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Lawrence M. Farkas, Joseph M. Aemisego Anthony R. Alfano Jose Almeida Charles Anderson Mike Antonucci Richard Arroyo John Barone Lawrence Bischofsberger Richard Bottari Andre J. Brown John Calabro George A. Calandrino Pete Capuano R. Caserta Vincent Castronuovo Thomas Clark Marvin Clausell Jerome D'AguiAr Peter Dalton Nick Defeis Salvatore Demaria Joseph Depaso Donald Dickinson Augustine Disalvo Jose J. Escobar Lawrence J. Faughnan John Feltham Chet Flower Wilfred Foster Michael Foti Robert Galassi Frank J. Gallagher John I. Gerace George A. Gerhens William Germann Michael Gold John M. Guido Kenneth Hampton William Harrington Brian Harrison Gerard Hart Charles A. Hendricks Santiago Hernandez Larry Hollenbeck Raymond Hoye Bob Hyland Cornelio Iacono Chester Jabacinski Walter Jacome Lehman Jenkins Robert Johnson John Jones John C. Richards, Jr. Clifton Oates, Jr. Manfred Kalkowski Charles J. Keller John Kleppe Anthony J. Lafemina Paul F. Lehnert Michael v. Lynch Eddie Maddox William Maffei Dominick Manocchi Rey

Citation: 101 F.3d 20Docket: 134

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; November 21, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

This case involves an appeal by Lawrence M. Farkas following the dismissal of his claims by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The primary legal issue is the timeliness of Farkas's appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1), which mandates a 30-day filing period post-judgment. Farkas filed his notice of appeal 64 days after the original judgment entry on October 3, 1995, resulting in the dismissal of his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Farkas argued that the appeal period should commence from a reentered judgment on November 16, asserting his attorney received no notice of the original judgment. However, the court found that the reentry did not alter substantive rights and was consistent with precedent, which states that appeal timelines are reset only if substantive changes or ambiguities are addressed. The district court's decision to deny Farkas's motion to extend the appeal period was without prejudice, allowing for potential renewal if necessary. Ultimately, the court upheld the jurisdictional nature of the timelines, concluding that the appeal was untimely and dismissing the case accordingly.

Legal Issues Addressed

Appeal Period and Substantive Changes

Application: The appeal period resets only when substantive changes or resolutions of genuine ambiguities occur, neither of which applied here.

Reasoning: The period for filing an appeal or a petition for certiorari resets only when a lower court alters substantive matters or resolves a genuine ambiguity in a prior judgment.

Distinction in Judgment Reentry and Impact on Appeal Timing

Application: Farkas's attempt to reset the appeal timeline based on reentry language was rejected as it did not alter substantive rights or clarify ambiguities.

Reasoning: Farkas's argument that the second judgment's 'vacate' language distinguishes it from prior cases is contrary to the rationale in Minneapolis-Honeywell.

Effect of Judgment Reentry on Appeal Period

Application: Reentry of judgment does not reset the appeal period unless substantive rights are altered, which was not the case here.

Reasoning: Legal precedent establishes that when a judgment is reentered without affecting substantive rights, the appeal period starts from the original judgment.

Jurisdictional Nature of Appeal Timelines

Application: The Supreme Court's mandate on strict adherence to appeal deadlines was upheld, establishing that these timelines are mandatory and jurisdictional.

Reasoning: The Supreme Court has emphasized that adherence to the prescribed appeal timelines is mandatory and jurisdictional.

Timeliness of Appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)

Application: The court dismissed the appeal as untimely because the notice of appeal was filed 64 days after the original judgment, exceeding the 30-day requirement.

Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed as untimely because Farkas filed his notice of appeal 64 days after the judgment was entered on October 3, 1995, exceeding the 30-day requirement set forth by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1).