Sass v. MTA Bus Co.

Citations: 6 F. Supp. 3d 238; 2014 WL 3818663; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106452Docket: No. 10-CV-4079 (MKB)

Court: District Court, E.D. New York; August 4, 2014; Federal District Court

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Plaintiff Gary Sass filed a lawsuit against his former employer, MTA Bus, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). After a jury trial on June 20, 2013, the jury found MTA Bus liable and awarded Sass $358,300 in damages. Following the trial, Sass sought equitable relief and attorneys' fees. However, on June 24, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar altered the standard of proof for retaliation claims under Title VII, which prompted MTA Bus to request a judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. On February 14, 2014, the Court granted MTA Bus a new trial concerning Sass's Title VII claim and dismissed Sass's motion for damages and fees as moot.

Sass then moved for reconsideration, noting that the Nassar decision did not affect claims under the NYCHRL. The Court granted reconsideration and upheld its decision for a new trial on the Title VII claim, but found MTA Bus also entitled to a new trial on the NYSHRL claim. Importantly, the Court denied MTA Bus's request for a new trial on the NYCHRL claim and partially granted Sass's motion for equitable relief, damages, and attorneys' fees. The Court assumes familiarity with prior rulings and summarized the necessary facts for this motion, which included Sass's allegation of retaliation for reporting Nazi symbols on a bus roster. The jury had awarded $0 in compensatory damages, $252,300 in back pay, and $106,000 in front pay, with Sass subsequently requesting reinstatement and other forms of relief.

Defendant sought an order to vacate the verdict and grant a new trial under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the Supreme Court's ruling in Nassar applied retroactively to the case. The Defendant claimed the jury's instruction allowing liability based on retaliation as a motivating factor was incorrect. While acknowledging the possibility of upholding the verdict under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), which is interpreted more liberally than Title VII, the Defendant contended that the new causation standard from Nassar should also apply to the NYCHRL claim.

Plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting that the Defendant did not object to the jury instruction and that any potential error was harmless because the jury would likely find that the Plaintiff's protected activity was the but-for cause of his termination. The Plaintiff also argued that NYCHRL claims should be analyzed independently from federal law claims, suggesting that the Nassar standard would not affect the NYCHRL analysis. The Court denied the motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding there was sufficient evidence for liability even under the new Nassar standard. However, it granted a new trial, determining that Nassar's standard applied retroactively and that the jury's mixed-motives instruction was inconsistent with it. The Court did not address the Plaintiff's arguments regarding the applicability of Nassar to NYCHRL claims.

Following this, the Plaintiff filed for reconsideration, emphasizing that the Court had not directly addressed the NYCHRL claim argument. The standard for reconsideration is strict, requiring the moving party to identify overlooked controlling decisions or facts that could change the Court's conclusion. Reconsideration is not intended for relitigating issues or presenting new arguments.

To succeed in a motion for reconsideration, the moving party must show that the Court overlooked significant controlling decisions or factual matters from the underlying motion (Lichtenberg v. Besicorp Grp. Inc., 28 Fed. Appx. 73, 75 (2d Cir.2002)). Under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a new trial may be granted for reasons traditionally recognized in federal law, including verdicts contrary to the weight of the evidence, significant errors in evidence handling, and non-harmless jury instruction errors. A new trial should only be granted if the court is convinced that the jury reached a seriously erroneous result or a miscarriage of justice occurred (Snyder v. N.Y.S. Educ. Dep’t, 486 Fed. Appx. 176, 177 (2d Cir.2012)).

The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration argues that the Court incorrectly instructed on the NYCHRL claim, a point not addressed in the February 14, 2014 decision, which focused solely on Title VII liability standards. The plaintiff contends that even if the Supreme Court's decision in Nassar applied retroactively, the jury instructions regarding city law claims were correct and that any errors concerning federal claims were harmless. This motion asserts that overlooked information could alter the Court's conclusion (Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257), thus justifying reconsideration.

The defendant's Rule 59 motion seeks a new trial based on the argument that the Nassar decision established a stricter causation standard under Title VII than the 'motivating-factor' standard used during the trial. The Court acknowledged that Nassar's standard applied retroactively and conflicted with the jury's instructions. Despite this, the defendant was found liable for retaliation under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL, with Nassar specifically addressing Title VII retaliation standards (Nassar, 570 U.S. at 133 S.Ct. at 2533).

Title VII prohibits employer retaliation against employees for opposing unlawful practices, a provision mirrored in state and city laws, allowing for a combined consideration of these claims. The jury concluded that the Plaintiff was terminated in retaliation for protected activity, and the Defendant failed to prove that the termination would have occurred regardless of any retaliatory motive. The Supreme Court's decision in Nassar altered the causation standard for Title VII retaliation claims to a "but-for" standard, but the implications for New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) claims remain uncertain, as state courts have not definitively addressed this issue. Historically, retaliation claims under Title VII and NYSHRL have been evaluated using the same standards. The Court emphasizes that the statutory language of both laws is similar, and as such, the interpretation of retaliation claims under NYSHRL will align with the clarified standards established in Nassar, which requires proving that retaliatory intent was the "but-for" cause of the adverse employment action.

In St. Juste v. Metro Plus Health Plan and related cases, the courts have established that the standards for state law discrimination and harassment claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) are identical to those under Title VII, particularly concerning retaliation claims. The rulings clarify that the "but-for" causation standard from the Supreme Court's decision in Nassar governs NYSHRL claims. However, the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) is to be interpreted liberally, distinct from federal and state laws, and does not adopt the Nassar standard. 

Several cases affirm that, under the NYCHRL, a plaintiff can establish a retaliation claim by demonstrating that the employer's action was motivated at least in part by an impermissible motive. The courts emphasize that the NYCHRL's causation requirement is less stringent than that of Title VII and the NYSHRL, allowing for a more favorable interpretation for plaintiffs. Notably, post-Nassar, the NYCHRL remains unaffected in terms of its causation standards, and courts have consistently ruled that the NYCHRL's provisions should be applied separately from those of Title VII and the NYSHRL.

Under the NYCHRL, a jury could find that the defendant's outburst was partially driven by the ongoing lawsuit involving the plaintiff. The court affirms that the standard for establishing causation in retaliation claims under the NYCHRL remains unchanged by the Nassar decision, requiring only that retaliation be a motivating factor in the plaintiff's termination. Consequently, the court finds no error in the jury instructions regarding this claim and denies the defendant's motion for a new trial on the NYCHRL claim. 

Following the trial, the plaintiff sought reinstatement, back pay, and pension contributions, but the court previously denied this motion as moot after granting the defendant a new trial. The court reconsiders the plaintiff's request for reinstatement, which he argues he is entitled to, although he acknowledges that reinstatement would negate his claim for front pay. The defendant counters that the plaintiff waived his right to reinstatement by not including it in the pretrial order and by choosing front pay as a remedy prior to trial. However, the plaintiff did seek reinstatement in his complaint, but only raised it during trial. 

The court references Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for granting relief even if it was not explicitly requested in the pleadings. This rule supports the court's discretion in determining appropriate relief for the plaintiff, irrespective of the defendant's arguments about waiver and the adequacy of damages as a remedy.

Under Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court can grant relief that a party is entitled to, even if it was not explicitly requested in the pleadings. This includes granting prejudgment interest and permanent injunctions, as supported by Rocket Jewelry Box, Inc. v. Quality Int’l Packaging, Ltd. The court may modify final pretrial orders under Rule 16(e) only to prevent manifest injustice, with the Second Circuit affirming that pretrial orders do not rigidly bind the court or parties. Courts have discretion to deviate from pretrial orders, considering factors such as prejudice to the opposing party, the ability to cure prejudice, disruption to the trial, and the non-compliance party's intent. 

In this case, the plaintiff's late request for reinstatement was deemed equitable, and there was no prejudice to the defendant since the issue was raised during trial discussions and fully briefed afterward. The plaintiff did not waive the right to seek reinstatement despite its absence in the joint pretrial order, as it was included in the initial complaint. Similarly, failure to request a permanent injunction or prejudgment interest in the pretrial order does not constitute a waiver of those claims, provided they were initially demanded in the complaint and the defendant was prepared to litigate them at trial.

Plaintiff seeks reinstatement to his position, but Defendant contends that this claim is not properly before the Court due to Plaintiff's failure to plead it specifically, though no legal authority has been cited to support this position. Defendant further argues that by opting to have the jury decide on front pay, Plaintiff waived his right to request reinstatement. However, Plaintiff asserts that submitting the front pay issue to the jury does not eliminate the Court's authority to grant equitable relief under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). Citing the NYCHRL, Plaintiff emphasizes that injunctive relief, including reinstatement, is available.

Defendant references the case Beilan v. Sun Co. Inc., suggesting that since Plaintiff sought a substantial front pay award, he should be deemed to have waived his right to equitable relief. In Beilan, the court ruled that reinstatement was not feasible before trial, leading to the jury only considering front pay. In contrast, no such pre-trial ruling occurred in this case; the Court indicated that reinstatement is an equitable remedy reserved for the Court, not the jury, and Defendant did not object to this ruling. 

The jury awarded Plaintiff front pay, which the Court notes can serve as an alternative to reinstatement. The law supports that front pay compensates for lost wages during the period between judgment and reinstatement or as a substitute for reinstatement where reinstatement is inappropriate. Given the jury's award of front pay, Plaintiff's decision to submit front pay to the jury does not negate his right to seek reinstatement from the Court afterward.

Plaintiff is not entitled to reinstatement due to allegations of misconduct, specifically making a false report and altering a document. The Defendant argues that these actions warrant denial of reinstatement, especially since the jury awarded front pay damages. Testimony from two witnesses highlighted the harm caused by Plaintiff's alleged fabrication of evidence. Although Plaintiff contends that the common reasons for denying reinstatement—animosity between parties or the position no longer existing—do not apply, the court notes a preference for reinstatement in employment discrimination cases. However, reinstatement may be denied if significant animosity exists, which could hinder a reasonable employer-employee relationship. Courts have previously denied reinstatement when evidence of conflict between the parties existed before the lawsuit or when a plaintiff violated company policies. In this case, evidence suggests that Plaintiff's actions may have irreparably damaged the employer-employee relationship, justifying the denial of reinstatement.

In Picinich v. United Parcel Serv., the court denied reinstatement to the plaintiff, who had engaged in inappropriate conduct including secretly recording conversations and displaying aggressive behavior towards employees. The defendant provided evidence that the plaintiff was terminated for lying during an investigation and for altering a document, which was deemed a breach of trust. Senior director David Franchesini detailed that the plaintiff's false statements significantly impaired his credibility, while deputy general manager Robert Bruno described the misrepresentation as a serious offense, which altered their perception of the plaintiff. The jury awarded $106,000 in front pay as an appropriate remedy, while the plaintiff attempted to modify the jury's back pay award of $252,300 to $290,859. However, the court affirmed the jury's verdict for back pay as it pertained only to the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) claim, treating back pay as a legal remedy under both the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) and the NYCHRL. The court rejected the plaintiff’s request for modification and upheld the back pay amount. The defendant sought to offset this back pay by $18,630 due to unemployment benefits received by the plaintiff, but the plaintiff argued against this using the collateral source rule, claiming the defendant did not sufficiently substantiate the offset request.

A letter dated July 25, 2014, addresses the application of the collateral source rule in employment discrimination claims regarding back pay awards. Courts typically reject defendants' requests to offset damages awarded to plaintiffs by the amount of unemployment benefits received post-termination. For instance, in the case of Clark v. Gotham Lasik, the court found no justification for deducting $14,750 in unemployment benefits from a plaintiff's back pay. This aligns with the approach taken in multiple cases where courts emphasized that allowing such deductions could unfairly reduce the employer's liability for wrongful termination. 

The rationale is that the burden of loss should be borne by the employer, not the victim of discrimination. The collateral source rule suggests that benefits from third parties should not be deducted from damage awards, as this would create an unfair advantage for the employer responsible for the wrongful act. The principle is reinforced by cases like Promisel v. First Am. Artificial Flowers, which argue that the employer should not benefit from the plaintiff's unemployment compensation. Furthermore, since unemployment benefits are provided by a state agency, they are not considered a collateral source paid directly by the employer, aligning with rulings in cases such as Stratton v. Dep’t for the Aging. Therefore, fairness dictates that any potential "windfall" from unemployment benefits should go to the victim of discrimination rather than the employer.

Federal employees’ unemployment compensation is derived from their employer, rather than considered collateral. Legal precedents allow defendants to offset back pay with benefits they directly provided to plaintiffs, as established in cases like EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys. Inc. and Stratton. In these cases, if an employer reimburses a state unemployment fund for benefits paid to an employee, it is viewed as effectively providing those benefits. The documentation shows that while the New York State Department of Labor issued unemployment benefits to the plaintiff, the defendant reimbursed the state for these payments, thereby assuming responsibility for the unemployment benefits.

The City of New York opts to pay directly for unemployment claims rather than contributing to the state fund, making it effectively liable for the plaintiff's benefits. Under federal law, specifically 5 U.S.C. § 8509, the Navy Exchange also reimburses the Federal Employees Compensation Account for unemployment compensation paid to employees. The plaintiff argues that cases allowing deductions for unemployment benefits emphasize form over substance and that the Second Circuit has not definitively mandated such deductions. They contend that unemployment benefits should be treated as part of total employee compensation, akin to other fringe benefits, and mention that the New York State Department of Labor allows government employers to use a reimbursement method for benefits paid to former employees.

Defendant has the option to fund unemployment obligations through either a benefits reimbursement method or a contribution method. Plaintiff argues that regardless of the funding method, unemployment benefits come from a collateral source—the state Department of Labor. Plaintiff claims it's illogical to deny employers using the contribution method the ability to deduct unemployment benefits, while allowing those using the reimbursement method to do so. However, the Court rejects this argument, stating the collateral source rule does not apply since Defendants have effectively paid Plaintiff's unemployment benefits by reimbursing the State. Consequently, the jury’s back pay award will be offset by $18,630 received in unemployment benefits.

Regarding past pension contributions, Plaintiff seeks restoration of credits for his participation in a defined benefit pension plan while employed by MTA Bus, specifically for the period from his termination on October 19, 2009, until the jury's verdict on June 20, 2013. The Court agrees to order Defendant to make contributions to Plaintiff’s pension plan for the corresponding years of service during this period, with Defendant's counsel not opposing the application.

Plaintiff also seeks prejudgment interest on the jury's back pay award. While the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) does not explicitly provide for prejudgment interest, the New York Court of Appeals has interpreted the analogous New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) as allowing such interest. The Court recognizes that the intent of these laws is to make victims whole, and awarding prejudgment interest is consistent with this aim. Thus, interest is warranted from the time Plaintiff was deprived of the use of money to ensure he is fully compensated.

Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest on a back pay award, supported by case law, including Loeffler v. Frank and Epstein v. Kalvin-Miller Int’l, Inc., which establishes the awarding of such interest under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). The applicable prejudgment interest rate, agreed upon by both parties, is 4 percent under New York Public Authorities Law, calculated from March 12, 2012, as the intermediate date between the date of termination (October 19, 2009) and the judgment date (August 4, 2014).

For attorneys’ fees, Plaintiff requests $97,560 at various hourly rates for different levels of attorneys, alongside costs of $3,109.21. Under the NYCHRL, courts may award reasonable attorney's fees, considering factors such as the time and labor required, lawyer experience, and customary fees for similar services. The "forum rule" mandates the use of hourly rates from the district where the court sits; however, the Plaintiff's counsel did not provide evidence of prevailing market rates for comparable attorneys, leaving the court to determine a reasonable hourly rate at its discretion.

Discretion is granted to determine a reasonable hourly rate for plaintiff's counsel based on familiarity with the case and prevailing rates in the Southern District. To obtain attorney fees, the requesting party must provide contemporaneous time records that detail the date, hours expended, and nature of work performed. The burden of proof lies with the fee applicant to establish entitlement and document hours worked. Recent Eastern District of New York rulings suggest reasonable hourly rates range from $300 to $450 for partners, $200 to $325 for senior associates, and $100 to $200 for junior associates. The size of the firm may influence rates, but courts should not automatically reduce rates solely based on an attorney being a solo practitioner.

Courts in this district have established hourly rates for experienced solo practitioners in civil rights cases, typically ranging from $300 to $425. Notable cases include Struthers v. City of New York, which documented rates between $300 and $400, and Thorsen v. Cnty. of Nassau, where a rate of $425 was awarded to a well-regarded labor and employment attorney with 26 years of experience. The highest rates are typically reserved for expert trial attorneys with extensive federal bar experience and recognition as leaders in civil rights law. 

O’Neill argues that his extensive experience justifies a higher billing rate, while the defendant contends that his small firm should warrant a lower rate due to reduced overhead and the case's relative simplicity, suggesting $350 as a reasonable rate. O’Neill, a solo practitioner since 1980, has handled about 500 employment discrimination cases and was previously awarded $300 per hour in a 2012 case, Holness v. Nat’l Mobile Television, which cited lower rates for solo practitioners. However, O’Neill’s extensive experience and the nature of civil rights work support a higher fee. The court concludes that O’Neill’s 33 years of experience and skills justify a rate of $425 per hour, though this is slightly above the established range. 

Regarding O’Neill’s associate, Aaron Solomon, the defendant challenges the requested rate of $275 due to insufficient information about Solomon's experience, as he graduated in 2009 and joined O’Neill's firm in January 2013.

Solomon was previously employed at a litigation firm in Brooklyn, handling cases in both federal and state courts, but his experience did not specifically focus on employment discrimination. The Court found an hourly rate of $225 for Solomon, reflecting a lower-end rate for a senior associate despite his four years of experience. Theresa V. Wade, who graduated in 2007 and has experience in employment discrimination cases, was awarded a reasonable rate of $275 per hour for her 15.8 hours of work. The rates for junior associates Bertucci and Ercolini were set at $175 per hour, deemed reasonable for their experience. The Court reviewed the submitted time records and awarded total attorneys’ fees amounting to $99,210, broken down as follows: $78,200 for O’Neill (184 hours at $425/hour), $4,345 for Wade (15.8 hours at $275/hour), $12,780 for Solomon (56.8 hours at $225/hour), $1,435 for Bertucci (8.2 hours at $175/hour), and $2,450 for Ercolini (14 hours at $175/hour). 

Additionally, the Court awarded costs totaling $3,109.21, which included documented expenses such as court costs and deposition services. Upon reconsideration, the Court upheld its prior ruling granting a new trial for the Defendant regarding the Plaintiff’s Title VII claim, acknowledged a new trial for the NYSHRL claim, denied a new trial for the NYCHRL claim, and partially granted the Plaintiff’s motion for equitable relief, damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. The request for reinstatement was denied, but the Court awarded $106,000 in front pay and $252,300 in back pay, offset by $18,630 in unemployment compensation, resulting in a total back pay of $233,670. Prejudgment interest on the back pay was awarded at a statutory rate of 4 percent from March 12, 2014. The attorneys' fees and expenses awarded were $99,210 and $3,109.21, respectively. The Court noted that the Plaintiff's argument regarding state and city law claims was addressed, confirming that controlling law had not changed despite a lack of specific discussion in the ruling.

A plaintiff can pursue damages, including punitive damages and injunctive relief, under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502. The defendant cites case law, specifically Price v. Marshall Erdman Associates, Inc. and Greenbaum v. Svenska Handelsbanken, to argue that the plaintiff's choice of front pay precludes seeking reinstatement. In Price, the court acknowledged that a plaintiff's genuine reluctance to return to employment could justify electing front pay instead of reinstatement, emphasizing that it does not require a prior election of remedies before trial. Greenbaum reinforces this view by allowing reinstatement to be addressed post-trial, after the jury declines front pay.

The defendant contends that the NYCHRL does not permit reinstatement, citing a lack of case law. However, the plaintiff counters that under state law, combining legal and equitable claims treats the entire action as equitable, typically heard by a judge rather than a jury. The NYCHRL explicitly allows the Commission on Human Rights to order reinstatement for unlawful discriminatory practices. Historical cases reflect this power, supporting reinstatement as a viable remedy. Furthermore, while the defendant argues that public employees must seek reinstatement through a CPLR Article 78 proceeding, this is countered by the principle that reinstatement is warranted when circumstances justify it, and that courts may disfavor it when legal remedies suffice.

Defendant's reliance on case law related to breach of contract claims is deemed irrelevant, as the current case involves a claim for reinstatement due to discrimination, not contract breach. Plaintiff's argument highlighted the lack of animosity with the MTA and the departure of prior managers involved in the termination decision. However, Defendant countered that Robert Bruno, a key witness who expressed a lack of trust in Plaintiff, remains employed, and the decision to terminate was based on a breach of trust linked to institutional policy. As noted in Shorter v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp. Inc., reinstatement was denied due to corporate management's negative views toward the plaintiff, which could lead to an untenable relationship.

Additionally, the collateral source rule, which prevents tortfeasors from reducing liability based on payments from other sources, does not apply here. Citing Oden v. Chemung Cnty. Indus. Dev. Agency, it is established that personal injury awards cannot be offset by collateral payments. The cases of Stratton v. Department for the Aging and Williams v. Secretary of Navy indicate that when a defendant effectively pays an employee’s unemployment benefits, those benefits are not considered collateral. Since the City of New York effectively pays Plaintiff's unemployment compensation, the collateral source rule is not applicable. Defendant provided a declaration from Robert Finnegan, indicating that Plaintiff received 46 weeks of unemployment benefits post-termination at a rate of $405 per week.

The court, in Simmons, appeared to summarize a stipulation between parties rather than decisively ruling on the deduction of unemployment benefits. Following a jury verdict favoring the plaintiff, the parties agreed on pensionable gross lost wages amounting to $97,099 for the period from January 16, 2001, to March 22, 2003. This amount will be subject to deductions for pension contributions calculated by the New York City Employee Retirement System and reduced by $28,350 in unemployment compensation received by Simmons, resulting in a net back pay loss of $68,749.

The collateral source rule, which prevents a defendant from benefiting from payments made by a collateral source to reduce liability, is not relevant under the benefits reimbursement method. This method entails that an employer only reimburses the state for the actual unemployment benefits paid to an employee, contrasting with the traditional contribution method where an employer pays a fixed percentage of salaries into the state fund each year, regardless of individual employee claims. Under the contribution method, a defendant could receive a windfall by offsetting its liability, whereas under the reimbursement method, the offset reflects a direct payment made due to the employee’s termination.

The court dismissed the plaintiff’s concerns regarding the adequacy of documentation provided by the defendant to prove reimbursement of unemployment benefits, noting that despite some documents redacting the employer's name, sufficient evidence was provided that included the name of MTA Bus Company. Furthermore, New York state law allows for prejudgment interest on back pay awards from the date the plaintiff would have received the funds.

In *Jattan v. Queens College of City University of New York*, the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division addressed the calculation of prejudgment interest in employment discrimination cases under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). The statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5001(b), stipulates that interest on damages is computed from the earliest ascertainable date of the cause of action, with provisions for calculating interest on damages incurred at different times. The court determined that for employment discrimination claims, interest should be calculated from a "single reasonable intermediate date," specifically the midpoint between when the plaintiff was first deprived of a paycheck and the verdict date. In this case, damages incurred by the complainant from her termination in November 1995 to her new employment in September 1996 warranted calculating interest from April 15, 1996.

Additionally, the court noted that while New York substantive law governs attorney fees under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), the NYCHRL's attorney's fee provision is similar to federal civil rights statutes, allowing federal case law to inform the analysis of these fees. The reasonableness of fees would be assessed consistently across both state and federal claims due to their textual similarities. O’Neill argued that since the plaintiff's fee application pertains to city law, the relevant legal community is New York City, justifying Manhattan rates for legal services, despite the plaintiff residing in Nassau County. The plaintiff's counsel documented a total of 184 hours worked on the case, including time spent on various motions and trial preparation.