Quick v. Freeman Decorating Co.

Citation: 55 F. App'x 450Docket: No. 01-17135; D.C. No. CV-99-01734-PMP

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; January 20, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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Michael Quick appeals the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of Freeman Decorating Co., which was issued on September 17, 2001. Quick, an employee of Renaissance Management, Inc., sustained injuries during the 1997 Automotive Products Aftermarket Association convention in Las Vegas while disassembling a NASCAR exhibit booth using a ladder that collapsed. Renaissance had contracted Freeman for the storage and transportation of its equipment after issues arose with accessing the show floor. Quick alleged negligence on Freeman's part regarding the ladder's transport and storage.

The District Court granted Freeman summary judgment, finding it immune from negligence claims under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (NIIA) because it was considered a statutory co-employee of Quick. Quick's appeal was reviewed de novo to determine if there were genuine issues of material fact and whether the law was applied correctly. Under Nevada law, the NIIA provides that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for industrial injuries against both employers and fellow employees, inclusive of subcontractors and independent contractors. This immunity was supported by the finding that Freeman acted as an independent contractor, providing specific services without detailed direction from Renaissance, establishing a principal contractor-independent contractor relationship as defined by NRS 616A.210.

Renaissance is identified as a principal contractor for Freeman, having contracted and paid for Freeman's services as an independent contractor. Freeman qualifies as a statutory employee of Renaissance under NRS 616A.210, contingent on demonstrating that NRS 616B.603(1) does not apply. This statute states that a person is not considered an employer if they contract with an independent enterprise that operates in a different trade or business. Despite Freeman potentially being classified as an independent enterprise, Renaissance is Freeman’s statutory employer because both are engaged in the same trade—assembling and disassembling trade show exhibit booths. The determination hinges on whether Freeman's essential activities are typically performed by employees rather than independent contractors. The District Court established that the activities of both Renaissance and Freeman were aligned, as they both provided booth assembly services at the APAA show and competed in this area. 

Quick, an injured Renaissance employee, contested the District Court's ruling by suggesting that Freeman's role as the official service provider and the uniqueness of individual booth assembly tasks warranted a different analysis. However, no precedent requires such a strict differentiation. The Nevada Supreme Court has previously declined to make overly technical distinctions between related tasks in similar contexts. Quick's argument that only transportation and storage activities should be considered in the 'same trade' assessment was deemed less persuasive since these tasks are closely related to booth assembly and disassembly, negating the need for a clear separation in this case.

Freeman meets the 'same trade' requirement concerning transportation and storage activities, as both Freeman and Renaissance engage in similar services, specifically the removal of equipment from show floors. Consequently, Freeman is considered a statutory co-employee of Quick, which protects him from liability. Quick contests this by arguing that the District Court failed to adequately apply the 'control' test and that granting immunity undermines public policy by reducing Freeman's incentive to ensure workplace safety. However, the court determined that the 'control' factor, while relevant, did not constitute a reversible error given Freeman's clear alignment with the 'normal work' criteria. The court affirmed that Freeman's status as a co-employee is consistent with Nevada's statutory framework and the principles of co-employee immunity. Quick's reliance on the Nevada Supreme Court's ruling in GES, Inc. v. Corbitt is misplaced, as the cases involve distinctly different trades. In contrast, Freeman and Renaissance are competitors in the same field of assembling and disassembling trade show booths, negating the argument that they operate in entirely separate trades. The ruling is not intended for publication and cannot be cited in future cases, with specific exceptions noted for construction-related cases, which do not apply here as neither Freeman nor Renaissance is a licensed contractor.