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Moss v. Commissioner of Social Security

Citation: 39 F. App'x 989Docket: No. 01-5743

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; July 31, 2002; Federal Appellate Court

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Charles Moss appealed a district court judgment affirming the Commissioner’s denial of his applications for social security disability and supplemental security income benefits. The appeal process included a hearing that was delayed due to the submission of new evidence by Moss’s attorney, leading to an examination by a consulting psychologist. The ALJ determined that Moss had severe impairments, including degenerative disc disease and a personality disorder, which prevented him from performing past work. However, the ALJ concluded that Moss retained the ability to perform a limited range of light work and cited testimony from a vocational expert who identified over 10,000 unskilled, light jobs available to him, satisfying the Commissioner’s burden to show job availability.

The district court adopted a magistrate judge's recommendation to affirm the Commissioner’s decision despite Moss's objections. Moss's appeal focused on the reports from two psychologists, with one indicating a fair to poor ability in mental work requirements and the other noting moderate impairment. The court emphasized that it must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if supported by substantial evidence and cannot re-evaluate the case or resolve evidentiary conflicts. Moss claimed bias from the ALJ and improper legal standards, but these were deemed harmless errors insufficient for reversal. The court, therefore, upheld the determination that Moss was not disabled.

Moss's claims of judicial bias were dismissed upon reviewing the hearing transcript and the ALJ's opinion, with no substantial evidence found to support such bias, referencing Schweiker v. McClure. Moss contended that the ALJ improperly ordered a psychological examination by Dr. Amble in 1996, but the ALJ's decision aligned with regulations due to inconsistencies in Moss's medical records regarding his mental impairments. The ALJ did not abuse his discretion in contacting Dr. Amble, a psychologist familiar with Moss's case. Moss also argued the ALJ failed to provide adequate findings to justify the consultative examination order, but no authoritative requirement for specific findings was cited. Additionally, Moss's attorney could not question the medical expert about how to quantify a 'moderate restriction,' which Moss claimed led to an improper hypothetical posed to a vocational expert. However, Dr. Anderson clarified that he used definitions consistent with regulations, equating moderate impairment to a three on a five-point scale. Ultimately, Moss's arguments were deemed unpersuasive, and the district court's judgment was affirmed.