United Van Lines, Inc. v. Henry

Docket: No. 4:97CV1342 JCH

Court: District Court, E.D. Missouri; July 19, 1998; Federal District Court

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Defendants filed a Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment on May 19, 1998, in response to a suit by Plaintiff United Van Lines, Inc., for unpaid transportation charges amounting to $7,325.61, related to the shipment of Defendants’ household goods from Montana to Idaho. The shipment was accepted by Defendant Gary Henry on July 11, 1996, who acknowledged receipt in good condition. After Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 4, 1998, which Defendants did not contest, the Court granted judgment in favor of Plaintiff on May 18, 1998. Defendants claimed they had not received notice of this motion. The Court allowed Defendants to file a memorandum to demonstrate good cause for setting aside the summary judgment, which they did by June 29, 1998. 

In their arguments, Defendants contended that Plaintiff operated as a contract carrier, thus the filed rate doctrine did not apply, suggesting they were unaware of tariff charges and their liabilities. The Court acknowledged that Plaintiff was a contract carrier for this case but noted that both contracts incorporated the relevant tariff rates, which undermined Defendants’ position.

Appendix A of the Transportation Services Agreement between the Plaintiff and Sterling incorporates the Referenced Tariffs published by the Carrier, establishing that Shipper (Sterling) is aware of the terms in these tariffs. The bill of lading signed by Defendant Sandy Henry outlines the rates charged and indicates that if credit is extended, the owner of the goods remains primarily liable for payment. Both the shipper and consignee are jointly and severally liable for all unpaid charges related to the shipment, regardless of any credit extended. The Court finds that while Defendants may not have presumed knowledge of tariff charges, they had actual knowledge from the contracts, leading to the denial of their first point for relief from summary judgment.

Defendants also claimed they were not liable because Sterling had made a full payment on their behalf via a check dated December 10, 1996. However, this check was returned unpaid, negating their claim of liability relief, and their second point was denied.

Lastly, Defendants argued that only Sandy Henry should be liable as she was the sole signatory of the bill of lading, asserting that summary judgment against Gary Henry was improper. Citing Cleckner v. Republic Van Storage Co., the Court upheld that Gary Henry could be held liable as well, based on the principle that spouses can bind each other in agreements involving shared property. Additionally, the argument that Sandy signed the bill of lading after the move and under false pretenses was also dismissed, affirming her liability.

United operated as a contract carrier for Sterling Healthcare Corporation, which means the Henrys could not be assumed to have knowledge of the bill of lading's contents and cannot be bound by its language. The defendants failed to provide evidence to substantiate their claims, lacking even an affidavit from Defendant Sandy Henry. To oppose a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present specific facts indicating a genuine issue of material fact, rather than mere allegations. The court found that the defendants did not meet their burden of production, leading to the denial of their motion to set aside the summary judgment.

Under the filed rate doctrine, carriers must publish service charge schedules, and all parties involved are presumed to know these tariffs. The court cited the Transportation Services Agreement between the plaintiff and Sterling, indicating that the plaintiff acted as a contract carrier. The court also noted that Sandy Henry signed the bill of lading, which states that if credit is extended for charges, the owner remains liable for payment if the charges go unpaid. Defendant Gary Henry acknowledged ownership of the goods and accepted the services rendered, further affirming his liability. The defendants' memorandum was deemed insufficient as evidence since it lacked the formality of an affidavit.