United States v. $30,000.00 in United States Currency
Docket: No. 00-5410, 00-5427
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; February 21, 2002; Federal Appellate Court
Atef Yousef Jaber and Wiam A. Younes, referred to as "Claimants," are appealing the civil forfeitures of $30,000 and $4,460, respectively, under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). They contest the denial of their motion to suppress evidence and the summary judgment favoring the Government, claiming that delays in the forfeiture process violated their due process rights. They seek dismissal of the forfeiture actions and the return of their seized currency, including interest and their bonds.
The case stems from an incident at the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport on January 20, 1998, where DEA officers stopped Jaber and Younes due to their suspicious travel arrangements. They had purchased round-trip tickets with cash shortly before departure and had no checked luggage. During questioning, Jaber initially provided a false name and claimed his substantial cash possession was meant for business opportunities, while Younes stated he had $4,600. Upon further inquiry, Jaber was found to be carrying cash in bank wrappers, and a criminal background check revealed Younes had a history of drug-related arrests. TFO Parker concluded he had probable cause to seize the money, suspecting it was derived from drug activities. The court ultimately reversed the prior ruling.
After Parker informed the Claimants of the money seizure, he sought consent to search them, which they granted. Parker discovered less than $100 in Jaber’s wallet, which he claimed as his own, and a small amount in Younes’ wallet. Parker returned the wallets and informed the Claimants that he would take the money to the airport police station for counting, offering them the chance to observe and receive receipts. The Claimants declined to attend and requested that the receipts be mailed. Following the incident, both men thanked Parker, which he found unusual given the circumstances.
Further investigation revealed multiple findings based on a DEA report:
1. Two counterfeit $100 bills were identified in Younes’ currency, totaling $4,460, while Jaber’s total was $30,000. The matter was referred to the Secret Service.
2. Local authorities confirmed Jaber's self-employment with no drug-related intelligence against him. Younes had previously been arrested for attempting to sell counterfeit drugs, but the charges were dropped after he agreed to cooperate with authorities.
3. An analyst from the El Paso Intelligence Center noted that Jaber was linked to a previous seizure of $34,460 and had submitted false identification details, though it was unclear if this information pertained to the Claimant or another individual.
4. While Columbus authorities had no intelligence on the Claimants, they noted that the city had become a source for pseudoephedrine, with individuals of Middle-Eastern descent traveling there for it.
5. Younes’ employer confirmed his tenure as a poker dealer and stated he could not have earned $90,000.
6. The National White Collar Crime Center found no records for Jaber and discrepancies in Younes’ provided social security number, revealing inconsistencies in his residential history.
7. The Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation indicated that Jaber had multiple addresses associated with family members, with no liens, judgments, or bankruptcy status.
These findings suggest potential connections to prior investigations but do not establish definitive criminal activity related to the Claimants.
A NADDIS check revealed that Jaber is identified as NADDIS-positive and has four aliases: Atef Abu Wassel Jaber, Atef Yousef Jaber, Atef Abu Jaber, and Sam Jaber. NADDIS records list an address for "Atef Jaber" at 1347 Heritage Court, Escondido, California, which does not match Jaber's known address and is associated with Ata Zalen Mohammed Dighlawi. Dighlawi has a criminal history, including three arrests for pseudoephedrine possession and a seizure of $116,764 at the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport in 1997, linked to drug trafficking. Further investigations connect Dighlawi to Body Dynamics, Inc., a source for precursor chemicals used in methamphetamine production. Dighlawi is also associated with Bob Younis Eliya, who was surveilled during a methamphetamine investigation.
Additionally, a TFO noted that Jaber's wife shares the maiden name Dighlawi, suggesting a familial connection. The DEA report indicated a trend of drug trafficking organizations utilizing individuals without criminal backgrounds to transport drugs and money, positing that Jaber fits this profile due to his lack of a criminal history despite his associations.
Claimants Jaber and Younes claimed lawful ownership of seized currency, asserting that the seizures were unlawful and violated various constitutional rights, citing racial motivations due to their Middle Eastern descent. Jaber provided sworn statements indicating his identity, residence, business operations, income, and lack of criminal history or involvement in illegal activities. He reported an income between $32,055 and $34,501 from 1995 to 1997, supplemented by cultural gifts, and maintained savings of $30,000. Jaber asserted that neither he nor his wife had ever been convicted of a crime or engaged in litigation, and that he had never bought or sold illegal substances.
Jaber detailed an encounter on January 20, 1998, explaining prior attempts to purchase a convenience store in California, which he could not afford. He mentioned learning from his uncle about lower-priced stores in Cleveland and Columbus and received a contact, Mr. Khuri, but did not disclose this name to officers due to fear of trouble. Jaber noted family members and Younes could support his claims, though no affidavits were provided. He inquired about a receipt four days post-incident and submitted documentation verifying his identity, including a marriage license and tax returns. Jaber admitted to lacking knowledge of business contacts in Columbus, acknowledged traveling under a different name, and consented to accompany officers to the Delta room, but denied consenting to a personal search. He also denied claims regarding the ownership of money he carried and knowledge of Younes' prior arrest for methamphetamine trafficking, as well as denying any prior interdiction at Dallas-Fort-Worth Airport.
Younes, in his responses, admitted to not knowing business contacts at the airport and consented to a personal search but denied agreeing to go to the Delta room. He acknowledged a previous arrest for attempting to sell methamphetamine but claimed he was not charged. Younes also clarified his employment status at the casino, stating he earned minimum wage at the time of the incident. The Government confirmed that Jaber had no criminal record and did not test the seized currency for narcotics due to its bank-wrapped condition. It identified three individuals associated with Jaber linked to methamphetamine trafficking, which included Jaber himself, Younes, and Dighlawi. Notably, neither Jaber nor Younes faced arrests or charges related to the seizures.
On January 20, 1998, currency was seized and sent to DEA headquarters for administrative forfeiture. Claimants filed sworn claims of ownership on April 6, 1998, prompting the referral to the United States Attorney for civil forfeiture proceedings, which began on June 10, 1998. The court found probable cause for the seizures on June 26, 1998, issuing a Warrant of Arrest In Rem for the currency. Claimants contested the seizures and forfeitures, engaging in discovery and subsequently moving to suppress evidence and for summary judgment. They argued there was no probable cause for the seizures, claiming the officers had only a suspicion of wrongdoing, and noted that the currency was not contraband or evidence of a crime at the time of seizure. They also contended that the five-week delay in initiating forfeiture proceedings constituted a denial of due process. The Government sought summary judgment, asserting that the Claimants could not prove their currency was not involved in drug trafficking and relied on the Warrant of Arrest In Rem to establish probable cause. In response, Claimants argued that the Government's reliance on the initial probable cause finding was insufficient for the forfeiture. After a hearing, the district court granted the Government's motion for summary judgment and denied the Claimants' motions. The legal framework underscored that seizure, arrest warrant in rem, and forfeiture proceedings are governed by different legal standards. Specifically, while lack of probable cause for a seizure may lead to the return of property, it does not terminate forfeiture proceedings. Conversely, failure to establish probable cause for forfeiture prevents it entirely. The Government's generic discussion of probable cause and the court's failure to separately evaluate the two cases were deemed improper under relevant legal precedents, particularly United States v. One 1974 Learjet 24D.
The court reviews district court factual findings on suppression issues for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. A warrantless seizure requires the government to establish probable cause, which is defined as reasonable grounds to believe the item seized is contraband or evidence of a crime, supported by more than mere suspicion. Each piece of evidence must be evaluated in the aggregate to determine probable cause. Since currency is not inherently contraband, the government must demonstrate probable cause that the currency was evidence of criminal activity. Although drug profiles can provide a basis for suspicion, they should not be overly relied upon due to their potential association with legal behavior.
In this case, the district court treated the seizure as non-consensual due to uncertainty about consent and found probable cause based on three types of evidence: the drug courier profile, details from an interview at a coffee shop, and information from a subsequent interview in the Delta room. The court noted that the Claimants fit the drug profile by traveling from a drug source city and paying for tickets in cash shortly before the flight. During the coffee shop interview, it was revealed that one Claimant was using a false name, both carried large amounts of cash, and they could not adequately explain their business purpose. Evidence from the Delta room indicated a positive NADDIS history and inconsistencies in the Claimants' explanations regarding the source of their cash, establishing probable cause for the seizure.
The Claimants contended that there was only suspicion of criminal activity, arguing for the exclusion of evidence due to lack of probable cause. Conversely, the government maintained that probable cause existed, citing additional factors such as the timing of their return flight and lack of checked luggage. The government also noted that one Claimant claimed the cash belonged to his brother and concealed it in multiple locations. However, the court found these factors unremarkable and emphasized that the government failed to adequately address probable cause at the time of the seizure, despite later asserting it through an ex parte Warrant for Arrest In Rem.
Younes was not reasonably suspected of criminal activity at the time of currency seizure since he traveled under his own name, provided valid identification, acknowledged carrying nearly $5,000 in cash, and stated it was his personal money. His lack of checked luggage was unremarkable due to his same-day return flight. Although he traveled from a known drug city, this is common across major cities, and he had a plausible explanation for his cash. Initial inquiries revealed he claimed an annual income of $90,000, which was later contradicted by evidence of minimum wage earnings; however, this subsequent information could not justify the seizure. The only notable issues were his negative response regarding past arrests and a prior NADDIS history of an arrest for methamphetamine, which did not indicate any convictions. Although his ticket purchase with cash and short notice raised some suspicion, no law mandates ticket purchases be made with credit cards or in advance. His travel under his own name contradicted typical drug courier behavior, as he had no contraband at the time of the seizure, and counterfeit bills were discovered later. Overall, the circumstances suggested only an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion," lacking reasonable suspicion or probable cause, paralleling previous case law.
Jaber's situation presented more complexity as he traveled under a false name but provided identification and claimed he was using his brother's ticket. His explanation was questioned due to inconsistencies, such as his brother's inability to use the ticket because of a funeral, raising suspicions about his identity and intent.
Jaber acknowledged possessing a large sum of cash, claiming it belonged to his brother, which raised suspicion about carrying someone else's money while traveling. He removed the money from his business suit and one sock, but the manner of carrying $30,000 did not appear highly suspicious overall. Despite the oddity of carrying cash in a sock, it was not concealed in a way that indicated illicit intent, as it was in bank wrappers, suggesting recent withdrawal. Jaber's explanations for the money's intended use were deemed implausible; he expressed interest in purchasing a business unrelated to his current job and claimed not to know anyone in Columbus, contributing to suspicion, especially given the substantial amount of cash not belonging to him. Although Jaber was not found to be involved in drug-related activities, the combination of circumstances raised some suspicion. However, there was no specific evidence linking him to drug trade activities. The presence of a companion with a drug-related arrest history did not substantiate probable cause for the currency's seizure, as the companion's behavior was otherwise ordinary. The court concluded that there was no probable cause for the warrantless seizure of the cash.
Regarding the legal standards for summary judgment, the court reviews grants de novo and denials for abuse of discretion, which occurs if the lower court relies on clearly erroneous facts or misapplies the law. Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The non-moving party must provide specific facts to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial when a motion for summary judgment is supported by admissible evidence.
Substantive law defines material factual disputes and assesses their genuineness by evaluating whether evidence presents enough disagreement to warrant jury submission or is so one-sided that one party must win as a matter of law. The evidence favoring the non-movant must be accepted, with all reasonable inferences drawn in their favor. Property can be forfeited under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) if it is connected to controlled substances, either as payment, proceeds from such transactions, or as tools to facilitate drug trafficking. Probable cause for forfeiture requires reasonable belief of guilt, surpassing mere suspicion but not reaching prima facie proof. This determination considers information available at the time of forfeiture, including insights from subsequent investigations. Once probable cause is established by the government, the burden shifts to the claimant to demonstrate innocent ownership.
In this case, the district court found that the government's evidence supported a probable cause finding for forfeiture, linking the claimants to drug activities through Younes's arrest and associations with known drug dealers. The court ruled that the claimants did not prove innocent ownership or provide a legitimate, non-drug-related source for the funds. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The claimants contended that the government failed to establish probable cause, while the government maintained it met its burden, thereby justifying the summary judgment. The investigation revealed no new evidence against Younes beyond what was known at seizure, and potential links to other individuals did not establish a direct connection to Younes as an alias.
Similarity of names alone is insufficient to establish a connection to illegal activity, particularly when the Government does not assert that the names refer to the same individual and lacks additional evidence to support such an inference. Records indicate that neither Dighlawi nor Eliya were charged or convicted of drug offenses, nor was the currency seized from Dighlawi successfully forfeited. The only link to drug trafficking is Younes’ arrest in California, for which he was not charged or convicted. The Government's case relies on speculation regarding the forfeiture action.
This case bears similarities to *$53,082*, where the government could not prove probable cause for forfeiture despite the individuals involved traveling between known drug activity locations with cash. Similarly, in *United States v. 5,000 in U.S. Currency*, the government had a stronger case but still faced challenges, leading to a reversal of summary judgment in its favor. In this instance, the Government's claims about Younes only suggest suspicion of involvement in a drug transaction, which does not meet the probable cause standard.
Regarding Claimant Jaber, the situation is more complex. Although the Government attempted to establish connections to drug trafficking by the time of the forfeiture proceedings, it acknowledged that Jaber lacked a criminal record and that local authorities had no drug-related intelligence on him. The purported links to drug trafficker Dighlawi stem from questionable connections, including Jaber's wife's maiden name, which contradicts evidence from a marriage certificate, and an address match for another individual named Atef Jaber. Thus, the Government's assertions regarding Jaber's involvement are undermined by insufficient and disputed evidence.
An address linked to Jaber appears in no other databases and does not match any official documents associated with him. NADDIS records indicate that Dighlawi was arrested three times and that currency was seized, but there are no charges or convictions against him, nor evidence of forfeiture of the seized currency. Although Dighlawi may be connected to the illegal drug trade, his ties to a legal pharmaceutical company do not substantiate a link between Jaber and drug trafficking, especially since Jaber's travel to Columbus does not imply involvement in illicit activities. The alleged connections between Dighlawi, Eliya, and drug trafficking do not support a link to Jaber, as Eliya has not been shown to be an alias for Claimant Younes, nor has he faced drug-related charges. Additionally, the EPIC report lacks concrete evidence linking Jaber to drug trafficking, relying instead on weak inferences that have been dismissed by the Government's own arguments. Evidence suggesting Jaber may have submitted false identification is insufficient to prove drug trafficking involvement. Travel with Younes, who has a drug offense arrest, does not substantiate Jaber's connection to drug trafficking either. The Government's case is based on mere speculation without sufficient evidence to establish probable cause linking Jaber to drug trafficking, thus entitling him to judgment as a matter of law and rendering the Government's motion for summary judgment inappropriate.
Claimants also argue that a five-month delay in filing forfeiture complaints violated their due process rights. Although civil forfeiture must be initiated promptly under 21 U.S.C. § 881(b), the court found that the delay did not constitute a denial of due process, referencing precedents that have upheld longer delays without due process violations.
A twenty-nine month delay in the legal proceedings was deemed not unreasonable. The case references prior findings where a ten-month delay was significant but also not unreasonable. The court reversed and remanded the case to the district court to enter judgment favoring the Claimants and ordered the immediate return of seized currency to them. An affidavit clarified that Younes was correctly identified as NADDIS-positive, rather than Jaber, who was incorrectly noted in earlier reports in connection with $34,460.00 seized after the Claimants' stop in January 1998. The Government conceded during oral arguments that Jaber was not the individual apprehended at the airport, and the aliases listed were not present in the report. The Government's assertion that the currency was detained based on probable cause related to drug trafficking was challenged, as it implied a lack of consent from the Claimants. The court found issues with the Government’s characterization of Columbus as a supply city for drug precursors, noting that the relevant information was derived from subsequent investigations rather than evidence at the time of seizure. This raised concerns about the justification for seizing assets based on individuals who had no criminal history. Jaber disputed claims regarding ownership of the money. The district court favored the officer's affidavit in its decision to suppress evidence, and the appellate court upheld the district court's credibility assessment.
