United States v. Rodriguez

Citation: 54 F. App'x 739Docket: Nos. 99-5965, 00-5278, 00-5266, 00-5267

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; December 5, 2002; Federal Appellate Court

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Appellants Charles and Joseph Rodriguez, along with Jose Soto, challenge their convictions for multiple federal crimes including conspiracy, bank robberies, attempted robbery, and firearms offenses. The Rodriguez brothers received life sentences, while Soto was sentenced to over 37 years. Nine issues were raised on appeal, all of which were affirmed by the court.

In the July 19, 1997 robbery at CoreStates Bank in Woodlynne, New Jersey, the Rodriguez brothers, disguised and armed, threatened customers and employees, resulting in the theft of $64,039. Although they could not access the vault, the robbery was captured on surveillance footage, showing the use of firearms resembling assault rifles. The robbers fled in a stolen vehicle, which they later set on fire.

On May 23, 1998, during the Commerce Bank robbery in Moorestown, New Jersey, the same individuals arrived masked and armed before the bank opened, shooting at the entrance. They forced employees to comply at gunpoint, stealing $15,373. Despite issues with their getaway vehicle, they commandeered an employee's car but abandoned it shortly thereafter. Both robberies were recorded by surveillance cameras.

In August 1998, the FBI sought assistance from Fernando Flores, a former police officer and cousin to fugitives Charles and Joseph Rodriguez, to locate Charles. Flores learned from Joseph that Charles was seeking a robbery opportunity that could yield over $100,000. At the FBI's direction, Flores provided Joseph with ammunition and relayed information about a potential armored car robbery involving an inside man, who was in debt, targeting a vehicle carrying $200,000 in cash. 

Joseph and Charles planned to participate in the robbery armed with several firearms, including an M16 and a suppressed MAC10, and intended to utilize stolen vehicles for their escape. They conducted reconnaissance at the rest stop where the robbery was to occur, and Joseph introduced Flores to Jose Soto, another conspirator. Although the robbery was initially called off, the FBI encouraged Flores to store the weapons at his apartment to ensure compliance.

On September 1, 1998, the conspirators arrived at Flores’ apartment with firearms and prepared for the heist. After dropping off a stolen minivan as a switch vehicle, they drove to the rest stop, heavily armed. Upon arrival, they were spotted by law enforcement, leading to a confrontation where FBI agents fired upon them. Joseph attempted to enter the rest stop but was apprehended, while Charles and Soto were arrested in the vehicle. Following their capture, Soto confessed to the robbery attempt, and Charles remarked about his weapon choices. The FBI seized various items, including ammunition and clothing, from Flores' apartment.

Charles, Joseph, and Soto faced a Superseding Indictment with eleven counts, including conspiracy to commit bank robberies and robbery of an armored car, along with multiple firearm-related charges under various sections of the U.S. Code. All three were charged in Counts 1 to 8, while Counts 9, 10, and 11 charged each defendant separately. A jury convicted Charles and Joseph on all counts, while Soto was found guilty of the charges related to the attempted armored car robbery. Charles and Joseph received life sentences, and Soto was sentenced to 447 months.

The appellants claim insufficient evidence for their convictions regarding the attempted armored car robbery, arguing that the government did not prove their intent to commit robbery or that they had taken a substantial step towards it. As they did not preserve these arguments for appeal through a timely motion for acquittal, the court reviewed them for plain error. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b), robbery requires a taking through actual or threatened force. The appellants contended that an accomplice indicated no force would be necessary, despite their armed presence. They acknowledged discussing the use of force but claimed the final decision against it was made by Joseph.

However, substantial evidence suggested their intent to use force, including the excessive arms and ammunition they brought, statements from Charles about shooting armored car employees, and testimony from FBI agents who fired on them when they saw a gun. The court found sufficient evidence that the appellants took substantial steps towards the robbery, as they prepared extensively, stole vehicles, and positioned themselves near the anticipated arrival of the armored car.

Appellants contend that the District Court erred by not instructing the jury to assess their knowledge of carrying a machine gun and a firearm with a silencer, which contributed to their lengthy sentences. Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), using or carrying a firearm during a violent crime incurs a minimum five-year sentence, escalating to at least thirty years for machine guns or silenced weapons, and life for subsequent convictions. Charles and Joseph faced life sentences for three counts of § 924(c)(1) related to bank robberies and an attempted armored car robbery, while Soto received a thirty-year sentence for one count. The jury affirmed that two firearms in the robbery were machine guns, while one had a silencer. The jury was instructed that knowledge of carrying a firearm was necessary for a conviction, but appeals courts have previously ruled that knowledge of the weapon's nature was not required. In United States v. Brantley, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court’s decision in Staples v. United States, which mandated knowledge of a weapon's classification under the National Firearms Act, did not apply to § 924(c). The Brantley court argued that the concerns in Staples were not relevant to sentence enhancements under § 924(c), as defendants already demonstrated culpability by committing the primary offense. Appellants assert that Brantley and similar rulings were rendered before the Supreme Court's later decisions in Castillo and Apprendi, which emphasized that firearm type references in § 924(c)(1) constitute a separate crime requiring jury proof, and that any fact increasing a penalty beyond the maximum must be proven to a jury.

A court of appeals has assumed that under § 924(c)(1), a defendant's knowledge of the type of weapon involved is an element of the offense. In United States v. Dixon, the court found that any inadequacy in jury instructions regarding this knowledge did not affect the defendant's substantial rights, as it was clear the defendant was aware of the weapon's characteristics. The current case similarly concludes that, assuming knowledge is required, any omission in instructing the jury was harmless, as the jury would likely have determined the Appellants were aware they possessed a machine gun or a silenced weapon. Specifically, testimony from a witness, Flores, indicated that one of the Appellants, Joseph, informed him of their possession of various firearms, including an M16 and a suppressed MAC10. The government argued that even if the Appellants were unaware one weapon was a machine gun, they could not deny knowledge of the silencer, which was visibly attached. 

The Appellants also argued that the District Court wrongly denied their motion to dismiss charges related to attempted armed robbery due to alleged outrageous government conduct. The District Court reviewed the factual claims presented by the Appellants but found that the alleged misconduct did not constitute a due process violation and invited them to renew their motion with additional evidence, which was subsequently denied at trial's end. The Appellants contended that the FBI's actions, including directing Flores to facilitate their involvement and encouraging them in the criminal scheme, constituted outrageous conduct. However, such a defense is only applicable in extreme cases where government actions are deemed "shocking" and "intolerable." The court referenced a precedent where defendants' claims of outrageous conduct were rejected, concluding that the government's actions in the current case did not rise to that level. Furthermore, the court noted that the inherent risks associated with attempted armed robbery were not exacerbated by the government's conduct.

Joseph and Charles Rodriguez contended that the District Court improperly admitted evidence from a re-enactment of the July 19, 1997 CoreStates bank robbery, which the government conducted on April 28, 1999, to demonstrate Joseph's involvement. The re-enactment featured an officer in a red windbreaker, similar to one confiscated from Joseph after a related robbery attempt. At trial, the government compared re-enactment photographs to actual video surveillance, aiming to establish that Joseph's jacket could be the one seen in photographs of the robbery. The defense received the re-enactment photographs on May 7, 1999, just eleven days before trial, and subsequently sought to exclude them. During a hearing on June 15, 1999, the District Court discussed arrangements for a counter re-enactment, but on June 21, the defense informed the court that the bank would not permit photography due to recent renovations. The District Court denied the motion to exclude the photographs on June 22, stating that the defense could have raised their concerns sooner and determined that the evidence's probative value outweighed any potential prejudice. 

Joseph argued that the late disclosure violated his due process rights and inhibited his ability to conduct a counter re-enactment, while also claiming the District Court abused its discretion by not suppressing the evidence. The court found no intentional delay in disclosure by the government, nor did Joseph demonstrate that a counter re-enactment would have exonerated him. The timing of the government's disclosure allowed for a defense re-enactment before the bank's renovations. Additionally, the court dismissed Charles’ claim of prejudice, noting that the re-enactment conditions were sufficiently similar to those of the robbery. The re-enactment occurred at the same bank, with the same surveillance camera placements and similar timing and weather conditions. Ultimately, the review under an abuse of discretion standard concluded that the District Court acted appropriately in admitting the evidence.

Charles Rodriguez argues that his convictions for carjacking related to the Commerce Bank robbery and an attempted armored car robbery should be overturned due to insufficient proof that his actions affected interstate commerce. Since he did not timely move for acquittal, the court reviews for plain error. Although the car involved had parts from Japan and was assembled there, Rodriguez claims this does not demonstrate interference with interstate commerce. He also contests that evidence regarding the armored car company's operations in 44 states and the nationwide impact of losses in New Jersey fails to prove an effect on commerce. Under the carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119, the government must show that the vehicle traveled in interstate commerce; the stipulation regarding the car's assembly in Japan and its theft in New Jersey meets this requirement. Regarding the attempted robbery, the Hobbs Act indicates that any obstruction of commerce suffices, and previous case law confirms that actual effects on commerce are not necessary for a conviction. Evidence indicating that the armored car company's earnings would decline if the robbery succeeded is adequate to establish the necessary effect on commerce.

Additionally, Rodriguez and Jose Soto seek a new trial, claiming the government violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) by offering benefits to Fernando Flores in exchange for his testimony. The statute prohibits giving anything of value for testimony, but case law, including United States v. Hunte, clarifies that the government can promise leniency for truthful testimony without violating this provision. The court noted that prohibiting such arrangements would undermine the government's prerogative. The appellants reference United States v. Singleton, which emphasizes that the government cannot offer anything beyond standard concessions. They argue that Flores’ total benefits of approximately $14,500, along with assistance with a gun permit and job placement, exceed typical government concessions.

The government asserts that compensating informants, like Flores, is a long-standing practice and that the assistance provided is similar to that given to individuals in the Government Witness Protection Program. The court has previously ruled that paying informants who testify does not violate § 201(c)(2). The appellants must demonstrate that any concessions received are not typically granted, but they failed to provide evidence or authority for their claim.

Charles Rodriguez challenges the denial of his pre-trial motion to dismiss Count One of the indictment, arguing it is duplicitous. The District Court determined that Count One does not combine separate offenses, as it charges conspiracy related to bank robberies and the obstruction of commerce through robbery. The court maintained that a single count can encompass multiple objectives of a conspiracy, and thus, Count One is not duplicitous.

Rodriguez also contends that the District Court erred in denying his motion for severance under Rule 14, asserting that the joinder of charges prejudiced him due to the circumstantial nature of the bank robbery cases and weak connections to the armored car robbery. The District Court found the indictment met Rule 8 criteria for charging similar offenses and concluded that the conspiracy justified the joinder. It ruled that Rodriguez did not demonstrate a compromise of specific trial rights or a significant spillover effect that would confuse the jury. The court's decision aligns with the precedent set in Zafiro v. United States, emphasizing that a severance is warranted only if joint trials risk compromising a defendant's trial rights or impairing juror judgment about guilt or innocence. Rodriguez failed to show such risks.

Charles and Joseph challenge the sufficiency of evidence supporting their carjacking convictions related to the Commerce Bank robbery, asserting that the government did not prove the car was taken by force or intimidation, nor that there was intent to cause death or serious bodily injury. The standard of review emphasizes substantial evidence in favor of the government. Testimony from a bank employee indicated that one robber pointed a large gun at her, ordered her to the ground, and demanded her car keys, which she surrendered out of fear for her life. This testimony supports a finding of intimidation and intent to inflict harm, as the armed robbers had just committed a bank robbery and were in a desperate situation.

The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to uphold the convictions. Additional claims by the appellants, including arguments regarding the classification of the weapon under the carjacking statute and the constitutionality of the statute itself, were either rejected or deemed unnecessary to address, as they had been previously resolved in prior cases. There was also a claim regarding a potential due process violation, which was distinguished from a related precedent due to differing circumstances. Joseph's assertion about the carjacking statute's legitimacy under the Commerce Clause was noted but not further examined, as it had been previously resolved against him. Lastly, Charles's suspicion regarding a co-conspirator's non-prosecution was dismissed as unsupported by evidence in the record. The court affirmed the convictions of both appellants based on these assessments.