct during a medical leave.
Sneed's actions are compared to a precedent involving a police officer who acted within their supervisory role when reporting misconduct. However, Sneed was a rank-and-file officer without supervisory authority, distinguishing his case. His multiple Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests further suggest he acted outside his patrol responsibilities. Although Sneed claimed he reported misconduct as part of his duties, this belief does not define his official responsibilities. Ultimately, the analysis concludes that Sneed's reports of misconduct to Eaves and others constituted speech as a citizen and addressed a matter of public concern, essential for his retaliation claim.
Multiple memos from 2011 and case law establish that speech alleging government corruption is generally considered a matter of public concern. However, not all legal actions are protected under the First Amendment. For instance, Sneed's April 2010 EEOC charge, related to the lack of reasonable accommodation, was deemed a personal grievance and not a public concern. His September 2010 charge, while framed broadly about discrimination against disabled officers, largely details personal incidents perceived as retaliation and remains focused on individual experiences. Similarly, Sneed’s January 2011 state lawsuit, alleging being passed over for promotion, is categorized as addressing a private concern.
In his federal lawsuit, Sneed claims he was falsely arrested after reporting police misconduct, which could be a matter of public concern. However, the court emphasizes that the subjective intent behind the speech is significant; Sneed’s complaint primarily seeks personal relief rather than addressing broader corruption issues. The delay in filing the lawsuit, nearly a year after the incident, further indicates a lack of intention to expose wrongdoing. The court notes that it must assess whether the speech concerns public or private issues, concluding that Sneed’s claims do not qualify for First Amendment protection. Typically, the next step would involve balancing Sneed's rights against governmental interests, although this aspect has not been fully explored by the parties involved.
Sneed’s interests in addressing matters of public concern are deemed to outweigh the City’s efficiency interests. The determination of whether Sneed experienced a deprivation that could deter free speech does not necessitate an adverse employment action as defined by antidiscrimination statutes. Minor harassment may suffice, and the standard is based on whether a person of "ordinary firmness" would be deterred from exercising First Amendment rights.
Sneed identifies several potential deprivations: 1) Kirkwood’s patrol-officer evaluation, 2) a “false arrest” on April 23, 2011, 3) alleged death threats post-lawsuit against Eaves, and 4) the investigation leading to his termination. The first two incidents are deemed trivial and insufficient to support a retaliation claim, as they did not lead to tangible job consequences or cause distress, consistent with case law. The false arrest allegation is also considered trivial since Sneed was told he was free to leave shortly after the incident.
The court emphasizes that minor incidents cannot always be deemed actionable, especially when they do not meet the objective standard of deterring speech. Sneed’s speculation regarding the death threats lacks sufficient evidence to counter a summary judgment. However, termination is recognized as a significant deprivation likely to deter speech, allowing the case to proceed to further analysis.
In assessing causation for Sneed’s First Amendment retaliation claim, it parallels his ADA retaliation claim, which can be proved via direct or indirect methods. Despite the timing of Sneed’s protected speech being closer to his termination, the elapsed time is considered longer than typically indicative of retaliatory motives, hindering his ability to establish prohibited retaliation under either method.
Sneed's claims for First Amendment retaliation and common law retaliatory discharge are insufficient to proceed. The investigation's timing does not imply retaliation due to Sneed's false accusations against Forbes, which serve as a significant intervening event. Consequently, any argument based on suspicious timing fails. Sneed cannot demonstrate that he was terminated for reasons other than his misconduct, nor can he show that the employer's reasons for his discharge were pretextual. For the common law retaliatory discharge claim, he must prove discharge due to retaliation for protected activities and that it violates public policy. However, Sneed has not met these criteria.
Regarding the class-of-one equal protection claim, Sneed must show he was intentionally treated differently than similarly situated individuals without a rational basis for that treatment. The Supreme Court has limited this doctrine in public employment cases to preserve employer discretion. Therefore, Sneed's claim fails under the Engquist ruling, and he has not provided evidence of differential treatment among similarly situated employees. Furthermore, his minimal engagement with the equal protection claim in response to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment indicates a lack of support for his argument. As a result, Sneed has waived potential legal arguments by not adequately developing them. All defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Sneed's claims.
Count VII alleges a procedural due process violation related to Sneed's pre-termination hearing. The investigation, including a review of video evidence and witness interviews, provided Sneed a fair opportunity to present his case, and his termination was upheld by an arbitrator. Sneed had legal representation during the hearings and received the due process required. The defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this count, as Sneed's response lacks substantial argumentation regarding the procedural due process claim.
Count VIII claims that the defendants failed to prevent Sneed’s retaliatory discharge. However, Sneed has not demonstrated any retaliatory actions that violate constitutional rights, leading to the defendants being granted summary judgment on this count as well.
Count IX involves a claim against the City of Harvey for damages due to an incident where a door allegedly struck Sneed. The defendants argue that this claim is preempted by the Illinois Workers Compensation Act (IWCA), which serves as the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries, including those from intentional torts. Sneed did not counter the preemption argument, effectively waiving it. Even if not preempted, Sneed fails to establish the necessary elements of assault and battery, as his own actions contributed to the contact. Thus, the defendants are granted summary judgment on Count IX.
In conclusion, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is fully granted, and Sneed's motion to compel is denied as moot.
Sneed opposes the defendants' motion for summary judgment, arguing that their Rule 56.1 statement improperly includes multiple facts within single numbered paragraphs, violating Local Rule 56.1. The court concurs that there are violations but decides against outright denial of the motion, as it would unnecessarily prolong the case. Instead, if Sneed fails to respond to a specific fact, his silence will be interpreted as a denial, ensuring he is not prejudiced by the defendants' procedural missteps.
Additionally, Sneed's case is assigned to the same judge who presided over Stallworth’s criminal trial, where Neal testified regarding Sneed's request not to file a report until after Stallworth's arrest. Stallworth's motion for a new trial, based on Sneed’s claim about Eaves instructing him not to testify, was denied.
Sneed's testimony about a potential sting operation and threats from Eaves was deemed not credible and unlikely to affect Stallworth’s acquittal. While Sneed speculated about the presence of officers, he lacked concrete evidence. Eaves's affidavit does not address Sneed's administrative leave, and Eaves himself could not recall the reason for it, which Sneed claims he was never informed about.
Sneed asserts that his PTSD stems from multiple on-duty incidents involving gunfire, although the origins of his PTSD are not discussed in the parties' statements. The defendants submitted Sneed’s April 2010 EEOC charge, which had been omitted from a prior exhibit. Although the defendants argue that an independent investigation was conducted, Sneed disputes the independence of the attorney retained by the City.
The court emphasizes that Sneed's unverified complaint is insufficient to counter the summary judgment motion, referencing the requirement for evidence beyond mere allegations. Lastly, the timeline regarding the defendants' receipt of certain memoranda is not definitively established, but the court will assume they received them around the indicated dates, with a contention from the defendants that Sneed prepared the receipt himself, which he contests as part of a standard grievance form.
The videotape does not clarify if Sneed made contact with the door as he crossed the threshold. On April 30, 2013, Sneed submitted a motion to compel discovery responses without scheduling a hearing, to which the defendants replied that they had already provided the requested information. During the June 5, 2013, hearing on the defendants' summary judgment motion, Sneed did not address his motion to compel, leading to its denial as moot. The defendants provided Sneed with a summary of requirements under Local Rule 56.2 for Pro Se Litigants opposing summary judgment. It is assumed for the sake of argument that Sneed's PTSD qualifies as a disability under the ADA. The defendants argue that Sneed's affidavit contradicts his deposition, where he could not confirm if defendant Patterson had approved any light-duty assignments, though this does not negate his observation of officers in the Radio Room.
Sneed refers to Rizzi's claim during an investigation that Forbes attempted to close the door twice, while Rizzi later testified at arbitration that the door was closed only once, suggesting potential credibility issues. However, the arbitrator's failure to resolve this inconsistency is deemed irrelevant to whether Sneed misrepresented the event. The relationship between satisfactory performance and pretext is acknowledged, with the focus shifting directly to pretext without establishing a prima facie discrimination case. Sneed's administrative leave and internal complaints do not receive First Amendment protection, and he fails to demonstrate that Kirkwood acted unfairly or that there was a motive for retaliatory action by Kirkwood or Forbes.
Regarding Ms. Mills' allegations of harassment from her supervisor, the instances cited do not imply retaliation as there was no link to the supervisor's actions and criticisms in her letters. Sneed has also included Patterson and Alvarado as defendants in claims related to his pre-termination hearing, but the complaint does not clarify their involvement, nor does Sneed provide evidence of their participation in any constitutional violations, leading to summary judgment in their favor. Finally, the claim for indemnification is rendered moot by the summary judgment on other counts.
