Everett H. ex rel. Havey v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary School District

Citations: 5 F. Supp. 3d 1184; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41482; 2014 WL 1779340Docket: No. 2:13-cv-00889-MCE-DAD

Court: District Court, E.D. California; March 26, 2014; Federal District Court

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Plaintiffs Heath and Rebecca Havey, on behalf of their son Everett, allege violations of his right to a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEA), alongside violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. They claim educational harms and seek compensatory education, damages, and attorneys’ fees. The Dry Creek Joint Elementary School District and its officials are named as Local Defendants, while the California Department of Education (CDE) and State Superintendent Tom Torlakson are designated as State Defendants. Both sets of defendants have filed motions to dismiss the complaint. This Memorandum addresses the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, which will be partially granted and partially denied.

The legal framework for educating disabled students includes federal IDEA standards and California statutes. The IDEA mandates states to ensure that students with disabilities receive FAPE, which entails providing special education services at public expense without charge to families. Individualized Education Plans (IEPs) are created to tailor instruction and services to meet students' specific needs. The CDE oversees the provision of special education services in California, while local educational agencies (LEAs) must comply with IDEA to receive federal funding. California has adopted laws and regulations to align with these federal requirements.

California law assigns the Local Educational Agency (LEA) the primary responsibility to ensure Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) for eligible students, which includes school districts and charter schools. The LEA must identify students with disabilities, determine suitable educational placements and services through the Individualized Education Program (IEP) process, and provide necessary special education services. In the event of disputes regarding a disabled student's educational needs, both federal and state law allows for two procedural avenues to challenge an LEA's decisions: an administrative due process hearing and a complaint resolution proceeding (CRP).

The due process hearing can be initiated by either the LEA or the parents, enabling a formal process where evidence can be presented, witnesses can be cross-examined, and a written decision is issued by an impartial Administrative Law Judge, contracted by the California Department of Education (CDE). This ruling is considered a final administrative decision, which can be appealed in court if either party is aggrieved, but only after exhausting this administrative remedy.

In contrast, a CRP is a less formal and adversarial process that allows any individual or organization to allege violations of the IDEA or its regulations, not limited to specific students or situations. The LEA cannot initiate a CRP against a parent. Unlike the due process hearing, a CRP lacks certain procedural protections, such as the right to confront witnesses. Upon filing a CRP, the CDE is required to investigate the allegations and produce a report based on its findings.

A due process hearing can be initiated by a parent or Local Education Agency (LEA) even while a Complaint Resolution Process (CRP) is pending, provided the issues relate to identification, evaluation, placement, or provision of Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) and fall within the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) jurisdiction in California. 

Everett H., a disabled student diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and associated delays, attended the Dry Creek Elementary School District from 2007 to March 2012. During this time, there were disputes regarding the special education services provided, with allegations from the Plaintiffs that Dry Creek misrepresented testing results to justify moving Everett to a more restrictive educational environment contrary to his needs. 

The Plaintiffs contend that Dry Creek failed to deliver the required services outlined in Everett's September 2009 Individualized Education Program (IEP), withholding 290 minutes of Specialized Academic Services and not rectifying this issue despite repeated requests. After the Plaintiffs began advocating for their son's rights in 2010, they allege the District engaged in retaliatory actions, which escalated in March 2012, culminating in the removal of Everett from school for safety concerns. 

The Plaintiffs assert that Dry Creek manipulated IEP documentation, delayed meetings, misrepresented proceedings, and endangered Everett’s safety through neglectful treatment. They also claim interference with their attempts to transfer Everett to another district. Throughout 2012, while a due process hearing was pending, the Plaintiffs filed multiple CRPs with the California Department of Education (CDE), asserting Dry Creek's non-compliance with special education laws. The CDE reportedly found Dry Creek in systemic non-compliance. The District dismissed its own OAH case against the Plaintiffs in July 2012, resulting in no final administrative decision regarding the alleged educational shortcomings. The Plaintiffs also allege errors by the Administrative Law Judge and CDE in managing the case and CRPs.

Failure to exhaust administrative remedies in IDEA-related cases can lead to an unenumerated motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 881 (9th Cir. 2011)). Such a motion can consider facts beyond the pleadings, resembling a summary judgment process (Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2003)). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all material factual allegations as true and view them favorably towards the nonmoving party (Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996)). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a short and plain statement of the claim, providing fair notice to the defendant (Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). While detailed factual allegations are not required, plaintiffs must provide sufficient grounds for relief beyond mere labels or conclusions (Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A court is not obligated to accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations (Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). Factual allegations must elevate the claim above speculation (Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), and a plausible claim must be presented (Id. at 570). If a claim does not cross from conceivable to plausible, it will be dismissed (Id.). However, a well-pleaded complaint can proceed even if actual proof appears unlikely (Id. at 556). When dismissing a complaint, the court must consider whether to grant leave to amend, which should be liberally allowed unless there is undue delay, bad faith, prejudice to the opposing party, or futility of amendment (Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Prejudice to the opposing party is the most significant factor in determining dismissal without leave to amend, which is appropriate only if no amendment could save the complaint. The State Defendants argue for dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ claims due to alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies, asserting that, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Plaintiffs must complete a due process hearing with the local educational agency (LEA) before initiating a civil suit for IDEA remedies. Citing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Payne v. Peninsula School District, the Defendants maintain that the claims are unexhausted and warrant dismissal. The Payne decision affirms that exhaustion is necessary when seeking IDEA remedies, injunctive relief related to an IEP, or enforcement of rights stemming from a denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The State Defendants contend that the complaint resolution procedures (CRPs) filed with the California Department of Education do not fulfill the exhaustion requirement. However, the court clarifies that exhaustion is a claims processing requirement rather than a jurisdictional issue, meaning it does not limit the federal court's power to hear the case. The Payne court concluded that exhaustion can serve as an affirmative defense, and while dismissal on these grounds is possible, it requires a fact-specific assessment rather than a jurisdictional inquiry.

Non-jurisdictional exhaustion deficiencies, as established in Payne and supported by Ninth Circuit precedent, can be addressed through an unenumerated motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b). Unlike the current motion, which focuses only on pleadings, an unenumerated motion examines facts beyond the complaint and resembles a summary judgment process. The need for factual resolution is underscored by Plaintiffs' claims that exceptions to the exhaustion requirement apply, specifically: exhaustion may be excused if pursuing administrative remedies would be futile or if the educational agency, in this case, the CDE, maintains policies contrary to law. Both parties have extensively debated the applicability of these exceptions, but the Court finds that these arguments exceed the scope of the current motion, as they require a factual record that is not present at this stage.

Regarding the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Second and Ninth IDEA claims against State Defendants, the State Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs cannot bring these claims due to inadequate exhaustion of administrative remedies through the CRPs filed with the SDE. However, the Court concludes it cannot determine, as a matter of law, that the CRPs were insufficient for exhaustion. The Plaintiffs allege that their CRP complaints were not investigated by the CDE, hindering their ability to exhaust remedies. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that CRPs can fulfill exhaustion requirements under various circumstances, treating them as alternative means of addressing complaints under IDEA.

In Porter v. Bd. of Trustees of Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist., the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that the Complaint Resolution Process (CRP) can serve as a substitute for exhausting due process systems under specific circumstances. The court noted that when a challenge involves a facially invalid policy and the state does not amend it post-CRP complaint, further exhaustion may be unnecessary due to perceived bias in the administrative body. Additionally, if all educational issues are resolved through the CRP, leaving only those without adequate administrative remedies, exhaustion may also be deemed futile.

Porter emphasized that administrative hearing officers lack authority to address statutory compliance issues, which further justified the futility of additional administrative exhaustion when non-compliance is alleged. The Ninth Circuit's subsequent ruling in Christopher S. v. Stanislaus Cnty. Office of Educ. found dismissal for failure to exhaust remedies erroneous when systemic compliance issues were raised, asserting that CRP complaints could suffice for exhaustion.

The State Defendants contended that the cases cited were factually distinct from the current situation, as the Plaintiffs primarily focused on the rights of one student, Everett, rather than seeking system-wide relief. However, the Complaint includes broader allegations of systemic violations, asserting that the State Defendants' policies contradict legal requirements, threaten the fundamental aims of the IDEA, and that both the CRP and due process systems are fundamentally flawed, rendering further pursuit of these processes futile. The Plaintiffs claim systemic violations of the administrative complaint process and systemic state policies denying Everett a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE), which they argue severely undermine the objectives of the IDEA and California Education Code.

The Plaintiffs’ Complaint highlights 16 illegal policies and practices by the California Department of Education (CDE) with specific examples relevant to their case, challenging the overall systemic nature of these policies rather than focusing solely on the individual situation of Everett. The Court acknowledges that while labeling claims as systemic might risk undermining the exhaustion requirement, it cannot disregard the Complaint's allegations at this stage. The Court finds that the claims indicate systemic violations that extend beyond individual issues related to Everett, thereby potentially exempting them from general exhaustion requirements. The State Defendants incorrectly assert that there is no private right of action to review a Complaint Resolution Process (CRP), contradicting Ninth Circuit precedent that allows such appeals. The Plaintiffs argue that their case should not be considered an appeal since the CDE failed to investigate their CRP complaints, which they claim violates federal law and grants original jurisdiction against the CDE for its non-compliance. This situation invokes recognized exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, such as futility and contrary to law doctrines. Consequently, the Court denies the dismissal motion for the Second and Ninth Claims for Relief related to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).

Regarding the Seventh and Eighth Claims for Relief under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Plaintiffs allege that the State Defendants intentionally discriminated against Everett by denying him a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) and failing to adopt necessary compliance measures with state and federal laws. The Eighth Claim addresses alleged discrimination against the Parents for advocating on behalf of Everett. The Court notes that a retaliation claim under Section 504 requires proof of knowledge of protected activity, an adverse action, and a causal link between them. The State Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs must exhaust IDEA remedies before pursuing any Section 504 claims that arise from a FAPE denial. However, the State Defendants misinterpret the requirement, as the cited case indicates that exhaustion is only necessary if a claim arises solely from a FAPE denial under either the IDEA or Section 504.

Payne does not establish that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional requirement or applicable to all claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Specifically, it notes that IDEA exhaustion does not cover challenges related to physical and emotional abuse of a disabled student, which is relevant to the plaintiffs' claims here. Consequently, the State Defendants' argument regarding the necessity of exhaustion for the plaintiffs' Section 504 claims lacks merit. 

Additionally, the State Defendants argue that the plaintiffs have insufficiently pled facts to support a Section 504 claim, asserting that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they denied Everett meaningful access to services due to his disability or did so with discriminatory intent. They also contest the sufficiency of allegations related to retaliation. However, the plaintiffs have identified at least 16 instances of alleged discriminatory actions and retaliation against the State Defendants, such as failing to provide required documents and dismissing requests without proper consideration. These allegations meet the standards set by Rule 8(a), which only requires a short and plain statement of claims, allowing the claims to survive a motion to dismiss.

In regard to the Eleventh Claim for relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Defendants acknowledge that the legal analysis for Section 504 and the ADA is largely the same, as both prohibit public service denial due to disability. The plaintiffs' arguments against dismissal of the ADA claim mirror those for Section 504 and are likewise unsuccessful for the same reasons.

The Twelfth Claim for Relief involves a Section 1983 action against Tom Torlakson, California’s State Superintendent of Public Instruction, based on alleged violations of IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA, along with constitutional claims. For a Section 1983 claim based on federal statutory violations, three conditions must be met: the statute must benefit the plaintiff, the right must be clear and not overly vague, and it must impose a binding obligation on the states.

Section 1983 cannot enforce a federal statutory right if Congress has indicated a contrary intent, particularly when the right falls under a comprehensive enforcement scheme incompatible with Section 1983 claims. The Ninth Circuit, aligning with other circuits, has determined that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) precludes Section 1983 claims for IDEA violations. Similarly, rights under Section 504 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) generally cannot be enforced through Section 1983. However, in this case, the plaintiffs assert that Torlakson and other defendants acted with bad faith, violating Everett's constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process, which are independent of the IDEA.

The plaintiffs allege retaliation and misrepresentation, including physical neglect and psychological humiliation, which may not be fully covered by the IDEA, as established in the Payne decision that clarifies IDEA does not shield school officials from all liability for constitutional violations. The defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment usually bars claims against state officers in their individual capacities unless under specific exceptions, such as the Ex Parte Young doctrine, which requires a direct connection to the alleged conduct. In this instance, the claim against Torlakson lacks sufficient factual allegations of his personal involvement in the events of the lawsuit, only stating that he acted with bad faith and intentional disregard for Everett's rights.

Torlakson is accused of neglecting the oversight responsibilities mandated by the CDC, leading to claims of individual liability for constitutional violations linked to systemic issues within local educational agencies (LEAs) like Dry Creek. However, supervisory liability under Section 1983 requires direct action or culpable indifference from the individual, as established in Menotti v. City of Seattle. The plaintiff's attempt to hold Torlakson accountable based solely on his position fails, as vicarious liability does not apply under Section 1983. The lack of direct involvement from Torlakson in the alleged constitutional violations renders the Twelfth Claim insufficient, resulting in his dismissal from that claim with an option to amend.

The Third Claim for Relief alleges the failure to provide necessary supplemental instruction under the IDEA and the California Education Code, while the Tenth Claim addresses violations of the same state law. The State Defendants argue that these claims for compensatory damages and injunctive relief are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits federal suits against state officials concerning state law violations unless there is explicit consent. However, it is acknowledged that states receiving IDEA funding waive their sovereign immunity under 20 U.S.C. § 1403. The California Department of Education (CDE) has participated in IDEA, thereby waiving its immunity regarding applicable state statutes. The CDE's use of IDEA funds to implement these statutes further supports this waiver. The State Defendants also claim discretionary act immunity; nevertheless, the Court is disinclined to address immunity issues at the pleading stage.

State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is partially granted and partially denied. The Twelfth Claim for Relief against Defendant Tom Torlakson in his individual capacity is dismissed, while all other claims remain intact. Plaintiffs are permitted to amend their Complaint within twenty (20) days of the electronic filing of this Memorandum and Order; failure to do so will result in the dismissed claims being permanently barred. The matter was submitted based on written briefs, as oral argument was not considered necessary. Both parties' requests for judicial notice of certain documents were granted, as there were no objections. The Court referenced several cases regarding the allegations presented in the Complaint and noted that while State Defendants asserted qualified immunity for Torlakson, the Court did not address this issue due to deficiencies in the pleadings. It emphasized that qualified immunity is typically assessed at the summary judgment stage, not the pleadings stage.