Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; November 12, 2002; Federal Appellate Court
Two criminal trials are involved in this appeal: one for Terrance J. Young and Yhosogn Jiles, and another solely for Jiles. A grand jury indicted Young on five counts and Jiles on two counts on September 17, 1998. The indictments included conspiracy to possess and distribute over 50 grams of crack cocaine and marijuana, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, using a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, and possessing ammunition as a felon. Young was convicted on all counts, while Jiles was convicted of possessing marijuana and conspiracy to distribute marijuana.
Jiles received a 60-month sentence for each count, to run consecutively but concurrently with another case. Young was sentenced to a total of 780 months for his convictions, with terms for each count served consecutively, along with 5 years of supervised release. In February 1999, a second indictment was issued against Jiles, charging him with conspiracy and possession of crack cocaine. He was convicted on all counts, but the jury did not determine the drug quantities involved.
Both Jiles and Young appealed their convictions. Young's attorney moved to withdraw based on Anders v. California, asserting no non-frivolous arguments for appeal, apart from a potential ineffective assistance claim better suited for a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. The court agreed to the withdrawal and dismissed the appeal after reviewing the record and issues raised. Young's attorney had considered the probable cause for the search warrant, sufficiency of evidence for the convictions, and the effectiveness of counsel, concluding that the latter required further factual development outside the record.
Ineffective assistance claims typically cannot be fully developed on direct appeal, and the court finds no error in the decision that preserves Young’s potential claim. All remaining issues raised by Young have been reviewed and deemed meritless. The trial presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, and the district court correctly ruled that the search warrant was valid. In response to an Anders brief, Young seeks new counsel to challenge the sufficiency of evidence for firearm-related counts, the failure to require jury determination of drug quantity, subject matter jurisdiction for one count, and the lack of a suppression hearing. These claims are also found to lack merit, leading to the decision not to appoint new counsel and to affirm the district court's rulings. Witness testimony established Young's involvement in gang-related activities, including threats and firing a weapon at rival gang members, sufficient to support his conviction. The district court's handling of drug quantity in sentencing was appropriate, as it fell within permissible ranges without requiring jury determination. Additionally, drug quantity is not an element for the firearm charge. The court confirmed its subject matter jurisdiction and found no need for a suppression hearing, as there were no disputed facts. Thus, Young’s attorney was justified in seeking withdrawal, and there is no basis for appointing new counsel.
Jiles was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess crack cocaine and sentenced to 365 months imprisonment for three counts, to be served concurrently. He challenges the sentence on grounds that it violated the Apprendi ruling, as the jury did not determine the drug quantity, which is essential for increasing the maximum sentence. The government acknowledges this error but argues that it does not meet the plain error standard required for reversal on appeal.
To succeed on a plain error claim, Jiles must show that the error affected substantial rights and that it was "plain" under current law. Even if plain error is established, the appellate court may only correct it if it significantly undermines the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings. The court found overwhelming evidence of drug quantity, particularly from a December 3, 1997, search that uncovered 28 grams of crack cocaine and cash typical of drug dealing, supporting the conviction and sentence.
The jury was instructed on joint possession, and all evidence indicated that Jiles possessed the crack cocaine alongside others, which met the threshold necessary for the imposed sentence. Jiles' additional arguments, which contradict established circuit precedent, include claims that a jury must decide all sentence-increasing factors and that 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) is unconstitutional, both of which have been previously rejected by the court. As Jiles provided no new rationale to challenge existing precedent, the court affirmed his conviction and sentence, granted a motion to withdraw from another appeal, and dismissed that appeal.
