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Hampton v. National American Red Cross
Citations: 3 F. Supp. 3d 612; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24283; 2014 WL 790915Docket: Civil Action No. 3:10-CV-00121-CRS
Court: District Court, W.D. Kentucky; February 25, 2014; Federal District Court
The Court, presided over by Senior District Judge Charles R. Simpson III, is addressing cross motions for summary judgment from Plaintiff Lenora Hampton and Defendants American National Red Cross and American Red Cross, Louisville Area Chapter. The Court grants the Defendants' motion and denies Hampton's motion. Hampton, a former employee, had informed her supervisors about her new legal custody of her grandchildren and a related medical issue. There is a dispute regarding whether she formally requested leave during this conversation. Nevertheless, her supervisors suggested she take the rest of the week off. Hampton was absent without explanation on March 3 and 4, 2008, leading to her termination for violating the attendance policy. In February 2010, she filed a lawsuit claiming violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) by the Defendants. The Defendants argued that one entity was not her employer and that her claims against the other entity were legally insufficient. Hampton conceded the former but maintained that the latter had not met its burden for summary judgment. The Court outlined the standards for granting summary judgment, emphasizing that the moving party must demonstrate the absence of material factual disputes, with the burden shifting to the non-moving party to show evidence of such disputes. The Court will assess the evidence favorably for the non-moving party but clarified that mere speculation is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact. A non-moving party must provide sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find in their favor; merely having a scintilla of evidence is inadequate, as established in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. If the non-moving party does not meet this burden, the court will grant summary judgment. Under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), there are two recovery theories: 'interference' (29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1)) and 'retaliation' (29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(2)). Hampton asserts claims based on both theories, which will be evaluated separately. To establish an FMLA interference claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) eligibility as an employee; 2) that the defendant qualifies as an employer under the FMLA; 3) entitlement to leave; 4) notice of intent to take leave; and 5) denial of FMLA benefits. Employer intent is irrelevant in determining actionable interference. Defendants argue for summary judgment, asserting that Hampton did not provide proper notice of her leave intention per 29 U.S.C. 2612(e)(1). They cite her deposition where she explicitly states she did not ask for time off during a meeting on February 26, 2008. Hampton counters this by asserting she did request leave during the meeting, supported by her affidavit. Additionally, she argues that even without an explicit request, the information she provided should have prompted her supervisors to recognize her need for FMLA leave and ensure she received it. Hampton's deposition indicates that she sought assistance from her superiors due to difficulties finding childcare for her infant with a serious medical condition, but she did not formally request leave during a meeting on February 26. The court highlights that a party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact by contradicting earlier deposition testimony after a motion for summary judgment is filed. Thus, despite her affidavit, Hampton is bound by her deposition statement, which asserts that she did not request leave, and therefore cannot establish a genuine dispute regarding this issue. Furthermore, while employees are not required to explicitly invoke the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to trigger rights under it, they must make a clear request for leave. The distinction between foreseeable and unforeseeable leave is noted, but it is deemed irrelevant since the foundational requirement is that the employee must explicitly request leave. Hampton's suggestion that she informed her supervisors of her potential eligibility for FMLA leave is insufficient; she failed to formally request leave, negating any claim regarding proper notice. In terms of retaliation claims under the FMLA, which prohibits discrimination for opposing unlawful practices, the plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) engagement in protected activity under the FMLA; 2) the employer's awareness of this activity; 3) adverse employment action taken by the employer; and 4) a causal connection between the two. The discussion underscores the necessity for a clear request for leave to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Consequently, summary judgment is deemed appropriate due to the lack of a genuine dispute over whether Hampton notified her employer of her intent to take FMLA leave. Defendants assert that there is no genuine dispute regarding their lack of knowledge about Hampton's alleged FMLA-protected activity, as she never requested leave, nor did she claim that Defendants were aware of her protected activity. Since Defendants' knowledge is a critical element for an FMLA retaliation claim, summary judgment is justified on this basis. A separate order will follow this opinion. Additionally, Defendants filed a motion to strike affidavits from Robin L. Cowherd and Gerald Snyder, which were submitted by Hampton in support of her summary judgment motion. The Court will deny this motion as moot since it did not rely on these affidavits for its summary judgment decisions. Hampton also filed a motion for excusable neglect due to technical difficulties regarding her late filing of the summary judgment motion. The Court finds her reasons sufficient to grant this motion. Furthermore, Hampton has acknowledged that Defendant National is not a proper party, leading to summary judgment in favor of Defendant National on all her claims.