Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; February 25, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
Jesse Martinez-Gonzalez, Miguel Benitez-Ruiz, and Osman Alejandro Mencia-Morales faced charges related to a heroin and methamphetamine distribution operation. Martinez-Gonzalez and Ruiz were convicted and are appealing, while Mencia-Morales is appealing his sentence following a guilty plea. The court affirms the convictions, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Martinez-Gonzalez contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conspiracy conviction, alleging that the prosecution failed to demonstrate a single conspiracy, instead indicating two separate ones. The court evaluates this claim by considering whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, referencing relevant case law.
To establish a single conspiracy, the evidence must show that each defendant had a stake in the operation's success. Testimony from conspirator Jose Lepe indicated that several family members were involved in drug distribution, sharing resources and customers, which supported the existence of a single conspiracy. Despite Martinez-Gonzalez's argument that he was not part of this conspiracy, the court clarified that a 'slight connection' suffices for involvement, meaning full knowledge of all conspirators or activities is not necessary.
Testimony indicated that Martinez-Gonzalez purchased heroin from key conspirators and was involved in coded communications about drug transactions. The court concludes that the evidence, viewed favorably for the prosecution, supports the jury's finding of Martinez-Gonzalez's involvement in the conspiracy to distribute heroin.
Martinez-Gonzalez contested the sufficiency of evidence for his convictions on two counts of possession with intent to deliver heroin. Count 13 pertained to an alleged possession of 100 grams or more of heroin on June 9, 2000, supported by recorded conversations between him and Tomate, where coded language such as "tripe tacos" and "about seven boys" was used. These conversations occurred shortly before law enforcement observed Gonzalo, Tomate's roommate, visiting Martinez-Gonzalez's residence with another man. Testimony from Lepe clarified that heroin is often divided into pieces of 25 grams, with terms like "bring me a guy" or "muchachas" used in the trade. Nava testified about past sales of heroin to Martinez-Gonzalez and provided insight into the coded language used, including "tripes" meaning three pieces of heroin.
Count 32 involved conversations recorded on June 20, 2000, where Martinez-Gonzalez arranged to meet Tomate and discussed "tripes." During this time, Tomate contacted Joel regarding "three spoons," which was linked to drug transactions. Observations confirmed a handoff in a parking lot, further implicating Martinez-Gonzalez. Testimony by a paid informant, X-O-L Martinez-Lopez, indicated Martinez-Gonzalez's involvement in arranging a heroin purchase, adding to the evidence of his distribution activities. A rational jury could infer that the conversations signified drug transactions. Based on the evidence viewed favorably to the Government, the court concluded there was sufficient evidence for the convictions, affirming them.
Ruiz's appeal against his convictions for conspiracy to distribute heroin and using a telephone to facilitate drug trafficking was also rejected due to his failure to demonstrate any error or abuse of discretion by the district court, leading to the affirmation of his convictions as well.
Ruiz contends that the inclusion of English translation transcripts of telephone calls in the jury room improperly highlighted testimony favorable to the Government. The standard for reviewing this decision is abuse of discretion, where reversal occurs only if there is a firm conviction of clear error. Precedent supports the admission of such transcripts if they are critical to establishing a defendant’s involvement in a conspiracy. In this case, the district court acted within its discretion by permitting the jury to use the translations.
Ruiz also challenges the admissibility of hearsay testimony from a co-conspirator, arguing it did not meet the criteria outlined in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). This rule excludes statements made by a party's co-conspirator during the conspiracy's course. The district court found that the testimony in question was relevant to the conspiracy's operation, thus upholding its admissibility.
Regarding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court typically refrains from addressing these on direct appeal unless the record is adequate or there is a clear violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Ruiz's claim was not pursued in this context.
Lastly, Ruiz alleges that the Assistant United States Attorney improperly vouched for a witness during trial. This argument, not raised during the trial, is subject to plain error review, which requires a significant impact on the trial's fairness or a miscarriage of justice for reversal. Vouching involves implying governmental endorsement of a witness's credibility, which could affect the jury's perception.
During Lepe's direct examination, he affirmed his commitment to testify truthfully as per his plea agreement. This was deemed not to constitute vouching, as referenced in Necoechea, where the prosecutor's inquiry about the truthfulness requirement did not imply a guarantee of truth or involve personal opinion. The AUSA's closing argument also did not vouch for Lepe, emphasizing a commitment to truth without implying witness credibility. Ruiz contended that the AUSA improperly characterized his statements during cross-examination as a "confession." Since Ruiz did not object at trial, the review is for plain error, which was not found due to his admissions regarding drug discussions and knowledge of drug dealing. Ruiz's claim of cumulative errors affecting his fair trial lacks merit as no individual errors were demonstrated. Mencia-Morales argued that the district court failed to comply with former Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c) regarding a discrepancy in the presentence report (PSR) about his relationship with a co-defendant. However, since defense counsel did not object to the PSR's accuracy, the court's findings were upheld, and no violations were identified.
Mencia-Morales did not dispute the accuracy of information in the Presentence Report (PSR) but only contested inferences drawn from it. He requested the district court to give more weight to his interpretation of his relationship with the co-defendant and supportive letter than to the PSR facts. The court, however, found that the facts in paragraphs 34 through 38 of the PSR established by a preponderance of the evidence that Mencia-Morales acted as a leader and supervisor, warranting a two-level enhancement under the guidelines. Mencia-Morales failed to prove that the district court did not comply with Rule 32 or erred in applying the supervisory role enhancement, as the guidelines allow for increased offense levels for organizers or leaders in criminal activities. The court could rely on the PSR evidence to substantiate the sentence enhancement. The PSR indicated that a co-defendant frequently acted under Mencia-Morales’s direction, justifying the enhancement. Consequently, Mencia-Morales’s sentence is affirmed, with a note that this disposition is not for publication and cannot be cited in this circuit except as allowed by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
