United States v. Jones

Citation: 63 F. App'x 826Docket: No. 01-5949

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; April 22, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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Defendant-appellant Arthur Quentice Jones was convicted on thirteen counts of distribution of crack cocaine and one count of possession with intent to distribute. He appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove his distribution of crack cocaine, and claims the district court erred by denying his motion for acquittal. Additionally, Jones contends that the court abused its discretion by not granting a downward departure in his sentence. The court affirms both the conviction and the sentence.

On January 10, 2001, Jones was indicted on fourteen counts of distributing cocaine base and one count of possession with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The government dismissed one count before trial. Five witnesses testified: Marion County detective Jackie Williams, chief detective Brent Myers, South Pittsburg police officer Wayne Jordan, confidential informant Anthony Hale, and DEA agent Robert Chester. 

Williams testified about observing Jones near Moore Park on January 28, 2000, where he found a white bottle containing twenty-three rocks of crack cocaine after Jones darted behind a tree. Upon arrest, Jones remarked about being a drug dealer in South Pittsburg. Myers confirmed that he witnessed Jones making a motion behind a tree, after which the bottle was retrieved. Both Williams and Myers noted that Jones had $597 in cash.

Jordan testified about tape recordings of conversations between Hale and Jones. He described how Hale, equipped with a body wire, purchased narcotics from Jones on two occasions. Hale, who had known Jones for years, detailed his involvement in the drug buys and confirmed the recordings' accuracy, stating he was paid for his participation.

Hale testified to multiple purchases of crack cocaine from Jones between December 19, 1999, and May 30, 2000. Recordings of these transactions were played, including one where Hale expressed dissatisfaction with the quantity received, to which Jones responded that it was the best he could provide. Hale also requested "an eight-ball in solid" of crack cocaine, to which Jones offered a solid ounce for $1,200. Chester, another government witness, testified that the twenty-three crack rocks found on January 23, 2000, indicated intent to distribute rather than personal use, supported by Jones's self-identification as a drug dealer and the money found with him. After the government's case, Jones's motion for judgment of acquittal was denied by the court. Jones did not call witnesses and both sides presented closing arguments, leading to the jury returning a guilty verdict on all counts.

A presentence investigation revealed two prior state convictions for cocaine distribution, qualifying as predicate offenses for "Career Offender" status and resulting in a sentencing guideline range of 262-327 months. Jones filed a motion for downward departure based on "extraordinary physical impairment" due to heart disease and argued that he was not a typical Career Offender since he sold small quantities and started criminal activities at age thirty-eight. The district court, however, found no acute distress regarding Jones's health and noted his consistent drug dealing, leading to the denial of the motion. Jones was sentenced to 262 months, the minimum within the guideline range. The court reviews claims of insufficient evidence by viewing evidence favorably to the prosecution, determining if a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

A defendant asserting insufficiency of the evidence faces a significant burden. Circumstantial evidence can support a conviction without eliminating every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. In reviewing such challenges, courts do not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility, and acquittals are granted only when the prosecution’s failure is evident. Jones claimed the evidence against him under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) was insufficient, arguing the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal. However, when viewed favorably for the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient. Testimony from Williams and Myers indicated they observed Jones acting suspiciously before a bottle with twenty-three crack rocks was found nearby, and Jones admitted to being a drug dealer at the time of his arrest. Confidential informant Hale testified to purchasing crack cocaine from Jones multiple times, with some transactions recorded, despite some recordings being of poor quality. Additional corroboration came from Jordan, who saw Hale and Jones together on two occasions. Jones's claims regarding Hale’s credibility were not available for appellate consideration, as such arguments must be made during the trial. The jury had the opportunity to evaluate credibility at trial. Furthermore, Jones's assertion that the evidence from the Moore Park incident was speculative was countered by the circumstantial evidence presented, which included witness observations and Jones’s incriminating statements. Thus, the jury's decision to convict was supported by adequate evidence.

Jones contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a downward departure in sentencing, asserting he was not a large-scale dealer and citing his health issues as justification. He claims the judge misunderstood the authority to depart from guidelines under the Career Offender provision and erroneously believed it lacked discretion. The government counters that the issue is generally non-reviewable on appeal and that the district court acted appropriately in its decision.

Typically, a district court's refusal to depart downward from sentencing guidelines is not subject to appeal unless the court believes it lacks authority to do so. However, if the court’s refusal is based on a legal conclusion that the defendant's circumstances do not warrant a departure, it becomes reviewable. In this case, the district court demonstrated awareness of its discretionary power and stated that Jones's health issues did not meet the criteria for a downward departure under §5H1.4, noting the nature of the offense and available prison accommodations. Furthermore, the judge acknowledged Jones's status as a career offender, highlighting his consistent drug dealing since 1989, regardless of the quantity.

The judge concluded that Jones failed to differentiate his case from typical career offender scenarios. As a result, the claim that the court was unaware of its authority to grant a downward departure is unfounded. Consequently, the conviction and sentence imposed by the district court are affirmed.