96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7855, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,034 George Washington Darryl Hicks v. Skystone-Eagle Lambert City of Santa Monica, and Bob Grant

Citation: 98 F.3d 1181Docket: 94-56685

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; October 27, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

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The case involves George Washington and Darryl Hicks, who filed a lawsuit against Santa Monica police officer Skystone Lambert and the City of Santa Monica, claiming violations of their Fourth Amendment rights due to an unlawful stop and seizure based on racial profiling. On June 25, 1991, after returning from a baseball game, the two African-American men were followed into a hotel parking garage by police, who used searchlights, ordered them out of their vehicle at gunpoint, handcuffed them, and detained them for up to 25 minutes while conducting a search. The police action was justified by Lambert on the basis that Washington and Hicks resembled suspects sought in connection with armed robberies, despite no incidents occurring in Santa Monica and the description being vague. The district court ruled in favor of Washington and Hicks, denying Lambert's claims of qualified immunity, as the court found the justification for the stop insufficient. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, underscoring the violation of the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights.

Police knowledge of the robbery suspects included descriptions identifying them as two African-American males, aged 20-30, with specific height and weight ranges: one tall (6' to 6'2", 150-170 pounds) and one short (5'5" to 5'7", 170-190 pounds). They were known to use various getaway vehicles, including a Porsche 911, BMW, and a stolen white Oldsmobile Cutlass, and were considered armed and dangerous. Neither suspects Washington nor Hicks matched these descriptions; Washington was 6'4" and 235 pounds, while Hicks was 5'7½" and weighed 135-140 pounds. 

Officer Lambert, believing he observed physical similarities between Washington and Hicks and the robbery suspects, called for backup and followed them from a fast-food restaurant. Hicks noticed the police following, prompting them to enter a white Plymouth Dynasty with a rental car sticker, which Lambert pursued. A license plate check revealed no stolen vehicle report. 

Upon arriving at their hotel, Washington and Hicks entered an underground parking garage where Lambert did not immediately follow. Police vehicles arrived shortly after they prepared to exit their car. Officers used spotlights and drawn guns to order Washington and Hicks to exit the vehicle, comply with instructions to interlock their fingers behind their heads, and walk backward toward the officers. They were handcuffed, patted down, and placed in separate police cars without resistance. 

Officers searched the rental car and items belonging to Washington and Hicks, checking their identifications, which revealed no outstanding warrants. After concluding their investigation, the two men were released. A total of three or four police cars, including a K-9 unit, were present in the garage, with varying accounts of the number of officers involved in the detention.

Washington and Hicks filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming their Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Defendant Lambert sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which was denied by District Judge Harry L. Hupp. During the trial, Judge Hupp again rejected Lambert's qualified immunity motion and granted a directed verdict for the plaintiffs, determining that the detention was effectively an arrest without probable cause, as established by precedent. The jury, however, was unable to reach a verdict on damages, leading the defendants to request reconsideration of the denial of qualified immunity. The judge maintained that Lambert had conducted an arrest rather than a valid Terry stop, while granting qualified immunity to the other officers who had reasonably relied on Lambert’s direction. A second trial was held in October 1994 to determine damages, resulting in a $10,000 award plus costs and attorney fees for each plaintiff.

The critical legal question was whether the police detention constituted a valid investigatory stop or an unlawful arrest. The court emphasized that there is no definitive rule for distinguishing between the two; rather, the determination relies on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the police actions and the extent of liberty restriction. Factors considered include the aggressiveness of the police tactics, the level of force used, and the justification for such tactics. Ultimately, the court supported the district judge's conclusion that the actions taken by the police amounted to an arrest, not an investigatory stop.

Police actions may qualify as an arrest under certain conditions, particularly when the suspect is cooperative; however, if a suspect is uncooperative or poses a potential threat to officer safety, those same actions may not constitute an arrest. The determination hinges on the reasonableness of the police conduct given the circumstances. Distinguishing between a Terry stop and an arrest is critical, as this classification affects the legality of police actions. A Terry stop can be lawful without probable cause, while an arrest requires it; improper classification can lead to evidence exclusion and potential liability for the officer.

The legal framework does not rely solely on the intrusiveness of police actions but considers the safety of law enforcement and the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Evaluating police conduct requires assessing the dangerousness of the situation. In some cases, aggressive police tactics may be justified during investigatory stops to ensure officer safety, even if those tactics do not meet the threshold for an arrest.

This nuanced approach stems from Terry v. Ohio, which established the acceptability of investigatory stops without probable cause. Courts allow police to adopt intrusive measures during these stops when justified by safety concerns, recognizing that the same actions may constitute an arrest in different contexts. This flexibility is essential for officer protection when facing potentially dangerous situations.

Requiring police officers to take unnecessary risks is deemed unreasonable, acknowledging the dangers inherent in law enforcement. However, the use of forceful tactics, such as pointing weapons or handcuffing during investigatory stops, does not automatically convert these stops into arrests necessitating probable cause. While police officers accept some level of physical jeopardy by choosing their profession, the rights of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as protected by the Fourth Amendment, must also be upheld. The document stresses that highly intrusive police actions, such as pulling individuals from cars at gunpoint or forcibly restraining them, cannot be justified by mere reasonable suspicion. Such actions are often viewed as violations of constitutional rights when the circumstances do not warrant them. Additionally, the impact of aggressive policing disproportionately affects African-American and Latino males, revealing systemic biases in law enforcement practices.

Lawson, an African-American man, was stopped or arrested fifteen times in predominantly white neighborhoods over 22 months, highlighting racial profiling. Studies show that 70% of stops by a Florida drug interdiction unit involved African-Americans or Hispanics, despite these groups constituting only 5% of drivers in that area, with only 5% of stops resulting in arrests. Similar patterns were reported in Maryland, where black motorists were searched four times more often than white motorists. Research indicates that police often lower their investigative standards for suspects described as minorities, leading to disproportionate intrusions. Although the evidence largely focuses on young, poor African-American males, older African-Americans and professionals also frequently experience police stops. Notable figures, including Deval Patrick and Christopher Darden, recount personal experiences of being stopped due to their race, even when driving high-end vehicles. These encounters are described as humiliating and damaging, reinforcing the pervasive reality of racism in the lives of many African-Americans, encapsulated in the term "Driving While Black."

The severity of police intrusions during investigatory stops is influenced by specific actions taken by law enforcement. Handcuffing significantly increases the intrusiveness of a stop, distinguishing it from a typical Terry stop, as established in United States v. Bautista and other cases. Similarly, drawing firearms elevates the seriousness of the encounter, as noted in United States v. Alvarez, with the Seventh Circuit emphasizing the heightened fear induced by a pointed gun. Physical restrictions on a suspect's liberty, such as removing them from a vehicle or detaining them in a police car, are also critical in determining whether an arrest has occurred, as demonstrated in various precedents.

The assessment of whether a stop becomes an arrest involves evaluating the reasonableness of police actions based on several factors. Particularly intrusive measures are deemed acceptable only in specific scenarios, including when a suspect is uncooperative, has known weapons, follows a violent crime, or when there is credible information about an imminent violent crime. The specificity of information regarding the suspects is crucial; the more detailed the intelligence about their potential resistance or danger, the more justified the officers are in employing aggressive tactics.

Courts assess the reasonableness of aggressive investigatory tactics during a Terry stop by considering several factors, including the number of police officers present. In the case of Serna-Barreto, it was deemed reasonable for a lone officer to approach suspects with his gun drawn due to being outnumbered. Conversely, in United States v. Ceballos, the presence of multiple officers surrounding a single suspect with drawn weapons was viewed as excessive. Similarly, in Jacobs, a single officer's directive to two suspects post-bank robbery was considered reasonable.

In the current case involving Washington and Hicks, their lack of provocation or threatening behavior prior to their encounter with police does not justify the intrusive measures taken by Officer Lambert. This scenario parallels Del Vizo, where police actions—drawing guns, handcuffing, and detaining a cooperative suspect—were classified as an arrest. The aggressive tactics employed here, despite the officers' belief that the individuals were drug dealers, did not meet the totality of circumstances test for lawful detention.

Key factors that typically justify aggressive police action, such as specific intelligence about weapons or a recent violent crime, were absent. There was no indication that Washington or Hicks were armed, nor were there specific similarities to suspects in prior crimes. The officer-to-suspect ratio, with more officers than suspects present, further undermines the justification for Lambert's actions.

The only link connecting Washington and Hicks to supermarket robberies was their vague physical resemblance to the suspects—two African-American males described in general terms. The descriptions lacked specific distinguishing features and did not accurately match the suspects’ characteristics, particularly in weight and build. This reliance on overly broad descriptions raises concerns about the potential for racial profiling, as many innocent individuals might be subjected to similar aggressive police tactics based solely on generalizations.

The legality of Officer Lambert's investigatory stop of Washington and Hicks is questioned, particularly regarding whether the minimal physical similarities to suspects in a robbery warrant reasonable suspicion. The court finds that Lambert lacked sufficient justification for the aggressive nature of the stop. Lambert's assertion that the use of a white rental car supported his actions is dismissed as illogical, given that the stolen vehicle involved in the robberies was of a different make and model, and there was no indication that criminals favored white cars. Lambert's argument that the timing of the stop—at night—was relevant is also rejected, as Washington and Hicks were dining at a restaurant, not loitering. The court criticizes any implicit bias suggesting the men were out of place in that neighborhood simply due to their race. Additionally, Lambert's observation that Washington appeared nervous fails to substantiate reasonable suspicion, especially as the officer's own description indicated a lack of nervous behavior. Ultimately, the court agrees with Judge Hupp's conclusion that the stop constituted an arrest without probable cause, warranting a directed verdict and leaving damages to be determined by a jury.

Lambert's appeal for qualified immunity was denied by the district court, prompting a de novo review. For police officers claiming qualified immunity related to Fourth Amendment violations, a two-part legal analysis is required, focusing on whether the right in question was clearly established and if the officer could reasonably believe their conduct was lawful. The law clearly established that highly intrusive measures during a Terry stop are not permissible unless justified by specific circumstances. In this case, Lambert conceded that there was no probable cause to arrest Washington and Hicks. The established law indicated that aggressive tactics are unwarranted when suspects are cooperative and there is no credible information suggesting they are armed or involved in a dangerous crime.

Given the minimal information Lambert had about Washington and Hicks, including their race, age, and togetherness in a rental car, the court determined that a reasonable officer would know that such intrusive actions were illegal. Lambert's justifications for the stops were deemed insubstantial, leading to the conclusion that he was not entitled to qualified immunity. The analysis confirmed that the first requirement for denying qualified immunity was satisfied, as the circumstances did not warrant the highly intrusive measures employed.

Lambert's claim for qualified immunity is unsupported by the precedents of Allen and Alexander. In Allen, the circumstances justified police actions due to a high-speed chase, uncooperative behavior from suspects, and indications of a stolen vehicle; none of these factors apply to Lambert's case. In contrast, Alexander involved specific, immediate threats as a robbery with gunfire had occurred nearby, and the police had detailed descriptions of the suspects. The court found that Alexander presented a close call regarding qualified immunity, whereas Lambert's situation is distinctly lacking in both temporal proximity to an offense and specific suspect identification. The current case exemplifies a significant Fourth Amendment violation, highlighting the inappropriate targeting of two African-American men based solely on vague similarities to robbery suspects. The district court's denial of qualified immunity and judgment for Washington and Hicks was appropriate and supported by the evidence. The ruling is affirmed, with Circuit Judge Kozinski concurring but refraining from broader sociological commentary on police racial biases, emphasizing that the case focused on a specific constitutional violation.

The police conduct described is deemed shockingly below societal standards of decency, with specific instances of unlawful detentions of high-profile African Americans, including Joe Morgan, Jamaal Wilkes, Al Joyner, Wesley Snipes, and Blair Underwood. These incidents highlight a troubling pattern of disproportionate stops and aggressive actions against African Americans. The excerpt references a historical perspective from Justice Jackson regarding unlawful searches and detentions of innocent individuals, emphasizing a lack of accountability for such actions. The duration of handcuffing to release varied between 15 to 25 minutes according to one party and 5 to 10 minutes according to the defense. Officer Lambert's testimony regarding the request for a computer check on warrants was inconsistent, as the radio log did not support his claim. Despite observing no suspicious behavior, both Officers Lambert and Rutan drew their guns during the encounter, suggesting an aggressive approach without justifiable cause.

Officer Marroquin did not draw his weapon during the incident in question. Lambert acknowledged that if the stop constituted an arrest, there was no probable cause to justify it, and he does not challenge this assertion on appeal. The district judge, recognizing the illogical nature of the law as it stands, hopes that the higher court will consider his comments. The court indicates it has reviewed these comments carefully and provides further explanations in response.

Factors such as the duration of the detention and the level of fear and humiliation caused by police conduct are crucial in determining if a stop amounts to an arrest. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have noted that both the length of the stop and the aggressiveness of police tactics warrant consideration. Even a brief stop may be deemed an arrest if the police tactics are overly forceful. 

In previous cases, such as Allen and Taylor, the courts found that no arrest occurred despite police drawing weapons and handcuffing individuals under circumstances that might seem arrest-like, particularly in contexts involving high-speed chases or non-compliance. The courts emphasized the need for context, noting that actions taken to restrain suspects fleeing or posing a threat can influence the determination of whether an arrest occurred. Examples are given where police relied on informant tips or descriptions closely matching suspects involved in recent crimes to justify stops.

In United States v. Buffington, police stopped suspects near a bank based on an informant's tip about an impending robbery, recognizing one suspect with a violent criminal history. In Greene, officers acted on specific information that suspects were armed, particularly when one suspect disobeyed a command. The court ultimately held in Del Vizo that police actions, although overly intrusive, were lawful due to probable cause for arrest. Testimony indicated that various vehicles were used in the robberies, and Lambert noted that in a similar case (Alexander), the police considered the use of rental cars common among criminals; however, this was deemed irrelevant in the current case because the police did not know if the suspects’ vehicle was a rental prior to stopping them. The only vehicle linked to the robberies was stolen, and the types of cars used were not consistent with typical rental cars. The law in effect at the time of the stop is crucial, with Alexander and Allen being the only cases not decided prior to the stop of Washington and Hicks. The case of United States v. Torres-Sanchez supported that an investigatory stop can be distinct from an arrest, as long as the officer employs non-intrusive tactics. The appropriateness of Lambert relying on cases decided after the conduct remains unaddressed, but it is suggested that if those cases do not introduce new legal principles, reliance may be acceptable.