United States v. Clarence Jones Jr.

Citations: 91 F.3d 5; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 18877; 1996 WL 428976Docket: 943

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; August 1, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a district court's order dismissing with prejudice the indictment against Clarence Jones Jr., citing an abuse of discretion. The case originated from a bank robbery on August 29, 1990, where a man resembling Jones robbed a bank in Manhattan. Jones was arrested shortly after, approximately five blocks away, for threatening a driver with a gun; he was wearing similar clothing to the robber. Despite being released from custody, a fingerprint found at the bank was later matched to Jones in 1991. 

In 1992, while awaiting sentencing for a separate bank robbery conviction in Queens, Jones was indicted for the Manhattan robbery. The Southern District filed a detainer in the Eastern District, but Jones was not informed about it. On February 18, 1993, the day before his sentencing for the Queens robbery, both a Southern District Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) and an Eastern District AUSA notified Jones's defense attorney about the indictment. Jones was sentenced to 30 years on February 19, but his counsel did not respond to subsequent communications regarding the Southern District indictment, leading to the conclusion that Jones wished to delay proceedings until after his appeal.

In February 1994, Jones's conviction in Queens was overturned, leading to a remand for a new trial. The U.S. Attorneys from the Southern and Eastern Districts agreed that Jones would not be transferred to the Southern District, allowing his retrial in the Eastern District. In July 1994, this retrial resulted in a hung jury, followed by a bail hearing where the Eastern District AUSA noted a detainer from the Southern District. In November 1994, Jones was acquitted of firearms charges in the Eastern District and was then transferred to the Southern District for an initial appearance related to a Manhattan robbery indictment, which was 25 months old.

On January 30, 1995, Jones moved to dismiss the indictment due to excessive delay, which the court granted in May, citing the delay as excessive under the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b). The government contested this ruling, claiming the delay stemmed from Jones's multiple proceedings in the Eastern District. The court analyzed the situation using a four-factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo, concluding that the 25-month delay was solely the government’s negligence and that Jones had timely asserted his rights, despite no actual prejudice being demonstrated.

The court found that the lengthy delay was not solely attributable to the government, as Jones was engaged in various criminal proceedings in the Eastern District during that time. The court determined that delays arising from the defendant's involvement in other legal matters are considered neutral and not prosecutorial delay. It emphasized the impracticality of a defendant managing concurrent trials in different districts. Ultimately, the court concluded that the government acted in good faith by delaying the Southern District prosecution until the Eastern District matters were resolved, and thus, it reversed the dismissal of the indictment.

The district court attributed the delay in proceedings solely to government negligence, a conclusion with which the appellate court disagreed. The government acted promptly by filing a detainer within six days of Jones's indictment and communicating with his counsel shortly thereafter, inviting him to consider appearing in the Southern District. The appellate court criticized the district court for dismissing the notice to Jones's lawyer, arguing that as an agent and fiduciary, the lawyer was required to keep Jones informed, particularly since the Southern District indictment impacted decisions regarding his defense in the Eastern District.

Jones acknowledged awareness of the Southern District indictment prior to raising a Sixth Amendment claim during his November 1994 appearance, indicating that the delay was not solely due to government negligence. The prosecutors could reasonably assume that Jones preferred to resolve matters in the Eastern District first. The appellate court noted that a defendant's failure to assert the right to a speedy trial complicates proving a denial of that right.

Ultimately, the court found no prejudice resulting from the delay, suggesting it may have even benefited Jones by enhancing his chances in the Eastern District. Although the district court recognized a presumptive prejudice due to the 25-month delay, it held that Jones failed to demonstrate actual prejudice. While the delay could impair his ability to locate witnesses to support an alibi, the circumstances of his arrest—occurring near the robbery scene—likely undermined any alibi defense. The prosecution faced its own challenges, as the delay could weaken its case by affecting witness memory regarding Jones's arrest. Thus, the court concluded that delay could disadvantage both parties in different ways.

The district court indicated potential prejudice against Jones due to delays, particularly concerning eyewitness testimony related to the robbery on August 9, 1990. The government had previously attempted to have bank employees identify Jones through photographs, but the reliability of such identifications was questioned since the robber was disguised. Key evidence against Jones includes surveillance footage, his fingerprint at the bank, and police records placing him near the scene shortly after the robbery. The court identified a 12-month prosecutorial delay but found no compelling reasons such as bad faith or actual prejudice to justify dismissing the indictment with prejudice. Citing precedents where longer delays did not result in speedy-trial violations, the court concluded that the district court's dismissal was an abuse of discretion. No evidence supported that the government unnecessarily delayed the prosecution under Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the district court's order was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Additionally, defense counsel later discovered missing documents relevant to the case, and the government noted that Jones had since been convicted of other bank robbery offenses.