David Thurman v. Richard Gramley, Marshall Jackson v. Dean Neitzke, Benny Michael Brown v. Lawrence E. Feldkamp and Federal Bureau of Prisons, Eddie Lee Walker v. Kenneth Perre and Bruce Hills, Douglas Jackson v. J.J. Clark, Warden, Federal Prison Camp, Terre Haute
Docket: 96-1062
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; September 23, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit consolidated five cases concerning the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The cases involve plaintiffs David Thurman, Marshall Jackson, Benny Michael Brown, Eddie Lee Walker, and Douglas Jackson, all proceeding pro se against various defendants, including officials from the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
The court addressed the jurisdictional issues surrounding Douglas Jackson's challenge to his federal conviction filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The district court dismissed his case, ruling that such a challenge should be pursued under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the district of conviction, not in the district of custody. The court affirmed this dismissal, concluding that a § 2241 petition focused on a sentence is not a "civil action" subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act but rather a continuation of the criminal proceedings. The court clarified that a proper § 2241 action would involve issues related to prison conditions rather than sentencing. Additionally, any further requests for relief under § 2255 would require prior approval from the court as stipulated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.
In the case of Walker v. Perre, the court determined that the appeal filed by Walker is jurisdictionally untimely, as his notice of appeal was received after the deadline. Following the precedent set in Martin, the court ruled that the appellate fees must still be assessed and collected, even for untimely appeals, meaning that dismissal of the appeal does not warrant a refund of fees already paid. Under 28 U.S.C. 1915(b)(1), prisoners appealing in forma pauperis must pay the full filing fee, though they can do so in installments. Consequently, the court will collect the $105 fee while dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
In the Brown v. Feldkamp case, the court addressed a Bivens action where Brown’s notice of appeal was also received after the relevant deadline. Since the district court allowed Brown to proceed in forma pauperis under prior law, his status carried over automatically for the appeal. Nonetheless, according to Covino v. Reopel and 28 U.S.C. 1915(b)(1), this does not exempt him from his obligation to pay appellate fees. Brown must provide a certified trust fund account statement to proceed with his appeal; failure to do so will result in dismissal for noncompliance, although fees will still be assessed. The clerk will instruct Brown’s prison to remit the appellate fees from his account, and he must ensure that the necessary payments are made, especially if he transfers to a new facility. Nonpayment, barring destitution, will be treated as a voluntary waiver of the right to file future in forma pauperis suits, akin to a history of frivolous litigation under 1915(g). The district court clerk will monitor payment histories and relay nonpayment information to this court for appropriate judicial action.
David Thurman, the plaintiff in a 1983 action, submitted a late notice of appeal on December 13, 1995, which the district court retroactively extended on January 4, 1996, under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5). However, the court subsequently denied Thurman permission to appeal in forma pauperis, deeming the appeal frivolous. On March 4, 1996, Thurman requested certification that his appeal was not frivolous to proceed IFP, but the introduction of the Act raised the issue of whether appellate fees should be imposed before this motion could be considered.
The court reiterated its stance from prior cases, emphasizing that the Act mandates fees for civil actions and appeals. It aligned with White v. Gregory, determining that fees should not be imposed for appeals filed before April 26, as opposed to Covino, which suggested otherwise. The court clarified that the Act specifies the events requiring fee assessment—namely, the initiation of a case and the filing of an appeal—indicating that fees do not apply to subsequent actions.
The key question is whether Thurman "filed" his appeal before April 26. While the district court had stamped the appeal as filed, the refusal to allow Thurman to proceed IFP complicated matters, as such permission was crucial for those unable to pay fees upfront. The court referenced previous rulings stating that a civil action is not fully "filed" until the district court addresses the IFP motion. Ultimately, a document submitted to the clerk is valid for statute of limitations purposes if the court later grants permission to proceed IFP, indicating that until the court makes a decision on the IFP motion, the appeal remains in a pending state.
Litigants like Thurman may face unexpected liability due to delays and new statutory requirements. Thurman submitted his notice of appeal and request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) before the new mandatory-assessment rules took effect. The interpretation of the law indicates that an appeal submitted before April 26 does not become officially "filed" until the IFP motion is resolved. Martin established that for appeals filed after April 25, fee payment must occur before any frivolousness assessment; however, for those lodged before April 26, the process is reversed. To protect litigants from unforeseen fees, Thurman and similar parties will receive notice and the chance to dismiss the appeal before incurring costs.
In the case of Marshall Jackson, who filed his notice of appeal between April 24 and May 2, the filing date is crucial for determining fee obligations. If filed on or after April 26, Jackson must pay fees, while appeals filed on April 24 or 25 fall under the previous law. The district court has allowed Jackson to proceed IFP but has not clarified the filing date or fee assessment, leading to a remand for necessary actions.
In summary, Thurman has 21 days to decide whether to dismiss his appeal to avoid fees. In Jackson v. Neitzke, the record is remanded for fee determination. In Brown v. Feldkamp, fees will be assessed unless Brown submits the required trust fund statement within 21 days; otherwise, he cannot avoid fees. Walker v. Perre involves fee assessment and dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction. Finally, in Jackson v. Clark, the new Act does not apply, and the judgment is affirmed.
