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Ming-Chu Chang Kang-Jye Chen Ching-Chieh Chang A.C.I. Trading Inc., and Fu-Nan Chen, Aka, George Chen v. Shu-Jen Tseng Chen, and Eugene Gabrych Marian Gabrych Eddie Lin, Aka, Eddy C. Lin, Aka, Chi-Chang Lin

Citations: 95 F.3d 27; 96 Daily Journal DAR 10915; 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6696; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 23321Docket: 94-55583

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; September 6, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

This case involves a lawsuit filed under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by a group of plaintiffs against several defendants. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision to dismiss the plaintiffs' second amended complaint without leave to amend. Subsequently, the defendants sought attorneys' fees, citing the RICO statute and an alleged contractual agreement. However, the court denied their request, emphasizing that RICO's section 1964(c) restricts fee recovery to prevailing plaintiffs only. The court explored the possibility of fee recovery through contractual agreements, noting that while RICO doesn't explicitly allow fee awards to prevailing defendants, such recovery isn't entirely precluded if supported by a contract. The contracts in question included clauses awarding fees to the prevailing party, but these were limited to disputes directly arising from the specific transactions they governed. As the RICO claim involved multiple contracts collectively and was not linked to any single transaction, the court concluded that the defendants were not entitled to fees under the contractual provisions. The ruling highlights the importance of the precise language within contractual agreements and its impact on the recovery of attorneys' fees in complex litigation involving statutory claims like RICO.

Legal Issues Addressed

Attorneys' Fees under RICO Section 1964(c)

Application: The court ruled that under RICO, only prevailing plaintiffs can recover attorneys' fees, and prevailing defendants cannot claim such fees unless authorized by another legal mechanism, such as a contract.

Reasoning: The Prevailing Defendants sought attorneys' fees but were denied such recovery under RICO's section 1964(c), which allows only prevailing plaintiffs to recover fees.

Contractual Agreements for Recovery of Attorneys' Fees

Application: The court determined that although RICO does not permit prevailing defendants to recover fees, such recovery is possible if an agreement between the parties exists. However, the contracts in question only permitted fee recovery for disputes arising from the specific transactions they governed.

Reasoning: The court noted that while RICO does not explicitly allow for fee awards to prevailing defendants, it does not preclude such recovery when authorized by other means, including contractual agreements.

Interpretation of 'Arising Out Of' Clauses in Contracts

Application: The court interpreted the 'arising out of' language in the contracts as covering both contract and tort actions but found it insufficient to support fee recovery for the broader RICO claim not tied to any single contract.

Reasoning: Each plaintiff was a party to one of these contracts, and the clause's 'arising out of' language is interpreted as encompassing both contract and tort actions, as established in relevant case law.

Limitations on Fee Recovery for RICO Claims

Application: The court held that since the RICO claim involved multiple contracts collectively and did not arise from any single contract, the defendants were not entitled to attorney fees based on the contractual provisions.

Reasoning: Since each plaintiff was associated with only one contract and the RICO claim did not arise from any single contract, the court denied the defendants' motions for attorney fees.