Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; March 10, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
G. Daniel Walker has initiated a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against five Illinois prison officials, alleging violations of his constitutional rights due to their failure to ship over 2,800 pounds of personal property, including legal materials, to a California prison where he is currently incarcerated. The district court dismissed the case without prejudice, citing Walker's failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). However, since the defendants have since abandoned the exhaustion argument, the judgment is modified to a dismissal with prejudice, affirming on the alternate basis of res judicata.
Walker has a lengthy criminal history, having been convicted in 1969 for shooting an Illinois state trooper, and later escaping to California where he committed murder, resulting in a life sentence. He was returned to Illinois in 1992 to serve the remainder of his prior sentence. Prior to his return, Walker arranged to bring 99 boxes of personal property weighing over 2,800 pounds, including food, clothing, legal materials, and other items.
In late 1997, as he prepared for parole and return to California, Walker filed a grievance to inventory and pack his property, which was initially denied but later allowed. He packed 80 boxes and instructed officials to send all 99 boxes to his new California address, providing $286.58 for shipping, although it is unclear if this amount was sufficient. Walker's property was never shipped due to conflicting statements from prison officials regarding shipping policies and the adequacy of the funds provided. After discovering the property had not been sent, Walker lodged multiple complaints.
Walker petitioned California officials to compel the Illinois Department of Corrections to ship his property but was informed they lacked control over an out-of-state agency. He also contacted Warden Thomas Page at his former Illinois prison, requesting an update on the shipment of his boxes. In response, Walker received a letter stating that California officials had advised against shipping the boxes, along with a memo instructing him not to attempt the shipment, which he had not seen before. Subsequently, Walker initiated a mandamus action in Illinois state court against multiple defendants to compel inventory and shipment of his 99 boxes, but his petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, a decision upheld by the appellate court.
Walker then filed a federal lawsuit in the Central District of California, alleging violations of his First Amendment rights regarding access to the courts. Although the district court dismissed his complaint before service, the Ninth Circuit remanded it for further proceedings on the access-to-courts claim. In September 1999, while pursuing these actions, he filed a suit in the Southern District of Illinois, claiming the defendants improperly withheld his property, which resulted in his inability to access various courts and default on nine pending cases. He sought an injunction for the shipping of his property and $225 in damages for each day it remained in Illinois.
The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing Walker had not exhausted his administrative remedies. A magistrate judge recommended dismissal on these grounds, which the district court adopted despite Walker's objections. After an unsuccessful reconsideration attempt, Walker appealed pro se, and counsel was appointed for the appeal. Walker contested the district court's exhaustion ruling, asserting he was unaware his property would not be shipped until arriving in California. He argued that once in California, he could not access Illinois's administrative remedies, which apply only to individuals currently under the Department of Corrections' control. The record did not adequately support the defendants' exhaustion defense, a point they did not contest in their appellate brief.
The district court's handling of the exhaustion issue is deemed unsustainable, rendering Walker's secondary appeal argument unnecessary. Walker contends that the court improperly converted the defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment without adequate notice, referencing specific precedents and procedural rules. The court considered an affidavit from Jim Simmons, asserting that Walker failed to file grievances, but this is irrelevant as it remains unclear whether Walker was required to utilize the administrative process. Although the defendants cannot succeed on the exhaustion claim, they present res judicata as an alternative basis for affirming the dismissal. Walker previously sued the same defendants in Illinois state court regarding the same events, which resulted in a dismissal affirmed by the appellate court. This judgment has preclusive effect in federal court, barring the current case due to the same parties and events involved. Walker does not contest the merits of the res judicata defense but argues that it was not raised in the initial motion and is therefore too late. However, the court has discretion to consider unpreserved arguments when the resolution is clear. Here, Walker fails to provide any rationale to counter the preclusive effect of the Illinois judgment. The case is distinguished from Walker's ongoing California litigation, which the Ninth Circuit found improperly dismissed but does not affect the preclusive impact of the Illinois action. The judgment is modified to reflect a dismissal with prejudice and is affirmed. Walker earns a 'strike' under the PLRA for initiating this action but does not receive one for the appeal since the district court's dismissal was based on an incorrect ground.
