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United States v. Edward Ruben Sotelo, Ernesto Castro Quintana, Henry Arguijo, Gary Artiaga, Lawrence Anthony Flores, and Joe Angelo Sotelo, Jr.
Citation: 97 F.3d 782Docket: 95-10755, 95-10758, 95-10760, 95-10762, 95-10766 and 95-10794
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; November 20, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
Defendants-Appellants, including Edward Ruben Sotelo and five others, appealed their convictions and sentences for involvement in a drug trafficking conspiracy. The appellate court, finding no reversible error, upheld the lower court's decisions. The defendants were indicted on twelve counts related to a marijuana and cocaine distribution conspiracy that spanned from 1990 to January 19, 1995. A jury convicted all six appellants on the conspiracy charge (Count 1). Individual sentences included: - Henry Arguijo: 160 months for conspiracy. - Edward Sotelo: Life imprisonment and a $50,000 fine for multiple charges, including continuing criminal enterprise and various drug-related counts. - Joe Angelo Sotelo: Life imprisonment for possession of cocaine and conspiracy. - Ernesto Castro Quintana: 151 months for possession of cocaine and marijuana with intent to distribute, plus conspiracy. - Lawrence Flores: 235 months for distribution of cocaine and conspiracy. - Gary Artiaga: 270 months for using a communication facility to commit a felony and conspiracy, along with a $25,000 fine. From 1988 to 1992, Edward Sotelo worked under Arguijo, later becoming a primary distributor as orders shifted directly to him. Testimony from twelve narcotics offenders and law enforcement outlined the Sotelo drug operation, with video evidence capturing activity at a warehouse linked to the conspiracy, including interactions between Sotelo, Artiaga, and others involved in the drug trade. Eric Bryant, a codefendant, pleaded guilty to drug charges and testified about his extensive involvement with the Sotelo drug organization, where he purchased cocaine in kilogram quantities to convert into crack for sale. On June 2, 1994, police intercepted conversations at Edward Sotelo's residence regarding a two-kilogram cocaine deal, which led to the recovery of a kilogram of cocaine from Bryant shortly after it was delivered in a cereal box. Another witness, Kevin Blevins, began purchasing drugs from the Sotelo organization in 1993 and escalated to kilogram quantities of cocaine. Following his arrest in August 1994, Blevins arranged a drug buy with Edward Sotelo, resulting in a police chase where drugs were discarded from the vehicle. In a separate incident, Joe Sotelo and others kidnapped Gilberto Robles, the brother of a supplier who had delivered flour instead of cocaine, but he was returned unharmed due to fear of retaliation. Arthur Franklin, another witness, coordinated a cocaine deal with Edward Sotelo, leading to their arrest during the monitored transaction. Regarding the sufficiency of evidence for Edward Sotelo's convictions for Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) and Distribution of Cocaine, the standard of review permits a conviction to stand if evidence viewed favorably to the prosecution supports a rational finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The CCE conviction requires proof that the defendant managed five or more individuals in a series of drug violations yielding significant income, with the relationships not needing to exist simultaneously or uniformly. The government does not need to demonstrate that the defendant is the sole leader of the operation. Edward Sotelo asserts that the evidence supports the existence of multiple conspiracies rather than a single conspiracy, claiming he acted independently, as indicated by referrals from other drug sellers. The court evaluates whether single or multiple conspiracies exist based on three factors: 1) common goal, 2) nature of the scheme, and 3) overlap of participants. The court found a common goal in the sale of cocaine and marijuana, a consistent scheme involving large drug sales, and substantial interrelation among indicted co-defendants and cooperating witnesses, except for undercover informant Arthur Franklin. Sotelo's conviction for a Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) is upheld as the evidence satisfies legal criteria. The government must prove that a defendant knowingly distributed a controlled substance, which was established against Sotelo in relation to Count 12, despite his claims that Franklin’s testimony was perjured. The court found no evidence of perjury, as Franklin’s testimony was corroborated by recorded conversations and police observations. Gary Artiaga challenges his conspiracy conviction, claiming ignorance of the conspiracy. However, evidence includes his name on the lease of the drug warehouse, surveillance footage of his visits, and testimony regarding his involvement in drug transactions with Sotelo, including discussions about negotiations and prices. Thus, the evidence sufficiently supports Artiaga's conviction. Lawrence Flores contests the sufficiency of evidence for his conspiracy and distribution convictions, arguing that the testimony against him was not credible. Evidence presented showed Flores participated in multiple drug transactions with Sotelo, handled drugs during transactions, and was present at the drug warehouse, confirming his involvement in the conspiracy and distribution efforts. Flores asserts that the evidence for Count 12 is inadequate, arguing it only indicates his presence at the drug buy. However, officer testimony demonstrated that Flores actively participated by leaving the apartment to retrieve drugs from a car and returning, contradicting his claim of innocence. Thus, the evidence sufficiently supports his convictions on Counts 1 and 12. Ernesto Quintana argues that the Government did not prove his knowledge regarding Counts 1, 10, and 11, claiming he was merely present during drug transactions and unaware they were occurring. He also contends there was no evidence of his agreement to commit any crime necessary for a conspiracy conviction. However, evidence against him included his involvement in multiple drug deliveries with Edward Sotelo, direct participation in transactions, and being present during crucial moments of the sting operation, which sufficiently supports the jury's verdict. Regarding the exclusion of minority members from the jury venire, appellants claim their right to a fair cross-section was violated due to the underrepresentation of Hispanics, as only one was present in a 50-person panel. The trial court found no systematic exclusion, a determination reviewed for clear error. To establish a prima facie violation, a defendant must show the group is distinctive, underrepresented in venires compared to their community numbers, and that this is due to systematic exclusion. Edward Sotelo did not meet this burden, so the trial court's denial of his motion to quash the panel was not clear error. Edward and Joe Sotelo challenge the district court's decision to disqualify their shared attorney, Denver McCarty, due to potential conflicts of interest. The court's discretion in such matters is reviewed for abuse. Despite the defendants’ willingness to waive any conflict, the court determined a conflict might arise, particularly in plea negotiations, leading to the requirement that each defendant obtain separate counsel. The Sotelo brothers argue this decision infringed their Sixth Amendment right to choose their counsel. The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused person's right to choose their attorney, emphasizing the need for effective representation rather than the mere preference for a specific lawyer. The right to counsel choice can be restricted by actual or serious potential conflicts of interest, even if a defendant wishes to waive such conflicts. In this case, the trial court appropriately determined that separate representation for each defendant was necessary to uphold the Sixth Amendment during pretrial plea negotiations, and this decision was supported by the case record, showing no abuse of discretion. Regarding Brady v. Maryland, appellants argued the government violated their rights by failing to disclose evidence that could impeach witness Arthur Franklin, asserting this warranted a new trial. The government is constitutionally required to disclose evidence favorable to the accused. The suppression of such evidence necessitates reversal if it undermines confidence in the trial's outcome. After the jury's verdict, the government revealed Franklin's ongoing drug trafficking involvement, which had not been disclosed during the trial despite being known to a government agent prior to evidence closure. However, while Edward Sotelo and Flores were implicated in the drug transaction Franklin testified about, the other appellants' claims were deemed frivolous. The court concluded that even if Franklin's credibility had been undermined, the corroborative evidence from DEA agents and recorded conversations made it unlikely that this new information would have altered the trial's outcome. Edward Sotelo and Artiaga argued that the district court erred by denying their request for a written copy of the jury charge during deliberations. The decision to provide a written charge is at the trial judge's discretion, as established in United States v. Acosta. Although a written charge was prepared and read, Artiaga's request for a copy was denied. The appellants contended that the complexity of the charges warranted a written version for jury clarity, especially since the jury had requested a portion of the instructions to be read back. The district court complied with this request but did not read other relevant definitions, potentially leading to confusion. However, past case law, including United States v. Perez, indicates disapproval of providing written jury instructions. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying the written charge request. In relation to Flores's objection to the prosecutor's closing argument, which referred to him as "the chubby man," the district court overruled the objection despite initially sustaining it. The reviewing court must determine if the comments were both inappropriate and harmful for a conviction reversal. Since Flores's objection at trial was based on a different premise than on appeal, the plain error standard was applied. The prosecutor's remark was deemed a logical inference from the evidence, and although it could be seen as bolstering the witness's credibility, the overall prejudicial effect was minimal. Additionally, there was no cautionary instruction provided, but the evidence against Flores was strong. Consequently, Flores did not demonstrate reversible error regarding the prosecutor's comments. Edward Sotelo, Artiaga, and Quintana argue that the district court erred by limiting their closing argument time to 10 minutes each, asserting this constraint hindered their ability to address the complex case involving multiple conspiracies, extensive evidence, and numerous witnesses. The court initially allocated 30 minutes for the Government and 45 minutes for the appellants but later reduced the appellants' time based on objections. The appellants contend this allocation was inadequate, yet the Government counters that the appellants failed to substantiate their claims regarding what arguments were excluded. The appellate review concluded there was no abuse of discretion, as the appellants effectively summarized their positions within the provided time. In relation to jury misconduct, the same defendants sought mistrials and new trials, alleging the district court mishandled accusations of juror misconduct and denied their request to interview jurors post-trial. The court's handling of such complaints is reviewed for abuse of discretion, requiring a balance between potential harm from misconduct and disruption caused by inquiries. Juror Gloria Ayala reported racial remarks made by others during deliberations, prompting the court to consider questioning her in front of the jury. The defendants objected to this approach as intimidating, but the objection was denied, demonstrating the court's discretion in managing jury-related issues. The district court summoned the jury to address concerns raised by Juror Ayala regarding feelings of racial tension experienced during deliberations. The court instructed Ayala to refrain from disclosing specific details about the jury's deliberation process. Ayala expressed discomfort, indicating that she felt the jurors were viewing the defendants predominantly as "Mexican boys" rather than simply as individuals. The court sought clarification on whether her feelings stemmed from trial proceedings or interactions among jurors, to which Ayala confirmed that her concerns were related to the reactions of other jurors rather than any comments made during the trial. Ayala described feeling singled out during discussions, particularly when her dissenting opinion was targeted without addressing the group, which contributed to her perception of racial tension. Despite the court's efforts to elicit more specific examples of offensive remarks or behaviors, Ayala struggled to articulate further instances but maintained that her concerns were serious. Juror Ayala left the jury room due to an incident that prompted her concern, though she could not provide additional examples. The district court found no evidence of racial bias among jurors despite Ayala’s claims and the observations of other jurors nodding in agreement with her. The court instructed the jury to continue deliberating based solely on evidence, disregarding race or national origin, and commended Ayala for her actions while advising jurors to report any further issues. Following the verdict, appellants sought a mistrial and a new trial, claiming Ayala’s statements indicated jury misconduct, which the court denied. They argued a violation of their Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, while the Government maintained that the district court’s response was adequate given its discretion in addressing jury misconduct. The court acknowledged the unacceptability of racial bias but noted the lack of Fifth Circuit precedent for handling such allegations during trial. It differentiated between extrinsic influences, like outside information, and intrinsic influences, such as juror statements made during the trial. The court emphasized broader discretion in dealing with intrinsic misconduct and rejected the appellants’ attempt to frame the racial bias incident as extrinsic, which would invoke a different standard of analysis. The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether jury misconduct has affected deliberations and the verdict. The case references United States v. Heller, where the Eleventh Circuit found an error in denying a mistrial due to jurors making anti-Semitic comments, which compromised the impartiality required by the Sixth Amendment. In Heller, the trial judge's individual questioning revealed significant juror bias. While acknowledging Heller's insights on juror prejudice, the current case is distinguishable because no overt racial remarks were made, only inferred prejudice. Juror Ayala indicated perceived bias against Hispanics, but the trial court's investigative methods were not deemed overly coercive and did not violate the defendants' rights to an impartial jury. Additionally, the focus on Rule 606(b), which pertains to juror testimony after a verdict, is misplaced since the issue arose pre-verdict, making the trial court's denial of post-trial jury interviews moot. Regarding the admission of hearsay evidence implicating Flores in a drug buy, the district court's decision to deny a mistrial is scrutinized under FED. R. EVID. 103(a), which requires that a substantial right must be affected for a reversal. The court notes that if evidence is stricken and the jury is instructed to disregard it, the likelihood of it influencing the verdict diminishes. A police officer’s testimony about two Hispanic males arriving at the apartment during the drug buy is noted in this context. Edward Sotelo was identified as one of two men involved in a drug buy, with the second man later identified as Lawrence Flores. The district court sustained an objection to hearsay regarding Flores' identity, instructing the jury to disregard the officer's testimony. On appeal, Flores did not demonstrate how this hearsay affected his substantial rights, as his identity was corroborated by two other non-hearsay witnesses. Therefore, the admission of the hearsay was deemed harmless. Joe Sotelo requested a mistrial after a government witness inadvertently mentioned his arrest for murder. Although Joe Sotelo's hearsay objection was sustained and the court instructed the jury to disregard the statement, he argued that the comment was too prejudicial. The court denied the mistrial request but allowed Joe Sotelo to suggest further jury instructions. The government argued that any prejudicial impact was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of Joe Sotelo's guilt, a view supported by case law. Joe Sotelo also challenged the district court's decision to limit his cross-examination of witness Juan Robles regarding five pending felony charges, including two for attempted murder. The trial court has discretion to impose limits on cross-examination, but such limits must adhere to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Joe Sotelo contended that the limitations impaired his ability to impeach Robles' credibility, particularly concerning potential bias or motive to testify falsely. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow impeachment of a witness with state indictments, as no evidence was presented to show the government could influence state court proceedings. The witness, Robles, explicitly denied that his cooperation was motivated by a desire for leniency regarding his pending charges. The district court's limitation on cross-examination was deemed appropriate. Regarding the cumulative effect of errors, the court found no merit in Artiaga's argument that errors denied him his Fifth Amendment right to due process. The court upheld the trial court's findings during sentencing, which must only be clearly erroneous to be overturned, and affirmed that credibility determinations are within the trial court’s discretion. In sentencing issues, particularly concerning drug quantity, the court highlighted that a defendant is accountable for all relevant conduct linked to conspiracy. The pre-sentence report indicated Quintana was accountable for 9,638 kilograms of marijuana equivalency. Quintana challenged this, arguing he was only aware of significantly lesser quantities from a specific incident but was countered by government testimony indicating his involvement in broader transactions. Quintana was granted a 2-level reduction for minor participation in the offense but argued for a 4-level reduction for minimal participation, which was not awarded by the district court. Nominal participant status under §3B1.2 is designated for defendants who are among the least culpable in a group offense, characterized by a lack of knowledge or understanding of the enterprise's extent and the actions of others. Examples include individuals with minimal involvement, such as those participating in only a small aspect of a larger drug operation. Evidence from Quintana's extensive involvement in over twenty drug deliveries led the district court to dismiss his claim of minimal participation. In Artiaga's case, the Pre-sentence Report indicated he was accountable for 186 kilograms of cocaine based on multiple testimonies, although he argued against direct involvement in the entire quantity. He acknowledged distributing 130-140 kilograms, and the court's attribution of the remaining amount was deemed not clearly erroneous due to his close relationship with Edward Sotelo. Flores contested the district court's decision to increase his offense level by two for his involvement in the kidnapping of Gilberto Robles, arguing it was not foreseeable or jointly undertaken with him. Despite being present during the kidnapping and claiming he was threatened while trying to assist Gilberto, the court found his involvement in the drug deal and kidnapping sufficient for the enhancement. The district court's sentence for Flores considered his minimal assistance and was affirmed as plausible. The convictions and sentences for all appellants were upheld. Edward Sotelo was acquitted on two cocaine distribution counts, and other details regarding concurrent sentences and legal rules about joint representation and juror contact were noted but not elaborated on due to their complexity and irrelevance to the main issues.