United States of America, and Duwamish Indian Tribe Snohomish Indian Tribe Steilacoom Indian Tribe, Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellants v. State of Washington Nisqually Indian Tribe Hoh Indian Tribe Lummi Indian Nation Skokomish Indian Tribe Jamestown Band of Klallams Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe Port Gamble Band Clallam Muckleshoot Indian Tribe Quinault Indian Nation Quileute Indian Tribe Tulalip Tribe Makah Indian Tribe Suquamish Indian Tribe Puyallup Tribe Swinomish Indian Tribal Community Nooksack Tribe Upper Skagit Tribe

Citations: 98 F.3d 1159; 96 Daily Journal DAR 12887; 36 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 66; 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7792; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 27479Docket: 95-35202

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; October 23, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

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In 1979, Judge George H. Boldt ruled that five Northwest Indian tribes lacked treaty fishing rights. In 1993, the Duwamish, Snohomish, and Steilacoom Tribes (collectively referred to as the Three Tribes) sought relief from this ruling under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), claiming that Judge Boldt may have been suffering from Alzheimer's disease at the time of his decision. Their motion faced opposition from the United States, the State of Washington, and most tribes holding treaty fishing rights. The district court denied the motion on January 23, 1995, leading the Three Tribes to appeal. The appeal was heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

The original case began in 1970 when the U.S. government, acting as trustee for seven Indian tribes, sued the State of Washington to enforce the Stevens Treaties related to fishing rights. By 1974, Judge Boldt had determined that fourteen tribes held fishing rights under these treaties. Subsequently, five additional tribes, including the Three Tribes, sought to intervene in the case. Magistrate Judge Robert E. Cooper heard the case regarding the Five Tribes' treaty status and concluded in 1975 that they did not possess fishing rights due to a lack of political cohesion. This finding was upheld after a de novo evidentiary hearing conducted by Judge Boldt.

In February 1978, Judge Boldt underwent surgery for an aortic aneurysm and communicated to counsel on July 25, 1978, that he was recovering but not fully well, intending to rule on the status of the Five Tribes in the coming months. On February 7, 1979, citing health concerns, he requested to be removed from the case. The Samish, Snoqualmie, Snohomish, and Steilacoom tribes subsequently filed a motion for a ruling on their treaty status regarding fishing rights, which Chief Judge McGovern granted on March 14, 1979, emphasizing judicial efficiency. Judge Boldt ruled on March 23, 1979, that the Five Tribes had no rights under the Stevens Treaties, adopting the United States' proposed findings. He denied a reconsideration motion on April 25, 1979. The tribes appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the ruling in a split decision, noting Judge Boldt’s application of an incorrect legal test but ultimately agreeing with his findings regarding the tribes' historical continuity. The U.S. Supreme Court denied the tribes' certiorari petition in 1982. Judge Boldt passed away in 1984. A 1992 article revealed that he suffered from Alzheimer's disease, which began in 1978, and his son remarked on the decline in his father’s mental acuity post-surgery, although he maintained that Judge Boldt was competent when he ruled against the tribes in 1979.

On November 22, 1993, the Three Tribes filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in the U.S. District Court for Western Washington, seeking relief from Judge Boldt's 1979 judgment, specifically to investigate the judge's mental health at the time of his decision. During the oral argument on November 11, 1994, nearly a year after filing, the Tribes maintained that the motion was limited to this discovery purpose; however, the record does not indicate any prior request for such discovery. On January 23, 1995, Judge Barbara J. Rothstein denied the motion without addressing whether Rule 60(b)(6) could apply due to a judge's disability. The court emphasized the importance of maintaining the finality of judgments, the risk of opening the door to numerous challenges based on judicial incompetence, and noted that the Tribes did not experience "manifest injustice" since subsequent rulings by a magistrate judge and the Ninth Circuit confirmed Judge Boldt's decision. The court found no extraordinary circumstances justifying the reopening of the 1979 order.

The Three Tribes appealed this decision, which will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. This standard requires a clear conviction that the district court made an error in judgment while weighing relevant factors. Rule 60(b)(6) allows relief from a final judgment for any reason justifying such relief, but it is intended for extraordinary circumstances to prevent manifest injustice and is applied sparingly. The court has previously noted that the use of this rule should only occur when extraordinary circumstances have hindered timely action to correct an erroneous judgment.

The Three Tribes seek relief under Rule 60(b)(6) due to concerns that they were denied a competent fact-finder when Judge Boldt determined their treaty status. The court finds that this case does not qualify as one warranting the vacating of an erroneous judgment due to "extraordinary circumstances." The Tribes' evidence consists of Judge Boldt's death certificate, which indicates an Alzheimer's diagnosis in 1978, and a newspaper article mentioning changes in his behavior post-surgery. However, the article also asserts that Judge Boldt was mentally competent during the decision-making process. Correspondence from Judge Boldt confirms that he was aware of his physical limitations and his obligation to rule on the tribes' status. When he felt unable to continue, he requested to be removed from the case, but the tribes insisted he make a ruling first. Both the district court and a magistrate judge have reviewed the case and reached conclusions consistent with Judge Boldt's ruling, indicating no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to reopen the judgment. The court affirms the denial of the Tribes' motion.

In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Kozinski criticizes the majority for assuming that Rule 60(b) applies to this situation, arguing that the district court could not have granted relief even if the Tribes conclusively demonstrated Judge Boldt’s mental impairment. He asserts that Rule 60(b) does not provide independent authority to set aside past judgments but only allows for setting aside judgments based on reasons that existed at the time of the original ruling. He emphasizes the need to determine whether Judge Boldt's alleged disability would have warranted recusal or reversal had it been known at the time of judgment.

A party may petition for a judge's recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455 if there is a financial conflict of interest, which is a recognized ground for disqualification. Other grounds include bias, prejudice, and personal knowledge of disputed facts, but any party seeking recusal must cite a specific statutory basis, as common law does not provide residual authority for disqualification. Claims of a judge's disability—whether mental or physical—are not grounds for recusal under these statutes; instead, concerns about a judge's fitness must be reported to the circuit judicial council, which can investigate and recommend actions such as voluntary retirement or reassignment of cases. This process differs from recusal motions, as it is a separate quasi-adjudicative proceeding. The legislation was influenced by cases like Chandler v. Judicial Council, which highlighted the challenges of addressing an unfit Article III judge without impeachment. The constitutionality of the measures under § 372 has been debated due to concerns about judicial independence.

Section 372 establishes a balance between judicial independence and the need for a competent judiciary, granting judicial councils, rather than courts of appeals, the authority to remove disabled judges. Judicial councils, comprising district and circuit judges, are deemed more equipped to address issues of judicial disability than appellate judges. Therefore, the Tribes could not have compelled Judge Boldt's recusal, even if they had known of his disability during his tenure over their case, and his judgment cannot be invalidated years later under Rule 60(b) on this ground.

The majority's second error pertains to the discovery process related to Rule 60(b), which the author disputes as inapplicable. The majority asserts that the district judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the Tribes' request for discovery regarding Judge Boldt's mental health at the time of his judgment. However, if mental disability were a valid reason to set aside a judgment, the Tribes would have warranted discovery. An analogy is drawn to a scenario where a judge's undisclosed financial interest necessitates discovery from a broker, emphasizing that late discovery requests should not be denied if the moving party acts in good faith and provides a reasonable basis for relevance.

The Tribes have presented compelling evidence suggesting Judge Boldt suffered from mental impairment when he adjudicated their case, including testimony from a close relative and a death certificate documenting an Alzheimer's diagnosis prior to the judgment. Although the majority claims that Judge Boldt was aware of his physical decline, there is insufficient evidence that he recognized the full extent of his mental impairment. If disability were deemed a legitimate basis for overturning the judgment, the Tribes should have been allowed to seek discovery from the judge's medical professionals to clarify his competency. The discussion surrounding a judge's mental state has evolved from being considered taboo, as illustrated by past legal precedents.

The increasing size of the federal judiciary and advancements in medical technology raise concerns about judges' mental capacity to serve. A critical issue addressed is whether parties can overturn a judgment if they demonstrate the judge was mentally incapacitated at the time of the decision. The majority opinion's reliance on the vague "abuse of discretion" standard leaves room for parties to challenge past rulings by investigating judges' health records, potentially leading to the reopening of old cases. The author criticizes this approach, asserting that Congress intentionally excluded mental disability as a reason for disqualifying judges and argues against the interpretation that Rule 60(b) allows for correcting judgments based on perceived mental incompetence. The author calls for a definitive ruling that prohibits using Rule 60(b) for such purposes. Additionally, the excerpt references the historical context of the Lummi tribe's fishing rights established in 1974, the resistance faced by Judge Boldt's decision, and the subsequent Supreme Court affirmation of his interpretation of the Stevens Treaties, which has influenced natural resource management in the northwest.

Judge Boldt's 1974 ruling has implications for international agreements, as demonstrated in *Confederated Tribes, Bands of Yakima Indian Nation v. Baldrige*, which endorsed stipulations related to the U.S.-Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty. The legal framework includes 16 U.S.C. § 3632, which establishes a tribal seat on the International Pacific Salmon Commission, and 50 C.F.R. § 301.20, addressing regulations for treaty tribes under the International Pacific Halibut Commission. Section 372 appears to permit only prospective relief and prohibits judicial councils from acting on pending cases. The judicial council has emphasized it cannot resolve matters that pertain to the merits of a case, which should be addressed through standard appellate processes. Administrative remedies under Section 372 are available only when there isn't a suitable judicial remedy. Importantly, decisions made by the judicial council are not subject to court review but can be appealed to the Judicial Conference of the United States. Furthermore, the majority opinion suggests that any impact from Judge Boldt's disability was temporary, as both the magistrate and the appellate court concurred with his decisions. However, this perspective may undervalue the district judge's role, particularly in cases where judges make factual determinations or exercise discretion, indicating that the majority's reasoning may not apply uniformly across different legal contexts.