August Gonzales, as Administrator of the Estate of Timothy Bourgeois, Deceased v. Garner Food Services, Inc. Willis Corroon Administrative Services Corporation Willis Corroon Corporation of Georgia, Garner Fast Foods, Inc., American Association of Retired Persons (Aarp) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Eeoc) American Medical Association, American Public Health Association, American Foundation for Aids Research, Gay Men's Health Crisis American Civil Liberties Union, the Arc, Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, Inc., National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, National Association of People With Aids, National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems, National Minority Aids Council, Equal Employment Advisory Council, Amici Curiae
Docket: 95-8533
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; August 2, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
August Gonzales, as Administrator of Timothy Bourgeois' estate, appealed a district court's dismissal of his ADA Title I discrimination claim against Garner Fast Foods, Inc. (GFF) and Garner Food Services, Inc. (GFS). Gonzales alleged that GFS discriminated against Bourgeois by capping AIDS-related treatment coverage after his termination, which was motivated by GFS's desire to avoid future claims. Bourgeois, who had been diagnosed with AIDS, was discharged shortly after GFS learned of his condition. Following his termination, he continued his health insurance under COBRA but faced an amendment to the plan that limited AIDS-related treatment to $10,000 annually and $40,000 lifetime. Bourgeois exhausted these benefits before his death, leading to a denial of further claims totaling approximately $90,000. The district court's dismissal was reviewed for abuse of discretion, and legal conclusions were assessed de novo. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), effective July 26, 1992, prohibits disability discrimination by employers under Title I, which is not retroactive, meaning it applies only to actions taken after its effective date. The AIDS cap in question was implemented in October 1991, prior to the ADA's effectiveness, leading GFF to argue that the Appellant's claim is barred. The Appellant contends that the ongoing refusal to pay health benefits under the AIDS cap after the ADA's effective date constitutes a continuing violation of the Act. To establish a continuing violation, the Court must differentiate between the effects of a one-time violation and the ongoing nature of a violation.
The district court assumed that denying AIDS-related health care benefits post-ADA could be a continuing violation. GFF counters that the Appellant has not established a prima facie case of discrimination under Title I, which prohibits discrimination against a "qualified individual with a disability" (QID). A QID is defined as someone who can perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation. Although it is agreed that AIDS qualifies as a disability under the ADA, Bourgeois does not meet the QID definition since he was not employed by GFF at the time of the alleged discrimination, participating in the health plan solely as a former employee. The Appellant argues that since benefits are often realized post-employment, former employees should also be protected under the ADA, but does not contest Bourgeois's ineligibility as a QID.
The definitions of 'employee' and 'discriminate' within the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) do not support the Appellant's claims. The ADA defines 'employee' as an individual employed by an employer and outlines various forms of discrimination, including adverse classification based on disability, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, and the use of exclusionary employment criteria unless job-related and necessary. Legislative history indicates that the term 'essential functions' was included to ensure employers could require all employees, including those with disabilities, to perform essential job functions. Consequently, Title I protections are limited to individuals who can perform these essential functions.
The Appellant suggests that the ADA should be interpreted similarly to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination. However, while Title VII's general rule addresses discrimination regarding employment terms and privileges, legislative history indicates that Title I of the ADA incorporates definitions from Title VII, including 'employee.' The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has noted that the definitions in Title I are nearly identical to those in Title VII and should be interpreted similarly, with the exception of a specific Title VII provision concerning public officials not applicable to the ADA.
Appellant argues that the Title VII retaliation statute, while explicitly protecting only 'employees' and 'applicants for employment' from retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, has been interpreted by courts to include former employees. Citing Bailey v. USX Corp., the Appellant contends that a strict interpretation excluding former employees contradicts Title VII's remedial purpose. Support is drawn from EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., which expanded the term 'employee' to encompass former employees in cases related to employment discrimination. Appellant asserts that because Bourgeois' health benefits are linked to his prior employment, he should be able to pursue a claim for post-employment discrimination under Title VII and, by analogy, the ADA.
Additionally, Appellant references EEOC v. South Dakota Wheat Growers Ass'n, where a court ruled that discrimination related to the employment relationship remains unlawful even for former employees, affirming that an employer cannot discriminate in post-employment health insurance coverage. However, the court ultimately disagrees with Appellant’s position. It emphasizes that statutory language must be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning and that the ADA's text explicitly limits its protections to current employees and job applicants. The court finds no legislative intent indicating that former employees should be included under ADA protections.
Appellant fails to provide binding authority that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) protects former employees, with two exceptions noted where cases involve anti-retaliation claims under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The Court emphasizes that the interpretation of statutes should not be overly literal if it undermines their purpose, but in this instance, excluding former employees from ADA protections does not conflict with the Act's policies. The Court notes that allowing all disabled former employees to sue would nullify the Qualified Individual with a Disability (QID) requirement, which mandates that an individual must be able to perform essential job functions.
Appellant's alternative argument seeks to reinterpret the QID requirement based on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Under Section 504, a 'qualified handicapped individual' cannot face discrimination in federally funded programs. The Supreme Court, in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, defined an 'otherwise qualified person' as someone who can meet all program requirements despite their handicap, which the Court applied in denying relief to a nurse with a hearing disability.
Appellant argues that Bourgeois should be deemed 'qualified' under the ADA for health benefits based on this interpretation, rather than needing to be an active employee. However, the Court finds this analogy flawed, likening it to comparing apples to oranges. Although Appellant cites Modderno v. King to support their argument, where the court outlined the criteria for establishing a prima facie case under Section 504, the district court ultimately dismissed it for lack of evidence that the plaintiff was denied benefits solely due to their handicap.
The court declines to adopt the Modderno decision, stating it is not binding in their Circuit and disagreeing with its interpretation. The court criticizes the EEOC and Modderno for misinterpreting the Supreme Court's ruling in Davis regarding 'otherwise qualified handicapped individual' under Section 504, which they argue has led to the erroneous creation of a new category, ‘post-employment benefits recipient.’ Citing Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, the court explains that a handicapped individual must be capable of performing essential job functions with reasonable accommodation to be considered 'qualified' under Section 504. The Eighth Circuit determined that the relevant provision of Section 504 does not protect against discrimination related to employee benefits but rather pertains to access to services provided by health and welfare entities.
The court finds Bourgeois, a former employee, does not meet the definition of a 'qualified individual with a disability' under the ADA since he was neither a job applicant nor a current employee able to perform essential job functions. Consequently, the court affirms the denial of Bourgeois's motion for reconsideration. However, Circuit Judge Anderson dissents, arguing that the ADA should protect former employees and criticizing Garner Fast Foods, Inc. (GFF) for discharging Bourgeois to evade future health insurance claims during the ADA's phase-in period, which was intended to allow compliance with the new law. Anderson highlights GFF's actions as unlawful under the ADA, which took effect after Bourgeois's termination.
Bourgeois seeks reimbursement solely for medical expenses incurred after July 26, 1992, the effective date of the Act, and does not seek retroactive recovery for expenses incurred before this date. The court previously ruled that a continuing discriminatory health insurance policy represents an ongoing violation, with each week of denied coverage constituting a wrong. The majority acknowledges AIDS as a disability under the ADA and recognizes that employer-provided health benefits fall under the Act's anti-discrimination protections. However, the majority concludes that Bourgeois lost ADA protections upon termination, defining "employee" strictly as current employees and excluding former employees from the definition of "qualified individuals with a disability."
In dissent, it is argued that the statute's language does not limit protections to active employees or job applicants, using the broader term "individual," which encompasses former employees. The dissent emphasizes the statute's purpose of eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities, advocating for a liberal interpretation of remedial statutes to fulfill their objectives. The dissent references legislative history, case law, and administrative guidance to support this interpretation, asserting that the Act's intent is to provide comprehensive protection against discrimination for all individuals with disabilities, including those who are retired or no longer employed.
The Act provides protection for fringe benefits offered by employers, including pension and profit-sharing plans and health benefits, which typically extend to retirees and former employees. It is inferred that Congress intended for this protection to continue post-employment, as it would be illogical for benefits to cease at retirement, when they are meant to be utilized. The structure of the Act, its legislative history, and interpretive regulations suggest that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) should be interpreted similarly to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The ADA explicitly incorporates Title VII's powers and remedies, and shares similar language, including the definition of "employee." Legislative reports confirm that definitions from Title VII are adopted in the ADA. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines also state that the term "employee" under the ADA should align with its Title VII meaning. Courts interpreting the ADA often refer to Title VII for guidance, emphasizing the shared remedial purposes and congressional intent. Additionally, case law, such as Bailey v. USX Corp., supports the interpretation that former employees retain rights under Title VII, indicating a broader understanding of "employee" in alignment with Congressional objectives.
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990, intending to align its definition of "employee" with the established Title VII case law, which includes former employees. The ADA's text explicitly references Title VII, and legislative history indicates a clear intent to adopt the Title VII interpretation of "employee." The majority's attempt to differentiate between Bailey and retaliation cases lacks sufficient rationale, as both involve claims by former employees. The assertion that excluding former employees from retaliation claims is necessary for the effectiveness of anti-retaliation provisions is unconvincing, given that current employees can still pursue such claims without including former employees. Furthermore, the ADA explicitly refers to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which establishes a standard that should govern ADA interpretations. The Supreme Court's interpretation of "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" under the Rehabilitation Act emphasizes that individuals should not be excluded from federally funded programs solely due to their handicap. The precedent set in Modderno v. King addresses discrimination in health insurance fringe benefits under the Rehabilitation Act.
The court did not find that a limit on fringe benefits constituted discrimination under Section 504, but acknowledged that claims of discrimination in fringe benefits could be asserted. To establish a prima facie case under Section 504, a claimant must prove they are handicapped as defined by the Act, qualified for the federally supported program, and excluded solely due to their handicap. The discussion highlights that retirees and former employees are protected under the ADA based on a reasonable interpretation of the statute, which defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as one who can perform essential job functions. Retired employees, having already fulfilled their job responsibilities, are expected to meet only the requirements set by the fringe benefit plan, such as making elections and paying premiums. Fringe benefits are viewed as part of deferred compensation for past service. Discrimination based on stereotypes or assumptions about disability is not permissible; differences in treatment must be based on actual ability to perform job functions. The dissenting opinion argues that the majority misconstrues the statute's plain meaning and overlooks its intended purpose, legislative history, and relevant case law. The appellant sought relief under both Section 510 of ERISA and Section 504.
The district court dismissed the ERISA claim while considering the allegations in the Appellant's complaint as true under the motion to dismiss standard. COBRA, which amended ERISA, mandates that employers allow former employees to elect to continue health insurance coverage for up to 18 months post-termination. GFF denies liability, asserting that Bourgeois was employed solely by GFS and did not seek employment with GFF. The Appellant argues that GFF is liable under de facto merger and mere continuation theories due to its takeover of GFS operations, shared corporate governance, and assumption of GFS’s liabilities and health plan. However, the court refrains from addressing this issue because the Appellant is not entitled to relief under the ADA, thus GFF's potential liability as a successor is irrelevant. The dissent refers to a two-year phase-in period for compliance with the ADA but fails to provide supporting authority. It is acknowledged that GFS qualifies as an "employer" under the ADA. The term "individual" in the ADA is specifically defined and does not broadly apply as suggested by the dissent. The statute, legislative history, and regulations establish that employers cannot deny health insurance based on a person's disability. The dissent's argument that the term "employee" should include former employees contradicts the ADA's explicit language, which focuses on current employees and job applicants. The dissent also argues against the notion that protections for fringe benefits would terminate upon an employee's retirement or termination.
The document expresses disagreement with the dissent's assertion that former employees should be included under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) based on Title VII case law. It highlights a lack of clear legislative intent from Congress regarding the inclusion of former employees in ADA protections. The majority opinion notes that most Title VII cases recognizing former employees' status relate to retaliation claims, with only two cited exceptions, neither of which is binding or particularly persuasive. The dissent's argument that the anti-retaliation provision would sufficiently cover current employees without including former employees is countered by examples of retaliation claims filed by former employees, such as blacklisting and unfavorable references post-employment. The majority also critiques the dissent's interpretation of "essential functions" in the context of fringe benefits, emphasizing the legislative intent to ensure that all employees, including those with disabilities, can perform essential job functions. Lastly, the majority declines to remand a case regarding an individual's ability to perform essential job functions, despite arguments from the appellant.
Bourgeois was not considered a qualified individual under Title I of the ADA because he was neither a current employee nor a job applicant with GFF at the time of the alleged discriminatory act. Although the opinion does not preclude a former employee from seeking recourse for changes in health insurance benefits post-discharge, it clarifies there is no cause of action under the ADA for Bourgeois. The majority's view that the violation constitutes a continuing violation is rooted in binding precedent. The discussion highlights that while the ADA explicitly protects fringe benefits, the majority focuses on actions that constitute discrimination rather than the individuals protected by the Act. The EEOC guidelines, though not controlling, provide valuable insights for legal interpretations. Other non-retaliation Title VII cases have recognized protections for former employees concerning health benefits. The excerpt also mentions a specific change to a health plan limiting mental health benefits. The Eighth Circuit's decision in Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home is critiqued for overlooking substantial Title VII case law relevant to the ADA's legislative context. The author argues for a common-sense interpretation of the statute and references limited ADA case law addressing former employees, noting that some courts have ruled similarly to Beauford, failing to consider the broader implications of Title VII precedents.
