United States v. Olufunke Yusuff, Also Known as Stella Johnson

Citations: 96 F.3d 982; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24853; 1996 WL 536619Docket: 95-3219

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; September 23, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

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In February 1994, Olufunke Yusuff, also known as Stella Johnson, was indicted by a federal grand jury for intent to distribute 686 grams of heroin, violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Yusuff pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to suppress evidence, which the district court denied after a hearing. Subsequently, she entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving her right to appeal the suppression ruling. The court sentenced Yusuff to 97 months in prison followed by four years of supervised release and imposed a $50 special assessment fee. Yusuff appealed both her sentence and the suppression ruling.

The case arose from a DEA and Chicago Police Department investigation at O'Hare Airport. On January 10, 1994, agents conducted drug interdictions and received information from a DEA informant regarding a TWA flight from New York. Agent Stewart, investigating potential drug couriers, noted a passenger named 'S. Johnson' who had booked a one-way flight shortly before departure. Upon disembarkation, Yusuff exhibited nervous behavior and made a brief phone call, which heightened the officers' suspicions. Although the officers did not initially know her identity, they observed her actions, consistent with behaviors associated with drug couriers.

Agent Stewart, a police officer, approached Yusuff at an airport, identified himself, and asked to speak with her. Yusuff confirmed she had flown in from New York to visit her sick sister but could not provide her sister's address or workplace. After revealing she had no identification except a calling card, she was informed she was free to leave but agreed to answer additional questions. Yusuff claimed she packed her own bag and had no other items to carry. When asked about money or drugs, she produced $300 in cash. After consenting to a search of her bag, which yielded only clothing, Officer Martin requested to pat Yusuff down. Initially, Yusuff purportedly consented, but during the suppression hearing, she claimed she had refused. During the pat-down, a hard object was felt in her coat pocket, which she admitted was drugs, specifically 700 grams. After being taken to a secluded area, Yusuff retrieved a plastic bundle containing a suspected narcotic from her girdle. She was arrested and read her Miranda rights. Yusuff was indicted for possession with intent to distribute 686 grams of heroin and filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing the search was unreasonable. The district court, however, found the officers' testimony credible and concluded that Yusuff had voluntarily consented to the search, denying her motion. Following this ruling, Yusuff pled guilty while reserving the right to appeal, arguing the court erred in finding her consent to the pat-down. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches, but searches conducted with voluntary consent are permissible.

A police encounter does not constitute a seizure merely because an officer approaches an individual and asks questions, as long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and continue their business. An encounter remains consensual and does not require reasonable suspicion unless it loses this consensual nature. A seizure occurs only when an officer uses physical force or displays authority that restrains a person's liberty. The determination of whether an encounter is voluntary is a factual inquiry based on the specific circumstances of each case. Factors influencing this assessment include whether the encounter took place in a public area, whether consent to speak was given, whether the individual was informed they were free to leave, if they were moved to another location, the presence of multiple officers or weapons, deprivation of essential documents, and the officers' tone of voice. Courts defer to trial judges' factual findings regarding consent, particularly when based on credibility. A trial judge's credibility assessments stand unless they involve testimony that is exceedingly improbable. In this case, the encounter occurred in a busy airport area, with officers maintaining distance, dressed in civilian clothing, and lacking any threatening demeanor or display of weapons. The officers communicated politely and informed Yusuff that she was not under arrest and was free to leave.

Yusuff, a Nigerian national residing in New York for over five years and fluent in English, contended that she did not understand her rights during police questioning. The trial court determined that the officers acted without intimidation and communicated politely. The district court, which assessed Yusuff's demeanor, concluded that her cultural background did not affect the voluntariness of her consent to a pat-down search, a finding deserving significant deference. 

Yusuff argued that inconsistencies between Officer Martin and Agent Stewart's testimonies warranted disregarding their accounts in favor of her claim of refusal for consent. The minor discrepancies in their wording were deemed insufficient to undermine their overall credibility, as both officers confirmed that Yusuff clearly consented to the search. In contrast, Yusuff claimed she explicitly denied consent. 

The district court resolved the conflicting testimonies by favoring the officers' credibility, a determination that is generally upheld on appeal. The court affirmed that Yusuff's encounter was consensual and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 

Regarding Miranda rights, the court explained that these rights must be advised only when a suspect is both in custody and under interrogation. Yusuff argued that her statement about drugs indicated she was in custody when Officer Martin felt a lump in her pocket, but the district court found she was not in custody at that moment, thus no Miranda warning was required.

The Seventh Circuit's standard of review for district court determinations regarding the necessity of Miranda warnings has been inconsistent but is clarified by recent Supreme Court rulings. The 'in custody' determination, based on factual findings, involves a mixed question of law and fact that typically allows for independent appellate review, as established in United States v. Hocking. However, there is a trend favoring clear error review for such mixed questions. Despite this, the court has not formally adopted clear error review for determining whether an interrogation is 'custodial.' Recent Supreme Court cases, namely Thompson v. Keohane and Ornelas v. United States, advocate for de novo appellate review once basic historical facts are established. These rulings challenge the Seventh Circuit's inclination toward clear error review. The court reaffirms the Hocking standard, asserting that determinations of 'custodial interrogation' warrant de novo review, while deferring to the district court on historical facts and credibility assessments. In assessing a case involving Yusuff, the court concludes that the trial court's determination of no 'custodial interrogation' during a consensual pat-down at O'Hare Airport stands, as the trial judge found the officers' testimony credible over Yusuff's claims.

Officer Martin's inquiry about a hard lump in Yusuff's pocket was deemed reasonable, as she was unaware it was drugs at the time. Her question did not transform the encounter into a custodial interrogation, as a reasonable person would not feel in custody after consenting to a brief pat-down in a crowded airport. Yusuff's claim of not feeling free to leave was attributed to her knowledge of the lump being heroin.

The district court based Yusuff's sentencing on 686 grams of heroin, resulting in a base offense level of 28. The court denied a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, citing Yusuff's perjury during the suppression hearing, where she falsely claimed she did not consent to the pat-down. Instead, the court increased her offense level by 2 for obstruction of justice, leading to a total offense level of 30 and a sentencing range of 97 to 120 months. The judge imposed a 97-month prison sentence followed by four years of supervised release.

The review of the district court's factual determinations is for clear error, while guideline interpretations are reviewed de novo. The guidelines allow for a two-level increase for willful obstruction during the proceedings, including committing perjury. Yusuff's testimony at the suppression hearing was found to conflict with that of Officer Martin and Agent Stewart, who stated she consented to the search. The district court found their testimony credible, concluding Yusuff committed perjury in an attempt to show a Fourth Amendment violation.

Yusuff's defense suggested cultural and language barriers affected her understanding of her rights, yet her assertion of explicitly refusing consent contradicted the officers' accounts. The judge's finding of perjury was upheld, consistent with precedents where conflicting testimony led to obstruction enhancements.

A two-level offense level reduction is permitted under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 if a defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility. However, if a defendant's conduct results in an enhancement for obstructing justice under § 3C1.1, this typically indicates a lack of acceptance of responsibility. The sentencing judge determined that Yusuff obstructed justice, disqualifying her from a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Yusuff claimed her case was extraordinary due to her cooperation with federal authorities and admission of guilt regarding heroin possession. Nonetheless, the court found that Yusuff's assertion of having refused consent for a search undermined her position, as it could render the search unconstitutional and the evidence inadmissible. The district court sided with the officers' version of events over Yusuff's conflicting testimony. Yusuff's situation did not meet the extraordinary threshold required for a reduction. The court affirmed Yusuff's conviction and sentence. Additionally, it addressed Yusuff's claims regarding the constitutionality of DEA procedures and inconsistencies in witness testimony, ultimately siding with the prosecution's version. The court also noted that the determination of whether Miranda warnings were necessary should be reviewed for clear error.